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1st STEP 22 APRIL 
2<* STEP 16 MAY 




The East-Central Front 




Historical Branch, G-3 
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps 
Washington, D. C, 1962 

U. S. Marine Operations in Korea 
Volume I, "The Pusan Perimeter" 
Volume II, "The Inchon-Seoul Operation" 
Volume III, "The Chosin Reservoir Campaign" 

Library of Congress Catalogue Number: 55-60727 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington 25, D,C. — Price $2.25 (cloth) 


A ME RICANS everywhere will remember the inspiring conduct of 
l\_ Marines during Korean operations in 1950. As the fire brigade 
of the Pusan Perimeter, the assault troops at Inchon, and the heroic 
fighters of the Chosin Reservoir campaign, they established a record 
in keeping with the highest traditions of their Corps. No less praise- 
worthy were the Marine actions during the protracted land battles 
of 1951, the second year of the Korean "police action." 

The 1st Marine Division, supported wherever possible by the 1st 
Marine Aircraft Wing, helped stem the flood of the Chinese offensive 
in April. Then lashing back in vigorous and successful counterattack, 
the Marines fought around the Hwachon Reservoir to the mighty 
fastness of the Punchbowl. The Punchbowl became familiar terrain 
to Marines during the summer of 1951, and the Division suffered 
its heaviest casualties of the year fighting in the vicinity of that aptly 
named circular depression. 

The fighting waxed hot, then cold, as the truce teams negotiated. 
They reached no satisfactory agreement, and the fighting again intensi- 
fied. Finally, after a year of active campaigning on Korea's east-central 
front, the Marines moved west to occupy positions defending the 
approaches to the Korean capital, Seoul. 

The year of desperate fighting, uneasy truce, and renewed combat 
covered by this volume saw the operational employment of a Marine- 
developed technique — assault by helicopter-borne troops. Tactics were 
continually being refined to meet the ever changing battle situation. 
However, throughout the period, the one constant factor on which 
United Nations commanders could rely was the spirit and professional 
attitude of Marines, both regular and reserve. This is their hallmark 
as fighting men. 

David M. Shoup 
General, U. S. Marine Corps, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, 

Reviewed and Approved 20 Nov 1961. 



THIS is THE FOURTH in a series of five volumes dealing with the 
operations of United States Marines in Korea during the period 
2 August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Volume IV presents in detail the 
operations of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 
the former while operating under Eighth Army control and also as 
■art of IX Corps and X Corps, USA, and the latter while controlled 
* the Fifth Air Force. 

The period covered in this volume begins in the latter part of 
December 1950, when the Division rested in the Masan "bean patch," 
a «d continues through the guerrilla hunt, the Punchbowl fighting, 
and all other operations during 1951. The account ends when the 
Marines move to positions in the west during March 1952. 

Marines did not fight this war alone; they were a part of the huge 
Eighth United States Army in Korea. But since this is primarily a 
Marine history, the actions of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force 
are presented only sufficiently to place Marine operations in their 
proper perspective. 

Many participants in the fighting during this period have generously 
contributed to the book by granting interviews, answering inquiries, 
and commenting on first draft manuscripts. Their assistance was 
invaluable. Although it was not possible to use all the plethora of 
detailed comments and information received, the material will go 
into Marine Corps archives for possible use and benefit of future 

The manuscript of this volume was prepared during the tenure of 
Colonel Charles W. Harrison, Major Gerald Fink, and Colonel 
William M. Miller as successive Heads of the Historical Branch. Pro- 
duction was accomplished under the direction of Colonel Thomas G. 
*°e. Major William T. Hickman wrote some of the preliminary drafts 
and did much valuable research and map sketching. Dr. K. Jack Bauer 
and Mrs. Elizabeth Tierney assisted the authors in research, and Mr. 
j ^ urna n R. Strobridge assisted in proofreading and preparing the 

To the Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, as well as Marine 
officers and NCOs, who submitted valuable comments and criticisms 
ot preliminary drafts, thanks are also extended. These suggestions 
added to the accuracy and details of the text. Additional assistance 
w as rendered by personnel of the Office of the Chief of Military His- 



tory, Department of the Army; the Division of Naval History, Depart- 
ment of the Navy; and the Historical Division, Department of the 
Air Force. 

The exacting administrative duties involved in processing the vol- 
ume from first draft manuscripts through the final printed form were 
ably managed by Miss Kay P. Sue. All manuscript typing was done 
expertly by Mrs. Miriam R. Smallwood. 

The maps contained in this volume were prepared by the Repro- 
duction Section, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia, and the 
Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps. Official Department 
of Defense photographs were used. 

The Marine Corps mourns the passing of the prime author of this 
series and other admirable works of Marine Corps and military history. 
Lynn Montross, after a lengthy illness, died on 28 January 196 1. 

H. W. Buse, Jr. 
Brigadier General, U, S. Marine Corps, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3. 



I Interlude at Masan 1 

Return to the Bean Patch— 1st Murine Division in EUSAK 
Reserve— General Ridgway New EUSAK Commander — 
Ridgway's Declaration of Faith — Marine Personnel and 
Equipment Shortages — Marine Air Squadrons in Action— The 
Air Force System of Control— X Corps Conference at Kyongju 

H The CCF January Offensive 21 

UN Forces Give Ground — Further Eighth Army With- 
drawals — Marine Aircraft in the Battle— 1st Marine Division 
Assigned Mission — Replacements by Air and Sea — The Move 
to Japanese Airfields— Red China's "Hate America" Cam- 
paign—A Tactical Formula for Victory 

HI The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 41 

The New Marine Zone of Operations — 1st MAW Moves to 
Bofu — Marine Rice Paddy Patrols— Operations Thunder- 
bolt and Roundup — Action in the Pohang- Andong Zone — 
KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division— 10th NKPA 
Division Scattered — New Mission for the Marines 

•V Operation Killer 59 

The Move to the Chung ju Area — -Marine Planes in Action — 
Planning for the New Operation— The Jump-Off on 21 Febru- 
ary—Stiffening of Chinese Resistance— General Smith in 
Command of IX Corps— The Advance to Phase Line Ari- 
zona— JOC Air Control System Criticised 

¥ Operation Ripper . 79 

Light Resistance the First Day— Seoul Abandoned by Enemy- 
Second Phase of the Operation — Changes in 1st MAW Units 
—General MacArthur Visits Marine Battalion— 1st KMC 
Returns to Division— 38th Parallel Recrossed by Marines- 
Renewal of Division's CAS Problems 

VI The CCF Spring Offensive 99 

Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive— Hwachon Occupied by 
KMC Regiment — CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine Flank — 



Com ems 


Marine Air in Support Everywhere — Plugging the Gap on the 
Marine Left — Repulse of Communist Attacks — Withdrawal 
to the Kansas Line — Enemy Stopped in IX Corps Sector — 
1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps 

VII Advance to the Punchbowl 127 

Plan to Cut Off Communists — Initial Marine Objectives Se- 
cured — MAG— 1 2 Moves to K— 46 at Hoengsong— Fight of the 
5th Marines for Hill 610 — 1st MAW in Operation Strangle 
— KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack— 1st Marines Move 
up to drown Line — 7th Marines Committed to Attack 

Communists Ask for Truce Talks — Patrol Bases on badger 
Line— Red Herrings at Kaesong — 1st Marine Division in 
Reserve— Marine Helicopters Take the Lead — Marine Body 
Armor Tested in Korea — MAG-12 Moves to K-18— The 
Division Back in Action Again 

Crossing the Soyang in Flood — Light Resistance at First- 
Supply Problems Cause Delay — Resumption of Division At- 
tack — The Mounting Problem of CAS — First Helicopter Sup- 
ply Operation of History— The Fight for Hill 749— 5th 
Marines Attack Hill 812— The Struggle for the "Rock" 

X The New Warfare of Position 199 

Sectors of Major eusak Units — Statement by General Van 
Fleet— Hill 854 Secured by 3/1— Helicopter Troop Lift to 
Hill 884 — Helicopter Operation blackbird — "To Organize, 
Construct, and Defend"— Marine Operations of November 
1951 — The Second Marine Christmas in Korea 

XI Winter Operations in East Korea 227 

Ambush Patrol on New Year's Eve — Marine Raid in Company 
Strength — Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command 
— Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated — 500 Armored Vests 
Flown to Korea— Helicopter Operations mule train and 
changie-changie— The Five Days of Operation clam-up 

XII The Move to West Korea 247 

Truce Talks — Tactical Innovations — The Marines in Opera- 

VIII The Truce Talks at Kaesong . 

IX Renewal of the Attack . 




A Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 263 

B Effective Strength of 1st Marine Division 267 

C Command and Staff List 269 

D Unit Citations 315 

Bibliography 319 

Index 325 




Sixteen-page sections of photographs following pages 86 and 21^. 

Maps and Sketches 


1 Korea as a Battlefield 4 

2 EUSAK Dispositions, December 1950 9 

3 Combat Air Bases 16 

4 eusak Front Lines, January 1951 23 

5 Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 43 

6 Operation killer 61 

7 Area Gained, February-March 1951 77 

8 Operation RIPPER Plan 82 

9 Operation ripper Zone 87 

10 CCF Offensive, April 1951 110 

11 Actions of 1/1 and 3/1, April 1951 112 

12 Night of 16-17 May 1951 124 

13 Drive to Yangu, May 1951 129 

14 X Corps Routes of Advance, May-June 1951 . , . . . 139 

15 1st Marine Division Zone of Action, June-July 1951 .... 140 

16 1st MAW Operating Area, May-July 1951 145 

17 1st Marine Division Area, September 1951 174 

18 X Corps Zone of Action, September 1951 , 177 

19 eusak Dispositions, September 1951 200 

20 1st Marine Division Situation, September 1951 .... . 205 

21 HMR-161 Operations 1951 209 

22 eusak Dispositions, March 1952 252 




Interlude at Masan 

Return to the Bean Patch — 1st Marine Division in eusak 
Reserve — General Ridgway New eusak Commander — 
Ridgway's Declaration of Faith — Marine Personnel and 
Equipment Shortages — Marine Air Squadrons in Action — 
The Air Force System of Control — X Corps Conference 

at Kyongju 

ANEW chapter in Korean operations began for the 1st Marine 
Division at 1800 on 16 December 1950 with the opening of the 
CP at Masan. By the following afternoon all units of the Division 
nacl arrived from Hungnam with the exception of VMO-6 and small 
groups of such specialists as the amphibian tractor troops left behind 
to assist with the redeployment of remaining X Corps elements to 
south Korea. 

The 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were 
separated for the first time since the Inchon landing. VMF-3U, the 
new Panther jet squadron, was flying from K-9, an Air Force field 
near Pusan. Operating together as an all-Marine carrier group taking 
part m the Hungnam redeployment were the three Corsair squadrons: 
VMF-212 on the CVL (light carrier) Bataan; VMF-214 on the 
CVE Sicily; and VMF-323 on the CVE Badoeng Strait. The two 
Japan-based night fighter squadrons, VMF(N)-542 and VMF(N)- 
513, flying from Itazuke, patrolled the skies between Japan and Korea, 

VMO-6, the observation squadron, consisting of helicopters and 
Or fixed -wing planes, was attached to various ships of the Seventh 
yeet fur rescue missions when pilots were forced into the sea. A 
detachment of Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron- 1 
(MGCIS-l) and the entire Air Defense Section of Marine Tactical 


The East-Central Front 

Air Control SquacIron-2 (MTACS-2) were also attached to the 
warships. They assisted in the control of hundreds of planes that 
flew over the Hung nam beachhead daily in support of the final stages 
of the X Corps evacuation. 

The three Marine Corsair squadrons on the Sicily, Badoeng Stfait, 
and Balaan represented the entire air strength of Escort Carrier Task 
Group (TG) 96.8, commanded by Rear Admiral Richard N. Ruble. 
Each squadron came directly under the operational command of 
the ship on which it had embarked. Supply, engineering, ordnance, 
billeting, and messing were of course provided through naval chan- 
nels. The only relationship of the squadrons to their parent organiza- 
tion, MAG-33, derived from the administration of personnel and 
the storage of equipment at Itami. 

Return to the Bean Patch 

Masan, the new Division assembly area, was located about 27 air 
miles and 40 road miles west of Pusan on the Bay of Masan, which 
indents the southern coast of the peninsula (Map 1). In order to 
prepare for the arrival of the Division, Brigadier General Edward A. 
Craig, the assistant division commander (ADC), had flown from 
Hungnam with the advance party on 12 December to make necessary 

The small seaport, which skirts the bay for about two and a half 
miles, was untouched by the war as compared to the ravaged towns 
of northeast Korea. It had a protected anchorage, dock facilities, and 
good rail and road communications. There was an air strip at 
Chinhae, a few miles to the southeast. 

Some sort of cycle seemed to have been completed by veterans of the 
5th Marines when they found themselves back again in the familiar 
surroundings of the Bean Patch on the northern outskirts of Masan. 
This large, cultivated field is entitled to capital letters because of 
its historical distinction as bivouac area of the 1st Provisional Marine 
Brigade after the battle of the Naktong in August 1950. Barely 
four months had passed since that hard fight, but a great deal more 
history had been made during the combats of the Inchon-Seoul and 
Chosin Reservoir operations. 

Interlude at Masdu 

There was room enough in the Bean Patch for all three infantry 
regiments. Headquarters, the 11th Marines, the 1st Signal, 1st Tank, 
1st Amtrac, 1st Ordnance, and 1st Motor Transport Battalions were 
located on the southern outskirts of town along with the 43 Inde- 
pendent Commando, Royal Marines. The 1st Combat Service Group, 
the MP Company, and the 1st Service, 1st Shore Party, and 1st 
Engineer Battalions occupied the dock area of Masan proper, A large 
building in the center of town housed the Division hospital, and the 
7th Motor Transport Battalion was assigned to the Changwon area, 
four miles to the northeast.' 

Peaceful as the surroundings may have seemed to troops who had 
just completed the 13-day running fight of the Chosin Reservoir 
Breakout, the Chidi San mountain mass some 50 miles northwest of 
Masan had been for many years the hideout of Korean bandits and 
outlaws. The Japanese had never been able to clear them out, and 
the Republic of Korea had met with no better success. After the 
outbreak of civil war, they made some pretense of aiding the Com- 
munist cause but were actually preying upon the ROK army and 
police for arms, food, clothing, and other loot. Operating in prowling 
bands as large as 50 or 60 men, the guerrillas were well armed with 
nfles, machine guns, and at times even mortars. 

In order to assure the safety both of its own bivouac areas and the 
v <tal port of Masan, Division promptly initiated measures to maintain 
surveillance over a broad belt of countryside which described an arc 
from Chinju, some 40 miles west of Masan, around to Changwon 
(Map i). The infantry and artillery regiments and the Division 
Reconnaissance Company were all assigned subsectors of this se- 
curity belt. Daily motor patrols of not less than platoon strength 
w ere to be conducted in each subsector for the purpose of gaining 
^formation about the roads and the guerrillas as well as discouraging 
their activities." As it proved, however, no hostile contacts were made 
b y the Marines during the entire Masan interlude. The guerrillas 
preferred to restrict their attention to the local police and civilian 

This section is based cm 1st Marine Division (IstMarDiv) Historical Diary (ND), 
c 50, 1-12; Ma j Gen O, P, Smith, Nf'h'i on the Opt rations uj the lit Murine Division 
WHIto the First Nine Month of the KOMtH) 9>ttt (hereafter Smith, Notts), 1239- 
aiL ilnd B ri£Gen E. A. Craig. Comments, A Jun 57, 
CG IstMarDtv FragO, 1515, 1H Dec 50. 

Interlude at Masan 


1st Marine Division in eusak Reserve 

At 2240 on the 18th a dispatch from Major General Edward M. 
Almond, USA, commanding general of X Corps, informed the 1st 
Marine Division that it had passed to the operational control of the 
Eighth Army. 8 

Major General Oliver P. Smith reported in one of his first dis- 
patches to EUSAK that the Marines had received fresh rations on only 
three days since landing in Korea, The Division commander invited 
attention to the importance of building up the physical condition of 
m en who had lost weight during the Chosin Reservoir operation. 
An information copy went to Commander Nava! Forces, Far East, 
(ComNavFE), who reacted promptly by ordering a refrigeration ship 
to Masan with 50,000 rations of turkey. The G-4 of eusak also 
responded with fresh rations from time to time until the Marines, in 
the words of General Smith, "had turkey coming out of their ears." * 

Games of Softball and touch football became popular in the crisp, 
invigorating weather as the men rapidly recuperated from fatigue and 
nervous tension. A series of shows was put on by troupes of U.S. 
Army and Korean entertainers, and the U.S. Navy sent Christmas 
trees and decorations. 

The first Christmas in Korea was observed with a memorable 
display of holiday spirit by men who had cause to be thankful. A 
choir from the 5th Marines serenaded Division Headquarters with 
carols on Christmas Eve, and all the next day the commanding general 
and ADC held open house for staff officers and unit commanders. 6 

The United States as a whole rejoiced over the news that the last 
of 105,000 X Corps troops had embarked from Hungnam on 24 De- 
cember without a single life being lost as a result of enemy action, 
President Truman spoke for the Nation when he sent this message to 
General MacArthur: 

Wish to express my persona) thanks to you, Admiral Joy, General Almond, 
and all your brave men for the effective operations at Hungnam. This saving 
of our men in this isolated beachhead is the best Christmas present I have 
ever had. 

' Smith C N PS mSS 4? ' 4 292, 18 DCC 50 ; EUSAK mSg GX_3529lKKGt)0 > 19 Dec 30 ' 
"The remaindet ofthis settion is based upon Smith, Notes, 1264-1274. 


The East-Central Front 

Photographers and press correspondents flocked to Masan during 
the holiday season for pictures and interviews about various aspects 
of the Chosin Reservoir campaign. Among them was Captain John 
Ford, USNR, a successful motion picture director who had been 
recalled to active duty to make a documentary film depicting the role 
of the Navy and Marine Corps in Korea. He used scenes in the 
Masan area for background material, 

General Smith was informed that a motion picture company in- 
tended to produce a feature film entitled "Retreat, Hell," based on a 
remark attributed to him, "Retreat, Hell, we are just attacking in a 
different direction!" When asked if these actually were his words, 
the Division commander had a diplomatic answer. He said that he had 
pointed out to correspondents at Hagaru that the drive to Hamhung 
was not a typical withdrawal or retreat, and thus "the statement 
attributed to me described my thinking, that of my staff and unit 
commanders, and my situation." 

During the Masan interlude Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, USAR, 
arrived as a representative of the Operations Research Office of Johns 
Hopkins University, which had been employed on military research 
projects by the Far East Command. Marshall, a well-known military 
analyst who had written several books about World War II opera- 
tions, based his studies on personal interviews with scores of par- 

The researcher was given a free hand at Masan. Aided by a 
stenographer, he interviewed officers and men from privates to com- 
manding general. The resulting thousands of words went into a 
classified report entitled, "CCF in the Attack (Part II), A Study 
Based on the Operations of the IstMarDiv in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, 
Yudam-ni area, 20 November-10 December 1950." 

General Ridgway New eusak Commander 

Shortly after arrival at Masan, General Smith called a conference of 
unit commanders and emphasized that their task was to re-equip, 
resupply, repair and rehabilitate, Officers and men of replacement 
drafts were to be integrated and given unit training as soon as possible. 
Both veterans and newcomers were soon training in regimental areas 

Interlude at Masati 7 

assigned by Colonel Alpha L. Bowser, the Division G-3, who arranged 
for a 200-yard rifle range and a mortar range. 

On 23 December came the news that Lieutenant General "Walton H. 
Walker, the Eighth Army commander, had been killed in a jeep 
accident. His successor, Lieutenant General Matthew B, Ridgway, 
USA, had commanded the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps in Europe 
during the final operations of World War II. Commencing his flight 
from Washington on the 24 th, he landed at Tokyo just before mid- 
night on Christmas day. 

The new commander's task was made more difficult by the fact that 
the Korean conflict, at the end of its first six months, had become 
probably the most unpopular military venture of American history, 
both at the front and in the United States. From a mere "police 
action" at first, the struggle soon developed into a major effort in 
which the national pride suffered humiliations as a consequence of 
military unpreparedness. Far from building up the morale of the 
troops, letters and newspapers from home too often contributed to 
the doubts of men who asked themselves these questions: 

"Why are we here? And what are we fighting for?" 

Some of the answers were scarcely reassuring. It was insinuated, 
for instance, that Americans were fighting "to make South Korean 
real estate safe for South Koreans." 

"I must say in all frankness," commented General Ridgway in his 
memoirs, "that the spirit of the Eighth Army as I found it on my 
arrival gave me deep concern. There was a definite air of nervousness, 
°f gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of apprehension as to 
what the future held. There was much 'looking over the shoulder' 
as the soldiers say." 7 

„ Th ese criticisms were not applicable to the 1st Marine Division. 

Our men were in high spirits and busily engaged in getting ready to 
fight again," commented Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, ADC. 

In my travels around the various units of the Division, and in talking 
™ the men, I never even once noticed any air of nervousness or appre- 
hension. . . . When General Ridgway visited the Division at Masan 
»e made a tour of the entire camp area and observed training and 
general arrangements. He stated that he was quite satisfied with the 

RiJ Gtn W - B - R 'dgway as told to H. M. Martin, Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. 
§**g* 1556), 196-211, hereafter Ridgway, Memoirs, 

&%540 0-62-2 


The East-Central Front 

1st Marine Division and its quick comeback after the Chosin 
fighting ." 8 

General Ridgway learned soon after his arrival that the Eighth 
Army staff had prepared a plan for a phased withdrawal to Pusan 
in case of necessity. He called immediately for a plan of attack. 
Prospects of putting it into effect were not bright at the moment, but 
at least it served to announce his intentions. 

Rumors were rife at this time that a general withdrawal from Korea, 
in virtual acknowledgment of defeat, was contemplated. In a letter 
of 1957, General Douglas MacArthur wrote an emphatic dental: 
"I have no means of knowing whether such action may have been 
seriously considered in Washington; but, for my own part, I never 
contemplated such a withdrawal and made no plans to that effect." 9 

The front hugged the 38th Parallel during the last week of 
December as the Eighth Army held a defensive line along die Munsan- 
Chunchon-Yangyang axis (Map 2). Three U.S. divisions were in a 
combat zone occupied largely by ROK units. The 24th and 25th 
Divisions both reduced a third in strength by casualties, remained 
in contact with the enemy in west Korea while the 1st Cavalry Divi- 
sion, also depleted in numbers, occupied blocking positions to the 
rear. Personnel and equipment losses suffered by the 2d Division 
during the CCF counteroffensive of late November had rendered it 
noneffective as a tactical unit until it could be reinforced and re- 
equipped, and the 3d and 7th Infantry Divisions had just landed in 
the Pusan-Ulsan area after the Hungnam redeployment. 10 

On 27 December 1950 the commanding general began a three-day 
tour of Eighth Army units at the front. He talked to hundreds of 
soldiers ranging from privates to unit commanders. There was noth- 
ing the matter with the Eighth Army, he assured them, that confidence 
wouldn't cure. "I told them their soldier forbears would turn over 
in their graves if they heard some of the stories I had heard about 
the behavior of some of our troop leaders in combat. The job of a 
commander was to be up where the crisis of action was taking place. 
In time of battle, I wanted division commanders to be up with their 
forward battalions, and I wanted corps commanders up with the 

LtGen E, A. Craig, USMC (Retd), llr of 4 Jun 57. All letters, typed interviews, tnd 
other documentary sources cited in footnotes are on file in the archives of the Historical 
Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps. 

"Gen Douglas MacArthur, Itr of 6 Jun 57 to MajGen E. W. Snedeker. 

"eusak Command Report (Cmd R/>i). Dec 50. 


The East-Central Front 

regiment that was tn the hottest action. If they had paper work to do, 
they could do it at night. By day their place was up there where the 
shooting was going on." 

It could never have been said that this professional soldier, the 
son of a Regular Army colonel, had failed to set an example in his 
own career. As the commander of an airborne division, he had jumped 
along with his men in Normandy. 

Seldom seen in Korea without a grenade attached to his harness, 
Ridgway insisted that it was not a gesture of showmanship, In mobile 
warfare a man might be surprised by the enemy when he least expected 
it, he said, and a grenade was useful for blasting one's way out of 
a tight spot. 

Ridgway's Declaration of Faith 

After completing his tour of the combat area, the commanding general 
concluded that one thing was still lacking. Soldiers of the Eighth 
Army hadn't as yet been given an adequate answer to the questions, 
"Why are we here?" and "What are we fighting for?" In the belief 
that the men were entitled to an answer from their commanding 
general, he sat down in his room and wrote this declaration of faith: 
To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that Korean town 
or village. Real estate is here, incidental. . . . 

The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as God has 
permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat 
Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave 
their citizens and deride the dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those 
to whom the individual and individual rights are sacred; whether we are 
to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead 
existence of a Godless world. 

If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any possibility of challenge, 
then this has long since ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean allies 
alone and for their national survival. It has become, and it continues to be, a 
fight for our own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, inde- 
pendent national existence. . . » 

The deep conviction of this declaration could not be doubted. But 
Ridgway did not confine himself to moral leadership; he also insisted 
on a return to sound tactical principles. Upon learning that some of 

11 Memorandum from commanding general to all troops of Eighth Army, 21 Jan 51. 

Interlude at Masan 

1 1 

the infantry commanders in combat sectors had no knowledge of the 
enemy's strength or whereabouts, he ordered that aggressive patrolling 
be resumed at once. He directed further that every unit make a 
resolute effort to provide a hot reception for the Red Chinese patrols 
which had met too little opposition while prodding every night for 
soft spots along the thinly held 135-mile United Nations line." 

In his talks with officers and men, the new commander told them 
that too many weapons and vehicles had fallen into the hands of 
the enemy during the withdrawals in west Korea. He made it plain 
that in the future any man abandoning equipment without good cause 
would be court-martialed. 

Not only did Ridgway stress the increased use of firepower; he 
requested in one of his first messages to the Pentagon that 10 addi- 
tional battalions of artillery be sent to Korea. These guns were to 
provide the tactical punch when he found an opportunity to take the 

Meanwhile, he had the problem of putting up a defense against a 
Chinese Communist offensive expected within a week. On his first day 
as Eighth Army commander he sent a request to President Syngman 
Rhee, of the Republic of Korea, for 30,000 native laborers to dig 
" e td fortifications. The energetic, 71 -year-old Korean patriot pro- 
dded the first 10,000 at dawn the following morning and the others 
during the next two days. Armed with picks and shovels, this army of 
toilers created two broad belts of defense, one to the north and one 
s ^uth of the river Han. The purpose of the first was to stop the 
enemy if American firepower could compensate for lack of numbers, 
af id the second was a final line to be held resolutely. 

Marine Personnel and Equipment Shortages 

Although the Marine ground forces found themselves in the unusual 
situation of being 200 miles behind the front, they could be sure that 
this respite wouldn't last. Every effort was being pushed to restore 
the Division to combat efficiency by a command and staff acutely 
?o rf °^ sll0t, tages °f men an d equipment. The effective strength on 
? December 1950 was 1,304 officers and 20,696 men, including 182 
^ached U.S. Army troops and 143 Roya 

' the remainder of this section is Ridgway, 



The East-Centra} Front 

total also included 28 officers and 1,615 men who had arrived in a 
replacement draft of 17 December, and 4 officers and 365 men in a 
draft of three days later." 

Authorized Division strength was 1,438 officers and 24,504 men, 
indicating a shortage of 134 officers and 3,808 men. Most of the 
deficiencies were in the infantry and artillery units — 29 officers and 
2,951 men in the three infantry regiments, and 38 officers and 538 men 
in the artillery. 

Division G-l had been informed by the FMFPac representative in 
Japan that about 5,000 casualties were hospitalized there, and an 
unknown number had been evacuated to the United States because 
of overcrowding of hospitals in Japan. Such factors made it difficult 
to predict how many would return to the Division, but G-l estimated 
from 500 to 1,000 in January. 

The situation in regard to Division equipment might be summed 
up by saying that on 23 December there was a serious shortage of 
practically all essential items with the single exception of M-l rifles. 
Upon arrival at Masan, units had been required to submit stock status 
reports. These lists were forwarded on 23 December to the Command- 
ing General, Eighth Army, with a notification that requisitions had 
been submitted to the 2d Logistical Command, USA, in Pusan. It was 
requested that deliveries of supplies and equipment be speeded up, so 
that the Division could soon be restored to its former combat effi- 
ciency. A comparison of the totals of selected items on 23 and 31 
December as listed on the following page shows that considerable 
progress was made during those eight days. 

The 2d Logistical Command in Pusan, commanded by Brigadier 
General Crump Garvin, USA, deserved much of the credit for the 
week's restoration of Marine equipment. Progress passed all expecta- 
tions, considering that General Garvin was supplying other Eighth 
Army units which had lost equipment during their withdrawal." 

There still existed on 29 December a requirement for clothing and 
individual equipment, and the spare parts problem remained acute. 
Ironically, the fact that the 1st Marine Division had brought most of 
its motor transport out from the Chosin Reservoir was a handicap at 
Masan. Eighth Army units which had lost their vehicles were given 

"Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are Smith, Nu/ct, 1280-1292, 
1294, 129% 1305; IstMarDiv Periodic Logistics Reports (PLR) 2, 11. 
"LtGen E. A.Craig, ltr of 4 jun 57. 

Interlude at Masan 13 

items of T/E Sharing** SbsHag/tt 

equip me in allowance 23 Dec 30 )] Dec 50 

Bags, sleeping 23,000 3,585 

Machine gun, Browning, 

Cal. 30, M.1919A4 1,398 338 

BA *> 30 cat 904 .141 

Carbine, 30 cal., M2 11,084 2,075 

Launcher, rocket, 3.5", M20 jM 105 

Howit&r, 105mm 54 8 

Howitzer, 155mm 18 9 

Glasses, field, 7x50 1,740 1,305 1,006 

Tank, Med., M4A3, dozer, 105 mm. 12 7 7 

Tank, med., M-26, yOmrn 85 16 12 

Truck, i T, 4x4 641 105 58 

Truck, l| T., 6x6, cargo 54 3 

T ^ck, 2\ T., 6x6, cargo 737 124 33 

«adi set, SCR 536 474 211 211 

Radio set, SCR 619 137 74 49 

Telephone, EE8 1,162 58 58 

priority for receiving new ones. This meant that the Marines must 
make the best of war-worn trucks. 

Marine Air Squadrons in Action 

While the ground forces trained in the Masan area, the Corsair 
squadrons and the jet squadron flew combat missions. Support of 
the Hungnam redeployment had top priority until 24 December, when 
the last of the 105,000 troops were evacuated by Rear Admiral 
James H. Doyle's Task Force 90. Such totals as 91,000 Korean 
refugees, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons of cargo 
£ere also recorded by the U.S. Navy's largest operation of the 
Korean conflict. 15 

No serious trouble was experienced from enemy action during the 
two weeks of the redeployment, although G-2 reports warned that 
several Chinese divisions were believed to be in the general area. 
Alr strikes and naval gunfire shared the credit for this result. Nearly 
34,000 shells and 12,800 rockets were fired by the support ships, 
a "d UN planes were on station or carrying out missions every moment 
toat weather permitted. Marine fighters of VMF-212, VMF-214, 

"ComPhibGruQne Action Rpt, Hungnam, 5-10, 25. 

The East-Central Front 

and VMF-323, flying from carriers after the closing of Yonpo Airfield, 
made a noteworthy contribution to the success of the Hungnam 

VMF-212, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczaw- 
ski, was assigned the task of gathering the helicopters of VMO-6 
from various ships of the Seventh Fleet and returning them to the 
operational control of the 1st Marine Division at Masan. There the 
OYs of the observation squadron were waiting after an overland flight, 
and Major Vincent J. Gottschalk's unit was complete. 

With the Hungnam redeployment ended, the Navy offered to 
make its primary carrier-borne air effort in support of the Eighth 
Army. There was no single over-all commander of Navy and Air 
Force aviation in Korea (other than General MacArthur himself) and 
the two services were working under a system of mutual agreement 
and coordination." 

The Far East Air Forces (feaf), under Lieutenant General 
George E. Stratemeyer, was the senior Air Force command in the Far 
East, on the same level as ComNavFE, Vice Admiral C Turner Joy. 
The largest feaf subordinate command was the Fifth Air Force, 
commanded by Major General Earle E. Partridge, with headquarters 
at Taegu, alongside that of the Eighth Army. 

Strictly speaking, land-based Marine air had been under Fifth Air 
Force operational control throughout the Chosin Reservoir operation. 
Actually a verbal agreement between General Partridge and Major 
General Field Harris, commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 
(MAW) , had given the Marines a good deal of latitude in making 
decisions relative to close air support. This was often the salvation 
of Marine units during the breakout, when every minute counted. 
Later, during the Hungnam redeployment, control of Marine aircraft 
became the responsibility of Admiral Doyle. His control agency was 
Tactical Air Control Squadron- 1 (TacRon-l) in his flagship, the 
Mount McKinley. TacRon-l kept in close touch not only with the 
3d Infantry Division, USA, defending the shrinking perimeter, but 
also with the Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force. 18 

During the last days of 1950 the four Marine air squadrons were 
kept busy. VMF-212 on the Bataan was attached to TF-77. The 

10 For a derailed account of the "amphibious operation in reverse," see the last 
chapter of Volume III of this series. 

" CinCPacFlt Interim Evaluation Report (PacFlt Interim Rpt) No, Z, II, 621-758. 
u T«Ron-I War Diary (WD), Dec 50. 

Interlude at Masan 


coastline of east Korea was its hunting grounds for such missions as 
knocking out warehouses, bridges, and railway tunnels between the 
38th and 39th parallels. 

Along the west coast, VMF-214 on the Sicily and VMF-323 on 
the Badoeng Strait were commanded respectively by Major William 
M. Lundin and Major Arnold A. Lund. These squadrons were part of 
Task Group-95.1 under Vice Admiral Sir William G. Andrews, RN. 
The Marine aviators found themselves in an organization made up 
°f Royal Commonwealth naval forces and of French, Thai, and 
ROK units, TG-95.1 had the responsibility for patrolling the western 
coastline to prohibit enemy movement by water in military junks and 
by vehicle along the littoral. 13 

VMF-311, the jet squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 
Neil R. Maclntyre, remained the only land-based Marine air unit in 
Korea. The Fifth Air Force had made space for it on crowded K-9, 
seven air miles northeast of Pusan, when General Harris expressed 
a desire to keep his jets in Korea for possible defense against Red 
air attacks (Map 3). 

Maclntyre exercised his prerogative as squadron commander to fly 
the unit's first combat mission on 17 December. He was not, however, 
the first Marine aviator to pilot a jet in combat. That distinction went 
*° Captain Leslie E. Brown on 9 September 1950. Assigned to the 
Fifth Air Force's 8th Fighter-Bomber Squadron as an exchange pilot, 
he made the first of several routine flights with an F-80 Shooting Star. 

On 20 December, 17 officers and 51 enlisted men arrived at K-9 
f o boost VMF-311's total to 27 officer pilots and 95 enlisted men, 
Under Fifth Air Force control, they were employed to attack suspected 
CCF troop shelters, entrenchments, and gun positions on the eve of 
the expected enemy offensive. Missions of the jet planes averaged 
*2 a day at the end of the month. 

The Air Force System of Control 

g was seldom realized in the middle of the twentieth century that 
Cr tne first time since the Middle Ages, a single human being repre- 
^ted^injiis person a decisive tactical unit. Just as the mailed knight 

OSmS WD% ° f VMF " 323 - VMF - 2l4 > and VMF-212; PacFlt Interim Kpt No. 2, 

Interlude at Hasan 


on his barded charger had ruled the battlefields of the medieval world, 
so did the pilot of a modern aircraft have the power to put an enemy 
battalion to flight with napalm, or to knock out an enemy stronghold 
with a 500-pound bomb. 

A great deal depended, of course, on how the lightning of this 
human thunderbolt was controlled. The Marine Corps and the Air 
Force had different ideas on the subject. At the foundation of the 
Marine system was the concept that the needs of the ground forces 
came first, and control of air support should be exercised by the troops 
being supported. In each Marine infantry battalion a tactical air 
control party (tacp) included two aviators — one to be employed as a 
forward ajr controller (FAC) at the front, and the other as an air 
liaison officer in the battalion supporting arms center (SAC)." 11 

In an emergency both could quickly be assigned to companies or 
even platoons to "talk" air strikes down on the enemy. The normal 
chain of command was bypassed in favor of direct radio from the 
Tacp to the cognizant air control agency that had the authority to 
cross-check the request for possible conflict with other operations and 
to channel fighter-bombers to the attack. 

Intermediate commands kept themselves informed of the over-all 
a *r picture and controlled the employment of aviation by their own 
subordinates as they listened in on these requests. They indicated 
approval by remaining silent, and disapproval by transmitting a 

The hub of the Air Force system was the Tactical Air Control 
Center (tacc) of the Fifth Air Force-EUSAK Joint Operations Center 
(JOC), known by the code name MELLOW. An aviator coming on 
duty called up MELLOW and received his instructions from JOC. 

FACs were assigned to U.S. Army and British units down to corps, 
^vision, and regimental levels, and to ROK corps and divisions. 
Further assignment to smaller front line units was possible but entailed 
a good deal of time and advance planning. And even the most urgent 
re quests had to be channeled through division and regimental levels 
to JOC for approval. 

'fa Marine FAC wasn't able to control an air strike visually because 
°r terrain conditions, he called for a "tactical air coordinator, airborne" 

n. Jj 11 -' material in this section is derived from the following sources: PacFIt Interim 
loi 2 " Chief, Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, 

"A„ i - inin S Directive for Air-Ground Operation*; and CMC, Itr to Dist List re 
^a'ysis of CAS Systems," 19 Aug 52. 


The East-Central Front 

(taca) to locate the target from the air and direct planes to the 
attack. The Fifth Air Force also used special airborne coordinators. 
Known as "Mosquitoes," they flew low-winged, two-seater North 
American training planes, designated T-6s by the Air Force and 
SNJs by the Navy. 

This plan was capable under favorable circumstances of providing 
the Fifth Air Force-EUSAK tactical air control system with a mobile 
and flexible means of directing air power at the front. Its chief weak- 
ness, according to Marine doctrine, lay in the separation of air power 
from ground force control. The Air Force claimed the advantage of 
projecting tactical air power deep into enemy territory; but as the 
Marines saw it, this was deep or interdictory support, and not to be 
compared to genuine close air support. 

X Corps Conference at Kyongju 

The command and staff of the 1st Marine Division could only specu- 
late during this interim period as to what the near future might hold 
for them. Rumors had been circulated, during the first week at Masan, 
that the Division would be employed as rearguard to cover an Eighth 
Army withdrawal from Korea, with Pusan serving as the port of 
debarkation. And while plans cannot be made on a basis of rumor, 
General Smith and Colonel Bowser went so far as to discuss the 
possibility seriously. At last, on 24 December, a more definite prospect 
loomed when the eusak staff requested the Division to furnish logisti- 
cal data for a move by rail and truck to Wonju, some 130 miles north 
of Masan. I 

It was not known whether an actual move was contemplated or the 
intention was merely to have available a plan for future use if the 
occasion warranted. General Smith sent the data but added a strong 
recommendation to the effect that any commitment of the Division be 
postponed until it was re-equipped and strengthened by replacements. 21 

At this time the Marine general received a copy of a map prepared 
by the Eighth Army staff which showed the phase lines of a 200-mile 
withdrawal from the combat zone to the Pusan port of debarkation. 
No enlightenment as to the employment of the Division was forth- 
coming until 27 December 1950, however, when a eusak dispatch 

a lstMarDiv HD Dec 50, 12-13; Smith, Notes, 1258-1259. 

Interlude at 


reassigned to the operational control of X Corps. 22 

A message of the 28th requested General Smith to attend a con- 
ference at the X Corps CP at Kyongju (about 60 air miles northeast 
of Masan) on the 30th. He was directed to bring several members 
°f his staff with him and to assign a liaison officer to X Corps. 23 

Two VMO-6 helicopters flew him to Kyongju along with his G-3, 
Colonel Bowser, and his aide, Captain Martin J. Sexton. Tossed by 
high winds, they landed just in time to meet General Ridgway, who 
gave a talk emphasizing the necessity for reconnaissance and maintain- 
ing contact with the enemy. 

The new plan for X Corps employment, as modified after discussion 
with the Eighth Army commander, called for the recently reorganized 
2d Infantry Division to be placed under operational control of Gen- 
eral Almond. It was to move out at once to the Wonju front, followed 
by the 3d and 7th Infantry Divisions. The 1st Marine Division was 
to stage to Pohangdong (Map 3) on the east coast, some 65 miles 
north of Pusan, with a view to being eventually employed on this 
same front. 24 

"Certainly no one could accuse General Almond, the X Corps 
commander, of defeatism," was a tribute paid by General Smith. On 
the contrary, the Marine general had sometimes differed with him on 
the grounds that he was aggressive to the point of giving too little 
Weight to logistical considerations and time and space factors. 

It was realized at the conference that administrative decisions must 
depend to a large extent on the outcome of the impending enemy 
offensive. G-2 officers of the Eighth Army, forewarned by prisoner 
interrogations, were not surprised when the blow fell shortly before 
midnight on the last night of the year. 

In spite of Air Force bombings of roads and suspected supply 
dumps, the Chinese Reds had been able to mount a great new offensive 
°nly three weeks after the old one ended. Attacking in the bitter cold 
of Nfew Year's Eve, they made penetrations during the first few hours 
in ROK-held sectors of the central and eastern fronts. By daybreak 
it became evident that Seoul was a major objective, with the UN 
situation deteriorating rapidly. 

^EUsak msg GX-20179-K600, 27 Dec 50. 

at Tu- X Corps ms # X 16070, 28 Dec 50. 

inis account of the Kyongju conference is derived from Smith, Notes, 1269-1271. 


The CCF January Offensive 

UN Forces, Give Ground — Further Eighth Army With- 
drawals — Marine Aircraft in the Battle — 1st Marine Divi- 
sion Assigned Mission — Replacements by Air and Sea — 
The Move to Japanese Airfields— Red China's "Hate 
America" Campaign — A Tactical Formula for Victory 

ON the last day of 1950 the 1st Marine Division was alerted for 
two missions within an hour. At 1425 it was detached from 
X Corps, after only four days, and once more assigned to the opera- 
tional control of the Eighth Army, The Marines were directed to re- 
sume their former mission of training, reorganizing, and replacing 
equipment so that they could be employed either to block enemy pene- 
trations along the Ulchin-Yongju-Yechon axis (Map 4), or to take 
Over a sector along the main line of resistance (MLR). 

Forty minutes later another EUSAK dispatch alerted die Division to 
move to the Pohang-Andong area, where it would be in position to 
block any CCF penetration. This warning order came as no surprise, 
since X Corps had already contemplated such employment for General 
Smith's troops. In fact, General Craig and Deputy Chief of Staff 
Colonel Edward W, Snedeker had left Masan that very morning to 
select assembly areas and command posts. 1 

At a conference of G-3 and G-4 officers held at Masan on New 
"ear's Day, it was recommended diat the administrative headquarters 
re main in its present location when the rest of the Division moved up 
to Pohang. Although this headquarters had accompanied the Division 
in the past, it was believed that gains in mobility would result if 

'eusakl rasgs GX 20332-KGOO and GX 20335 KG00 31 Dec 50; IstMarDiv 
n °> Jan 51, 4. 


22 The East-Central Front 

the large number of clerical personnel and their increasing bulk oJ 
documents were left behind," In view of the changing situation at the 
front, there was less danger of losing valuable records if the head- 
quarters continued to function at Masan, maintaining contact with thf 
forward CP by means of daily courier planes. The plan was approved 
by the Division commander and worked out to general satisfaction. 

UN Forces Give Ground 

Decisions were made during the first few days of 1951 in an atmos- 
phere of suspense and strain as adverse reports came from the firing 
line. General Ridgway had assumed correctly, on the basis of prisoner 
interrogations, that the main Chinese effort would be channeled down 
the historical invasion corridor north of Seoul. He made his disposi- 
tions accordingly, and the Eighth Army order of battle on 3 1 Decem- 
ber 1950 (Map 2) was as follows: 

U.S. I Corps— Turkish Brigade, U.S. 25th Division, ROK 1st Divi- 
sion, from left to right northwest of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British 
29th Brigade. 

U.S. IX Corps— ROK 6th Division, U.S. 24th Division, from left 
to right north of Seoul. In Corps reserve, British Commonwealth 
27th Brigade, U.S. 1st Cavalry Division. 

ROK III Corps— ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions, from left to right 
on central front. In Corps reserve, ROK 7th Division. 

ROK II Corps — ROK 3d Division, on east-central front. 

ROK I Corps— ROK 9th and Capital Divisions, from left to right 
on eastern front. 

The U.S. X Corps, comprising the newly reorganized U.S, 2d 
Infantry Division at Wonju and the 7th Infantry Division in the 
Chungju area, had been given a mission of bolstering the ROK-beld 
line in central and east Korea and blocking enemy penetrations to 
the rear. 

In Eighth Army reserve was the 187th Airborne RCT, with Thailand 
Battalion attached, in the Suwon area. Also under eusak operational 
control in rear areas were the 1st Marine Division (Masan), the 
3d Infantry Division (Kyongju), the Canadian Battalion (Miryang), 
and the New Zealand Field Artillery Battalion (Pusan). 

'Smith, Www, 1315. 


The East-Central Front 

Altogether, the United Nations forces in Korea numbered 444,336 
men as of January 1951. The cosmopolitan character of the fight 
against Communism is indicated by the aid given to the U.S. and ROK 
forces by contingents of combat troops from 13 other nations — 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom. 3 

Enemy numbers at this time were estimated at a total of 740,000 
men in Korea and near-by Manchuria. Seven CCF armies, the 37th, 
38th, 39th, 40th, 42d, 50th, and 66th were identified among the 
troops attacking on New Year's Eve. The nkpa I and V Corps also 
participated. Estimated strength of the assaulting forces was 174,000 
Chinese and 60,000 North Koreans. 

Previously identified but not reported in contact with U.S. forces 
on 31 December were the 24th, 48th, 49th, and 65 th CCF armies and 
the nkpa 1st, 3d, and 15 th Divisions. 

As another possibility which could not be overlooked, the five CCF 
armies which had opposed X Corps in northeast Korea might also 
take part in the new offensive. Elements of the 20th, 26th, 27 th, 30th, 
and 3 2d Armies identified in that area early in December, had more 
than two weeks in which to reorganize and make their way to the 
Eighth Army front. If they got into the fight, it would mean a 
formidable addition to the enemy's forces. 

With only five days at his disposal, after arrival in Korea, General 
Ridgway's preparations were limited. His dispositions could not be 
blamed, but it was the old story of the chain and its weakest link as 
the enemy scored a major breakthrough at the expense of the 1st ROK 
Division on the west-central front, Unfortunately, this unit repre- 
sented the tactical joint between I Corps and IX Corps. The enemy 
widened the gap before dawn and drove on toward Seoul, 

Early in the morning the eusak commanding general was on the 
road, waving his arms in an attempt to stop ROK soldiers streaming 
rearward in their vehicles after abandoning crew-served weapons. The 
short training period for these troops, their tactical inexperience, and 
the language barrier were the dissonant notes tolling the ominous 
chords of defeat. The whole front was endangered as the enemy 
poured through an ever widening gap, and Ridgway ordered that 
roadblocks be set up where MPs could halt the fugitives, rearm them, 

'Sources for this section are EUSAK Cmd Rpl, Jan 51, 4-5, 7, 9, 27. 62-65. 

The CCF January Offensive 


and send them back to the front. At his request, President Syngman 
Rhee appealed to ROK soldiers over the radio and exhorted them to 
make a stand. By that time it was too late to save Seoul, and the 
commanding general gave orders for its evacuation. 

"The withdrawal was initiated in mid-afternoon on the 3d," he 
commented in retrospect. "I stayed on the bridge site on the north 
bank until dark to watch the passage of the most critical loads. These 
were the 8-inch howitzers and the British Centurion tanks, both of 
which exceeded the safety limits of the bridge under the conditions 
existing at the time." 4 

It was a scene of terror and despair that Ridgway never forgot. 
Thousands of Korean civilian refugees were making their way over 
the thin ice of the river Han, many of them carrying children or old 
people on their backs. What impressed the observer most was the 
uncanny silence of this mass flight in the freezing winter dusk, broken 
only by the sound of a multitude of feet shuffling over the ice— a sound 
strangely like a vast whispering. It was as if these derelicts of war 
were trying incoherently to confide their misery to someone. 

From a strategic viewpoint, the only course left to the Eighth Army 
Was a continued retirement south of Seoul. "We came back fast," 
Ridgway admitted, "but as a fighting army, not as a running mob. 
We brought our dead and wounded with us, and our guns, and our 
will to fight." s 

further Eighth Army Withdrawals 

EUsak. Fragmentary Operations Plan 20, issued as an order on 4 Janu- 
ary, called for a further withdrawal to Line D (Map 4). In prepara- 
tl0r », X Corps had moved up to the front on the 2d, after assuming 
operational control of the U.S. 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions and 
the ROK 2d, 5 th, and 8th Divisions and occupied a sector between 
^■S. IX Corps and ROK III Corps." 

The U.S. 3d Division was attached to I Corps and the 187th Air- 
borne RCT passed temporarily under operational control of IX Corps. 

B y 7 January the UN forces had pulled back to a modified Line D 

s 9?? M - B - Ridgwny, !tr of 5 Jun 57. 
Rldgwajr, Memoirs, 215. 
EWAK CmdRpt, Jm51, 9, 62, 64, 82, 92. 

26 The East-Central Front 

extending from Pyongtaek on the west coast to Samchok on the east 
and taking in Yoju and Chechen. General Ridgway sent telegrams 
to all corps commanders expressing dissatisfaction with the personnel 
and material losses inflicted on the enemy during the withdrawal. 
"I shall expect," each message concluded, "utmost exploitation of 
every opportunity in accordance with my basic directive." 

That evening, foreshadowing the offensive operations he was con- 
templating, the commanding general ordered a reconnaissance-in- 
force by a reinforced infantry regiment north to Osan to search out 
the enemy and inflict maximum punishment, No contacts were made, 
nor did strong patrols sent out by U.S. IX Corps flush out any sizeable 
groups of Chinese. But the Eighth Army had served notice that it 
intended to regain the initiative at the first opportunity. 

One more blow remained to be absorbed. On the 8th the Com- 
munists struck in the Wonju area with an attack of four divisions. 
Elements of the newly reorganized 2d Infantry Division were forced 
to give up that important highway and rail center after counterattacks 
failed. The enemy now directed his main effort along the Chunchon- 
Wonju-Chechon corridor, and North Korean guerrilla forces infil- 
trated through the gap between the U.S. X Corps and E.OK III Corps. 

The salient created by this CCF attack caused Line D to be modified 
again so that in the center it dipped sharply downward to Chungju 
before curving northeast to Samchok (Map 4). 

Marine Aircraft in the Battle 

The pilots and aircrewmen of the three carrier squadrons and the 
land-based jet squadron were the only Marines in a position to take 
an active part in the battle. With but one tacp per division, close 
air support was out of the question for the ROKs on New Year's Day. 

Control facilities were severely strained when scores of UN fliers 
made use of the frequencies which the Mosquitoes employed for tac- 
tical air direction. The voices were all in the English language, but 
with more than one person doing the sending, shrill side noises sliced 
in to garble the whole into a cacophony of jungle sounds. A Mosquito 
trying to coach a fighter-bomber attack at the crossings of the Imjin 

The CCF January Offensive 


might be drowned out by a distant pilot calling up a controller in the 
Hwachon Reservoir Area. 7 

As a consequence, there was no coordinated air-ground attack in 
direct support of the man in the foxhole. Most of the JOC effort was 
directed to the enemy's rear in an effort to block supporting arms, 
reinforcements, and supplies. 

The two Marine squadrons attached to Admiral Ruble's carriers 
were at sea, some 80 miles south of Inchon when news of the Chinese 
offensive filtered through the tedious communication channels from 
JOC and eusak, Major Lund, CO of VMF-323, led an eight-plane 
attack which destroyed enemy trucks and some 40 huts believed to be 
occupied by CCF troops in a village south of the Imjin. 

Another Marine air mission of New Year's Day was the flight com- 
manded by Major Kenneth L. Reusser for the purpose of wiping out a 
reported CCF concentration on the central front. Unfortunately, he 
could not get verification that the target consisted of enemy troops, 
before a decision could be made, Reusser heard a Mosquito of the 
2d ROK Division calling urgently for any flier in the area to hit 
a "other CCF concentration (this time verified) in a village to the 
enemy's rear of the Chorwon-Hwachon area. Under the Mosquito's 
direction the Corsairs bombed and napalmed the village, then strafed 
survivors trying to escape. 

VMF-212, flying with Navy (Task Force) TF-77 on the eastern 
sif le of the peninsula, had a busy New Year's Day. Two eight-plane 
ir "terdiction strikes were flown in the morning against rear area targets 
along the coastal highways. The afternoon brought an emergency call 
rrom JOC, and the squadron "scrambled" 14 planes which hit the east 
flank of an extensive enemy push south of the Hwachon Reservoir.* 

More than 300 UN fighter-bombers were sent out under JOC, or 
M ELLow, control on the embattled first day of 1951. On the west 
coast TacRon-3 received more calls for air support than TG-96.8 
could fill. Rear Admiral Lyman A, Thackrey sent a request to Admiral 
^truble in the Missouri for additional carrier planes, and within a few 
hours the Marines of VMF-212 were detached and on their way to 
tl ^wesUoast to join the other two Corsair squadrons of TG-96.8. 

,„ USAF Hist Study No. 72, U. S. Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 
iv , t ^ Utl 52 ' ( liert ' af ter Cltetl W AHS-72) pp, 188-196. The term "net" denotes a net- 

**ti£^ ra< *'" stations > a " <m a SffliSfc frequency for a specific purpose. 
, Ihe term "scramble" in military aviation parlance refers to an expeditious takeoff 
ca . ( r "P°nse to an emergency call or an alert. With highly trained personnel, it is a 
y "em rasher than a panic. 


The East-Central Front 

All four Marine fighter-bomber squadrons took part daily in air 
operations as the Chinese Reds continued their advance south of 
Seoul. VMF-311 was badly handicapped, however, by mechanical 
difficulties. Engine or radio trouble accounted for five "aborts" of the 
15 sorties launched on 4 January. The remaining pilots could not make 
radio contacts with their assigned Mosquito controller, and had little 
choice other than to attack targets of opportunity. 

The jets continued in action, but it was realized that they were not 
giving the maximum of their capabilities. By mid- January the squad- 
ron had become almost ineffective through no fault of its own. Techni- 
cal representatives from the companies that had manufactured both 
the engine and plane were flown to K-9 (Map 3), and on the 16th 
all jets were grounded. These inspectors did not work on the planes; 
they were empowered only to report the nature of the trouble to the 
airplane companies concerned. The companies in turn reported to 
BuAir in Washington, which sent instructions and if necessary me- 
chanics to Itami, where major aircraft maintenance was done. 

Meanwhile, the fall of Seoul meant that the Air Force was evicted 
by enemy action from such major fields as Kimpo and K-16 on an 
island in the river Han. The Sabre jets and Mosquitoes had to be 
pulled back, and soon the F-5 Is were no longer secure at Suwon from 
an advancing enemy. 

Admiral Thackrey's Western Deployment Group completed the 
evacuation from Inchon of 70,000 tons of supplies, 2,000 vehicles, 
and about 5,000 troops." As the Navy closed out activities on the west 
coast, TG-96.8 sent out its last combat air missions on 7 January. 
VMF-214 made its final reconnaissance patrols; VMF-212 flew 25 
sorties in support of UN troops in central Korea; and VMF-323 took 
part in a series of Air Force raids on enemy troop assembly areas in 
the Hoengsong area." 

Until the last, the carrier Marines alternated their Eighth Army 
support missions with routine CAPs, coastal searches, and airfield 
bombings. Admiral Thackrey's Redeployment Group, including 
TacRon-3, completed its task in the Inchon area and departed on the 
7th. On that same day HMS Theseus, flying the flag of Admiral 
Andrewes, was back in west coast waters as the British pilots resumed 
their coastal patrols and naval air support on that side of the peninsula, 
Within a week VMF-212 and the Bataatt returned to fly alternate 

"AHS-72, 47, 48; PhibGru-3 WD, Jan SI. 

The CCP January Offensive 

tours of duty with the pilots of the Theseus. The other two carrier 
squadrons found themselves unemployed for the time being. Not only 
w ere they out of a job, they were also homeless, since the United 
Nations had been forced to give up airfields at Yonpo, Wonsan, Seoul, 
Kimpo, and Suwon. Only K-l, K-2, K-4, K-9, K-10, and two small 
fields near Taegu remained (Map 2), and they would scarcely serve 
the needs of feaf. Thus it was that VMF-214 and VMF-323 found 
a temporary haven at Itami, along with VMF-311 and most of the 
administrative and service units of the 1st MAW, There was nothing 
to do but wait until a new home could be found for the fighter- 
bomber squadrons . 

1st Marine Division 

The Marine aviators might have found some consolation in the fact 
that their comrades of the ground forces were also groping in a fog 
w uncertainty. At the most critical period of the CCF thrust in the 
wonju area, General Smith was summoned to Taegu on 8 January for 
a conference with General Ridgway. The Eighth Army commander 
proposed to attach one of the Marine RCTs to X Corps in the Andong 
*rca, about 95 air miles north of Masan. The remainder of the 
division would then move to the Pohang-Kyongju-Yongchon area, 
s ome 60 air miles northeast of Masan (Map 4) . 

Ridgway asked the Marine general to discuss the prospect with his 
sta ff' He realized, he said, that no commander liked to have his 
division split up, and he assured Smith that as soon as the X Corps 
zone became stabilized, the RCT would be sent back to him. 

They parted with this understanding, but a few hours after his 
^turn by air to Masan the following message was received from 

Subsequent your departure, alternate plan occurred to me on which I 
would like your views soonest. It follows: 1st Mar Div, under Army control, 
rnove without delay to general area outlined to you personally today, to take 
?™ responsibility at date and hour to be announced later for protection of 

SR between Andong and Kyongju, both inclusive, and prevent hostile 
P^etration in force south of Andong-Yongdok road. 10 

"istMarDiv HD, Jan 51, 4; eusak msg G-1-62B-KGG, S Jan 51. 


The East-Central front 

At 1115 on the 9th the plan was made official. An Eighth Army 
dispatch ordered the 1st Marine Division to move without delay to 
the Pohang area (Map 4), remaining under eusak control, with the 
following missions: 

(a) Prevent enemy penetrations in force south of the Andong- 
Yongdok road; 

(b) Protect the MSR connecting Pohang, Kyongju, Yongchon, 
Uihung, and Uisong. 11 

Based on these directives, Division OpnO 1-51 was issued at 1600 
on the 9th. RCT-1 was directed to move by motor to Yongchon and 
to protect the MSR, Yongchon-Uisong inclusive, from positions in 
the vicinity of Yongchon and Uihung. The 1st and 7th Motor 
Transport Battalions, plus other Division elements, were ordered to 
provide the required trucks. 12 

General Ridgway arrived at Masan by plane on the morning of 
9 January. He was met by General Smith and driven to Headquarters, 
where the Division staff officers and regimental commanders were pre- 
sented to him. In a brief talk he reiterated the necessity for reconnais- 
sance and for regaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. The 
Marine officers were told that limited offensive actions by Eighth 
Army units would be put into effect soon. 13 

Division OpnO 2-51, issued at 1300 on the 10th, provided for the 
completion of the Division movement by road and water from Masan 
to the objective area. 14 

Shortages both of personnel and equipment were much reduced dur- 
ing the first two weeks of January. Returns to duty of battle and 
nonbattle casualties added 945 to the Division strength. Correspond- 
ing improvements had been made in the material readiness of the 
Division, Early in January a large resupply shipment arrived from 
Kobe, and a Navy cargo ship brought supplies and equipment which 
had been left behind at Inchon in October. Thus the situation was 
generally satisfactory except for nearly 1,900 gaps in the ranks that 
remained to be filled. 1 -' 

"eusak ms£ GX-1-661-KG00, 9 Jan 51. 

" lstMarDiv OpnO 1-11, 9 Jan 51. 

11 Smith, Nous, 1279. 

"lstMarDiv OpnO 2-51, 10 Jan 51. 

'"Smith, Now, 1285-1286, 1307-U08, 

The CCF January Offensive 


Facilities for air transport across the Pacific were limited, since the 
Army was also moving replacements to the Far East. A piecemeal 
process of shuttling Marines in plane-load increments could not be 
completed before 30 January. Lieutenant General Lemuel C. 
Shepherd, Jr., commanding FMFPac, took a dim view of this delay. 
It would be better for the Division, he maintained, to receive even a 
part of its replacements before it went back into action. As a com- 
promise, he proposed a combined air-sea lift which met the approval 
9f Rear Admiral Arthur H. Radford, commanding Pacific Fleet. 

Three replacement drafts were already on the way, with the 3d 
in Japan and the 4th and 5th at Camp Pendleton. General Shepherd 
scraped the bottom of the manpower barrel so closely that he dug 
up an additional 700 men from Marine security detachments in Japan, 
the Philippines, and other Pacific Ocean bases. 

Seven train loads of Marines from Camp Lejeune arrived at San 
Francisco on 10 January to join those from Camp Pendleton. On the 
same day 230 of these replacements were flown to Hawaii by the 
Mditary Air Transportation Service (mats), by the R5D's of Marine 
VMR-352 an( ] of Navy VR-5, and by the "Mars" flying boats of 
Navy VR-9, The next day 799 Marines sailed on the fast transport 
u i>NS General W , O. Darby. The remainder were transported at the 
f ate of one plane load a day by mats and at the rate of three or four 
plane loads a day by the Navy and Marine transport planes of Fleet 
L °gistics Air Wing, Pacific (FLogAirWingPac). 1 ' 

Five days later, on the 16th, the airlift had cleared the last Marine 
out of Treasure Island. On 21 January, 1,000 men of the special draft 
^ere already with the 1st Division at Pohang and the 799 on board 
Genera! Darby were due to dock at Pusan. 

It had been a fast job of coordination by the Navy, Army, Air Force, 
a nd virtually all major units of the Marine Corps. Much of the special 
WaSft was flown by the R5Ds of VMR-352 and of VMR-152. The 
,°rmer, commanded by Colonel William B, Steiner, had been flying 
P* Et . Toro-Tokyo flights since October, but most of its elfort had 

keen in l_l :_1 1 1 it i;ifn ,c-> 


etl in shuttling between the mainland and Hawaii. VMR-152 

concentrated on the Hawaii-Japan leg of the long trip. During 

D <* Mi'i'nd j rela j'j Vt! 66 Milrim ' W g j fo !* " * has b»W derived from FMFPac II D. 


The East-Central Front 

the Chosin campaign, the squadron commander, Colonel Deane C. 
Roberts, had maintained his headquarters and 10 planes at Itami to 
support the shuttle to Korea. He had barely returned to Hawaii from 
that job when his squadron was alerted not only for the special lift of 
Marine replacements but also for a return to the Far East. 17 

Hawaii had been the bottleneck in this special troop lift. Land 
and seaplanes were discharging their human cargo at Barbers Point, 
Hickam Air Force Base, and Keehi Lagoon. From there FLogAir- 
WingPac had to space the planes over the long stretches of sea at 
approximately four-hour intervals. The guiding factor was other air 
traffic over the same route and the servicing, messing, and rescue 
capabilities of Guam and other points along the way, such as tiny 
Johnston Island. The latter was barely big enough for its single 
6,100-foot runway. 

VMR-152 and the Navy's VR-21 were assigned the mission of fly- 
ing the long Hawaii-Japan portion of the big lift. Itarni became 
another collection center for the airborne replacements and five of 
the VMR-152 planes were retained there to shuttle the troops the 
last 300 miles to K-3, near Pohang (Map 2), On 21 January the 
troop lift reached virtual completion, but Admiral Radford authorized 
the 1st MAW to retain a couple of R5D's at Itami a little longer. 
Thus the Marines were able to avoid highway and rail traffic jams 
in Korea by flying men and materials from troop and supply centers 
in Japan to K-l, K-3, or K~9. 

Looking back at the troop lift from a historical distance, the ob- 
server is most impressed by its demonstration of teamwork on a 
gigantic scale. The Marine Corps had functioned as a single great 
unit, even though a continent and an ocean separated the vanguard 
in Korea from the rear echelons in North Carolina. 

The Move to Japanese Airfields 

The seven remaining UN airfields in Korea were of course not enough 
to accommodate the 25 feaf and Marine tactical squadrons. Logistics 
and lack of space proved to be knotty problems. Thirty tank cars of 
gasoline a day were needed for normal flight operations of K-2 alone. 

"The balance of this section is derived from the Dec 50 and Jan 51 historical diaries 
of VMF-352. VMR-152, 1st MAW. and FMFPac. 

The CCF January Offensive 


Yet it took these cats eight days to make the 120-mile Pusan-Taegu 
round trip, such was the strain put on the railway system by the CCF 

Feaf had standby plans to evacuate Korea entirely in an emergency. 
Some of the secondary airfields of the Itazuke complex in Japan had 
been reevaluated for this purpose. Originally built by the Japanese 
for World War II, they were obsolescent by 1951 and because of 
Weather, neglect, and misuse badly deteriorated." 

The most promising of these secondary airfields were Tsuika, Ozuki, 
and Bofu (Map 3) , ranging from 30 to 65 miles east of Itazuke and 
facing one another around Japan's Inland Sea. Nearest to Itazuke 
and on the same island of Kyushu was Tsuika. Across the narrow 
Shimonoseki Strait, on the shore line of Honshu, were Ozuki and Bofu. 

General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander, informed General 
MacArthur that it was necessary to start air operations from Ozuki 
^d Bofu as soon as possible. A good deal of work had already been 
done on Tsuika, even to moving a major Japanese highway in order 
*o lengthen the runway to 7,000 feet. The Air Force general wanted 
to repair Ozuki for his F-51 squadrons, and Bofu was to be reserved 
for the 1st MAW. 

This decision meant a revision of plans for the Marines. MAG-12 
had recently been lifting a hundred men a day to K-l (Pusan west) 
with a view to making it into a major base. These preparations came 
t0 an abrupt halt, pending the final decision on Bofu. 

A Marine survey of that World War II airfield showed it to be in 
Serious disrepair. The Air Force had already rejected it as a base for 
^ght-harassing B-26s. Although the runway was only 7 feet above 
level, a 720-foot hill complicated the traffic pattern. Nevertheless, 

°fu was considered suitable for the time being, and the Air Force 
assured the 1st MAW that its use would be but temporary. 

Feaf proposed that the Marines start flying out of Bofu immedi- 
ately, operating under field conditions. There were, however, essential 
repairs to be made. The 5,300-foot runway remained in fair condi- 
[J°"^ but much of the taxiway was not surfaced and couldn't stand 

Fof l - Th u- section is based on the lst MAW and MAG-33 WDs of Jan 51; Fifth Air 
Eik» ™ sto fy (hereafter to be designated FAF), Dec 50 and Jan 51; AHS-72, 35-37; 

iSfyThW R M Jan 51, Sec II, 12, 63, 64-65; PacFh Interim Rj>t No. 2, II, 969, 
JtoVtrM Construction Battalion Two (hereafter MCB-2) Report of Activities for 
■ H , Co! T. J. Noon, interv of 5 Jun 58. 


The East-Central Front 

repairs, as did die barracks and mess hall. Fuel would have to be 
stored in drums. 

The Wing had the capability for minor construction but lacked the 
equipment, men, and fiscal authority to handle major work on the 
runways and taxi ways. The Air Force offered to furnish the labor and 
materials, provided that the Navy pay for them. The Navy in its 
turn was too limited in funds to restore an Air Force field for only 
temporary use by Marines, 

Finally, a compromise solved the problem. The Navy agreed to 
have the engineering work done by a detachment of its Mobile Con- 
struction Battalion 2 (Seabees) and furnish the concrete for patching 
the runways and rebuilding the warm-up aprons. The Air Force was 
to provide the pierced steel planking for the runways. 

On 15 January MAG-33 sent an advance detachment of 125 officers 
and men to Bofu to do some of the preliminary work, and on the 
following day the Seabees initiated the heavy construction. The 
restoration of K-l was meanwhile resumed by MAG-12. 

Until these two fields were made ready, VMF-212 on the Bataati 
would be the only Marine squadron in combat. 

Red China's "Hate America" Campaign 

The middle of January was also a transition period for the 1st Marine 
Division. In accordance with Division Orders 1-51 and 2-51, the 
movement from Masan commenced at 0545 on 10 January when the 
first serial of RCT-1 departed by motor for the Pohang-Andong area. 
LSTs 898 and 914 sailed the next day with elements of the Tank, 
Ordnance, Engineer, and Service Battalions. The new Division CP 
opened at Sinhung, about five miles southeast of Pohang, at 1600 
on 16 January; and by the 17th all designated motor and water lifts 
were completed. Thus the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine 
Aircraft Wing were poised to begin new operations which will be 
described in the following chapter. 10 

By 15 January relative quiet prevailed along the entire front; the 
Chinese Reds had shot their bolt. In terms of territorial gains (Map 4) 
the Communists could claim a victory, for they had inflicted heavy 

" lstMarDIv HD, Jan 51. 

The CCF January Offensive 


losses both in troop casualties and equipment on the UN forces. Yet 
the CCF January offensive could not compare with the November- 
December attacks either in moral or material damage done to the 
Ctghtb Army. This time the UN divisions had withdrawn for the 
most part in good order after the rout of ROK units at the outset. Nor 
w ere Ridgway's troops always driven from their positions by enemy 
action. Whenever he had an option between sacrificing men or 
Korean real estate, it was the latter he chose. And by his insistence 
on good combat discipline, he made the enemy pay an exorbitant price. 

Nevertheless, the blunt fact remains that the United Nations forces 
had been beaten in spite of an overwhelming superiority m aircraft, 
artillery, armor, and transport as well as command of the sea. State- 
side Americans can scarcely be blamed for asking themselves why 
their well-equipped divisions had been defeated twice within six weeks 
"V an Asiatic peasant army using semiguerrilla tactics and depending 
hugely on small arms, mortars, and light artillery. 

The answer cannot be given in simplified terms. Although the 
Chinese Reds were represented by a peasant army, it was also a first- 
rate army when judged by its own tactical and strategic standards. 
Military poverty might be blamed for some of its deficiencies in arms 
a nd equipment, but its semiguerrilla tactics were based on a mobility 
^hich could not be burdened with heavy weapons and transport. 
I he Chinese coolie in the padded cotton uniform could do one thing 
better than any other soldier on earth; he could infiltrate around an 
enemy position in the darkness with unbelievable stealth. Only 
Americans who have had such an experience can realize what a shock 
lt is to be surprised at midnight with the grenades and submachine gun 
Slu gs of gnomelike attackers who seemed to rise out of the very earth. 

Press correspondents were fond of referring to "the human sea 
tactics of the Asiatic hordes." Nothing could be further from the 
truth. In reality the Chinese seldom attacked in units larger than a 
re giment. Even these efforts were usually reduced to a seemingly 
endless succession of platoon infiltrations. It was not mass but decep- 
'°n and surprise which made the Chinese Red formidable. 
They also had an advantage over Western soldiers in their ability 
withstand hunger and cold while making long night marches, 
rter all, the rigors of a winter campaign in Korea were not much 
worse than the hardships the Chinese peasant had endured all his life. 
"ie was a veteran of at least five years' combat experience, for 

The East-Central From 

China had known little but war since the Japanese invasion of 1935. 
Many of Mao Tse-tung's troops, in fact, were former Nationalists 
who had fought for Chiang Kai-shek. 

The Chinese Reds held another advantage in Korean terrain well 
suited to their tactical system. This factor has been ably summarized 
by U.S. Military Academy historians: 

The mountains are high, and the deep gorges between them are a bar to 
traffic even when the streams are dry or frozen. Roads are few, and those 
that do exist are not suited for heavy traffic. Transportation then becomes a 
problem for the pack mule and the human back rather than the self-pro- 
pelled vehicle. Telephone wires are difficult to lay and, with guerrillas on 
every hand, are doubly hard to maintain. Even radio is limited by such 
terrain, with a considerable reduction in range. In all, most observers have 
agreed that American forces have seldom fought in terrain to which modern 
means of war are less adaptable. 20 

The fanaticism and political indoctrination of the CCF soldier must 
also be taken into account. His introduction to Communism began 
when he was persuaded that China's small farms would be taken away 
from the hated landlords and divided among the people. This is the 
first stage of every Communist upheaval. Next comes a reign of terror 
calculated to liquidate the entire class of landlords and small shop- 
keepers. Communist China, almost literally wading in blood, had 
reached this second phase in 1951, the "year of violence." Mass trials 
were held in which the People's Tribunals, keyed up to a frenzy of 
fury, sentenced group after group of "Capitalist oppressors" to death 
without bothering about the evidence. The executions were public 
spectacles. An estimated million and a half of them took place in 
1951 alone as loudspeakers on street corners blared out first-hand 

Drives were organized for everything in Red China. So rapidly 
did they multiply that humorless Communist leaders saw no absurdity 
in announcing a new drive to reduce the number of drives. And when 
the Youth League tried too zealously to please, a drive was launched 
"to Correct the Undesirable Habit of Filing False Reports." n Under 
these circumstances it is understandable that great emphasis was 
placed on Red China's "Hate America" drive early in 1951. The 
illiterate masses were made to believe that Americans practiced all 
manner of bestialities, including even cannibalism. This was the 

" U.S. Military Academy, Operations in Korea, 28-29. 

"Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism {New Haven, 1955), 119, 307. 

The CCP January Offensive 

indoctrination of the CCF soldier in Korea, and political commissars 
with a captain's authority were attached to each company to see that 
no backsliding occurred. In case of doubt, it was a simple matter to 
compel the suspected political deviate to kneel at the roadside and 
await a bullet from behind. 

A Tactical Formula for Victory 

It might well be inquired where Red China raised the funds, for even 
wars waged with human cannon fodder do not come cheaply. Much 
°f the money was donated by new farm owners as "voluntary" contri- 
butions exceeding by far the rent and taxes of pre-Communist years. 
The slave labor of millions of Chinese sent to concentration camps also 
helped to foot the bill. In the long run, however, the Communist lords 
round perhaps their most effective means in the extortion of ransom 
"om Chinese living outside the country on pain of torturing or killing 
f elatiyes dwelling within its borders. Enormous sums were collected 
«J spite of the efforts of foreign governments to put an end to this 
form of secret terrorism." 

Altogether, the army of Red China may be appraised as a formidable 
instrument on terrain suited to its tactics. Several of America's fore- 
most military thinkers were convinced, nevertheless, that Eighth Army 
reverses of the first few months in Korea were the penalty paid for a 
national preoccupation with airborne atomic weapons at the expense 
of preparations for limited wars. 

It was only natural that the American public and its political and 
military leaders in Washington should have been much concerned 
about a weapon with the capability of wiping out a medium-size city 
in a minute." Their anxiety was heightened by President Truman's 
announcement on 23 September 1949 that Soviet Russia had exploded 
ari atomic bomb. A great many Americans, probably a majority, 
sincerely believed that it was hardly worthwhile to prepare for an old- 
rashioned limited war when the Armageddon of the future would be 
J^ u ght to an awesome finish with thermonuclear weapons. National 

y; and though we had every 

J 13 ' 

PMemiali^oM "hVT When the h >' dro S en bomb would havc a much greattr 

The East-Central Front 

opportunity to study Chinese tactics prior to 1950, few if any prepara- 
tions were made to cope with them. The outbreak of Korean hostilities 
found the four U.S. skeleton divisions in Japan woefully unready, 
both morally and materially. 

At a later date three high-placed U.S. Army generals, Matthew B. 
Ridgway, James M. Gavin, and Maxwell D. Taylor, would retire 
because they could not reconcile their views with a national policy 
which they interpreted as placing all our strategic eggs in the basket 
of intercontinental bombers and guided missiles. Afterwards, as 
advocates of preparedness for limited as well as atomic warfare, they 
published books presenting their side of the case.* 1 

On 15 January 1951 these developments were still in the future, 
of course. But even at the time it had already been made evident that 
the armed forces of Red China were not an exception to the age-old 
rule that there is no such thing as an invincible army. When they 
came up against well trained and led U.S. Army outfits in both of their 
offensives, they always had a fight on their hands and frequently 
a repulse. 

The Marines had proved beyond doubt in their Chosin Reservoir 
campaign that the Chinese Reds could be beaten by ground and air 
firepower engendered by sound training, discipline, and combat 
leadership. Five Chinese armies, of three or four divisions each, were 
identified in northeast Korea during the November-December opera- 
tions. Three of them were directly or indirectly opposed to the 1st 
Marine Division, with a U.S. Army battalion and smaller Army units 
attached. Yet the beleaguered American forces seized the initiative 
and fought their way for 13 days and 35 miles through enveloping 
CCF units which had cut the mountain MSR in five places. 

Throughout the CCF January offensive, eusak G-2 officers anx- 
iously sought every scrap of evidence as to the whereabouts of the 
five CCF armies identified in northeast Korea as late as 10 December. 
Even if reduced by casualties, they would have been a formidable and 
perhaps even decisive reinforcement to the seven CCF armies engaged. 
But they did not appear. Nor were they encountered again until the 
middle of March 1951, when similarly numbered units filled with 
replacements reached the front. 

■" Gen M. B. Ridgway, Memoirs (New York, 1956) ; Gen J. M. Gavin, War md 
Peace «/feJ,J«^ e (New York, 1958) ; Gen M, D. Taylor, Tie Uncertain Trumpet 

The CCP January Offensive 


The full story may never be known, since the Chinese Reds are not 
fond of acknowledging their disasters. But it is a likely conjecture 
that the fatal combination of Marine firepower and General Winter 
created terrible havoc among Communists who had been so certain 
of an immediate victory that they were neither armed, clothed, nor 
supplied for a 13-day campaign in subzero weather. 

634000 O-62-i 


The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 

The New Marine Zone of Operations — 1st MAW Moves to 
Bofu — Marine Rice Paddy Patrols — Operations thun- 
derbolt and roundup — Action in the Pohang-Andong 
Zone— -KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division— 10th 
Npka Division Scattered — New Mission for the Marines 

ON 15 January 1951 a reinforced regiment of the U.S. 25th 
Infantry Division drove northward from Line D (Map 4) to 
a point about half a mile from Suwon in the I Corps sector. VMF-212, 
flying from the CVE Bataan, supported the movement along with 
land- based Air Force planes. No CCF troops were encountered during 
a two-day thrust dignified with the name Operation wolfhound. Its 
only importance lay in its distinction as the first Eighth Army counter- 
stroke in reply to the enemy's January offensive. Other eusak ad- 
vances were soon to follow, each more ambitious than the last and 
bearing a more bristling code name. 

General Ridgway proposed by this means to exert continual and 
^creasing pressure on an enemy paying for victory with extended 
Su pply lines. Meanwhile, he hoped to build up the morale of his own 
troops without asking too much of them at first. 

In less than seven weeks, from 1 December 1950 to 15 January 1951, 
the Eighth Army had been pushed back an average distance of 200 
niiles. Never before in the Nation's history had an American army 
given up so much ground and equipment in so short a time, and 
damage to morale was inevitable. Yet the commanding general was 
confident that a cure would be effected by better combat leadership 
a nd discipline. He planned to emphasize the need for these remedies 
until he restored the Eighth Army to tactical health. 



The East-Central Front 

The New Marine lone of Operations 

Ridgway agreed with Marine generals that the 1st Marine Division 
had come out of its 13-day battle in the Chosin Reservoir area with its 
fighting spirit undulled. Minor respiratory ills seemed to be the only 
consequences felt by the survivors. "A hacking cough," recalled a 
Marine staff officer long afterwards, "was the symbol of the Bean 
Patch." 1 

Such ills soon responded to rest and medical care, and it was a 
physically fit division that made the move to the new zone of opera- 
tions. About one man out of three in the infantry and artillery 
battalions was a newcomer to Korea, These replacements were shap- 
ing up nicely, and the new operation promised to be ideal combat 

The move took nearly a week. While the other troops proceeded by 
motor, LSTs 898 and 914 sailed with elements of the Tank, Ordnance, 
Engineer, and Service Battalions. The Division CP opened at Sinhung 
(Map 5), about 5 miles southeast of Pohang, on 16 January. By the 
following day all designated motor and water lifts were completed. 

On the 18th the Marines were assigned a three-fold mission by 
Division OpnO 3-51: (l) the protection of the Pohang-Kyongju- 
Andong MSR (main supply route) ; (2) the securing of Andong and 
the two airstrips in the vicinity; and (3) the prevention of hostile 
penetrations in force to the south of the Andong- Yongdok road. The 
following zones of patrol responsibility were assigned to Marine units: 

Zone A— RCT-1: an area about 10 miles east and west of the 
Uisong-Andong road, including both Uisong and Andong. 

Zone B — RCT-5: an area some 15 to 20 miles wide astride the 
Kyongju-Yongchon-Uisong road, including Kyongju but excluding 

Zone C — RCT-7 : an area 20 to 25 miles wide from east to west 
and extending north from the latitude of Pohang to the Andong- 
Yongdok road. 

Zone D— 11th Marines: a strip seven miles wide along the coast 
astride the road from Pohang to a point about 10 miles north of 

Zone £ — 1st Tank Battalion: the area bounded by the road from 

1 MajGen F. M. McAlister Itr, 17 Jun 57. 



The East-Central Front 

Pohang to Kyongju and thence to the east coast at a point about 19 
miles southeast of Pohang, 

Keeping open the 75-mile stretch of MSR from Pohang to Andong 
was considered the principal mission of the Division. Strong points 
were set up at Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong. 

Captured documents indicated that enemy forces in unknown num- 
bers had already infiltrated through gaps in the eastern sectors of the 
Eighth Army's Line D. Guerrilla activity was reported as far west as 
Tanyang, on the MSR of IX Corps, and as far south as Taejon, 
threatening the supply line of I Corps, Train ambushes occurred on 
13 January in the Namchang area and to the south of Wonju, Other 
attacks took place on the rail line about 60 miles north of Taegu. 
In expectation of further attempts, trains were provided with a sand- 
bagged car, pushed ahead of the engine, to absorb the shock of land- 
mine explosions. Another car was occupied by guards who had the 
duty of dealing with direct guerrilla attacks. 2 

The tactical problem of the Marines was quite simple— on paper. 
About 1,600 square miles, most of them standing on end in moun- 
tainous terrain, were included in the new zone of operations. The 
experience of World War II had demonstrated how effective guerrilla 
warfare could be as an adjunct to large-scale military operations. 
Officers of the 1st Marine Division had no illusions about their 
mission, therefore, when they received unconfirmed reports of nkpa 
guerrilla infiltrations behind the eusak lines toward Andong. 

All uncertainty vanished on 18 January, shortly after the issuing of 
OpnO 3-51, when a patrol of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, flushed 
out an undetermined number of North Korean troops east of Andong. 
They took to their heels so earnestly that the Marines barely managed 
to catch three of them after a long chase. 

The prisoners identified their unit as the 27th Infantry of the NKPA 
10th Infantry Division. The other two regiments, the 25th and 29th, 
were also in the general area. All three were supported more in 
theory than fact by artillery, mortar, medical, and engineer units 
organic to the division. In reality, however, the estimated total of 
6,000 troops consisted largely of infantry. A few mortars, according 
to the prisoners, were the largest weapons. 

Following the Inchon-Seoul operation, the remnants of the badly 
mauled nkpa 10th Infantry Division had straggled back across the 

"eusak Cmd Rpt, Jan 51. 

The Pobang Guerrilla Hunt 


38th Parallel to the Hwachon area. There they were reorganized by 
the Chinese for guerrilla operations and placed under the command 
of Nkpa Major General Lee Ban Nam. 3 

Late in December the rebuilt division, still short of arms and equip- 
ment, departed Hwachon with a mission of infiltrating through the 
UN lines to cut communications and harass rear installations of the 
Andong-Taegu area. Shots were exchanged with United Nations 
troops near Wonju, but General Lee Ban Nam and his troops con- 
trived to slip to the east through the mountains. Stealthily moving 
southward, marching by night and hiding by day, they were soon in a 
position to heckle the rear of the X Corps sector. This advantage did 
not last long. Before they could strike a blow, the element of surprise 
was lost along with the three prisoners taken by the Marines. 

As the Marine units moved into their assigned zones, General Ridg- 
way flew to Pohang to confer with General Smith. Not only did he 
express confidence that the Marines would soon have the situation well 
under control; he also suggested the possibility of small amphibious 
landings along the east coast. The purpose was to block a possible 
southward advance of the three CCF armies that had operated in 
Northeast Korea during the Chosin Reservoir campaign. 4 

The east coast littoral was considered the most likely route of 
approach. Smith was of the opinion, however, that an amphibious 
landing should be made in strength, if at all. And there the matter 
rested. 5 

Is/ MAW Moves to Bofu 

During the operations of the first few days the Marine ground forces 
had to depend for air support on feaf planes sent by JOC. The 1st 
Marine Aircraft Wing had its hands full at this time with house- 
keeping activities. Work began at Bofu (Map 3) on 20 January as a 
Seabee detachment arrived with its graders and bulldozers. They were 
fist ed by details of Marines from MAG-33. 8 

* IstMarDiv Periodic Intelligence Report (P/fl) 87-94, 17-22 Jan 51. 
of ir 111 ' 5 °f these armies, it may be recalled, were not identified again in the CCF order 
5 battle before the middle of March 1951. Until that time, the possibility of these 
nerny troops being used for a surprise stroke had to be taken into consideration. 
B iwmth, Notes, 1339. 

O, r s see'ion, unless otherwise stated, is based on the January historical diaries of 
S££UMM[ organizations: 1st MAW; MAG-33; MAG-12; VMF-312; VMF-214; 
l c , 3 , 23; VMF(N)-513; VMF(N)~542; MWSS-t ; FMFPae. Another source is 
mm Interim Rpt No, 2, II, 969. 


The East-Central Front 

The job went ahead with typical Seabee efficiency. While specialists 
installed plumbing for the galleys and barracks, other crews graded 
taxiways, laid pierced steel planking, and poured concrete to patch up 
runways, parking ramps, and warmup aprons. 

MAG-12 kept busy at the task of moving men and equipment 
from Itami and other Japanese fields to Korea. Aircraft of VMR-152, 
commanded by Colonel Deane C. Roberts, provided transportation. 
Since safety measures precluded the use of the K-l runway during 
construction activity, K-9 substituted temporarily. As fast as the 
planes unloaded, passengers and gear were trucked 15 miles through 
Pusan to K-l. 

It was a transition period in more ways than one for the 1st MAW. 
Following are the changes of commanders that took place during the 
last 2 weeks of January: 

Colonel Radford C. West, relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Fontana 
as commanding officer of MAG— 33; 

Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Cole, joined MAG- 3 3 staff as personnel 
officer after being relieved of VMF-312 command by Major Donald P. 
Frame ; 

Major Arnold A, Lund of VMF-323, relieved by Major Stanley S. Nicolay 
and assigned to General Harris' staff as assistant operations officer; 

Major William M. Lundin, relieved of VMF-214 command by Major 
James A, Feeney, Jr., and transferred to the command of Service and Mainte- 
nance Squadron-3 3 (SMS— 33). 

This left only Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski of 
VMF-212 and Lieutenant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr., of 
VMF(N)-542 still in command of the tactical squadrons they brought 
to Korea; and the latter was to be relieved by Lieutenant Colonel 
James R. Anderson in February. 

The only combat operations of the 1st MAW during the week of 
housekeeping from 16 to 23 January were carried out by VMF-212 
from the deck of the Bat dan? This CVL carrier alternated with the 
British light fleet carrier HMS Theseus on the Korean west coast 
blockade. Their activities were coordinated by Vice Admiral An- 
drewes, RN, commanding the group blockading the Korean west 

VMF-212 sent out a morning and afternoon reconnaissance flight 

'VMF-212 HD, Jan 51; USS Emaan (CVL-29) Action Rpt, "Operations off the 
West Coast sf Korea, 15 Jan-7 Apr 51 ;" USS Bttaan WD, Jan 51 ; Col R. W. Wyczaw- 
ski, interv of 2 Jun 58. 

The Pohang Guerrilla Htmt 


each day up the coastline as far as the 39th parallel. On the trip 
north the pilots scanned the coastal waters for small enemy shipping 
which might indicate reinforcement from Chinese ports on the Yellow 
Sea, The return trip along the highways and railroads of the littoral 

was made to detect signs of any new enemy activity on land. Four 
aircraft flew each of the two coastal sweeps; eight maintained a 
defensive patrol over the carrier itself; and any remaining flights 
were under control of JOC, with ffaf Mosquitoes providing liaison 
between fighter- bombers and ground forces. 

To insure sea room beyond the islands and mudbanks of the west 
coast, the Bat nan liad to stay outside the 100-fathom curve. This meant 
that the pilots must fly across 65 to 80 miles of open sea in order to 
reach the coast. The winter weather varied from unbelievable to 
unbearable, and bulky, uncomfortable survival suits were a necessity. 
They could be a death trap, however, if a leak developed or if they 
were not adjusted tightly at the throat and wrists. Captain Alfred H. 
Agan, for instance, was shot down southeast of Inchon and had to 
choose between landing in enemy territory and ditching in the sea. 
He tried for a small island offshore but crash-landed into the surf. 
Before a helicopter from the Bataan could fly 65 miles to the rescue, he 
died from the shock of icy water which partially filled his survival suit. 

The pilots of VMF-212 reported an increase in enemy antiaircraft 
fire, particularly in CCF rear areas. They were amazed to find troops 
dug in along the coast as far back as 50 or 60 miles from the battle 
lines. These precautions were the enemy's tribute to Marine capabili- 
ties for amphibious warfare. The fear of another Inchon caused the 
Chinese to immobilize thousands of men on both coasts to guard 
against another such decisive landing far behind the front. 

On the squadron's third day of sea operations, three planes were 
hit by rifle and machine gun fire on reconnaissance missions. One of 
them, flown by Captain Russell G. Patterson, Jr., was shot down 
behind the enemy lines but a FEAF helicopter rescued the pdot. First 
Lieutenant Alfred J. Ward was not so fortunate. His plane was 
riddled the following day by enemy fire and he crashed to his death 
$ the midst of CCF soldiers. 

Not until 22 January did the reconditioning of Bofu reach such an 
advanced stage that Lieutenant Colonel Fori tan a could set up his 
MAG-33 command post. VMF-312 moved in the next day and the 
first combat missions were launched to the vicinity of Seoul, 300 miles 


The East-Central Front 

away. On the 24th General Harris established his headquarters. A 
few hours later VMF-214 and VMF-323 arrived from Itami, where 
they had put in an idle week, -with no place to go, after their carrier 
duty. On the 26th, when they flew their first missions as land-based 
squadrons, MAG-33 was back in business and Bofu was a going 

No such claim could have been made for MAG-12 and K-l. 
Although Colonel Boeker C. Batterton set up his command post on 
27 January 1951, two more weeks were to pass before the K-l runway 
was fit for the flights to tactical aircraft. Meanwhile, the MAG-12 
squadrons had to make out as best they could at K-9. 

Marine Rice Paddy Patrols 

Operations of the first few days demonstrated to 1st Marine Division 
ground forces that locating the enemy was more of a problem than 
defeating him. Obviously, the NKPA 10th Division had few if any 
of the advantages which make for effective guerrilla warfare. Far 
from receiving any voluntary support from the inhabitants, the Korean 
Reds had their own movements promptly reported to the Marines. 
Retaliations on civilians, such as burning mountain villages, were not 
calculated to improve relations. Nor did the enemy possess any of the 
other requisites for successful operations in an opponent's rear — 
a base, a source of supply, good communications, and a reliable 
intelligence system. 

If it came to a fight, there could be little doubt about the outcome. 
But Marine staff officers must have been reminded of the old recipe 
for rabbit pie which begins, "First, catch your rabbit." 

Such a situation called for systematic patrolling in all Marine zones 
of action. Secondary roads and mountain trails were covered by "rice 
paddy patrols." Numbering from four men to a squad, these groups 
ranged far and wide on foot in an area that was more often vertical 
than horizontal. On a single day the 5th Marines alone had 29 of 
these rice paddy patrols in action. 8 No better training for replacements 
could have been devised. Sometimes the men were on their own for 
several days, depending for supplies on helicopter drops. And while 

'SthMar WD, Jan-Feb 51. 

The Pohang Guerrilla Hum 

casualties were light, there was just enough clanger from sniping and 
potential ambushes to keep the replacements on the alert. 

Roads fit for vehicles— especially the 75-mile stretch of MSR from 
Pohang to Andong — were under the constant surveillance of motor- 
ized patrols, each supported by at least one tank or 105mm howitzer. 
The farthest distance was 15 miles between the main Marine strong 
points at Pohang, Yongchon, Uisong, and Andong." 

Close air support was seldom needed against such an elusive enemy 
as the Marines faced. General Craig put in a recjuest, however, for 
an air squadron to be based at Pohang or Pusan (Map 2). The two 
Marine all-weather squadrons, VMF(N)-513 and VMF(N)-542, 
were General Harris* first and second choices. They had been flying 
under Air Force (314th Air Division) control in the defense of Japan, 
a mission of dull routine and waiting for something to break the 
monotony of patrolling. 

The twin-engined F7F-3N Tigercats of VMF(N)-542 were well 
equipped with electronics equipment for night interceptor work. 
VMF{N)-513 flew F4U-5Ns, the night-fighter modificatio n of the 
latest Corsair. 10 

General Harris' plan for VMF(N)-542 to take over the duties of 
VMF(N)-513 at Itazuke had the approval of General Partridge. 
This made it possible to send the latter squadron to K-9 at Pusan to 
replace the VMF-311 jets, which in turn left for Itami to await correc- 
tions of engineering defects. 

VMF(N)-513 flew its first combat missions from K-9 on 22 Janu- 
ary. These consisted of routine armed reconnaissance flights and an 
occasional deep support mission for the Eighth Army. Not until the 
25 th did the squadron respond to a request from Marine ground 
forces. And out of 49 combat missions (110 sorties) during the 
remaining 6 days of the month, only three (10 sorties) were in support 
of the 1st Marine Division. 

For routine operations the Marine ground forces found the support 
of VMO-6 sufficient. The nimble little OY observation planes were 
ideal for seeking out an enemy who had to be caught before he could 
be fought. And die helicopters did their part by dropping supplies, 
evacuating casualties, and laying wire. 

MstMarDiv HD, Jan 51. 
The remainder of this section, except when otherwise noted, is based on IstMAW 
f7°. Jan 51 and VMF(N)-513 HD, Jan 51. See Glossary in Appendix A for explana- 
tions of aircraft designations. 


The East-Central Front 

Meanwhile, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing strengthened its adminis- 
trative ties with the 1st Marine Division, Although the two organiza- 
tions had no common operational commander other than General 
MacArthur, they maintained a close liaison. Harris attached two 
TBM Avengers to VMO-6 for use as radio relays when ground-to- 
ground communications failed in the mountainous Pohang-Andong 
area. He also set up daily courier flights, at General Smith's request, 
to provide fast administrative liaison between widely dispersed Marine 
air and ground units in Korea and Japan. 

Operations thunderbolt and roundup 

On 25 January two corps of the Eighth Army jumped off in Operation 
thunderbolt. Advancing side by side, I Corps and IX Corps had 
orders to launch limited objective attacks and regain solid contact with 
the enemy, who was obviously preparing for a new offensive. 

The eusak commander moved his CP from Taegu to Chonan 
(Map 1), the I Corps headquarters, in order to maintain personal 
control of the operation. He requested the Navy to step up offshore 
patrolling on the west coast as left-flank protection. Emphasis was also 
placed on aerial reconnaissance, both visual and photographic, as well 
as deep support directed by the Mosquitoes. 

Even VMF(N)-542 at Itazuke had orders to conduct long flights 
to Seoul and maintain continuous patrols to report any attempt of the 
enemy to retire across the frozen Han River. The F7F-3N pilots shot 
up camp areas, convoys, and other lucrative targets but found no indi- 
cations of large-scale crossings over the ice." So varied were the mis- 
sions of the squadron that it came as no surprise to be assigned to naval 
gunfire spotting for the USS St. Paul and the other British and Ameri- 
can cruisers shelling Inchon. 

All Marine tactical squadrons were m action on 28 January for the 
first time since December, Nearly two-thirds of the flights from Bofu 
and K-9 were diverted from armed reconnaissance to troop support 
A typical operation was carried out by four VMF-312 planes on their 
second day of duty at Bofu. After reporting to mellow they were 
directed to Mosquito Cobalt, which had received a message that enemy 
troops were hiding in a village just north of Suwon, occupied that day 

" VMF(N)-542 HO, Jan 51. 

Guerrilla Hunt 


by the U.S. 35th Infantry. Under the Mosquito's direction tliey 
bombed, strafed, and napalmed some 40 buildings containing CCF 
soldiers. 12 

The fall of Suwon opened the way to Inchon and Seoul as Chinese 
resistance stiffened. Eighth Army progress was anything but reckless, 
but Ridgway had served notice on the enemy that he held the initiative 
and intended to keep it. Operation ROUNDUP followed on the heels 
of thunderbolt. Merely a change in name was involved, for the 
advance continued at the same prudent pace without any important 

Action in the Pobang-Andong Zone 

The Marines in the Pohang-Andong zone had their first brush with the 
elusive enemy on 22 January. A patroi of the 1st Battalion, 1st 
Marines, flushed out a guerrilla force near Mukkye-dong, several miles 
southeast of Andong (Map 5). Captain Robert P. Wray's Charlie 
Company deployed for action at sunset and shots were exchanged. The 
Marines had no casualties and the enemy could not have suffered many 
losses before he disappeared into the winter dusk. 

Even at this early date the Korean Reds seemed to have lost confi- 
dence tn their guerrilla operations. In a message dated 23 January 
taken from a prisoner, the commanding general of the II NKPA Corps 
directed General Lee Ban Nam to withdraw if possible. It read as 

Get all of your troops out of the enemy encirclement and withdraw to 
north of Pyongchang without delay. Liaison team sent with radio. If you 
will inform us of your escape route we will assist by clearing your advance. 
If you cannot escape, stay in the rear of enemy as guerrillas. 18 

By the 24th an enemy drift southeast from the zones of the 1st and 
5th Marines to 7th Marines territory was apparent. The 1 /7 command 
post and Company A received scattered mortar fire late that afternoon. 
Action picked up the next morning when dawn brought an attack by 
an estimated 100 guerrillas on the regimental command post. After 
a brisk 90-minute fire fight the Korean Reds withdrew to the east, 
leaving seven dead behind and taking with them an unknown number 
of wounded. 

"-VMF-312 HD, Jan 51. 
^IstMarDiv FIR U6, End 1. 


The East-Central Front 

Later that morning the 7th Marines teamed up with the National 
Police against the Chiso-dong area. Nine bodies were counted as the 
3d battalion seized its objective, but 1/7 was slowed by an entrenched 
enemy who offered an unyielding defense. The Marine battalion 
ground to a halt just one mile short of Chiso-dong and dug in for 
the night as artillery continued to pound the enemy. The arr strikes 
on the 25th were flown by VMF(N)-513 and VMF-323, both based 
at K-9, but the pilots could not contact the FAC and had to make 
dummy runs over the enemy. 

Marine planes and artillery cleared the way on 26 January as 1/7 
advanced against scattered opposition. Nearly 400 guerrillas put up 
a ragged and futile resistance, but by 1530 Marine firepower prevailed 
and Chiso-dong was taken. The 2d Battalion had meanwhile occupied 
Hapton-ni, eight miles southeast of Topyong-dong (Map 5). A light 
enemy counterattack was repulsed with ease," Altogether, enemy 
casualties for the day amounted to 161 KIA or POW. 

The VMF-323 flight led by Captain Don H. Fisher and Captain 
Floyd K. Fulton's VMF(N)-513 flight merit recognition as the first 
successful instance of Marine air-ground cooperation since the Chosin 
Reservoir campaign. 

While the 7th Marines served eviction notices on the enemy in its 
area, action elsewhere was light. Task Force Puller u ' hastened on the 
26th to Chongja-dong, seven miles northeast of Uisong, to investigate 
a police report that 300 enemy had seized the town. A Marine attack, 
following an artillery preparation, was planned for 1500. Captain 
Thomas J. Bohannon led Able Company in but discovered that the 
shells had fallen on empty huts." 

During the next few days the rice paddy patrols continued to range 
over the countryside, searching out the enemy. Combat units were 
sent to areas where the G-2 red arrows indicated an nkpa butld-up. 
On the morning of the 29th, the 5th Marines tried to organize an 
attack on a large enemy force reported near Chachon-dong, 12 miles 
west of Topyong-dong. Captain Jack R. Jones' Charlie Company, 
moving out at night in small foot patrols to maintain secrecy, scoured 
the area in an attempt to pin down the enemy. 

14 HDs of IstMarDiv, 7thMar, VMF(N)-513, and VMF-323 for Jan 51. 

''Organized from units of RCT-1 on 25 January when Colonel Puller was promoted 
to the rank of brigadier general. On that date Colonel McAlister assumed command of 

" IstMarDiv HD, Jan 50, 11. 

The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 

Marine intelligence reports had warned of a dawn raid on the town 
for the purpose of plundering food from the inhabitants and arms 
from the Korean police station. First Lieutenant Richard J. Schening, 
executive officer, led a scouting force ahead of the main body to 
teconnoiter the area. He urged that a trap be set for the enemy, and 
the company commander has left a description of one of the most 
elaborate ambushes ever attempted by the Marines during the war: 

Well before daylight, a cordon was stealthily braided around Chachon- 
dong and we settled down to await the raiders. A later daylight inspection 
of the deployment showed that the men had done a splendid job of locating 
themselves so as to avoid detection. They were concealed under porches, 
beneath the brambles, and in the heaviest foliage and trees. But no guerrilla 
attack materialized, probably due to a "grapevine" warning of our movement 
and intent. . . . During the remaining days in the village we conducted ex- 
tensive patrolling in an attempt to catch at least one guerrilla for our effort. 
Patrols were kept small to maintain secrecy. We even dressed Marines in 
clothing worn by the "locals" and sent them out in the hills with wood- 
gathering details. Larger patrols up to a platoon in size were sent on combat 
missions at night. One thing was certain: it was easier to talk about captur- 
ing guerrillas than it was to lay a hand on them." 

The elusiveness of the enemy could not always be credited to effec- 
tive guerrilla tactics. Often it was due to distaste for combat. As 
evidence of low nkpa morale, Major Yu Dung Nam, a battalion com- 
mander, was condemned to death and shot late in January because he 
planned to surrender, according to POW testimony. Rations were 
at a bare subsistence level and typhus had claimed many victims. 18 

Unrelenting Marine pressure throughout the first week of February 
w ore the guerrillas down until groups larger than 50 men were seldom 
encountered. On the 3d an NKPA second lieutenant surrendered volun- 
tarily to a RCT-7 patrol and brought three of his men with him. 
Nkpa morale had sunk so low, he divulged, that all ranks were 
striving only for survival. The division commander, Major General 
Lee Ban Nam, had apparently become a victim of acute melancholia. 
He spent nearly all his time, according to the prisoner, in the solitude 
of foxholes dug into the slopes of hills for added protection. There 
he brooded constantly over his predicament, but without arriving at 
any better solution than alternate hiding and flight. 1 " 

Certainly the military situation didn't offer much to gladden this 

"Maj j. R, Jones Itr, 24 Jun 57. 

u JstMarDiv PIR 105, 5 Feb 51 ; IstMarDiv HD, Jan 51, U. 


The East-Central Front 

Hamlet of the rice paddies, and the Marines continued to give him 
fresh causes for pessimism. His footsore remnants eluded RCT-5 
only to stumble into the zone of RCT-1, northeast of Uisong. Neither 
rest nor sanctuary awaited them, for the 1st and 2d battalions pene- 
trated into the mountains near Sangyong to surprise and rout a force 
estimated at 400 men.-" 

KMC Regiment Joins 1st Marine Division 

Late in January the 1st KMC Regiment got into the fight after being 
attached once more to the 1st Marine Division by a eusak dispatch 
of the 21st. Lieutenant Colonel Charles W, Harrison headed a new 
group of Division liaison and advisory officers as the four KMC 
battalions moved out from Chinhae by LST and truck convoy to the 
Pohang area. Division OpnO 4-51 (26 January) assigned the regi- 
ment Sector F, astride the Yongdok-Andong road, which had been 
carved out of Sectors C and D, held by the 7th and 11th Marines 
respectively. The KMCs were ordered to conduct daily patrolling from 
positions near Yongdok, Chaegok-tong, and Chinandong and prevent 
enemy concentrations in their sector." 

Although the ROK Army and Eighth Army had the responsibility 
for supplying the KMCs, it proved necessary for the 1st Marine Divi- 
sion to cope with some of the gaps in equipment and rations. Contrary 
to a prevalent Western belief, Koreans did not subsist on a diet of 
rice alone. They were accustomed to having "side dishes" with their 
rice, such as eggs, meat, fish, or vegetables. Colonel Kim Sung Eun, 
the regimental commander, had an allotment of money for these 
purchases, but the sum was insufficient to meet inflation prices even if 
there had been enough food left in a district eaten bare, As a conse- 
quence, the KMCs had to get along on a monotonous and vitamin-poor 
diet until the ROK Army belatedly came to the rescue with issues of 
food for side dishes. 

On 29 January the KMC Regiment opened its CP at Yongdok. 
Regimental OpnO 1 of that date divided Sector F into three parts, 
assigning the western, central, and eastern subsectors to the 3d, 1st, 

IstMar WD, Feb 51. 

11 References to the 1st KMC Rej>t in this chapter are bused on Smith, Notes, 1450- 
1458, and Col C, "W. Harrison, Narrative, n.d., 1-15. Previous periods of KMC attach- 
ment to the lstMarDiv are described in Vols I, Ii, and III of this series. 

The Pobang Guerrilla Hunt 


and 2d Battalions respectively. The 5th Battalion was attached to the 
1st Marines and assigned to patrolling operations in the Andong area."" 
The first few days of February saw a brief flurry of activity before 
Nkpa guerrilla resistance breathed its last gasps. Reports chat the 
iemnants of the nkpa 25th and 27th Regiments were in flight toward 
the zone of the 5th Marines led to a concentration for a knockout 
blow, but the enemy stole away to the north in the vicinity of 
Topyong-dong. There he discovered that he bad jumped from the 
frying pan into the fire. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines 
closed in from one side while the 1st and 3d Battalions of the KMC 
Regiment blocked roads in the vicinity of Samgo-ri and Paekcha- 
dong. Only a wild flight in small groups saved the guerrillas from 

The nearest approach to effective nkpa resistance was encountered 
on 5 February after the 1st and 2d KMC Battalions had established 
blocking positions in zone at the request of the 7th Marines, which 
was driving the enemy northward. A platoon-size patrol of the 2d 
KMC Battalion came up against Korean Reds dug in with 81mm 
fnortars and heavy and tight machine guns a few miles southwest of 
Vongdok. The KMCs were scattered with losses of 1 KIA, 8 WIA, 
and 24 MIA in addition to all arms and equipment, though the missing 
men returned later. 

It was the single nkpa success of the entire campaign. 

An assault was launched the following morning on this enemy 
stronghold by a composite KMC battalion, supported by four 
VMF(N)-513 aircraft which attacked with rockets and bombs. The 
largest combat of the guerrilla hunt appeared to be in the making, 
but again the enemy vanished after putting up an ineffectual resistance 
with small arms and mortars.- 3 

An unusual air tactic was tested on 4 February in the 7th Marines 
zone when an interpreter in an R4D plane hailed the guerrillas by loud 
speaker in their own language with a demand that they surrender or 
suffer the consequences. Marine fighter- bombers were on station to 
back the threat, and about 150 supposed nkpa soldiers came in with 
uplifted hands while VMF-323 planes delivered the consequences to 
the holdouts in the form of bombs, rockets, and napalm. Unfortu- 

^ What would normally have been the 4th KMC Battalion was designated the 5th 
feeause the Korean word for 4th is the same as the word for death and is considered 

" Col C. W. Harrison, Nottaihe, VMF(N)-51i HD, Feb 51. 

<> 34(140 O-W-l 

56 The East-Central From 

nately, it developed that practically all of the prisoners were terrified 
civilians seeking an escape from the slave labor imposed upon them 
by the 

Wth NKPA Division Scattered 

Reports of enemy activity were received daily from Korean civilians 
and police, and seidom was a smaller number than "about two 
thousand" mentioned. In reality, Marine patrols had difficulty in 
tracking down as many as ten of the skulking, half-starved fugitives 
split up into small bands hiding in the hills. On 5 February the 
situation was summed up by General Smith in reply to a EUS4K request 
for an estimate of the time required to complete the Marine mission: 

The original 10th NKPA Div forces in the 1st Marine Division area have 
been dispersed into many groups, reduced to an effective strength of 40 per 
cent, and are no longer capable of a major effort while dispersed. ... It is 
considered that the situation in the Division area is sufficiently in hand to 
permit the withdrawal of the Division and the assignment of another mission 
at any time a new force to be assigned the responsibility for the area assumes 
such responsibility and the 1st Marine Division can be reassembted. 2r ' 

Patrolling continued as usual in all Marine regimental zones during 
the second week in February. Some units, such as the 11th Marines 
and the Division Reconnaissance Company, had made few enemy 
contacts throughout the operation. But at least the cannoneers had 
found good pheasant hunting and enjoyed a change in the bill of fare. 

It was just as well that the tactical situation seldom made it necessary 
to call for air support at this stage, since the 1st MAW was once 
again in the throes of moves which will be described in the following 
chapter. Bofu had been only a temporary base for MAG-33 squadrons 
which were making another transfer to K-9 while MAG- 12 completed 
its shift to K-l. 

VMO-6 took care of the reduced air requirements of the Division 
adequately. Another helicopter "first" was scored when First Lieu- 
tenant John L. Scott received credit for the first night casualty evacua- 
tion by a HTL (Bell), which then had no instruments for night 

" VMF-M5 HD, Feb 51. 
"'Smith, Notes, 1378. 

The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt 


flying. For a harrowing moment, however, it would be hard to beat 
the experience of Captain Clarence W. Parkins and Corpsman R. 13. 
Krisky. While they were flying a casualty to the hospital ship Con- 
solation, the patient became wildly delirious. It took the combined 
efforts of pilot and corpsman to subdue him and make a safe landing."" 

Any excitement would have been welcomed by the troops in general. 
For the area was as tranquil as if the guerrillas had never troubled 
its snowbound heights. Recently arrived Marines might have been 
pardoned for concluding that the nkpa 10th Division and its gloomy 
commander were but creatures of the imagination— phantoms to be 
compared to the crew of the Flying Dutchman, that legendary ship 
condemned to sail on endlessly until the Day of Judgment. The nkpa 
10th Division also seemed doomed to perpetual flight as its ghostly 
survivors made their way from crag to crag of the remote ridgelines. 

Thanks to the rice paddy patrols, the replacements were ready for 
combat and the Division was organizing a rotation draft for return 
to the States. Five officers and 600 men had already been selected on 
a basis of combat time, wounds received, and length of service. Major 
General Edward A. Craig, who commanded the first Marines to land 
m Korea, was given a farewell dinner and congratulated on his 
second star, Two new brigadier generals were named, with Lewis B, 
"Chesty" Puller relieving Craig as ADC and Gregon A. Williams 
accompanying him on the voyage back to the States. Captain Eugene R. 

Bud" Hering, (MC) USN, was also returning with the gratitude of 
all Marines for his care of casualties in the "frozen Chosin" campaign.- 7 

All Marine missions in the guerrilla hunt had been successfully 
accomplished, so that the Division could be relieved at any time by the 
2 d ROK Division. There were 120 counted enemy dead and 184 
prisoners. Only estimates are available for the wounded, but there is 
n ° doubt that the total nkpa casualties were crippling. At any rate, 
the nkpa 10th Division was destroyed as a fighting force without 
a ccomplishing any of its objectives. Marine casualties from 18 January 
to 15 February were L9 KIA, 7 DOW, 10 MIA, 148 WIA, and 
V51 of a nonbattle classification, largely frostbite cases soon restored 
to duty. 28 

*VMCM5 HD, Feb 51. 
Smith, Soles, 1369. 

IstMarDiv Periodic Operations Report (FOR) 18 Jan-lJ Feb 51. 71-159. 



The East-Centrd Front 

New Mission for the Marines 

On 11 February, General Smith flew to Taegu to discuss the next 
Marine mission with General Ridgway. The eusak commander spoke 
favorably of employing the 1st Marine Division to relieve the 24th 
Infantry Division in the critical Han River corridor, where recent UN 
advances had been made. He also recognized the advantages of 
committing the Marines to the east coast, so that they could be held 
in readiness foi an amphibious operation. A third possibility was the 
Yoju corridor of the IX Corps zone (Map 1). As "the most power- 
ful division in Korea," said Ridgway, "the Marines would be 
astride what he considered the logical route for an expected enemy 
counterthrust." 2 " 

No decision was reached that day. At midnight the CCF attack 
materialized; and the central front was the area of decision, as Ridg- 
way had predicted. 

Naturally, the next mission for the Marines had to be reconsidered 
in the light of this development. On 12 February eusak warning 
orders alerted the 1st Marine Division to be prepared to move to 
Chung ju, in the rear area of the IX Corps front where the heaviest 
CCF attacks were taking place. The Division was further directed 
to make an immediate reconnaissance of the Chungju area while the 
1st KMC Regiment prepared for a move to Samchok on the east coast 
and attachment to the ROK Capitol Division. The following day 
brought orders from the Eighth Army to initiate these movements 
on 15 February 195 l.™ Thus the Pohang-Andong guerrilla hunt 
came to an end with the Marines on their way to new employment 
in the battle line of the Eighth Army, 

-"■Smith, Kales, 1441-1445. 
"IstMarDiv HD, Feb 51. 


Operation Killer 

The Move to the Chungju Area- — Marine Planes in Action 
— Planning for the New Operation — The Jump-Off on 
21 February — Stiffening of Chinese Resistance — General 
Smith in Command of IX Corps — The Advance to Phase 
Line Arizona — JOC Air Control System Criticized 

The ccf counterattack which began northeast of Wonju on 
11 February 1951 came in reaction to the unremitting pressure 
exerted during tbe previous month by the Eighth Army. Twice 
beaten during a recent six- week period and pushed back some 200 
miles, eusak had shown amazing powers of recuperation. 

"It is hard for me to put into words the magnificent competence, 
the fierce, combative, aggressive spirit of that force once it picked itself 
°ff the ground and waded back into the fight," commented General 
Ridgway in retrospect. 1 

During Operations thunderbolt and roundup he had kept a 
hght rein on the Eighth Army by insisting on vigorous artillery 
preparations and close lateral contacts between units. On 10 February, 
however, caution was relaxed as CCF resistance suddenly collapsed 
^est and south of Seoul, That day the U.S. 24th Infantry Division 
fo rged ahead 11,000 yards to occupy the port of Inchon and Kimpo 
-Airfield, both so wrecked that weeks of repair would be necessary to 
make them operational. Seoul was within sight of the U.S. forces 
°n the left bank of the Han when an aroused enemy struck back on 
the subzero night of the 11th. 

Apparently the CCF drive on the central front had as its objective 
the relieving of UN pressure on the Seoul area to the west. The CCF 

' RidgWily, Mem/ms, 216. 



The East-Central Front 

40th and 66th Armies and nkpa V Corps struck in the IX Corps sec 
tor north of Hoengsong (Map 6). Two ROK divisions being dis- 
lodged by the initial blows, their retreat made necessary the with- 
drawal of other IX Corps units. As a consequence, Hoengsong had 
to be abandoned on 12 February to the Communists hammering out a 
salient northeast of Wonju, a 

The UN forces were not bound by any unrealistic concept of hold- 
ing ground to the last ditch. General Ridgway deemed it more im- 
portant to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy at a minimum 
cost in casualties. While fighting on the defensive, he had already 
made up his mind to launch an offensive of his own to catch the 
Chinese off balance the moment their counterattack ground to a halt. 
His new limited objective operation emphasized the destruction of the 
enemy's fighting strength as the major objective rather than the acquisi- 
tion of territory. A high attrition rate would preclude the Communists' 
capacity to hold and enable eusak commander to recover the criti- 
cal hill mass north of Wonju. It was for this purpose, he in- 
formed Major General Bryant E. Moore, IX Corps commanding gen- 
eral, that the 1st Marine Division would be employed. 

"The force which holds Wonju," he said, "has the situation in 
hand." 3 

The Move to the Chung ju Area 

The 1st Marine Division had instructions to report its order of march 
to the Eighth Army, and to keep the Taegu headquarters informed 
of progress. Meanwhile, the Marines were to remain under EUSAK. 
operational control but would pass to IX Corps control at a date 
and hour to be announced. 

Genera! Puller flew to Chungju with a reconnaissance party on 
13 February to look over the road and select CP sites. On the follow- 
ing morning Major Walter Gall's Division Reconnaissance Company 
arrived at Chungju for patrol duty, and movement by rail and road 
commenced on the 15th in accordance with Division OpnO 5-51, issued 
the day before. 

The 1st Marines, with the 7th Motor Transport Battalion attached, 

a lX Corps Cmd Rpl, Feb 51; IstMarDiv HD. Feb 51; Smith, Notes, 1462-1465. 
"eusak Cmd Upt, Feb 51, Sec !, 52. Gommenis by Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret), 
liOct 57. and BrifcGen A. L. Bowser, H Feb 58, 

62 The East-Central front 

led the motor march, and the 5th and 7th Marines followed in that 
order. Tracked vehicles were outloaded by rail from Andong and 
Pohang in a total of 67 flat cars. Owing to a shortage of cars, Com- 
pany B and H&S Company of the 1st Tank Battalion made the move 
of 120 miles by road. These tankers claimed the all-time Marine 
Corps distance record for armor* 

While the Marine move was in progress, the CCF counterattack 
went on full blast along the central front. Driving southeast from 
the IX Corps area to the X Corps front, the Chinese cut off and sur- 
rounded the 23d Infantry of the 2d Infantry Division, USA. Colonel 
Paul Freemen and his men put up a fight that is one of the classics of 
the war. Supported by Marine and Air Force planes, they gave more 
fire than they received and held out until rescued by a tank column. 5 

February was also a transition period for Marine fighter squadrons 
which had been more or less on the move since the middle of January. 
Even before the transfer to Bofu, it had been decided that K-3, four 
miles south of Pohang, was to be the ultimate home of MAG-33- 
While awaiting completion of this field, VMFs-214, -312, and -323 
would find temporary lodging at K-l, near Pusan, recently assigned to 
MAG-12. 8 

On 6 February, Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, assistant 
commanding general of the 1st MAW, radioed General Harris that 
K-l would be ready to receive a squadron a day, starting on the 8th. 
Harris ordered Squadrons 323, 214, and 312 to make their moves 
on 8, 9, and 10 February respectively. Transport aircraft were to lift 
ground crews, extra pilots, and light equipment directly to K-l. 
Pilots had orders to fly combat missions en route. 

By the 13 th most of the vehicles, heavy equipment, and general 
supplies had been loaded on a train for Kobe, there to be transshipped 
on LSTs to Pohang. That same day Lieutenant Colonel Fontana set 
up his MAG-33 command post at K-3 and directed the three fighter 
squadrons to report from K-l. 

The new field occupied a bench overlooking a wide, sandy beach. 
Built originally by the Japanese, the strip had 5,200 feet of concrete 

1 LtG)l H. T. Milne, Ltr of 3 Dec 57; lstMarDiv HD. Feb 51. 

' EUSAK Cmd Rpi, Feb 51; Comments by Gen M. B, Ridgway, USA (Ret), 4 Oct 
57, and 1 BripGen A. L. Bowser, L4 Feb 5B. 

" Tlie balance of tliis section, unless otherwise specified, is derived from the fJDs 
for Feb 51 of the 1st MAW, MAG-33, VMF-214, VMF-312, VMF-32J, VMF(N)- 
513, and VMF-311. 

Operation Killer 


runway. The Air Force had extended it to 5,700 feet with pierced 
steel planking. This addition brought the end of the runway to the 
brink of a 60-foot drop-off— a hazard in the event of a "hot" landing 
to the northwest or too low an approach from the southeast. 

Next to arrive at K-3 were the F9F-2Bs of VMF-311. Four weeks 
of adjustments at Itami had restored the jets to operative condition. 
An advance echelon went ahead to establish squadron living and 
operating areas, and the pilots ferried the 19 aircraft. Ground crews 
and equipment followed on transport planes. 

Plans were made for VMF(N)-513 to move from Itami to K-3 
before the end of the month. The other all-weather squadron, 
VMF(N)-542, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel James R. 
Anderson, completed the transfer from Itami and Irazuke to K-I. 

This field was also the destination of the photo pilots of Head- 
quarters Squadron, 1st MAW, who flew their F7F-3P and F4U-5P 
fighters from Itami. Major Donald S, Bush commanded a unit, 
formerly a squadron, which had been one of the first aviation organiza- 
tions to see action in Korea. Among its accomplishments were the 
preliminary beach studies for the Inchon and Woman landings. 

With the completion of the moves of February 1951, the 1st MAW 
was again based on Korean soil. Fifteen types of Marine aircraft 
were being flown. For the heavy hauling, the R-1D and R5D transports 
shifted troops and supplies. Included among the fighters were F9F 
Panthers, F4U Corsairs, and two models of F7F Tigercats — a stripped- 
down photo plane, and a radar-armed night fighter. Stinson OY 
Grasshoppers, TBM Avengers, and Beechcraft SNBs rounded out the 
list of conventional planes. Three types of rotary -wing aircraft were 
represented: the Sikorsky HO3S-] , and two models of the Bell HTL. 7 

Marine Planes in Action 

By 15 February the brief CCF counterstroke had spent its force. 
Hoengsong had fallen to Communists who hammered out a salient 
on a 20-mile front extending as far southward as the outskirts of 
Wonju (Map 6), But the enemy's main purpose had failed of 
accomplishment, for the grip of the Eighth Army on Inchon and 

'Nasal Aviation News, Apr 51, 8. 


The East-Central Front 

Kimpo Airfield was not shaken. Nor did the Chinese gain a breathing 
spell in their preparations for a third great offensive as a follow up 
to the December and January drives. 

More by coincidence than design, the Fifth Air Force launched a 
new system of air tactics a few days after the beginning of the CCF 
counterstroke. Called "Reconnaissance Plan Fighter," it was based 
on a division of enemy-held Korea into 22 sections. Squadrons were 
given the mission of making hourly surveys of the same areas, day 
after day, until pilots became so familiar with them that any change 
hinting at CCF activity would be noticed at once. 8 

If these surveys revealed any sign of any enemy concentration, either 
of men or supplies, JOC scrambled special bombing strikes against 

Although Marine fliers could readily see the advantages of covering 
the same ground daily, it made for monotony on reconnaissance 
missions. Only a highly unusual spectacle would startle a pilot, but 
First Lieutenant Weldon R. Mitchell blinked when he saw a camel 
in his gunsights.' J Shaggy little Mongolian horses were no novelty 
as ammunition bearers, and after recovering from his first astonishment 
the VMF-311 pilot cut loose with .50 caliber machine gun slugs. As 
he suspected, the camel's pack contained ammunition and the animal 
was all but vaporized in the explosion. 

Major Bush's photographic unit had an important part in keeping 
the enemy under constant surveillance. The Fifth Air Force directed 
on 16 February that all photo requests were to be screened by the Fifth 
Air Force's 543d Tactical Support Group at Taegu. Under the tactical 
coordination of this Group, the Marine unit was to fill all Navy and 
Marine requests. When not on such missions, it would be fitted into 
the Fifth Air Force photographic reconnaissance program. 10 

Pinpoint photos of suspected troop areas and such terrain features 
as defiles, junctions, detours, and bridges were in demand. The fact 
had to be faced that the enemy was almost unbelievably clever at 
camouflage and concealment. In one instance it was found that the 
Chinese had constructed bridge sections which they hid by day and 
put to use at night. 11 On another occasion they sank a bridge by 
means of weights so that it remained far enough beneath the surface 

"VMF-323 HD, 15 Feb 51. 

"N<fiW Aviation News, Apr 51, 8. 

"' 1st MAW and MAG- 12 HDs, Feb 51. 

ll MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, Itr of 14 Jun 57. 


Operation Killer 65 

of t±ie water in the daytime to avoid detection by reconnaissance 

When the photo planes carried out missions as far north as MIG 
Alley 12 they flew in pairs. A fighter circled overhead to protect the 
photo pilot from an enemy air attack while he paid full attention to 
the task of "shooting" the terrain with his camera. 

Planning for the New Operation 

Adaptability to changing circumstances had already become perhaps 
the outstanding quality of the revitalized Eighth Army. No better 
example could be found than the evolution of Operation KILLER, 
which completed the cycle from concept to plan and execution in 
just three days. 

On 18 February 1951, General Ridgway learned that the enemy was 
apparently withdrawing. IX Corps and X Corps units had probed 
forward that morning without meeting any opposition. Before night- 
fall the commanding general decided to launch a limited objectives 
offensive by the entire Eighth Army. He called a planning conference 
for the 19th and set the 21st as D-Day for the new operation. 

The 1st Marine Division found itself detached from X Corps on 
the 19th and placed under the operational control of General Moore 
of IX Corps. This was not the first time in Marine Corps history, of 
course, when "soldiers of the sea" have fought alongside U.S. Army 
units in conventional land warfare. One of the best-known occasions 
was in World War I, when two Marine regiments distinguished them- 
selves in France as a brigade of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. 

The Marines had been a part of X Corps in 1950, but always under 
tactical circumstances which permitted more or less independent opera- 
tions with the support of organic aircraft. Now the Division was to 
be closely integrated with the other major IX Corps units, the 24th 
Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, the 6th ROK Division, and 
the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade. Marine calls for air strikes 
would continue to be made through JOC, as they had been since the 
Hungnam redeployment. 

General Ridgway was on hand for the planning conference held 

n MIG Alley was the name the American airmen gave the area along the Yalu River 
*hert Communist jets were active. 


The East-Central From 

on 19 February in General Moore's CP at Yoju and attended by officers 
from LX and X Corps. General Smith, Colonel McAlister, and Colonel 
Bowser represented the 1st Marine Division. 

The scheme of maneuver called for the Marines to relieve elements 
of X Corps and attack in a northeasterly direction from a line of 
departure north of Wonju (Map 6) through the Wonju basin. The 
object was to cut off enemy forces which had penetrated south and 
east of Hoengsong, and to recover control of the roads running east- 
ward by seizing the high ground just south of the town." 

In the X Corps zone to the east, on the right flank of the Marines, 
the 7th Infantry Division was to attack to the north along the 
Yongwol-Pyongchang road. On the other Marine flank would be 
elements of the 6th ROK Division. 

Simultaneous advances were planned for I Corps to the west, 
where patrols had found evidence that Seoul was lightly held. 

Two U.S. Army units were designated at the 19 February conference 
to support the 1st Marine Division — the 74th Truck Company and the 
92d Armored Field Artillery, then en route to the Chungju area. 11 
These cannoneers and their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel 
Leon F. Lavoie, USA, were well and favorably known to the Marines, 
having given effective support during the Chosin Reservoir operations. 

First Marine Division OpnO 6-51, issued on 20 February, directed 
the two assault regiments, the 1st and 5th Marines, to jump off at 
0800 on the 21st and seize the first objective, the ridgeline about three 
and a half miles south of the high ground dominating Hoengsong 
(Map 6). RCT-1, with Division Recon Company and C/Engineers 
attached, was to pass through elements of the 2d Infantry Division 
in zone while RCT-5, with A/Engineers attached, passed through 
elements of the 187th Airborne Infantry, USA. RCT-7 had been 
designated the reserve regiment; but since it could not arrive from 
the Pohang-Andong area in time, a battalion of the 5th Marines was 
assigned this mission, 15 

The objective area was believed to be defended by the 196th 
Infantry Division of the 66th CCF Army and unknown elements of the 
39th and 40th CCF Armies. Ahead of the Marines and other IX Corps 
units lay some uninviting terrain. Rocky heights and narrow valleys 
were laced by swift streams, the largest being the river Som, running 

M lstMarDiv HD. Feb 51, 1-2, 20. 
™lbi4„ 2, 22, and IstMarDiv OpnO 6-51. 

Operation Killer 


from northeast to southwest through a defile cutting across the 
western part o£ the Division sector. Bordering this twisting stream 
was the Wonju-Hoengsong "highway" — a poor dirt road even by 
Korean standards. Through the right half of the Division zone an 
even more primitive road, scarcely fit for vehicular traffic, wound 
northeast from Wonju. lu 

All Eighth Army forces were to be tightly buttoned up and to keep 
in close physical contact while maintaining integrity of units. Patrol 
observation and reconnaissance were stressed by the EUSAK command- 
ing general, and even lack of opposition would not justify a unit in 
advancing ahead of schedule. Again, as in previous operations, real 
estate was to be secondary to the inflicting of maximum personnel and 
materiel damage. 

On the eve of Operation killer, a message from IX Corps empha- 
sized to all units the necessity for making sure "that no hostile force 
of sufficient strength to jeopardize the safety of your forces has been 
bypassed. Maintenance of lateral contact between all units is of 
prime importance." 11 

Marine ground force and aviation officers alike realized that the 
forthcoming offensive would be the first real test of the operational 
control of the 1st MAW by the Fifth Air Force and the Eighth Army. 
General Smith was uneasy about the outlook. On 13 February 1951, 
the day he was alerted for the move to Chung ju, he had requested in 
a message to EUSAK that the 1st MAW be assigned to the support of 
his division. Both Marine ground and air officers, he said, believed 
that this change would fit into the JOC overall air control system 
without any disruption. 1 " But no approval of General Smith's pro- 
posal had been received before D-Day. 

The Jumpoff on 21 

From the outset the transport and supply situation was a G-4 officer's 
nightmare. Heavy traffic broke the back of the MSR before the 
jumpoff, so that mud delayed the 5th Marines in reaching the line 
of departure (LD). 

Puller, the ADC, telephoned the Division commander 

* Ibid., 22-24 

IX Corps insfi in IstMarDiv ln&Out#9. 
CG IstMarDiv, msg of 12 Feb 51 to CG 



The East-Central Front 

for a decision in the event that all elements of the regiment were 
unable to arrive in time. This question was already under discussion 
between General Moore and General Smith in the new 1st Marine 
Division CP, just opened at Wonju. After later reports of troop 
arrivals reached him, Smith decided with few minutes to spare that 
he would attack with only the troops able to reach the LD in time — 
three battalions of the 1st Marines, a battalion of the 5th Marines, 
two battalions of the 11th Marines, and a company of tanks. Moore 
then confirmed 1000 as H-hour and notified Puller of the decision. 

The last-minute arrival of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reminded 
Smith of the occasion in France, 32 years before, when the 5th 
Marines of World War I had to double-time across the wheat fields 
in order to attack on schedule at Soissons on 18 July 1918. For at 
Wonju the lone battalion scrambled out of trucks on the double and 
advanced without taking time for reorganization. 1 " 

Snarled traffic conditions were complicated by the arrival of high- 
ranking officers for the jumpoff. General MacArthur visited the zone 
of the 187th Airborne RCT, recently attached to X Corps. General 
Ridgway and General Moore were on hand when the Marines attacked. 
The EUSAK commander, surveying the scene from a snow-covered 
embankment, was disturbed to see a Marine corporal stumbling over 
an untied shoe lace while carrying a heavy radio. 

"I hesitated just a moment," commented Ridgway, "knowing that 
what I wanted to do might be misconstrued as showmanship. Then 
I slid down the bank on my tail, landed right at his feet, knelt down 
and tied his shoe. Later, when this incident was reported in the States, 
there were some who did report it as a theatrical gesture. This was 
not true. It was purely an impulse to help a fighting soldier, a man 
in trouble." ™ 

The Eighth Army commander was not the only one to see the 
advantages of tobogganing in terrain consisting of mud on the sunny 
slope of hills and snow on the shady side. When Captain jack R. 
Jones' Charlie -Company of 1/5 reached its first steep decline, the 
Marine leading the 2d Platoon slipped and fell in the snow, sliding 
about a hundred feet down the embankment. The man behind 
him profited from his example to make a purposeful slide, as did the 
rest of First Lieutenant William E. Kerrigan's men. 21 

"LtGen O, P. Smith, hr of 28 Jul 53. 

Ridgway, Memoirs, 218-219. 
"Maj W. E. Kerrigan, ttr of 25 May 57. 


Operation Killer 69 

This was but one of the nnwarlike incidents which enlivened the 
jumpoff of Operation killer. Seldom if ever have Marines taken 
part in an offensive which began so inoffensively, for 21 February was 
distinguished for lack of enemy resistance in the Marine zone. Only 
a few rounds of scattered rifle fire were encountered until late after- 
noon. Then the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, leading the column of 
attack, had two long-distance fire fights before digging in for the 
night. Three Marines were slightly wounded and the enemy withdrew 
with such casualties as he may have suffered. 2 " 

The word "light" could never have been applied to the resistance 
put up by the weather and terrain. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. 
Stewart, commanding 3/5, described it as "a mixture of thawing snow, 
rain, mud, and slush." His men spent the night in foxholes half 
filled with water. Every one of them was "wet to the bones, including 
his clothes, parka, weapons, and ammo," 23 

The 1st Marines led the attacking column of battalions on 22 Febru- 
ary, with 1/1 in the lead. More long-distance small-arms fire was 
encountered than on the first day, but again there were no close con- 
tacts with a retreating enemy.= J 

Stiffening of Chinese Resistance 

Not until the 23d did either Marine regiment run into determined 
opposition. Then the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines, ad- 
vancing abreast, had a fight while going up against two hills of a 
ridge just south of the first phase objectives. 

So far the Marines had found JOC air support satisfactory in 
quantity. The statistics show that the Fifth Air Force supported the 
Eighth Army during the first phase of Operation killer (21-24 
February, inclusive) with an average of 600 sorties a day.- n There 
w as no room for complaint until the morning of the 23d, when an air 
strike the 5th Marines requested the preceding evening for 0800 failed 
to materialize on time. On this occasion the combination of an intense 
Marine artillery preparation and light enemy resistance compensated 
for lack of air support and the hill was taken with ease, 

a IstMarDiv HD. Feb 51. 4. 

"Ccmracni by Col }. L. Stewart, 25 Oct 57. 

" IstMnrDiv HD, Feb 51, 4-5. 

* Statistics are from eusak Cmd Rpt, Feb 51, G-} Air Rpt. 


The East-Central Front 

That afternoon it took a brisk fight to evict an enemy in estimated 
battalion strength from log-covered bunkers on the second hill. This 
time JOC responded to Marine requests with two effective air strikes. 
Sixty Chinese dead were counted, and the Marines reported 1 KIA 
and 21 WlAr* 

On the whole, however, the 5 th Marines encountered only slight re- 
sistance. "About all we did was walk— walk— walk!" recalled Captain 
Franklin B. Mayer, commanding Easy Company of 2/5. "I don't think 
I've ever been so tired or footsore in my life — exception the retreat 
from Chosin, but not by much." S7 

On the 24th the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines had little 
trouble in taking two hills designated as the main Phase 1 objectives. 
The 1st Marines on the left sent a tank and infantry patrol into 
Hoengsong after artillery preparation and an air strike. Captain 
Robert P. Wray, commanding Charlie Company of 1/1 and a platoon 
of tanks, entered the ruins of the town only to encounter machine gun 
and mortar fire from the hills to the west." 8 

When the antennae were shot off two tanks, Wray directed their 
90mm fire by runner and knocked out the enemy positions. After 
proceeding further into the town, he was recalled by his battalion 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, because an 
aerial observer had reported that Chinese were waiting to ambush 
the patrol. 

An air strike was directed on them while Wray rescued several 
survivors of "Massacre Valley," northwest of Hoengsong, where a 
U.S. Army truck convoy had been ambushed during the recent CCF 
counterattack. The patrol returned before the ground had completely 
thawed. Only a few hours later a jeep passing over the same road 
was blown up by a land mine which killed the driver. This was one 
of the first object lessons illustrating the danger from enemy mines 
which were harmless until the midday sun thawed out the ground. 

Chinese artillery fire from the hills north of Hoengsong accounted 
for one Marine KIA and four WIA late that afternoon before counter- 
battery fire by 2/11 silenced the enemy. This exchange ended the 

'"•2/1 HD, i<5 Dec 51. 15-16. 

* LtCol F. B. Mayer, Itr of H May 57. 

""This account of the tank-infantry patrol is based on Muj R. P. Wray's ltr of 
6 May 57. 

Operation Killer 71 

first phase of Operation killer at dusk on 2A February with all 
preliminary objectives seized. 1111 

Air support had been rendered, for the most part, by Fifth Air 
Force planes. This gave rise to grumbling by Marine ground forces, 
who felt that they had been unnecessarily deprived of their own close 
air support. The fact was, however, that U.S. Army and British 
Commonwealth troops also preferred Marine air and were outspoken 
about it. As a disgruntled Marine ground force officer put it, Marine 
air was "too good for our own good." 

During the first phase of Operation killer most of the sorties by 
1st MAW planes were in support of U.S. Army units. On 23 February 
the Marines flew 101 of the Fifth Air Force total of some 800 sorties 
for the day. 3 " The experience of VMF-312 was fairly typical of the 
other Marine fighter-bomber squadrons. In the morning VMF-312 
took part in a 16-pIane strike behind the CCF lines. That afternoon 
two special flights of four planes each were scrambled in support 
of 2d and 7th Infantry Division units of X Corps. The following 
morning Major Daniel H. Davis, executive officer of the squadron, 
scrambled with four planes and reported to a FAC attached to the 
Canadian and Australian battalions of the British Commonwealth 
Division. These troops were engaged near Chipyong-ni in the hottest 
fight of the first phase of Operation killer. After the FAC marked 
the CCF strongholds with white phosphorus, the Corsairs came snarl- 
ing in with napalm, rocket, and strafing runs just ahead of the infantry. 
The enemy was driven out of positions defended by 20mm antiper- 
sonnel fire, but Major Davis paid with his life on his eighth run when 
he lost a wing and crashed to his death. 

General Smith in Command of IX Corps 

On 24 February 1951 came the news that General Moore had sud- 
denly died as the indirect result of a helicopter accident. The aircraft 
had plunged into the Han River, after hitting a telephone wire, and 
the IX Corps commander was rescued unhurt only to die of a heart 
attack half an hour afterwards. 

* IstMarDiv HD, Feb 51, 2, 5-6. 

eusak Cmd R/,1, Sec III, Bk 4, Pt 5, 23 and 24 Feb; 1st MAW HD, 22-24 
■o 51. 

mmo o-<52-6 


The East-Central Front 

Commander of the 8th Infantry Division in European operations 
of World War II, General Moore later became Superintendent of the 
U.S. Military Academy at West Point. As his successor, pending a 
permanent appointment, General Ridgway named General Smith to 
the command of IX Corps. When announcing this decision, the 
Eighth Army commander said, 'General Smith is to be taken into their 
hearts in IX Corps, and, by definite action, made to feel that he 
belongs there." 31 

Marines with an interest in Corps history could recall only two 
similar occasions when Marines commanded major U.S. Army units. 
Major General John A. Lejeune had headed the 2d Infantry Division 
in World War I, and Major General Roy S. Geiger led the U.S. Tenth 
Army to victory during the closing days of the Okinawa operation 
after a Japanese shell killed Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar 
Buckner, Jr., USA, 

On 24 February, with General Puller taking command of the 1st 
Marine Division, General Smith flew to Yoju by helicopter to begin 
his new duties. His military competence and complete lack of osten- 
tation made him cordially accepted at the IX Corps CP. The following 
day General Ridgway arrived for a conference. Wishing to change 
the boundary between IX and X Corps, so as to orient the former 
more to the north, he directed the Marine general to reach an agree- 
ment with X Corps. He also asked for a recommendation as to future 
operations of the Marines, and General Smith replied that he knew of 
no better employment for his division than to continue attacking along 
the Hoengsong-Hongchon axis,- 8 

The change in boundaries, as decided at a conference of corps com- 
manders, meant that in the zone of the 1st Marine Division the 5th 
Marines on the right would be pinched out by the 3d ROK Division 
of X Corps. On the left, the 2one was to be extended by bringing the 
7th Marines into line to the left of the 1st Marines while the 5th 
Marines dropped back into reserve. 3 " 

Logistics became the better part of valor on 25 February as Ridgway 
called a halt in the fighting until enough ammunition, fuel, and other 

supplies could be brought up for a resumption of the attack toward the 

" Eusak Cmd R/>t, Feb 51, Sec 2, 23. 

m Ma j Gen Oliver P. Sfnith, Chronicle 0/ the Operations of the 1st Marine Division 
During the First Nine Mo tubs of the Korean War. 1950-1951 (MS), (hereafter, Smith, 
Chronicle), 24-25 Feb 51, 

M 5th and 7th Marines WDs, Feb 51. 

Operation Killer 73 

final objective, Phase Line Arizona (Map 6). Napoleon's famous 
remark that mud should be recognized as a separate element was apt 
as violent rains turned all roads into swamps. Operations might have 
come to a standstill except for air drops. On the 25th the Combat 
Air Command flew 480.7 tons of freight and 1,004 passengers, 
followed by 604.9 tons and 1,193 passengers the following day, ai 
Corps and Division engineers strove meanwhile with indigenous labor 
to repair the roads. 

By a prodigious effort, enough progress in logistics was made so 
that the fjUSAK commanding general could issue orders on 25 February 
for the second phase of Operation killer to commence on 1 March. 
He made it known thijfc he was not satisfied with results so far. The 
assigned physical objectives had been taken, but the enemy's with- 
drawals had saved him from the full extent of the personnel and 
material losses Ridgway had hoped to inflict. He called on his staff 
officers, therefore, for plans aiming at a new operation "having the 
primary intent of destroying as many enemy and as much equipment 
as possible and, by continued pressure, allowing the enemy no time to 
mount a connteroffensive," * A secondary mission was that of out- 
flanking Seoul and the area between Seoul and the Imjin River, "so 
that this territory may be taken either by attack from the east or by 
enemy default." 

The name of the new drive was to be Operation ripper, and it was 
to jump off as soon as possible after the finish of killer. 

The Advance to Phase Line Arizona 

Prom newly won positions in the high ground south of Hoengsong, 
the Marines could look across the soggy plain to their Phase II objec- 
tives, the hills to the north of the battered town. Hoengsong occupied 
a valley at the confluence of two rain- swollen streams. Thus a tri- 
angular area of low, flat ground lay between the ruins and the hills 
which must be taken in the final phase of Operation killer. The 
1st and 7th Marines were the combat units, with the 5th Marines in 
reserve. (The KMC Regiment, it may be recalled, had been tem- 
porarily detached for service with the ROK army.) 

M FEAF QfgWtW Hhtoi); Vol II, 300-306; Commcnl by Col J. H. Partridfie, 
10 Dec 57. 

Eusak Cmd Hp/. Mar 51, Sec 1, 53. 


The East -Central Front 

Before the 1st and 7th Marines could launch their combined attack, 
the latter had to fight its way up to the point of junction after relieving 
elements of the 6th ROK Division; 1 " The scheme of maneuver then 
called for Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning's 3/1 to sideslip 
into the zone of Major Maurice E." Roach's 3/7, in order to be in 
position for the advance across the Hoengsong plain. This meant a 
crossing of the river Som for 3/1 and a combined assualt with 3/7 
on the high ground along the west bank. 

The problem of crossing the river, 200 feet wide and chest-deep at 
the most likely site, was turned over to Banning with the explanation 
that the engineer company supporting the regiment could not be 
diverted from road repairs. To meet this emergency Major Edwin H. 
Simmons, commanding Weapons Company of 3/1, produced a field 
manual with instructions for building a "Swiss bent bridge." 3r His 
Antitank Assault Platoon was given the task under the command of 
energetic Technical Sergeant Carmelo J. Randazzo, a veteran on his 
third enlistment. 

There was no lack of trees for timbers, and rolls of telephone wire 
were sworn to be beyond salvaging by the battalion communications 
officer. The A-shaped bents, or trusses, were lashed together with 
wire and enthusiasm, then carried out into the ice-cold water to be 
attached to spars and stringers. 

It was a great triumph for "war by the book." Before dark on 
28 February two spans, one 120 feet long and another half that length, 
were linked by a sandbar in midstream. The improvised bridge stood 
up well next morning when the battalion crossed to the west bank. 
There 3/1 echeloned itself behind 3/7, which gained the first 1,000 
yards under cover of a vigorous artillery preparation and belated 
air strikes. 

On the left, Major James I. Glendinning's 2d Battalion of the 7th 
Marines ran into increasingly stubborn opposition from CCF mortar 
and small-arms fire. Before noon the attacks of both battalions of the 
7th Marines were brought almost to a halt in difficult terrain which 
the Communists had booby-trapped. Neither artillery nor air strikes 
had a decisive effect against an enemy sheltered by log-covered 

m Except when otherwise noted, this section is derived from the IstMarDiv HD, 
Mar 51, 2-5; 7thMur HD, Mar 51, 2-6; IX Corps Cmd Rfl No. <!, Mar 51, JI-J2; 
kusak Cmd Rpi. Sec 1, M3r 51, 53-59; LtCol Edwin H. Simmons narrative, n.d.; Com- 
ment by Col Wilbur F. McycrhofT. 

" FM 71)-] I), Mountain Operations, 41-46, 

Operation Killer 75 

bunkers, So many delays were encountered that it was decided in mid- 
afternoon to postpone the advance until the following morning, 
2 March. 

Artillery and air strikes supported 2/7, 3/7, and 3/1 as they 
attacked at 0800 west of the river. Meanwhile, 1/7 patrolled on the 
division left flank while maintaining contact with the 6th ROK 

Apparently the enemy put up a hard fight only when he could not 
withdraw in time to avoid one. Resistance was light on the west bank, 
and east of the river Lieutenant Colonel Allen Sutter's 2/1, supported 
by tanks, had little trouble. His battalion linked up with 3/1 in the 
afternoon and dug in after taking its assigned objective, Hill 208, 
with casualties of three men wounded. 

The only determined opposition of 2 March took place during the 
afternoon in the zone of 2/7. There the attackers could only inch 
forward over rocky terrain which the enemy defended, ridge by ridge, 
in spite of air strikes and 1,600 artillery rounds fired by the 11th 

At daybreak on the 3d the men of the 1st and 7th Marines could 
took to the north and see their final objectives. Five hills lay along 
Phase Line Arizona from west to east — Hills 536 and 333 in the zone 
of the 7th Marines, and Hills 321, 335, and 201 in the zone of the 
1st Marines. 

The last two positions were in the path of 2/1, which seized them 
after several brisk fire fights. Casualties of three K1A and 28 WIA 
were incurred while inflicting tosses of 70 counted CCF dead. The 
terrain gave 3/1 more trouble than the enemy in taking Hill 321, 
where the CCF troops had already begun their withdrawal. 

It was in the zone of the 7th Marines that Communist resistance 
was hottest. The 1st battalion was summoned to cover the regimental 
left flank and aid in the attack of 2/7 on Hill 536 while 3/7 con- 
tinued its struggle for Hill 333. Both battalions had their hardest 
fight of the entire operation that afternoon. They lost most of the 
14 KIA and 104 WIA which the Division reported for 3 March, and 
the enemy still held the topographical crests. 

The 1st Marines had reached the mopping-up stage on 4 March, 
while the 7th Marines prepared to go up against an expected last- 
ditch stand of the enemy on Hills 536 and 333. The parkas of the 
assault troops were powdered with snow as the men moved out to 


The East-Central Front 

the attack at 0800, following an intensive artillery preparation. There 
was something ominous about the silence in the objective area, but 
no trap had been set for the attackers. The Communists actually had 
pulled out under cover of darkness, leaving behind only enough 
outpost troops for delaying operations. 

Operation KILLER ended at nightfall on the 4th for the Marines, 
though mopping up continued throughout the following day. Total 
Marine casualties for the 8 days of fighting were 395—48 KIA, 2 MIA, 
and 345 WIA, Enemy losses amounted to 274 counted dead and 48 
prisoners. It is certain, however, that the actual KIA and WIA figures 
were much higher, since the withdrawing Communists buried their 
dead and took their wounded with them. 

Any evaluation of this limited objective operation must credit it with 
achieving its main purpose- — keeping the Communists off balance 
while they were striving desperately to make ready for another great 
offensive (Map 7). This explains why the enemy as a whole put up 
a half-hearted resistance. He preferred to withdraw whenever possible 
and fight another day. 

JOC Air Control System Criticized 

Operation KILLER was the first real test of the JOC system as far as 
the Marines were concerned, and both the flying and ground-force 
Marines felt that it had shown grave shortcomings. Air support on 
1 March proved so disappointing that General Puller, as temporary 
commander of the 1st Marine Division, reported the situation to 
General Shepherd, commanding FMFPac. His letter is quoted in 
part as follows: 

We are having very little success in obtaining Marine air for CAS [close 
air support] missions and practically no success in having Marine air on 
station for CAS missions. . . . Most of our CAS missions in the current op- 
eration have been Air Force or Navy Carrier planes. They do a good job and 
we are glad to have them, but our Marine air, with whom we have trained and 
operated, can do a better job. We have attempted to insure that Marine air 
would support us, and to cut down the delays in receiving such support, as 
evidenced by the attached dispatches. We have received no decision relative 
to our requests. Apparently, the answer is no by default, 88 

"Shepherd Papers, 27 Apr 51, End. 4. This is a file of documents in the Marine 
archives relating to problems of JOC control in the spring of 1951. 


The East-Central front 

General Puller's report was obviously written for the record, since 
General Shepherd was present at the 1st Marine Division CP at the 
time. He witnessed personally the Marine attacks of 2 and 3 March 
and the air support they received. On the 3d, the day of heaviest 
fighting in the entire operation, there could be no complaint that few 
Marine aircraft supported Marine ground forces. The Corsairs flew 
26 CAS sorties that day and cleared the way more than once for the 
2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines. The trouble was that air 
support as administered by JOC was so often late in arriving, even 
when requested the evening before. More than once the infantry had 
to go ahead with only artillery support. Such delays threw the whole 
plan of attack out of gear, for air and artillery had to be closely 
coordinated to be at their best. 

Generai Shepherd had a series of talks with General Harris. Both 
then conferred with General Partridge, commander of the Fifth Air 
Force. They requested that he authorize the 1st MAW to keep two 
planes on station over the 1st Marine Division whenever it was 
engaged. General Partridge did not concur. He maintained that 
Marine aircraft should be available to him if needed elsewhere in an 
emergency. He did consent, however, to permit 1st MAW armed 
reconnaissance sorties to check in with devastate baker for any CAS 
requests. 39 

This conference did much to clear up the situation. On 5 March 
no less than 48 Marine sorties reported to DEVASTATE BAKER, though 
there was little need for them in mopping-up operations. And during 
the next two weeks an average of 40 sorties a day was maintained. 

"'Shepherd Papers, End 2, a Itr from Gen Shepherd to CMC, dtd 9 Mar 51. devas- 
tate baker was the call sign of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2), 
which coordinated the assignment of aircraft to tactical air control parties (tacps). 


Operation Ripper 

tight Resistat?ce the First Day — Seoul Abandoned by 
Enemy — Second Phase of the Operation—Changes in 
1st MAW Units— General Mac Arthur Visits Marine Bat- 
talion — 1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division — 3Sth 
Parallel Recrossed by Marines — Renewal of Division's CAS 


The new ix corps commander, Major General William H. Hoge, 
USA, arrived at Yoju on 4 March 1951. He relieved General 
Smith the next day and a color guard turned out to render honors to 
the Marine commander when he returned by helicopter to his own 
Division CP. Upon Smith's arrival, General Puller resumed his 
former duties as ADC 

The jumpoff of the new operation was scheduled for 0800 on 
7 March, so little time remained for last-minute preparations. The 
basic plan called for the drive of IX and X Corps toward the 38th 
Parallel on die central front. Protection was to be given on the left 
flank by I Corps in the area south and east of Seoul. On the right 
the ROK divisions had the mission of maintaining lateral security 
with a limited northward advance. 

It was no secret that General Ridgway had been disappointed in 
the numbers of enemy soldiers put out of action during Operation 
Killer. The primary purpose of ripper was to inflict as many Com- 
munist casualties as possible, and by means of constant pressure to 
keep the enemy off balance in his buildup for a new offensive. A 
secondary purpose was to outflank Seoul and the area between that 
city and the river Imjin, thus compelling the enemy to choose between 
default and a defense on unfavorable terms. 1 

1 eusak Cmd Rpt, Mar 51. 



The East-Central From 

CCF strategy in the early spring of 195 1 was obviously conditioned 
by preparations for a third great offensive. The enemy's emphasis on 
caution is shown in a translation of a CCF training directive of this 

There must absolutely be no hasty or impatient attitude toward warfare. 
Consequently, even though we have a thorough knowledge of the enemy 
situation and the terrain, if one day is disadvantageous for us to engage in 
combat, it should be done the next day; if day fighting is disadvantageous, 
fighting should be conducted at night, and if engagements in a certain terrain 
are not to our advantage, another location should be selected for combat 
engagement. When the enemy is concentrated and a weak point is difficult 
to find, one must be created (by agitating or confusing them in some way), 
or wait until the enemy is deploying. Engagements must be conducted only 
when the situation is entirely to our advantage.- 

Light Resistance the First Day 

United Nations forces held a line extending across the peninsula from 
Inchon (Map 8) in the west by way of Hoengsong to the east coast in 
the vicinity of Chumunjin, The IX Corps order called for the 1st 
Marine Division to maintain lateral contact with the 1st Cavalry 
Division on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right. Hong- 
chon and Chunchon, two of the main objectives of Operation ripper, 
lay directly in the path of the IX Corps advance. Both were important 
communications centers which could be utilized to advantage by the 
enemy for his forthcoming offensive. 

The first phase line in the IX Corps zone was ALBANY, The Marines 
did not need a map to locate an objective just beyond Oum Mountain, 
a stark 2,900-foot peak about five and a half miles from the line of 
departure. Distance in this area was conditioned by terrain, and it was 
a natural fortress of wooded hills and swift streams that confronted 
the 1st Marine Division. Highways were conspicuous by their absence, 
and extensive maintenance would be required to utilize the Hoengsong- 
Hongchon road as a MSR. So few and poor were the secondary roads 
that it would sometimes prove necessary for vehicles to detour along 
the rocky stream beds. 3 

• !X Corps MR #169; IX Corps Cmd Rftt, Mar SI, 21. 

* This section, except when otherwise stated, is derived from the IX Corps Cmd Rpl 
and the IstMarDiv WD for Mar 51. 

Operation Ripper 81 

The last offensive had not developed major or prolonged resistance 
at any point. Yet that possibility had to be anticipated by Marine 
planners. At least the enemy was an old acquaintance — the 66th 
CCF Army, 1 commanded by General Show Shiu Kwai. The 196th 
Division was on the left and the 197th on the right, with the 198th 
in reserve. These units were believed to comprise about 24,000 men. 

Wednesday, 7 March, dawned cold and clear, with snow falling 
in the afternoon. The Hoengsong-Hongchon road, winding through 
Kunsamma Pass, paralleled the boundary between the two Marine 
assault regiments, the 7th Marines on the left and the 1st Marines on 
the right. They jumped off to attack in line abreast, employing ail 
three battalions when the broken terrain permitted, while the 5th 
Marines continued its patrolling activities in the Hoengsong area as 
Division reserve. 

The 11th Marines had to ration its artillery ammunition, owing to 
supply shortages. JOC came to the rescue nobly by ordering MAG— 33 
to place 11 flights of four planes each at the disposal of devastate 
baker on D-minus-one. These aircraft reported at hourly intervals to 
work over targets in the area of the next day's Marine operations. For 
the ground forces, it was an embarrassment of riches. They had more 
air support than they could use at times, and devastate baker sent 
the surplus to hit reserve concentrations and other targets of oppor- 
tunity in the enemy's rear." 

The two Marine assault regiments met with light resistance on 
D-Day. Both took their objectives with little trouble except for 
scattered bursts of machine gun fire. Total casualties for the day were 
seven men wounded. 

It was like old times to have Marine planes supporting Marine 
ground forces. MAG- 12 aircraft were on the job the next day, when 
CCF resistance stiffened without ever becoming serious. Heavy CCF 
mortar and small-arms fire was received by 3/1, supported by Com- 
pany A of the 1st Tank Battalion. Well placed rounds by the 11th 
Marines silenced the enemy in this quarter, and both battalions of the 
1st Marines reached their assigned positions by nightfall. 

The second day's advances gave added proof that the enemy was 
up to his old trick of putting up a limited defense while pulling back 

4 A CCF Army, composed of three or four infantry divisions supported by artillery, 
lC Comp"]atLn°fro^ Sqdns" HDs, 7 and 8 Mar 51. 

Operation Ripper 


before the Marines could come to grips. Log bunkers were ideal for 
these CCF delaying tactics; each was a little fortress that might enable 
a squad to stand off a company while larger CCF units withdrew. 

The Marine assault troops found that a preliminary treatment of 
napalm from MAG- 12 aircraft, followed by well- aimed 90mm fire 
from the tanks, did much to soften up the bunkers for an infantry 
attack with hand grenades. 

Company A of the 7th Marines had the hardest fight of all Marine 
units on 8 March. Second Lieutenant Clayton O. Bush and the 2d 
Platoon led the attack on the company objective, a hill mass to the 
left of Oum San. With 300 yards still to be covered, the Marines were 
pinned down by well aimed CCF small-arms and mortar fire, including 
white phosphorus. A high explosive shell scored a direct hit on the 
platoon, killing two men and wounding three. Bush was evacuated, 
with his right arm mangled. First Lieutenant Eugenous Hovatter, the 
company commander, ordered the 1st Platoon to pass through the 
2d and continue the attack with air and tank support. The flat- 
trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles did much to help the company clear 
the enemy from the hill and the 7th Marines reached all assigned 
regimental objectives for the day." 

The Marine advance came to a halt on 9 March to wait for Army 
units to catch up on the right. While the 2d Battalion of the 1st 
Marines took blocking positions, the 1st and 7th Marines sent out 
patrols on both flanks in an effort to regain lateral contact. For the 
next two days, 1st Marine Division operations were limited to patrol- 
ling. A good deal of activity took place in the rear, however, as Marine 
service units moved up to Hoengsong. 

Seoul Abandoned by Enemy 

The advance was resumed on 11 March after the relief of 2/1 by 
Major Walter Gall's Division Reconnaissance Company, reinforced by 
a platoon of tanks. Although the enemy withdrew from most of his 
positions without putting up much resistance, a patrol of George 
Company, 3/1, had a hot fire fight on Hill 549. Opening fire at 50 
yards from camouflaged, log-faced bunkers, the Chinese killed one 

'7thMar HD, Mas 51; VMF-323 HD. Mar 51; Opt Clayton O. Bush, Itr of 11 
Aug 57. 


The East-Centred Front 

man and wounded nine. Marine infantrymen, supported by flat- 
trajectory 90mm fire, approached within grenade-throwing range to 
destroy five bunkers and kill 16 of the defenders. As the patrol with- 
drew, it called on the 1 1th Marines to finish the job. The cannoneers 
were credited with several direct hits.' 

Chinese resistance continued to be light as the two Marine regi- 
ments occupied rather than seized ground on 12 and 13 March, By 
the 14th all units were dug in along Phase Line ALBANY. 

CCF withdrawals were also reported by other Eighth Army units. 
On 15 March a patrol from the 1st ROK Division of I Corps found 
Seoul abandoned by the enemy. The Chinese Reds had made their 
choice and UN forces took over a devastated city with some 200,000 
civilians dragging out a miserable existence in the ruins. Dead power 
lines dangled over buildings pounded into rubble, and even such a 
famous landmark as the enormous red, brass-studded gates of the 
American Embassy Compound had been destroyed. 

It was the fourth time that Seoul had changed hands in 9 months 
of war. Air reconnaissance having established that the enemy had 
withdrawn about 15 miles to entrenched positions in the Uijongbu 
area, General Ridgway enlarged the mission of I Corps by directing it 
to advance on the left of IX Corps. 9 

During the first phase of Operation ripper, from 7 to 13 March, 
counted casualties inflicted on the enemy by X Corps amounted to 
6,543 KIA and 216 POW. IX Corps casualties during the same period 
were reported as 158 KIA, 965 WIA, and 35 MIA— a total of 1,158. 6 

The total strength of the Eighth Army (less the Marines) was 
185,229 officers and men in March 1951. Adding the 25,642 of the 
1st Marine Division, the 4,645 of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, plus 
11,353 of the American Air Force and 355 attached from the U.S. 
Navy, 227,119 Americans were serving in Korea. This does not count 
13,475 South Koreans serving in various U.S. Army divisions. 10 

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with an authorized total of 728 
officers and 4,216 enlisted men, had an actual strength of 626 and 
4,019 respectively on 31 March 1951. Of an authorized 29 officers and 

' IstMarDiv HD, Mar SI, 8. 
"eosak Cmd Rpt, Mar 51, 68-70. 
* IX Corps Cmd Rf>t, Mar 51, }5-}7. 
J0 Ibid. 

93 enlisted men from the Navy, 22 and 83 in these categories were 
on duty. 11 

Troops to the number of 21,184 from the ground forces of other 
United Nations were represented as follows: 

United Kingdom and Australia 10,136 

Turkey -1,383 

Philippines 1,277 

I liiiiLind i ,, h + . , 1,050 

C&n&dii * ,..f- $58 

New Zealand 816 

Greece 777 

France 749 

Belgium- Luxembourg 638 

Netherlands 500 

12 21,184 

The 249,815 officers and men of the ROK Army make a total UN 
combat strength of 493,503. There were an additional 671 in three 
noncombat units: the Danish hospital ship jutlandia, 186; the 60th 
Indian Ambulance Group, 329; and the Swedish Evacuation Hospital 
Unit, 156. 13 

Chinese forces in Korea, including confirmed and probable, totaled 
16 armies, each comparable to a U.S. corps. Eight others were re- 
ported. Assuming that these CCF units averaged a field strength of 
24,000 officers and men, the total would have been 384,000 for the 
16 armies. The reorganized forces of the North Korean People's 
Army (nkpa) were credited with five armies. Adding these 120,000 
men to the 16 Chinese armies, the enemy had 504,000 troops in 
Korea plus whatever might have been the strength of the eight re- 
ported armies and the rear area service elements. In addition, large 
reserves stood just over the border in Manchuria." 

Second Phase of the Operation 

With scarcely a pause on Phase Line Albany, the second phase of 
Operation ripper began on 14 March with a drive toward Phase Line 

"FMF Status Sheet, 31 Mar 51. 

a Eusak Cmd Rpi, Mar 51, Plate 17. Figures do not include personnel in hospitals 
or clearing stations. UK and Australian statistics are not separated in available records. 

"eusak Cmd Rpt, Mar 51. 95. 


The East-Central Front 

BUFFALO (Map 8). Despite the difficulty of maneuver over muddy 
roads in mountainous terrain, an Eighth Army directive of that date 
called for a pincers movement to be initiated by means of a rapid 
advance of the 1st Marine Division on the right and the 1st Cavalry 
Division on the left. It was hoped that the Chinese forces south of 
Hongchon might be trapped and destroyed after the 187th Airborne 
Regiment cut off escape by landing north of the town. General 
Ridgway having urged his corps commanders to stress maneuver, IX 
Corps sent this message to division commanders: 

It is desired that more use be made of maneuver within and between divi- 
sion zones with a view toward trapping and annihilating the enemy through 
such maneuver. Movements should be less stereotyped; it is not desirable 
that units always advance toward the enemy abreast. Well planned and suc- 
cessfully executed maneuver using companies and battalions has previously 
been conducted; this should be extended to include regiments. This Head- 
quarters is studying and will continue to study and order into execution the 
maneuver of divisions with the same intent and purpose. 15 

Both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Cavalry Division made rapid 
progress toward Phase Line BAKER (Map 9), established by IX Corps 
as an intermediate control. Unfortunately for the purposes of the 
envelopment maneuver, the Chinese withdrew from the Hongchon 
area before the pincers could close or the 187th Airborne make an 
air drop. CCF resistance was confined to machine gun fire covering 
hasty retirements. The 7th Marines on the left occupied its objective 
without once calling for air or artillery support, and the 1st Marines 
was virtually unopposed. Division casualties for the 14th were six 
men wounded. 

Flash floods and roads churned into hub-deep mud were the greatest 
enemies of progress. Serious as the resulting supply problems were, 
they might have been worse but for the efforts of the recently organ- 
ized Civil Transport Corps formed from members of the ROK Na- 
tional Guard who lacked the necessary training for military duties. 
There was no shortage of willing indigenous labor, for these auxil- 
iaries received pay as well as rations and clothing. Formed into 
companies, they worked with the wooden "A-frames" — so-called be- 
cause of their shape — used from time immemorial in Korea as a 
rack for carrying heavy burdens. 

The Civil Transport Corps proved to be a boon for the Eighth 

'= IX Corps msg IXACT-1053 (122100) in IstMflrDiv HD, Mar 51. 

USA Photo SC356JJ3 

Flight From The Foe— A Korean carries bis aged father across the icy Han 
River in the flight southward to escape the advancing Communist troops in 
their drive of January, 1951. 

634040 0-62-7 

USMCPhotoA 158075 

At the Critical Moment— Above, a Marine tank blasts an enemy emplace- 
ment while a rifleman stands by for the final assault; below, Marine rifle- 
men hug the ground as they advance under fire during Operation ripper in 
March, 1951. 

USMC Photo A 6862 

USMC Photo A 8064 USMC Photo A 161016 

Attack — Above, Marine machine gunner climbs a ridge while a flame- 
thrower operator burns straw to deny cover to the enemy; below, a young rifle- 
man hurriedly reloads after emptying a clip at Chinese Communist soldiers. 

t^SMC Photo A 15902J 

USMC Photo A 155354 

Supporting The Fighting Man— Above, a group of surgeons are at work in 
a minor surgery ward; below, a cargador train carries ammunition and 
rations to the front-line companies. 

USMC Photo A 9857 

USMC Photo A 8756 

Moving Out— Above, a Marine rifle company, C/l/1, moves to a rest area 
after almost two months of fighting; below, camouflaged Korean Marines on 
patrol pause to check the route. 

USMC Photo A 161982 

USMC Photo A 9458 USMC Photo A 9457 

"Calling devastate baker !" '— Above, forward air controllers with at- 
tacking companies use the call sign of supporting air; below, a dependable 
Corsair responds to the infantry's call. 

USMC Photo A 13J540 

USMC Photo A 346714 

"Launch and Attack"— Above, a Panther jet takes off on a close air support 
mission; below, the attack is pressed at close range on a stubborn enemy by a 
Tigercat (left) and a Corsair (right). 

USMC Photo A 158968 

Supporting The Troops— Above, a tank commander emerges from his steel 
shell in order to scan the hills for targets; below, a rocket battery harasses the 
enemy near Chunchon in May, 1951. 

USMC Photo A 155643 

USMC PhoroA 159109 

Power- Packed Punch— Above, a Marine tank topples Korean trees while 
moving into position to support an attack by fire; below, a rocket battery 
firing a ripple at night. 

USMC Photo A 169791 

USMC A »97 

Prisoners of War— Above, Marines guarding captured prisoners awaiting 
interrogation; and below, after hearing the familiar order to "saddle up" 
a Marine awaits the word to move out. 

USMC A 9769 

Random Scenes— Above, the result of what happens when a jeep runs over 
an anti-tank mine; and below, a Marine fire direction control center in 

USMC A 155905 

USMC Photo A 1 53962 

Aerial Workhorse— Above, after refueling at a mountainside fuel dump, a 
Marine helicopter loads men for evacuation; below, pre-fab bunkers are 
unloaded on a Korean hillside. 

USMC Photo A 16849} 

USMC Photo A 160193 USMC Photo A-l 588 1 1 

Fighting Faces— Above, left, PFC H. W. Hodges pauses to drink from a "re- 
frigerated" spring; above, right , PFC J. W. Harnsberger relaxes on the 
MLR; below, Sgt E. L. Whitlow and Capt W, F. Whitbeck scan the front 
for signs of enemy action. 

USMC Photo A 167904 

USMC Photo A L31819 

Family Reunion— Above, Col W. S. Brown, CO 1st Marines, visits his son, 
a Marine corporal; below, left, Copt G. H. Parker directs an air strike from 
a tree top observation post; below, right, PPC K. L. Spriggs receives his Purple 

USMC Photo A B2390 USMC Photo A 1 53745 

USMC Photo A 1 58079 

Necklace of Boots— Above, a South Korean cargador carries a necklace of 
boots to a front line company; below, new thermal boots are issued to combat 

USMC Photo A 157927 

6MM0 0-62-8 

88 The East-Central Front 

Army. Veteran porters could manage a load of 100 to 125 pounds 
over ground too rugged for motor vehicles. Several hundred were 
attached to each regiment during Operation ripper. 

Any lingering hope of rounding up Chinese prisoners in the Hong- 
chon area was blasted on the 15th when evidence of Chinese with- 
drawal came in the form of an enemy radio message intercepted at 
1230. "We cannot fight any longer," the translation read. "We must 
move back today. We will move back at 1400. Enemy troops will 
enter our positions at 1300 or 1400. Enemy troops approaching 
fast." lfl 

Hongchon fell without a fight to the 1st Battalion of the 7th 
Marines on the afternoon of 15 March. Major Webb D. Sawyer, the 
commanding officer, sent a motor patrol through the ruins without 
flushing out any Chinese, but on the return trip a truck was damaged 
by a "butterfly bomb." This led to the discovery that the Hongchon 
area was covered with similar explosives that had been dropped by 
U.S. planes to slow up the CCF counterattacks in the middle of 

Butterfly bombs, so-called because of the whirling vanes that con- 
trolled the drop and armed the 4-pound projectiles, could be set for 
air or ground bursts. Usually, however, they were dropped in clusters 
to remain on the ground until disturbed. Apparently the enemy had 
not troubled to clear them from the Hongchon area, and that three-day 
task was begun by Company D of the 1st Engineer Battalion while 
1/7 sei2ed the high ground northwest of the town. 17 

Changes in 1st MAW Units 

Air support fot the ground forces continued to be more than adequate 
in quantity. Since the agreement between Generals Partridge and 
Harris, 40 1st MAW sorties a day had been allotted to the 1st Marine 
Division. The timing was not all that could have been asked on 
occasion, but on the whole the Marine infantry had no complaint. 

The 1st MAW had undergone an extensive reshuffling of units on 
the eve of Operation ripper. VMF(N)-542 was sent back to El Toro, 

10 CO 7thMar msg to CO IstMarDiv; CO IstMar, 1300 15 Mar 51. 

"LtCol W. D. Sawyer, interv of 30 Aug 57; Field Manual 9-1980, AF 136-137. 
This was not the first nor the last time that M-83 fragmentation (butterfly) bombs 
became a deadly nuisance to friendly forces. 


Operation Ripper 89 

California, for conversion to F3D jet all weather fighters. The squad- 
ron's F7F-3Ns and two F-82's were left with VMF(N)~513. The 
former commanding officer of 542, Lieutenant Colonel James R. 
Anderson, assumed command of 513. He relieved Lieutenant Colonel 
David C. Wolfe, who returned to the States. 

The California-bound cadre of 542 included 45 officers and 145 
enlisted men under Major Albert L. Clark. VMF(N)-513 was now 
a composite squadron, attacking from K-l during the day with its 
F4U-5N's and at night with its F7F-3N's. 

Another change took place when VMF-312 replaced VMF-212 
On the CVE Bataan. The former squadron had been preparing for 
weeks to perform carrier duty, so that the change was made without 
a hitch. VMF— 212, after nearly 3 months on the Bataan, established 
itself at K-3 under a new commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel 
Claude H, Welch, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Wyczawski. 

The transportation jam in Korea made necessary the permanent 
assignment of a VMR-152 detachment to 1st MAW Headquarters. 
Transports had heretofore been sent to the Wing on a temporary 
basis and returned to Hawaii when missions were completed. 

Mud and inadequate rail facilities doubled the demands on feaf's 
aerial supply of combat forces. The Wing's courier service to Marine 
air and ground forces scattered over Korea reached the limit of its 
capabilities. As a solution General Harris requested a five-plane 
VMR-152 detachment on a long-term assignment, and Colonel 
Deane C. Roberts took command of this forward echelon at Itami. 

It was now possible to handle cargo and troop transport at the cargo 
and passenger terminals of all Marine air bases. In one 4-day period, 
early in April, approximately 2,000 replacement troops were lifted 
from Masan to Hoengsong by the five R5Ds. About a thousand 
rotated veterans were flown back on the return trips," 

A further change involved the coordination of the Wing's air 
control organizations. As the enemy's air power increased, obviously 
the problems of UN air defense multiplied. At K-l the Marine 
Ground Intercept Squadron-1 (MGCIS-l) and the Air Defense 
Section of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2) 
w ere hard pressed to identify and control the hundreds of aircraft 
flying daily over Korea. 

"Unless otherwise specified, references to changes in 1st MAW units are derive 
tr Om the historical diaries of the units concerned for February, March, and April 1951. 


The Easi-Cetural Front 

There was no adequate system of alerting these air defense stations 
to the effect that planes were departing or incoming. Many of them 
failed to send out their standard identification friend or foe (IFF) 
signals; and those that did so were still suspect, since U.S. electronics 
equipment on UN planes had fallen into enemy hands. As a conse- 
quence MGCIS-1 was kept busy vectoring air defense fighters to verify 
that certain bogeys were friendly transports, B-29s, or enemy 
bombers. 1 '' 

In an effort to cope with the situation, General Harris requested 
that another Marine ground control intercept squadron, MGCIS-3 
be sent to Korea. He desired that Marine Air Control Group-2 
(MACG-2) also be made available to coordinate the Wing's air 
control functions. These units sailed on 5 March from San Francisco. 

Until March 1951 the Air Force's 606th Aircraft Control and Warn- 
ing Squadron had participated in the air surveillance of the Pusan area 
from the top of 3,000-foot Chon-San— the encroaching mountain that 
made K-9's traffic pattern so hazardous. This Air Force unit displaced 
to Taejon early in March, and the MGCIS-1 commanding officer, 
Major H. E. Allen, moved his radio and radar vans to the mountain 
top to take over the job.*" 

General MacArtbur Visits Marine Battalion 

Following the occupation of Hongchon on the 15th, the Marine 
ground forces ran into stiffening enemy opposition during the next 
two days. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines were pinned 
down by intense CCF mortar and artillery fire when attacking Hill 
356 (Map 9). Three out of six friendly 81mm mortars were knocked 
out on 15 March in the 3d Battalion area, and at dusk 2/7 and 3/7 
had barely won a foothold on the hill.- 1 

The 1st Marines also met opposition which indicated that the 
enemy planned to make a stand on the high ground east and north of 
Hongchon. An intricate maneuver was executed when Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert K. McClelland's 2/1 swung from the right flank, 
where no enemy was encountered, to the extreme left. As a pre- 

n PacFlt Ir/terit/! Rpt No. 2, tl, 1038. 1039, A "bogey" is ;in unidentified pl:me. 

* LtCol H, 6. Allen, interv of 26 Feb 59, 

fl CO 7thMar ms£ to CG lslMarDiv, 2130 15 Mar 51. 

Operation Ripper 91 

liminary, the battalion had to circle to the rear, then move by truck 
up the MSR and through the zone of the 7th Marines as far as the 
village of Yangjimal (Map 9) . Dismounting, the men made a diffi- 
cult march across broken country toward Hill 246. At 1230 on the 
1 5th the column deployed to attack Hill 428 in conjunction with 
Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Bantling's 3d Battalion. 

Easy Company (Captain Jack A. Smith) and Item Company (First 
Lieutenant Joseph R. Fisher) engaged in a hot fire fight with the 
enemy. Both sides relied chiefly on mortars, but the Chinese had the 
advantage of firing from camouflaged bunkers. Smith called for an 
air strike and four planes from VMF-214 responded immediately. 
Fox Company (Captain Goodwin C. Groff) and Dog Company 
(Captain Welby D. Cronk) were committed in the attempt to carry 
Hill 428, but the enemy continued to resist stubbornly until dusk. 
McClelland then ordered a withdrawal to night defensive positions 
around Hill 246. The two assault battalions had suffered 7 KIA and 
86 WIA casualties. Counted enemy dead were reported as 93 -~" 

Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Kennedy's 3/5 was attached to the 
1st Marines to protect the right flank as the Marines prepared to 
resume the attack on the morning of the 16th. But the enemy had 
pulled out from Hill 428 during the night and patrols advanced more 
than 300 yards without making contact. 

Another hard action awaited the 7th Marines on the 16th, when 
Major Sawyer's 1st Battalion moved up to Line baker (Map 9), 
The Chinese resisted so hard on Hill 399 that the Marines had to 
attack bunker after bunker with grenades. 

The following morning was the occasion of a visit to the front by 
General MacArthur. Accompanied by Generals Ridgway and O. P. 
Smith, he drove in a jeep from Wonju over the mountain pass to 
Hongchon, where Marine engineers were still clearing mines. The 
jeep stalled after crossing the Hongchon-gang at a ford and a tow 
was necessary. This did not deter the commander in chief, who had 
asked to visit a Marine battalion in a combat area. He was taken to 
^e CP of Major Sawyer, whose ] /7 was mopping up on Hill 399 
after the hard fight of the day before. 

Five hours of riding over miserable roads had not daunted the 
7 1-year-old veteran of two World Wars, He seemed fresh and 
tested as he shook hands with 1/7 officers. "Although we had not 

a Vl HD 16 Dec 50 to JO Apr 51, 21-22; VMF-214 tiD Mar 51, 25-26. 


The East-Central Front 

passed the word regarding General MacArthur's visit," commented 
General Smith, "there were dozens of cameras in evidence." aa 

IX Corps orders were received on the 17th for the 1st Marine 
Division to attack from Line BAKER to Line buffalo (Map 9). The 
Division plan of maneuver called for the 5th Marines to pass through 
and relieve the 7th Marines while the 1st Marines continued to 
advance on the right. 

Again the enemy chose withdrawal to resistance, and five of the six 
Marine battalions reached Line buffalo on 20 March after encounter- 
ing only sniper fire and a few scattered mortar rounds. Enemy opposi- 
tion was reserved for 2/1 on the 19th, when Fox Company was 
pinned down by enemy small-arms and mortar fire from a long, 
narrow ridge running north and south to the west of Hill 330, 

Fortunately for the attackers, a parallel valley enabled a platoon 
of tanks from Baker Company, 1st Tank Battalion, to knock out 
unusually strong CCF bunkers with direct 90mm fire while Fox Com- 
pany riflemen followed along the ridgeline with a grenade attack 
before the enemy had time to recover. Thanks to intelligent planning, 
not a single Marine was killed or wounded as the battalion dug in 
for the night on Hill 330. 

Adopting the same tactics on the 20th, after artillery preparation 
and an air strike by VMF-214 and VMF-323 planes, Easy Company 
of 2/1 advanced along the ridgeline connecting Hills 330 and 381 
while tanks moved forward on either side providing direct flat-tra- 
jectory 90mm fire. By 1315 the Marines had overrun the enemy's main 
line of resistance without a casualty. 24 

1st KMC Regiment Returns to Division 

As the Eighth Army jumped off on 20 March from Line buffalo 
toward Line CAIRO (Map 9), the 1st KMC Regiment was attached 
again to the 1st Marine Division. This was the third time that 
Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. Harrison had been directed to reor- 
ganize and reassemble a KMC liaison advisory group. The 3d Bat- 
talion of the 11th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William 
McReynolds, was placed in direct artillery support. When the advance 

"Smith, Chronicle, 17 Mac 51. 

M IstMarDiv 1!D, Mar 51, 10; VMF-214 and VMF-323 HD, Mar 51. 

Operation Ripper 93 

was resumed, the KMCs attacked between the 1st Marines on the 
right and the 5th Marines on the left." 

The high esprit de corps of the KMCs shines forth from a comment 
written in his own English by First Lieutenant Kim Sik Tong: "The 
KMC ideal is to complete the mission, regardless of receiving strong 
enemy resistance, with endurance and strong united power, and always 
hearing in one's mind the distinction between honor and dishonor." 2H 
The zone of the KMC Regiment was a roadless wilderness, making 
it necessary to air-drop ammunition and supplies for the attack on Hill 
975. This was the hardest fight of the Division advance to Line CAIRO. 
Excellent artillery support was provided for the 2d and 3d Battalions 
as they inched their way forward in three days of bitter combat. Not 
until the morning of 24 March was the issue decided by maneuver when 
the 1st Battalion moved around the left KMC flank into a position 
threatening the enemy's right. Resistance slackened immediately on 
Hill 975 and the KMCs took their objective without further trouble. 

The 1st and 5th Marines were already on Line CAIRO, having met 
comparatively light opposition from nkpa troops who had relieved 
the 66th and 39th CCF Armies. Apparently the enemy was using 
North Koreans as expendable delaying elements while massing in the 
fear for an offensive that could be expected at any time. A smoke 
produced by burning green wood, shrouded the front in an 
: constant haze. 

the objectives of Operation ripper had been reached, 
jway planned to continue the UN offensive for the purpose 
the enemy off balance during his offensive preparations. 
The Eighth Army had been attacking with few and brief pauses for 
regrouping even since 21 February, and the commanding general 
wished to maintain its momentum. 

An advance of the 1st Marine Division to a new Line cairo was 
ordered by IX Corps on 26 March. This was simply a northeast 
extension of the old line to the boundary between IX and X Corps 
(Map 9). There was no need for the 5th Marines to advance, and 
the 1st Marines and KMC Regiment moved up to the new line on 

Eighth Army units had made average gains of about 35 miles 
during the last three weeks while driving nearly to the 38th Parallel. 

. Hamwn^N^w/w, Mar-Apt 51, 2-S. 


The East-Central Front 

On 29 March, General Ridgway published a plan for Operation 
rugged. It was to be a continuation of the offensive, with Line 
Kansas (Map 8) as the new objective. While other 1st Marine units 
were being relieved by X Corps elements, the 7th Marines was to be 
moved up from reserve near Hongchon and attached to the 1st 
Cavalry Division for the attack beyond Chunchon, evacuated by the 
retreating enemy. 27 

On 1 April the Marines were informed of sweeping changes in 
IX Corps plans. Instead of being relieved, the 1st Marine Division 
was to continue forward with two infantry regiments plus the KMCs. 
Its new mission called for a relief of the 1st Cavalry Division (with 
the 7th Marines attached) north of Chunchon. This modification gave 
General Smith the responsibility for nearly 20 miles of front.- 8 

"I visited this front frequently," commented Major General A. L. 
Bowser, the G-3 of that period, "and it was difficult at rimes to even 
locate an infantry battalion. . . . Visitors from the States or FMFPac 
were shocked at the wide frontages." 311 

3 Uh Parallel Recrossed by Marines 

Further IX Corps instructions on 2 April directed that the 1st Marines 
go into Division reserve near Hongchon while the 5 th Marines and 
1st KMC Regiment attacked. The deep, swift Soyang-gang, fordable 
in only a few places, lay squarely in the path of the 5th Marines. 
Speculations as to the method of crossing became rife just as air 
mattresses were issued. And though the officers denied any such 
intent, the troops were convinced that inflated mattresses would be 

As it happened, the regimental executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel 
Stewart, worked out a plan that did not include any such novelty. 
A narrow ford was discovered that would get the 1st and 2d Bat- 
talions across while the 3d rode in DUKWs. Light enemy opposition 
of a rear guard nature was encountered but the regiment completed 
the operation without casualties. Stewart reported to the regimental 
CP and learned that a jeep waited to take him on the initial lap of 

'■"eusak Cmd Rf't, Mar 51. 18-19. 

* Smith. Chronhle, 1 Apr 51. 

»°BrigGcn A. L. Bowser, Itr of 14 Feb 58. 

Operation Ripper 95 

his homeward journey. He was the last man to leave Korea of the 
1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which had landed at Pusan on 
2 August 1950.™ 

After reaching their prescribed objectives, the 5th Marines and 
KMC Regiment were relieved on 5 April by elements of the 7th 
Infantry Division of X Corps. Meanwhile, the 7th Marines, attached 
to the 1st Cavalary Division, advanced northward with the 7th and 
8th Cavalry Regiments. Little opposition developed and on 4 April the 
Marines were among the first Eighth Army troops to recross the 38th 

General Ridgway published another operation plan on 6 April 
1951 and designated new Eighth Army objectives to the northward. 
The purpose was to threaten the buildup for the forthcoming CCF 
offensive that was taking place behind the enemy lines in the so-called 
"Iron Triangle." 

This strategic area, one of the few pieces of comparatively level 
real estate in central Korea, was bounded by Kumhwa, Chorwon, and 
Pyongyang (Map 14). A broad valley containing a network of good 
toads, it had been utilized by the Chinese for the massing of supplies 
and troops. 

Experience had proved that interdictory bombing could not prevent 
the enemy from nourishing an offensive, even though the feaf had 
complete control of the air over roads and rail lines of a mountainous 
peninsula. The Chinese, though hampered in their efforts, had been 
able to bring up large quantities of supplies under cover of darkness. 
General Ridgway determined, therefore, to launch his ground forces 
at objectives threatening the Iron Triangle, thus forcing the enemy 
to fight. 

On 8 April, in preparation for the new effort, the 1st Marine Divi- 
sion was directed by IX Corps to relieve the 1st Cavalry Division on 
Line Kansas and prepare to attack toward Line quantjco (Map 8). 

Reneiual of Division's CAS Problems 

% this time, after three months of various sorts of operational diffi- 
culties, VMF-311 was riding a wave of efficiency. The distance from 
^cooperating base to the combat area emphasized the superior speed 

""Col J. i. Stewart, Itc of 25 Oct 57. 


The East-Central Vroni 

of the F9Fs. The Panther jets could get into action in half the time 
required by the Corsairs. The jets were more stable in rocket, bomb- 
ing, and strafing runs. They were faster on armed reconnaissance and 
often were pouring it into the enemy before he could disperse. These 
advantages offset the high fuel consumption of the F9Fs and made 
them ideal planes for close air support. 

On the morning of 8 April an opportunity arose for the Marine 
jets to help the 7th Marines. It started when 3/7 patrols encountered 
120mm mortars, small arms, automatic weapons, and grenades em- 
ployed by an enemy force dug in on a ridge looming over the road 
near the west end of the Hwachon reservoir. The battalion forward 
air controller radioed devastate baker at Hongchon for air support. 51 

At the time Major Roy R. Hewitt, an air officer on General Shep- 
herds FMFPac staff, was visiting the Air Support Section of Marine 
Tactical Air Control Squadron-2 (MTACS-2). His blow-by-blow 
report of events is as follows: 

a. At 0900 a request for an air support strike on an enemy mortar position 
was received from the 7th Marines. It took the Air Support Section until 
0945 to get through to JOC and then it had to be shunted through K-t in 
order to get the request in. 

b. The G-3 1st Marine Air Wing had arranged with JOC to have four 
(4) F9F 'scramble alert' for use by the 1st Marine Division. The F9Fs were 
requested, and JOC authorized their use, but when Marine Aircraft Group-33 
was contacted they informed the Air Support Section that JOC had already 
scrambled the aircraft and sent them to another target. 

c. Air Support Section again contacted JOC, and JOC said aircraft would 
be on station in one (1) hour. At the end of one (I) hour JOC was again 
contacted concerning aircraft. This time JOC said they would have two (2) 
flights on station within one (t) hour. At the end of the second one (1) 
hour period no aircraft were received. 

d. Again the Air Support Section contacted JOC and was informed that 
any air support for the 7th Marines would have to be requested through the 
1st Cavalry Division to which the 7th Marines were attached. [In fact, JOC 
notified devastate baker that any such requests from the 1st Marine Divi- 
sion would not be honored until the Division went back into action, ] s - 

During all this time ten Marine planes— six from VMF-3U and 
four from VMF-214— had reported in and out of the area. They had 

"The following description is from: 7th Mar HD, 8 Apr 51, 5; IX Corps Cmd Rpt, 
Apr 51, Bk III, Vol 2, PORs #574 and 575 of 8 Apr; Shepherd Memo, 27 Apr 51, end 
(7) "Excerpt from Maj Hewitt rept;" IstMAW HD, Apr 51, App VII, "Staff Journal 
G— J Section " 9 Apt 

" 1st MAW G-3 StafT Journal, 9 Apr, op, 0, 

Operation Ripper 97 

been sent by mellow to work under the control of Mosquito strategy, 
the tactical air controller (airborne) (taca) of the 1st Cavalry Divi- 
sion. The flights also supported the 6th ROK Division patrols on the 
Marines* left, hit troops in a small settlement 3 miles to the Marines* 
front, and aided the 7th and 8th Cavalry regiments which were en- 
countering resistance on the commanding ground to the right. None 
of the flights supported the Marines. 

Meanwhile, the 3/7 Marines employed artillery and tanks on the 
enemy positions, and late in the day a Mosquito brought in a flight of 
four Air Force F-80s. Major Hewitt's report continued: 

e. At the end of six (6) hours air support was finally received by the 7th 
Marines. It was brought in by a Mosquito who would not relinquish control 
of the aircraft to the Forward Air Controller who could see the target much 
better than the Mosquito. 

f. After having the fighters make a couple of passes the Mosquito took 
the fighters and went to another target without having completely destroyed 
the position, 

This was the beginning of a deterioration in air support for Marine 
ground forces that can be charged in large measure to the JOC system 
of control. Major Hewitt's report was read with great interest by 
high-ranking Navy and Marine Corps officers. By now they were 
devoting a lot of thought to the breakup of the Marine air-ground 


The CCF Spring Offensive 

Prisoners Reveal Date of Offensive — Hwachon Occupied 
by KMC Regiment — CCF Breakthrough Exposes Marine 
Flank — Marine Air in Support Everywhere — -Plugging the 
Gap on the Marine Left — Repulse of Communist Attacks 
— Withdrawal to the Kansas Line — Enemy Stopped in IX 
Corps Sector- — 1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps 

On 10 April 1951 the 1st Marine Division was poised on Line 
Kansas for a drive to Line quantico. Then a new IX Corps 
directive put on the brakes, and for 10 days Marine activities were 
limited to patrolling and preparation of defensive works. Boundary 
adjustments between the Division and the 6th ROK Division on the 
left extended the Marine zone about 2,000 yards to the west; and 
General O. P. Smith's CP was advanced to Sapyong-ni, just south of 
foe 38th Parallel (Map 8). 

Out of a blue sky came the announcement on the 11th that General 
MacArthur had been recalled by President Truman for failure to give 
wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Govern- 
ment and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official 
duties. General Ridgway was appointed to the UN command, and he 
«i turn was relieved on 14 April by Lieutenant General James A. 
Van Fleet, USA. 

The new Eighth Army commander, youthful in appearance for his 
59 years, was no novice at fighting Communists. In 1949 and 1950 he 
bad been Director of the Joint Military Aid Group that saved Greece 
r rom falling into the clutches of Communism after Moscow fomented 
a civil war. Van Fleet also brought to his new command a World 
war II reputation as a vigorous leader with a preference for offensive 


100 The East-Central Front 

Prisoners Reveal Date of O 

Chinese prisoners taken during the first three weeks of April 1951 told 
all they knew with no apparent reluctance, just as Japanese captives 
had given information in World War II. Inconsistent as it may seem 
that fanatical Asian soldiers should prove so cooperative, such was 
the penalty the enemy paid for insisting on resistance to the last ditch. 
Since the possibility of surrender was not considered, CCF prisoners 
were taught no code of behavior and answered questions freely and 

POW interrogations were supplemented by captured documents 
revealing that the Chinese prided themselves on a new tactical doctrine 
known as "the roving defensive," put into effect in the spring of 1951. 
It meant "not to hold your position to the death, but to defend against 
the enemy through movement," explained a secret CCF directive dated 
17 March 1951. "Therefore, die wisdom of the roving defensive is 
based on exhausting the enemy without regard for the loss or gain 
of some fighting area or the immediate fulfillment of our aims." 1 

It was admitted that the CCF soldier must work harder, "because 
the troops will have to construct entrenchments and field works in 
every place they move," But die advantages were that "roving warfare 
can conserve our power, deplete the enemy's strength, and secure 
for us more favorable conditions for future victory. Meanwhile, die 
enemy will make the mistake once again, and coltapse on the Korean 

The last sentence evidently refers to the UN advance of late Novem- 
ber 1950 that was rolled back by a surprise CCF counteroffensive. 
Chinese strategists seem to have concluded that their "roving defen- 
sive" had made possible another such offensive victory in the spring 
of 1951. At any rate, prisoners questioned by die 1st Marine Division 
and other IX Corps units agreed that the CCF 5th Phase Offensive was 
scheduled to begin on 22 April 1951. The IX Corps zone was said 
to be the target area for an attempted breakthrough/ 

Marine G-2 officers recalled that prisoners gave information on the 
eve of the CCF offensive in November 1950 that proved to be aston- 
ishingly accurate in the light of later events. For it was a paradox that 

' This section is based upon the folio winy ducumentsi IX Corps C»idR(>t 5, Apr 
51, Sec 3, Intel licence; IstMaiDiv HD, Apr 51 ; PIR 171, 179, ISO. 
"Eusak, IX Ojrps and IstMarDiv G-2 PlRs, 1-20 Apr 51. 


The CCP Spring Offensive 101 

the Chinese Reds, so secretive in other respects, let the man in the 
ranks know about high-level strategic plans. In the spring of 1951 
it mattered little, since air reconnaissance had kept the Eighth Army 
well informed as to the enemy buildup. 

Prisoners were taken in the IX Corps zone from the following major 
CCF units during the first three weeks of April: 

20th Army (58th, 59th, and 60th Divisions), estimated strength, 24,261; 
26th Army (76th, 77th, and 78th Divisions), estimated total strength. 

39th Army (115th, 11 6th, and 117th Divisions), estimated total strength, 
19, 538; 

40th Army (118th, H9th, and 120th Divisions), estimated total strength, 

The 20th and 26th, it may be recalled, were two of the CCF armies 
opposing the 1st Marine Division during the Chosin Reservoir 
breakout. It was a satisfaction to the Marines that their opponents of 
December 1950 had evidently needed from three to four months to 
reorganize and get back into action. 

In CCF reserve on 21 April 1951 were the 42d and 66th Armies, 
both located in the Iron Triangle to the enemy's rear. The former 
included the 124th, 125th, and 126th Divisions— the 124th being the 
unit cut to pieces from 3 to 7 November 1950 by the 7th Marines 
in the war's first American offensive action against Chinese Red 

Hwacbon Occupied by KMC Regiment 

At 0700 on the 21st the 1st Marine Division resumed the attack 
toward Line quantico with the 7th Marines on the left, the 5th 
Marines in the center, the KMC Regiment on the right, and the 
1st Marines in reserve. Negligible resistance awaited the Marines and 
other IX Corps troops during advances of 5,000 to 9,000 yards. An 
ominous quiet hung over the front as green wood smoke limited 
Visability to a few hundred yards. 

On the Marine left the 6th ROK Division lost touch, opening a gap 
of 2,500 yards, according to a message from Corps to the 1st Marine 
Division. The ROK commander was ordered by Corps to restore 


The East-Central front 

lateral contact. This incident would be recalled significantly by the 
Marines when the CCF blow fell. 3 

The KMC Regiment had the mission of finishing the fight for con- 
trol of the Hwachon Reservoir area. Early in April the 1st Cavalry 
Division and the 4th Ranger Company, USA, had been repulsed in 
attempts to fight their way across the artificial lake in rubber boats. 
The enemy retaliated by opening the penstocks and spillway gates. 
Considering that the dam was 275 feet high and the spillway 826 feet 
long, it is not surprising that a wall of water 10 feet high roared 
down the Pukhan Valley into areas recently occupied by IX Corps 
units. 4 

Both Army and Marine engineers were on the alert, having been 
warned by aerial observers. They cut three floating bridges loose from 
one bank or another, so that they could ride out the crest of the flood. 
Thanks to this precaution, only temporary damage and interruption 
of traffic resulted. 6 

The 1st Engineer Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel 
John H. Partridge, was given the mission by Corps of jamming the 
gates of the dam at the open position. Compliance would have to 
wait, of course, until the KMCs took the dam. Partridge conferred 
meanwhile with Colonel Bowser, and it was decided to take no action 
after the anticipated capture until a demolitions reconnaissance could 
be made." 

As early as 18 April a KMC patrol had crossed the Pukhan into 
the town of Hwachon, which was found abandoned except for 
II Chinese soldiers, who were taken prisoner. Marine engineers 
installed a floating bridge on the 21st for the advance of one KMC 
battalion the next morning. The other "two battalions were to cross 
the river several miles downstream by DUKWs. 7 

Corps plans for the attack were made in full realization of air 
reconnaissance reports for 20 and 21 April indicating that the enemy 
offensive buildup was in its final stages. This intelligence was gleaned 
in spite of all enemy efforts to frustrate the airmen. CCF spotters 
were placed on mountain tops to give the alarm, and relays of men 

• lsiMarDiv 11D Apr 51, 47-48; CO 7thMar msg to CG IstMarDiv, 1830 21 Apr bl, 

* Capt D. E. Fowler, "Operations at the Hwachon Dam, Korea, ' The Military Engi- 
neer, Jan-Feb 1952, 7-8. 

s IstMarDiv HD, Apr 51. 

'BrigGen A. L. Bowser, Itr of 14 Feb 58; Col j, H. Partridge, Itr of 17 Mar 58. 
'CO KMC Regt msg to CG IstMarDiv, 2335 22 Apr 51, in KMC In&Out #1; 0)1 
C. W. Harrison, Namt/ire, Mar-Apr 51, 

The CCF Spring Offer/she 


fired shots to pass on warnings of approaching planes. Antiaircraft 
defenses were increased at such vital spots as bridges and supply 
areas. The Communists even went so far as to put out decoys — fake 
trucks, tanks, and tank cars— to lure UN fighter-bombers within 
range of antiaircraft guns. 

These efforts resulted in 16 Marine planes being shot down from 
1 to 21 April 1951. Nine of the pilots were killed, one was captured, 
three were rescued from enemy territory, one walked back to friendly 
outposts, and two managed to bail out or crash-land behind the 
UN lines. 6 

This total was equivalent to two-thirds of the average tactical 
squadron. Because of the disruption to the 1st MAW pilot replace- 
ment program, the Commandant arranged for 20 pilots to be flown to 
Korea to augment the normal rotation quotas." 

Direct opposition from enemy aircraft was also on the increase. 
CCF flights even reached the eusak. battle line as unidentified light 
planes flew over positions or dropped small bombs. Evidently the 
enemy was using well camouflaged airfields in North Korea. 

An air battle took place on 20 April when two VMF-312 pilots 
from the Bataan, Captain Philip C. DeLong and First Lieutenant 
Harold D. Daigh, encountered four YAK fighters in the heavily 
defended Pyongyang-Chinnanpo area. They gave chase and shot 
down three of the enemy planes. 10 

Marine aircraft were on station when Marine ground forces re- 
sumed their forward movement at 0830 on the morning of 22 April. 
A CCF prisoner taken that very afternoon confirmed previous POW 
statements that the 2 2d was the opening day of the Fifth Phase 
Offensive. The front was quiet, however, as the three Marine infantry 
regiments advanced almost at will, 

A motorized patrol of Division Reconnaissance Company, led by 
the commanding officer, Major Robert L. Autrey, had the initial 
contact with the enemy while advancing on the Division left flank. 
The two platoons, supported by Marine tanks, found their first indi- 
cations when searching a Korean roadside hut. Although the natives 
denied having seen any Chinese soldiers, Corporal Paul G. Martin 
discovered about 50 hidden rice bowls waiting to be washed. Upon 

'Compilation of data from IstMAW sqdn HDs, Apr 51; PacFit Interim Rpt No. 2, 

1051, 1071. 
' Ibid 

15 1st MAW HD, 20 Apr 51; VMF-312 HD, 20 Apr 51. 

("i.14040 0-62_<> 


The East-Central front 

being confronted with this evidence, the terrified Koreans admitted 
that Chinese soldiers had reconnoitred the area just before dawn. 

Farther up the road, an ammunition dump of hidden mortar shells 
was discovered. The enemy had also put up several crude propaganda 
signs with such sentiments as Your Folks Like See You Home and 
Halt! Forward Means Death. 

The patrol dismounted and proceeded with caution, guided by an 
OY overhead. Although the "choppers" were the favored aircraft of 
VMO-6, the OYs also earned die gratitude of the troops on many 
an occasion such as this. The pilot gave the alarm just before hidden 
Communists opened fire. Thus the Marines of the patrol were enabled 
to take cover, and the tanks routed the enemy force with well placed 
90mm shells." 

The KMCs met no resistance worth mentioning when they secured 
the town of Hwachan and the north bank of the Pukhan just west of 
the reservoir. Only light and scattered opposition awaited the 5th 
Marines (Colonel Richard M. Hay ward) and the 7th Marines 
(Colonel Herman Nickerson, Jr.) on their way to the occupation of 
assigned objectives on Line quantico, 


h Ex i 

For weeks the Communist forces in Korea might have been compared 
to an antagonist backtracking to get set for taking aim with a shotgun. 
There could be no doubt, on the strength of daily G-2 reports, about 
both barrels being loaded. And on the night of 22 April the enemy 
pulled the trigger. 

The KMCs, after taking their objectives, reported a concentration 
of enemy small-arms fire. At 1800 the command of the 1st Marine 
Division directed a renewal of the advance at 0700, on the morning 
of the 23d. This order was cancelled at 2224 by a message c^ n 8 

instructions. 1 ' 

One of the reasons for the sudden change was the receipt of a 
message by the 1st Marine Division at 2120, informing that the 6th 

"Set Paul G. Martin, USMC (Ret.), Itr of 2 Jul 56. 

"CG lstMarDiv msg to COs 5th, 7th, llih Mar, 1st KMC, Tk, and EngBns, 2224 
22 Apr 51 in Div In&Out #21. 

The CCF Spring Offensive 


ROK Division was under heavy attack to the west of the Marines. 
Meanwhile, an on-the-spot questioning of a CCF prisoner just taken 
by the KMCs convinced the command and staff of the 1st Marine 
Division that the CCF 5th Phase Offensive was only hours away and 
gathering momentum. Thanks to this timely interpretation, all for- 
ward Marine units were alerted two hours before the main blow fell. 

It was on the left of the 1st Marine Division that the situation first 
became critical. The 6th ROK Division had never quite succeeded in 
closing up the gap on its right and restoring contact with the 
Marines. But this failure was trivia) as compared to the collapse of 
the entire ROK division an hour before midnight, leaving a gap wide 
enough for a major breakthrough. 

The 1st Marine Division took prompt measures to cope with the 
emergency. As early as 2130, the 1st Marines, in reserve just north 
of Chunchon, were alerted to move one battalion to contain a possible 
enemy threat to the Division left flank. A second message an hour 
later called for immediate execution. And at midnight the Division 
Provost Marshal was directed to stop ROK stragglers and place them 
under guard. The Division Reconnaissance Company received orders 
to aid the military police. 13 

Colonel Francis M. McAHster, commanding the 1st Marines, se- 
lected Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. West's 1st Battalion to carry out 
Division orders. "By midnight we were all on trucks and rolling on 
the roads north," wrote Second Lieutenant Joseph M. Reisler in a 
letter home. "Mile after mile, all the roads were covered with rem- 
nants of theROKs who had fled. Thousands of them [were] strag- 
gling along the roads in confusion." 11 

Despite these preparations for trouble on the left flank, the KMCs 
on the right and the 5th Marines in the center were first in the Division 
to come under attack. During the last minutes of 22 April the 2d 
KMC Battalion had it hot and heavy on Hill 509. To the left the 
1st KMC Battalion, partially encircled, notified the 5th Marines of 
a penetration. 

The effects were felt immediately by 1/5, with its CP in Hwachon. 
Hill 313 was the key to the town, being located at the Hwachon end 
of a long ridge forming a natural avenue of approach from the 

" CG IstMarDiv msg to CO IstMar 2130 and 2232 22 Apr 51 in Div In&Out #12; 
istMarDiv HD, Apr 51, 6 and 50, 
" 2dLt J. M. Reisler, lu to family of I May 51, 


The East-Central Front 

northeast. Captain James T. Cronin's Baker Company of 1/5 had 
the responsibility for protecting the CP and shifting troops to the right 
flank if necessary. He sent Second Lieutenant Harvey W. Nolan's 
platoon to run a race with the enemy for the occupation of Hill 315. 
Attached in excess of T/O for familiarization was Second Lieutenant 

About 220 yards from the summit the slope was so steep that the 
Marines clawed their way upward on hands and knees. The company 
commander posted the attached light machine gun section while 
Nolan, McGahn, and Sergeant William Piner organized the assault. 
The three squads of riflemen advanced a few yards, only to be pinned 
down by well directed CCF machine gun fire. Another rush brought 
the Marines closer to the enemy but a stalemate ensued in the dark- 
ness. Seven of the platoon were killed and 17 wounded. 

The situation in the 1/5 area was so serious that Fox Company 
of 2/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Glen E. Martin) sent reinforcements. At 
dawn, however, Hill 313 proved to be abandoned by the enemy. 
A vigorous KMC counterstroke had swept the Communists from 
Hill 509, so that the front was relatively quiet in this area. The 
courage and determination of the KMC Regiment were praised by 
General Smith, who sent this message on the morning of the 23d to 
Colonel Kim, the commanding officer: 

Congratulate you and your fine officers and men on dash and spirit in 
maintaining your positions against strong enemy attacks. We are proud of 
the Korean Marines. IB 

It is taking no credit away from the KMCs and 5th Marines to 
point out that they appear to have been hit by enemy holding attacks. 
The main CCF effort was directed at the left of the Division line, 
held by the 7th Marines. 

The heaviest fighting took place in the sector of 1/7 on the extreme 
left, commanded by Major Webb D. Sawyer. It was obvious that the 
enemy planned to widen the penetration made at the expense of the 
6th ROK Division. The 358th Regiment of the 120th Division, CCF 
40th Army, hurled nearly 2,000 men at the Marine battalion. Charlie 

lfl Souses for this 1/5 action are 5thMar HD, Apr 51; UCol John L Hopkins 
interv of 24 Jan 58; Maj J. T. Cronim, Itr of 30 Jan 58; Capt P. T. McGahn, interv o) 
27 Jul 56. 

"CG IstMarDiv msg to CO KMC (ftgfc 0910 23 Apr 51. 

The CCF Spring Offensive 


Company, commanded by Captain Eugene H. Haiifey, took the brunt 
of the assault. 17 

The thin battalion line bent under sheer weight of numbers. But 
it did not break. It held through three hours of furious fighting, with 
the support of Marine and Army artillery, until the 1st Battalion of 
the 1st Marines came up as reinforcements under the operational 
control of the 7th Marines. The newcomers took a position to the left 
of 1/7, so that the division flank was no longer completely "tn the air." 

This was one of the first examples of the Corps and Division 
maneuvering that played such a large part throughout in the blunting 
of the CCF offensive. Troops were not left to continue a desperate 
fight when a shift of units would ease the pressure. 

Marine Air in Support Everywhere 

At first light on the 23d the FF.AF Mosquitoes and fighter-bombers 
went into action. The Marines had four two- plane flights of Corsairs 
airborne before sun-up. VMF-323 responded to a call from Baker 
Company, 1/5, only to find that the enemy had abandoned Hill 313- 
A low-flying OY of VMO-6, commanded by Major D. W. McFarland, 
guided the Corsairs to the withdrawing Chinese, who were worked 
over thoroughly. VMF-214 planes meanwhile supported 1/7 in that 
battalion's desperate fight at the left of the line. 111 

A pilot's-eye view showed fighting in progress from one coast to 
another, although the enemy was making his main effort in the IX 
Corps sector. The U.S. 24th Infantry Division, to the left of the 6th 
ROK Division, was having to bend its right flank southward to defend 
against the CCF penetration. Toward the rear the 27th Brigade of 
the British Commonwealth Division, in IX Corps reserve, was being 
alerted to meet the Communists head on and bring the breakthrough 
to a halt. 

Elements of the U.S. 24th and 25th Divisions on the edge of the 
Iron Triangle were giving ground slowly, Seoul was obviously an 
objective of CCF units that had crossed the Imjin in the moonlight. 

"This account of the 7th Marines' fi^ht is based on the following sources: IstMarDiv 
WD, Apr 51; BrigGen A. L. Bowser, Itr of 14 Feb 58; Col Ft. G. Davis, Comments, 
n.d; Col H. Nickersori, comments of 25 Feb 58; Col W. F. Meyerhoff, kr of 25 Feb 58; 
Col j. T. Rooney, Itr of 26 Feb 58. 

"HDj of VMF-32J, VMF-2H, and VMO-6 for Apr 51. 


The East-Central Front 

But General Ridgway had decided chat the city was not to be aban- 
doned. "Considerable importance was attached to the retention of 
Seoul," he explained at a later date, "as it then had more value 
psychologically than its acquisition had conferred when we were still 
south of the Han." 10 

Near the junction of X Corps and I ROK Corps the 7th ROK 
Division had been hard hit, although the enemy attack in this area 
was a secondary effort. Air support helped this unit to hold its own 
until it could be reinforced. 

Of the 205 Marine aircraft sorties on 23 April, 153 went to support 
the fighting front. The 1st Marine Division received 42 of these CAS 
strikes; 24 went to the ROK 7th Division; 59 to I Corps to check the 
advance on Seoul; and 28 to pound the Communists crossings the 
Imjin. sn 

Only about 66 percent of the landing strip at K-3 (Pohang) could 
be used; the remainder was being repaired by the Seabees. In order to 
give the Panther jets more room, VMF-212 shifted its squadrons for 
two days to K-16 near Seoul. A detachment of VMF-323 planes from 
K-l (Pusan) also made the move. Since K-16 was only 30 miles from 
the combat area along the Imjin, the Corsairs were able to launch 
their attacks and return for rearming and refueling in an hour or less," 

Plugging the Gap on the Marine Left 

At first light on 23 April the entire left flank of the 1st Marine Divi- 
sion lay exposed to the Chinese who had poured into the gap left by 
the disintegration of the 6th ROK Division. IX Corps orders called 
for the ROKs to reassemble on the Kansas line, but most of them 
straggled from 10 to 1 4 miles behind the positions they held prior to 
the CCF attack. The 1st Marine Division ordered Reconnaissance 
Company to stop ROK stragglers at the river crossing, and several 
groups were turned back. 

The reasons for the ROK collapse are variously given. Weak 
command and low morale have been blamed for the debacle, yet the 
shattered division did not lack for defenders. No less an authority 

* Gen M. B. Ridgway, In of 29 Jan 58. 

""Compilation of data from 1st MAW squadrons for 23 Apr 51. 
"VMF-212, MAG-33, and MAG-12 HDs for Apr 51. 

The CCF Spring Offensive 


than General Van Fleer declared himself , . reluctant to criticize 
the 6th ROK Division too severely. I do not believe they deliberately 
threw away their equipment — I am inclined to believe such equipment 
was abandoned due to the terrain, lack of roads and weight. Our 
check at the time indicated that the Korean soldiers held on to their 
hand weapons. It is interesting to know that General Chang who 
commanded 6th ROK Division at the time ... is today [March 
1958] Vice Chief of Staff of the Korean Army." " 2 

As a first step toward setting up a defense in two directions, the 
1st Marine Division received orders from IX Corps to fall back to 
Line PENDLETON (Map 10). This was one of the Eighth Army lines 
assigned to such profusion that they resembled cracks in a pane of 
glass, pendleton ran generally southwest to northeast through the 
7th Marines sector, then turned eastward just north of the town of 

By occupying this line, the 7th Marines could bend its left to the 
south in order to refuse that flank. Still farther to the south, the 
1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Marines were to take positions facing 
west. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division would face west as 
much as north. On the center and right the KMCs and 5th Marines 
would find it necessary to withdraw only about 1,000 yards to take 
up their new positions. 23 

It was up to 1/1 to make the first move toward plugging the gap. 
At 0130 on the 23d Captain John Coffey's Baker Company led the 
way. Moving north in the darkness along the Pukhan and then west 
along a tributary, the long column of vehicles made its first stop about 
1,000 yards from the assigned position. Here the 9 2d Armored Field 
Battalion, USA, was stationed in support of the 6th ROK Division and 
elements of the 1st Marine Division. The commanding officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. Lavoie, was an old acquaintance of 1/1, 
having supported that battalion during the final days of the Chosin 
Reservoir breakout. Lavoie was held in high esteem by the Marines, 
who found it characteristic of him that in this fluid situation his 
cannoneers were formed into a tight defensive perimeter, ready to 
fight as infantry if need be. 

"Gen J. S. Van Fleet. USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mac 58. 

"HDs of IstMarDiv, IstMar, and 7thMar for Apr 51 ; Maj Gen O. P. Smith, Chronicle, 
23-24 Apr 51; MajGen E. W, Snedeker, ltr of 12 Feb 58; Col j. T. Rooney, ltr of 
26 Feb 58; Col H, Nickerson, ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col W, F, Meyerlioff, ltr of 25 
Feb 58; Maj R. P. Wray, ltr of 27 Apr 58 ; LtCol J. F. Coffey and Maj N. B, Mills, interv 

The CCF Spring Offensive 


Another Army artillery unit, the 987th Armored Field Artillery 
Battalion, had been roughly used by the Chinese who routed the 
ROK division. Losses in guns and equipment had resulted, and 
Coffey moved with his company about 1,500 yards to the west to assist 
in extricating from the mud all the 105s that could be saved. Re- 
sistance was encountered in the form of machine gun fire from 
Chinese who' had set up a road block.- ' 

Upon returning to 1/1, Coffey found it occupying what was in effect 
an outpost to the southwest of the 7th Marines. Baker Company was 
assigned to the left of Captain Robert P. Wray's Charlie Company, 
holding the curve of a horseshoe-shaped ridge, with Captain Thomas J. 
Bohannon's Able Company on the right. In support, along the com- 
paratively level ground to the immediate rear, was Weapons Company 
(Major William L. Bates). 

With 1/1 facing in three directions to block a CCF attack, 1/7 
managed to disengage and withdraw through 3/7, which occupied a 
position on Line pendleton. VMO-6 helicopters and troops of 2/7 
helped to evacuate the 1/7 casualties incurred during the night's 
hard fighting. 

During the early morning hours of the 23d the Marines of 3/1 had 
boarded trucks to the village of Todun-ni (Map 11) on the west bank 
of the Pukhan. Their assigned position was Hill 902, a 3,000-foot 
height dominating the surrounding terrain. The Chinese also were 
interested in this piece of real estate, since it overlooked the river 
crossing of the 1st Marine Division. Pressure to beat the Communists 
to the crest mounted as NCOs urged the men to their utmost efforts 
over steep uphill trails. 

The Marines won the race. Once in position, however, it was evi- 
dent to Lieutenant Colonel Banning that three ridge lines leading 
u p to the hill mass would have to be defended. This necessity imposed 
a triangular formation, and he placed Captain Horace L. Johnson's 
George Company at the apex, with First Lieutenant William J. 
Allert's How Company on the left, and First Lieutenant William 
Swanson's Item Company on the right. The heavy machine guns of 
Major Edwin A. Simmons' Weapons Company were distributed among 

-ources for operations of the two Army artillery battalions are: Gtn W. M, Hoge, 
OSA (Ret.), Itr of i Feb 58; UCol Leon P. Lavoie, USA, Itr of 5 Feb 58; LtCol Roy A, 
fucker, USA, lit of 30 Nov 57; UOA John F. Coffey, USMC, Itr of 9 Feb 58; Cupt 
Kussell A. Gugelet, USA, Combm Actions in Korea (Washington, 195-i), 162-175- 


Action of 1/1 at Horseshoe Ridge, 3/1 on 902, 
and Subsequent Withdrawals, 23-2 5 April 


, .^Horseshoe 
V] ■ 


I i i i i l- m Positions Z3 Apr. 
□urnun " 24 Apr. 
Ml 25 Apr 

The CCP Spring Ojjemive 


the rifle companies and the 81mm mortars placed only 10 to 20 yards 
behind the front lines. 25 

The KMCs and 5th Marines completed their withdrawal without 
interference. Thus the line of the 1st Marine Division on the after- 
noon of 23 April might have been compared to a fishhook with the 
shank in the north and the barb curling around to the west and south. 
The three Marine battalions plugging the gap were not tied in physi- 
cally. Major Maurice E. Roach's 3/7 was separated by an interval 
of 1,000 yards from 1/1 , and the other two Marine battalions were 
5,500 yards apart (Map 11). But at least the 1st Marine Division 
had formed a new front under fire and awaited the night's attacks 
with confidence. 

Repulse of Communist Attacks 

Bugle calls and green flares at about 2000 announced the presence 
of the Chinese to the west of 1/1 on Horseshoe Ridge. 

"They came on in wave after wave, hundreds of them," wrote 
Lieutenant Reisier, whose platoon held an outpost in advance of 
Charlie Company. "They were singing, humming and chanting, 
'Awake, Marine. ..." In the first rush they knocked out both our 
machine guns and wounded about 10 men, putting a big hole in our 
Hnes. We held for about 15 minutes, under mortar fire, machine gun 
fire, and those grenades— hundreds of grenades. There was nothing 
to do but withdraw to a better position, which I did. We pulled 
back about 50 yds. and set up a new line. All this was in the pitch- 
black night with Chinese cymbals crashing, horns blowing, and their 
god-awful yells." sa 

For four hours the attacks on Horseshoe Ridge were continuous, 
particularly along the curve held by Wray's company. He was rein- 
forced during the night by squads sent from Coffey's and Bohannon's 
companies. Wray realized that the integrity of the battalion position 
depended on holding the curve of the ridge, but his main problem 
was bringing up enough ammunition. Men evacuating casualties to 
the rear returned with supplies, but the amount was all too limited 
until Corporal Leo Marquez appointed himself a one-man committee. 

_ * UtMarDiv, IstMar, and 7thMar HDs, Apr 51; LtCol E. A. Simmons, intern of 12 
Jm 57. 

""SdLt J. M. Reiskr, Itr 10 family of 1 May 51. 


The Edit -Central Front 

His energy equalled his courage as lie carried grenades and small-arms 
ammunition all night to the men on the firing line. Marquez emerged 
unhurt in spite of bullet holes through his cartridge belt, helmet, and 
a heel of his shoe. 

About midnight it was the turn of 3/1. These Marines had dug in 
as best they could, but the position was too rocky to permit much 
excavation. Ammunition for the mortars had to be hand-carried 
from a point halfway up the hill. 

Several hours of harassing mortar fire preceded the CCF effort. 
George Company, at the apex of the ridge, was almost over- 
whelmed by the first Communist waves of assault. The courage of 
individual Marines shone forth in the ensuing struggle. Technical 
Sergeant Harold E. Wilson, second in command of the center platoon, 
suffered four painful wounds but remained in the fight, encouraging 
his men and guiding reinforcements from How Company as they 
arrived.- 7 

Steady artillery support was provided by Colonel McAlister, who 
rounded up a jury-rigged liaison party and three forward observer 
teams composed mainly of officers from the 987th AFA Battalion. 
They registered 11th Marines and 987th Battalion defensive fires 
which had a large part in stopping the CCF attack as it lapped around 
George Company and hit How and Item on the other two ridges. 

Colonel McAlister and Colonel Nickerson paid a visit to the CP 
of 1/1, which remained under the operational control of the 7th 
Marines until morning. The two regimental commanders arranged 
for artillery and tank support to cover the gap between 1/1 and 3/7. 29 
The enemy, however, seemed to be wary about infiltrating between 
the three battalion outposts. This reluctance owed in large part to 
the deadly flat-trajectory fire of the 90mm rifles of Companies A and 
B of the 1st Tank Battalion, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Holly F. Evans, had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. 
Milne that day. 

Attacks on 3/1 and 3/7 also continued throughout the night. At 
daybreak tbe close air support of Marine aircraft prevented further 
Communist efforts, though dug-in enemy groups remained within 
machine gun range. Identification of Chinese bodies at daybreak indi 

IstMarDiv HD, Apr 51; IstMar I ID, Apr 51. 
*"Col H. Nickerson Jr., Itr of 13 Feb 58; Col R. E. W&t, comments. n.J. 

The CCP Spring Ofjensive 


cated that the 359th and 36oth Regiments, 1 20th Division, 40th CCF 
Army, had been employed. 

Withdnnual to tide Kansas Line 

Now came the problem for the three Marine battalions of letting 
loose of the tiger's tail. Corps orders were received on the morning 
of 24 April for all units of the Division to pull back to Line KANSAS, 
This was in accordance with General Ridgway's policy, continued by 
General Van Fleet, of attaching more importance to destruction of 
enemy personnel than the holding of military real estate. 

Some of the most seriously wounded men of 1/1 required immediate 
evacuation, in spite of the obvious risks. A VMO-6 helicopter piloted 
by First Lieutenant Robert E. Matthewson attempted a landing at 
the base of Horseshoe Ridge. As he hovered over the panel markings, 
CCF small-arms fire mangled the tail rotor. The machine plunged to 
earth so badly damaged that it had to be destroyed. Matthewson 
emerged unhurt and waved off a helicopter flown by Captain H. G. 
McRay. Then the stranded pilot asked for a rifle and gave a good 
account of himself as an infantryman. 2 " 

While First Lieutenant Norman W. Hicks' second platoon fought 
as the rear guard, First Lieutenant Niel B. Mills' first platoon of 
Charlie Company led the attack down the hill, carrying the wounded 
behind. In an attempt to rout die Chinese from a flanking hill, Mills 
was wounded in the neck by a bullet that severed an artery. Corpsman 
E. N. Smith gripped the end of the artery between his fingers until 
a hemostat could be applied, thus saving the lieutenant's life. Just 
before losing consciousness. Mills looked at his watch. It was 1000 
a nd 1/1 had weathered the storm. ao 

The 3d Battalion of the 7th Marines, which had beaten off probing 
attacks all night, coordinated its movements with those of the two 
Marine battalions as they slowly withdrew toward the Pukhan, Despite 
Marine air attacks, the Communists not only followed but infiltrated 
in sufficient numbers to threaten the perimeter of Lavoie's cannoneers. 
The training this Army officer had given his men in infantry tactics 
now paid off as the perimeter held firm while mowing down the 

™ VMO-6 HD far Apr 51. 

""LtCol R. P. Wray and Maj N. W. Hicks, interv of 16 Dec 59. 


The East-Central Front 

attackers with point blank 105mm shells at a range of 1,000 yards. 
The Marines of Captain Bohannon's company soon got into the fight, 
and the 92d repaid the courtesy by supporting 1/1 and 3/7 during 
their withdrawal. Counted CCF dead numbered 179 at a cost to the 
92d of 4 KIA and 11 WIA casual ties. ■ 

As the morning haze lifted, the OYs of VMO-6 spotted for both 
Army and Marine artillery, devastate baker fed close support to 
the forward air controllers as fast as it could get planes from K-16 
at Seoul, only a 15-minute flight away. Not only 49 Corsairs but also 
40 of the Navy ADs and Air Force F-51s and jets aided the Marine 
ground forces in their withdrawal to Line Kansas, To speed the 
fighter-bombers to their targets, some of the Marine pilots were 
designated tactical air coordinators, airborne (taca) . Their famili- 
arity with the terrain was an asset as they led incoming pilots to 
ground force units most in need of support.* 2 

It was a confusing day in the air. The mutual radio frequencies to 
which planes and ground controllers were preruned proved to be 
inadequate. The consequence was all too often the blocking out of 
key information at a frustrating moment. Haze and smoke made for 
limited vision. The planes needed a two-mile circle for their attacks, 
yet the battalions were at times less than 1,000 yards apart. DEVASTATE 
baker had to deal with this congested and dangerous situation as 
best it could. 

In addition to its strong support of Marine ground forces, the 1st 
MAW sent 10 sorties to the ROKs in east Korea and 57 to I Corps 
in its battle along the Imjin. By this time the Gloucestershire Bat- 
talion of the 29th British Brigade was isolated seven miles behind 
enemy lines and receiving all supplies by air-drop. The outlook grew 
so desperate that officers ordered their men to break up and make their 
way back to the UN lines if they could. Only 40 ever succeeded. 

In the former 6th ROK Division sector units of the 27th Brigade 
of the British Commonwealth Division had done a magnificent job 
of stopping the breakthrough. The 2d Battalion of the Princess 
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the 3d Battalion of the Royal 
Australian Regiment distinguished themselves in this fight, which 
won a Distinguished Unit Citation for the division. 3 " 

; " Capt R. A. Gufider, USA, Combat Actions in Korea, 170-172. 
"Summary of data from 1st MAW HDs for 24 Apt 51. 

"Eusak Cmd Rpl, April, Sec I, 98, 100, 101; Brig C, N. Barclay, The Pint 
Commonwealth Dhh'ton (Aldershot, 1954), 69-70. 

The CCF Spring Qflenshe 


in IX Corps Sector 

Spring had come at last to war-ravaged Korea and the hills were a 
misty green in the sunshine. Looking down from an aircraft on the 
warm afternoon of 24 April 1951 the Marine sector resembled a 
human anthill. Columns of weary men toiled and strained in every 
direction, Qiaotic as the scene may have seemed, however, everything 
had a purpose. The 1st Marine Division was in full control of all 
troop movements, despite enemy pressure of the last two nights. 

The 5th Marines and KMCs had no opposition as they continued 
their withdrawal. Marine air reduced to a minimum the harassing 
efforts of the Chinese following the 1st Marines. As front-line units 
disengaged and fell back, the length of the main line of resistance was 
contracted enough for the 7th Marines to be assigned a reserve role. 
The 1st and 2d Battalions were given the responsibility for the defense 
of Chunchon as well as the crossing sites over the Pukhan and Soyang 
Rivers. Major Roach had reached the outskirts of Chunchon when 
3/7 was ordered back across the Chunchon, to be attached to the 
1st Marines on the left flank. 34 

Throughout the night of 24-25 April the enemy probed the Marine 
lines, seeking in vain a weak spot where a penetration could be made. 
It was already evident that the breakthrough in this area had given 
the Communists only a short-lived advantage. By the third night they 
were definitely stopped. Only minor patrol actions resulted except 
for two attacks in company strength on 2/1 at 0050 and 0150. Both 
were repulsed with total CCF losses of 25 counted dead. 

Contrary to the usual rule, the Marines saw more action during the 
daylight hours. A company-size patrol from 1/1 became heavily 
engaged at 1350 and three Company A tanks moved up in support. 
The fight lasted until 1645, when the enemy broke ofT action and the 
tanks evacuated 18 wounded Marines. 

Early in the afternoon a 3/1 patrol had advanced only 200 yards 
along a ridgeline when it was compelled to withdraw after running 
into concentrated mortar and machine gun fire. Sporadic mortar rounds 
continued until a direct hit was scored on the battalion CP, wounding 
Colonel McAlister, Lieutenant Colonel Banning, Major Reginald R. 
Myers, the executive officer, and Major Joseph D. Trompeter, the S-3. 

"*7thMar HD, Apr 51. 


The East-Centra! Front 

Banning and Myers were evacuated and Trompeter assumed command 
of 3/1. 

Losses of 18 KIA and 82 WIA for 24-25 April brought the casual- 
ties of the 1st Marines to nearly 300 during the past 48 hours." 

A simple ceremony was held at the 1st Marine Division CP on the 
afternoon of the 24th for the relief of General Smith by Major 
General Gerald C. Thomas. The new commanding general, a native 
of Missouri, was educated at Illinois Wesleyan University and enlisted 
in the Marine Corps in May 1917 at the age of 23. Awarded the 
Silver Star for bravery at Bel lean Wood and Soissons, he was com- 
missioned just before the Meuse-Argonne offensive, in which he 
was wounded. 

During rhe next two decades, Thomas chased bandits in Haiti, 
guarded the U.S. mails, protected American interests in China, and 
served as naval observer in Egypt when Rommel knocked at the gates 
of Alexandria in 1941. As operations officer and later chief of staff of 
the 1st Marine Division, he participated in the Guadalcanal campaign 
in 1942. The next year he became chief of staff of I Marine Amphibi- 
ous Corps in the Bougainville operation. Returning to Marine Head- 
quarters in 1944 as Director of Plans and Policies, he was named 
commanding general of the Marines in China three years later. 

General Smith had won an enduring place in the hearts of all 
Marines for his magnificent leadership as well as resourceful general- 
ship during the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin Reservoir campaigns. Speak- 
ing of the Marines of April 1951, he paid them this tribute in 

The unit commanders and staff of the Division deserve great credit for 
the manner in which they planned and cond acted die operations which 
resulted in blunting die Chinese counterof Tensive in our area. In my opinion, 
it was the most professional job performed by the Division while it was 
under my command. 3 " 

The night of 25-26 April passed in comparative quiet for the 
Marines. A few CCF probing attacks and occasional mortar rounds 
were the extent of the enemy's activity. All Marine units had now 
reached the modified Line Kansas, but General Van Fleet desired 
further withdrawals because the enemy had cut a lateral road. 

IX Corps also directed that the 1st Marine Division be prepared on 

*■ lstMar HD, Apr 51 

M Gtn O. P. Smith USMC (Ret.), Itr of 11 Feb 5S. 

The CCF Spring Offensive 119 

the 26th to move back to Chunchon, where it would defend along the 
south bank of the Soyang until service units could move out their 
large supply dumps. The Division was to tie in on the right with the 
lower extension of the Hwachon Reservoir, and contact was made in 
that quarter with the French battalion of the 2d Infantry Division, 
X Corps. On the Marine left flank the 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry 
Division had relieved elements of the British Commonwealth Division. 

Marine regimental officers met with Colonel Bowser, G-3, to plan 
the continued withdrawal. It was decided that four infantry battalions 
—1/1, 2/1, 3/5, and 3/7 — were to take positions on the west bank 
of the Pukhan to protect the Mojin bridge and ferry sites while the 
other units crossed. The execution of the plan went smoothly, without 
enemy interference. After all other Marine troops were on the east 
side, 3/7 disengaged last of all and forded the chest-deep stream as a 
prelude to hiking to Chunchon.' 7 

The enemy was kept at a discreet distance throughout the night by 
continuous artillery fires supplemented by ripples from Captain 
Eugene A. Bushe's Battery C, 1st 4.5" Rocket Battalion. An acute 
shortage of trucks made it necessary for most of the troops to hike. 
Th en came the task of organizing the new Division defenses on a line 
running northeast and southwest through the northern outskirts of 
Chunchon (Map 10). Planning continued meanwhile for further 
withdrawals to positions astride the Hongchon-Chunchon MSR. :iii 

It was apparent by this time that the enemy had been badly mauled 
on the IX Corps front. The Communists were now making a supreme 
effort to smash through in the I Corps area and capture Seoul. It was 
believed that they had set themselves the goal of taking the city by 
May Day, the world-wide Communist holiday. 

In this aspiration they were destined to be disappointed. They tried 
to work around the Eighth Army's left flank by crossing the river 
Han to the Kimpo Peninsula, but air strikes and the threat of naval 
gunfire frustrated them. Another flanking attempt 35 miles to the 
southeast met repulse, and before the end of the month it was evident 
that the Chinese Reds would not celebrate May Day in Seoul. 

Generally speaking, the Eighth Army had kept its major units intact 

"MstMarDiv HO, Apr 51; CO TthMar ms fi to CG IstMarDiv, 2lM0 27 Apr 51. 
, CO [X Oirps IX ACT 1.170; IstMar HD, Apr 51; 5tliMar 1ID, Apr 51; 7lhMor 
Apr 51. A '■ripple" normally consists of 144 rounds fired simultaneously by six 

634010 O-G2-10 


The East-Central Front 

and inflicted frightful losses on the enemy while trading shell-pocked 
ground for Chinese lives. The night of 27-28 April saw little activity 
on the IX Corps front, adding to the evidence that the enemy had shot 
his bolt. The next day the 1st Marine Division, along with other 
Eighth Army forces, continued the withdrawal to the general defensive 
line designated NO name Line (Map 10) . Further withdrawals were 
not contemplated, asserted the IX Corps commander, who sent this 
message to General Thomas: 

It is the intention of CG Eight)) Army to hold firmly on general defense 
line as outlined in my Operation Plan 17 and my message y6"39, and from 
this line to inflict maximum personnel casualties by an active defense utilizing 
artillery and sharp armored counterattacks. Withdrawal south of this line 
will be initiated only on personal direction of Corps commander. 30 

Feaf placed the emphasis on armed reconnaissance or interdiction 
flights for Marine aircraft during the last few days of April. 1st 
MAW pilots reported the killing or wounding of 312 enemy troops 
on the 29th and 30th, and the destruction of 212 trucks, 6 locomotives, 
and 80 box cars. On the other side of the ledger, the Wing lost a plane 
a day during the first eight days of the CCF offensive. Of the fliers shot 
down, five were killed, one was wounded seriously but rescued by 
helicopter, and two returned safely from enemy-held territory. 40 

The shortage of vehicles slowed the withdrawal of Marine ground 
forces, but by the 30th the 5 th Marines, KMC Regiment, and 7th 
Marines were deployed from left to right on no name Line. The 
1st Marines went into reserve near Hongchon. On the Division left 
was the reorganized 6th ROK Division, and on the right the 2d 
Infantry Division of X Corps. 41 

Nobody was in a better position to evaluate Marine maneuvers of 
the past week than Colonel Bowser, the G-3, and he had the highest 
praise. "Whereas the Chosin withdrawal was more spectacular than 
the April 'retrograde,' " he commented seven years later, "the latter 
was executed so smoothly and efficiently that a complex and difficult 
operation was made to look easy. The entire Division executed every- 
thing asked of it with the calm assurance of veterans." 42 

CG IX Corps msg to CG IstMarDiv with plans for withdrawal, 28 Apr 51. 
Jn 1st MAW WD, Apr51, Pt #1, Chronology 22-30 Apr and App VI, PORs #46 
(2J Apr) and 54 (1 May). 
"IstMarDiv I ID, Apr 51; 5thM*r HD, Apr 51; TlhMar HD, Apr 51. 
" BrigGen A. L. Bowser, In of 14 Feb 58. 

The CCF Spring jjensi ve 1 2 1 

1st Marine Division Returns to X Corps 

UN estimates of enemy casualties ranged from 70,000 to 100,000. 
The Fifth Phase Offensive was an unmitigated defeat for the Com- 
munists so far, but eusak G-2 officers warned that this was only the 
first round. Seventeen fresh CCF divisions were available for the 

General Van Fleet called a conference of corps commanders on 
30 April to discuss defensive plans. In the reshuffling of units the 1st 
Marine Division was placed for the third time in eight months under 
the operational control of X Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General 
Edward M. Almond. The Marines were to occupy the western sector 
of X Corps after its boundary with IX Corps had been shifted about 
12 miles to the west.*" 

Van Fleet put into effect a reshuffling of units all the way across the 
peninsula in preparation for the expected renewal of the CCF offen- 
sive. Thus on 1 May the UN line was as follows from left to right: 

OS I Corps — 1 ROK Division, 1st Cavalry Division and 25th Infantry Divi- 
sion in line; the 3d Infantry Division and British 29th Brigade in reserve; 

PS IX Corps— British 27th Brigade, 24th Infantry Division, 5th and 6th 
ROK Divisions and 7th Infantry Division in line; the 187th Airborne 
RCT in reserve; 

OS X Corps— 1st Marine Division, 2d Infantry Division, 5th and 7th ROK. 

ROK III Corps— 9th and 3d Divisions; 

ROK 1 Corps — Capitol Division and ROK 11th Division. 

"I don't want to lose a company— certainly not a battalion," Van 
Fleet told the corps commanders. "Keep units intact. Small units 
must be kept within supporting distance. . . . Give every considera- 
tion to the use of armor and infantry teams for a limited objective 
counterthrust. For greater distances, have ready and use when appro- 
priate, regiments of infantry protected by artillery and tanks," J_1 

From the foxhole to the command post a confident new offensive 
spirit animated an Eight Army which only four months previously had 
been recuperating from two major reverses within two months. The 
Eighth Army, in short, had been welded by fire into one of the finest 
military instruments of American military history; and the foreign 
"nits attached to it proved on the battlefield that they were picked 

^EUSAK Cmd Rpt. Apr 51, 115-118. 


The Udit'CeiUVdl From 

With the Hwachnn dam now in enemy hands, the Communists had 
the capability of closing the gates, thus lowering the water level in 
the Pukhan and Han rivers to fording depth. As a countermeasure, 
liUSAK asked the Navy to blast the dam. It was a difficult assignment, 
but Douglas AD Sky raiders from the Princeton successfully torpedoed 
the flood gates on 1 May." 

An atmosphere of watchful waiting prevailed during the next 
two weeks as the Marines on no name Line improved their defensive 
positions and patrolled to maintain contact with the enemy. Eighth 
Army evolved at this time the "patrol base" concept to deal with an 
enemy retiring beyond artillery range. These bases were part of a 
screen, called the outpost line of resistance (oplr), established in 
front of the MLR. Their mission was to maintain contact with the 
enemy by means of patrols, give warning of an impending attack, and 
delay its progress as much as possible. 

When it came to artillery ammunition, the 1 1th Marines found that 
it had progressed from a famine to a feast. Where shells had recently 
been rationed because of transport difficulties, the Eighth Army now 
directed the cannoneers along NO NAME Line to expend a unit of 
lire a day. The 11th Marines protested, since the infantry was seldom 
in contact widi the enemy. One artillery battalion submitted a tongue- 
in-cheek report to the effect that the required amount of ammunition 
had been fired "in target areas cleared of friendly patrols." The 
requirement was kept in force, however, until the demands of the 
renewed CCF offensive resulted in another ammunition shortage for 
the 11th Marines. 

Marine tanks were directed by Division to use their 90mm rifles to 
supplement 11th Marine howitzers in carrying out Corps fire plans. 
The tankers protested that their tubes had nearly reached the end of 
a normal life expectancy, with no replacements in sight. This plaint 
did not fall upon deaf ears at Corps Headquarters and two Ajrmy 
units, the 96th AFA Battalion and 17th FA Battalion, were assigned 
to fire the deep missions. 17 

Eighth Army staff officers concluded that the enemy would launch 
his next effort in the center. Intelligence, according to General 
Van Fleet, "had noted for some 2 weeks prior to the May attack that 

10 ParFtt hneri,» Rpt No. 2. II. 766. 
"'Col Mcrntt AJelman, Itr of 10 Feb 58. 

"UthMar tel to G-2 IstMarDiv, 4 May 51; CG IstMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 
$ May Ji; X Corps RKg XpfilJ, 10 May 51. 

The CCF Spring OJ]emive 123 

the Chinese Communists were shifting their units to the east." Never- 
theless, the blow fell "much farther east than [was] expected." |K 

Although the east offered the best prospects of surprise, a rugged 
terrain of few roads imposed grave logistical handicaps on the enemy. 
Moreover, UN warships dominated the entire eastern littoral. Despite 
these disadvantages, an estimated 125,000 Chinese attacked on the 
morning of 16 May 1951 in the area of the 111 and I ROK Corps 
between the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and the coast. Six CCF divi- 
sions spearheaded an advance on a 20-mile front that broke through 
the lines of the 5th and 7th ROK Divisions. Pouring into this gap, 
the Communists made a maximum penetration of 30 miles that 
endangered the right flank of the U,S. 2d Infantry Division. 

General Van Fleet took immediate steps to stabilize the front. In 
one of the war's most remarkable maneuvers he sent units of the 
3d Infantry Division, then in reserve southeast of Seoul, on a 70-mile 
all-night ride in trucks to the threatened area."' 

The 1st Marine Division was not directly in the path of the enemy 
advance. During the early morning hours of 17 May, however, an 
enemy column made a thrust that apparently was intended as an 
end-run attack on the left flank of the 2d Infantry Division. Avoiding 
initially the Chunchon-Hongchon highway, Chinese in estimated regi- 
mental strength slipped behind the patrol base set up by a KMC 
company just west of the MSR (Map 12). 

For several days Colonel Nickerson and his executive officer, Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis, had been apprehensive over the 
security of this road on which the 7th Marines depended for logistical 
support. On the afternoon of the 17th they pulled back Lieutenant 
Colonel Bernard T. Kelly's 3/7 (less Company G) to establish a 
blocking position, generally rectangular in shape, at the vital Morae- 
Kogae pass on the Chunchon road. This move was not completed until 
sunset and George Company did not rejoin the battalion until mid- 
"tght, so that the enemy probably had no intelligence of the new 
position. The main road ran along a shelf on one shoulder of the 
pass, but the Chinese avoided it and came by a trail from the north- 
West (Map 12). 

: was mutual. A platoon of D/Tanks, a Weapons Com- 

™ Gen J. A. Van Fleet USA (Ret.), Itr of 24 Mar 58^ 

Unless otherwise specified, accounts of the CCF offensive of 16 May 51 are based 
oft the following sources: eusak Cmd Rpl, May 51, 12-18; lstMarDiv HD, May 51; 
*-<J TthWt msg to CG lstMarDiv, 2015 17 May 51. 

The CCF Spring OpfWi* 125 

pany platoon, and an Item Company platoon, defending the northern 
end of the perimeter, opened up with everything they had. A 
desperate fire fight ensued as the enemy replied with a variety of 
weapons— mortars, recoilless rifles, satchel charges, grenades, and 
machine guns. 

Two CCF soldiers were killed after disabling a Marine tank by a 
grenade explosion in the engine compartment. A satchel charge 
knocked out another tank, and the enemy made an unsuccessful at- 
tempt to kill a third by rolling up a drum of gasoline and igniting it. 

Captain Victor Stoyanow's Item Company, at the critical point of 
the thinly stretched 3/7 perimeter, was hard-pressed. The enemy 
made a slight penetration into one platoon position but was repulsed 
by a counterattack that Stoyanow led. Marine infantry and tanks 
were well supported by artillery that sealed off the Chinese column 
from the rear. The action ended at daybreak with the routed enemy 
seeking only escape as Marine artillery and mortars continued to find 
lucrative targets. Air did not come on station until about 1030, when 
it added to the slaughter. Scattered enemy groups finally found a 
refuge in the hills, leaving behind 82 prisoners and 112 counted dead. 
Captures of enemy equipment included mortars, recoilless rifles, and 
Russian 76mm guns and machine guns. Friendly losses were 7 KIA 
and 19 WtA,* 

1st MAW scjuadrons were kept busy furnishing close air support 
to the 2d Infantry Division and the two ROK divisions hit by the 
enemy's May offensive. Because of the patrolling in the Marine 
sector, the OYs of VMO-6 took over much of the task of controlling 
a ir strikes. They flew cover for the infantry-tank patrols, and in the 
distant areas controlled almost as many air strikes as they did artillery 
missions. From the 1st to the 23d of May, VMO-6 observers con- 
trolled 54 air strikes involving 189 UN planes — 159 Navy and Marine 
F4lJs, F9Fs, and ADs, and 30 Air Force F-80s, F-84s, and F-51s, 
About 40 percent of the aircraft controlled by the OYs were non- 
Marine planes," 

On the 18th the 1st Marine Division, carrying out X Corps orders, 
began a maneuver designed to aid the U.S. 2d Infantry Division on the 
east by narrowing its front. The 7th Marines pulled back to no name 
Une to relieve the 1st Marines, which side-slipped to the east to take 

f *This account of 3/7's action is d«ived from IstMarDiv, 7iIiMar, IslTkBn, and 
m HDs, May 51 ; Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 28 Dec 57, 
"VMO-S HD. May 51. 


The liast-Central Front 

over an area held by the 9th Infantry. The 5th Marines then swung 
around from the Division left flank to the extreme right and relieved 
another Army regiment, the 38th Infantry. This permitted the 2d In- 
fantry Division to face east and repulse attacks from that direction, 

By noon on 19 May the enemy's renewed Fifth Phase Offensive had 
lost most of its momentum as CCF supplies dwindled to a trickle 
along a tenuous line of communications. That same day, when Colonel 
Wilburt S. Brown took over the command of the 1st Marines from 
Colonel McA lister, all four Marine regiments were in line— from 
left to right, the KMCs, the 7th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 
5th Marines. A new no name Line ran more in a east-west direction 
than the old one with its northeast to southwest slant. Thus in the 
east of the Marine sector the line was moved back some 4,000 yards 
while remaining virtually unchanged in the west. 

Enough enemy pressure was still being felt by the 2d Infantry 
Division so that General Van Fleet ordered a limited offensive by 
IX Corps to divert some of the CCF strength. While the rest of the 
1st Marine Division stood fast, the KMC Regiment advanced with 
IX Corps elements. 

At the other end of the line the Marines had the second of their 
two fights during the CCF offensive. Major Morse L, Holliday's 3/5 
became engaged at 0445 on the 20th with elements of the 44th CCF 
Division. Chinese in regimental strength were apparently on the way 
to occupy the positions of the Marine battalion, unaware of its 

This mistake cost them dearly when 3/5 opened up with every 
weapon at its disposal while requesting the support of Marine air, 
rockets, and artillery. The slaughter lasted until 0930, when the last 
of the routed Chinese escaped into the hills. Fifteen were taken 
prisoner and 152 dead were counted in front of the Marine positions." 

From 20 May onward, it grew more apparent every hour that the 
second installment of the CCF Fifth Phase Offensive had failed even 
more conclusively than the first. The enemy had only a narrow pene- 
tration on a secondary front to show for ruinous casualties. Worse yet, 
from the Chinese viewpoint, the UN forces were in a position to 
retaliate before the attackers recovered their tactical balance. The 
Eighth Army had come through with relatively light losses, and it was 
now about to seize the initiative. 

"SthMar HD, May ft. 



Advance to the Punchbowl 

Plan to Cut Off Communists — Initial Marine Objectives 
Secured — MAG- 12 Moves to K-46 at Hoengsong — Fight 
of the 5 th Marines for Hill 610— 1st MAW in Operation 
strangle — KMC Regiment Launches Night Attack — 1st 
Mamies Moves Up to brown Line — 7th Marines Com- 
mitted to Attack 

Only from the air. could the effects of the UN counterstroke 
of May and June 1951 be fully appreciated. It was more than 
a CCF withdrawal; it was a flight of beaten troops under very little 
control in some instances. They were scourged with bullets, rockets, 
and napalm as planes swooped down upon them like hawks scattering 
thickens. And where it had been rare for a single Chinese soldier to 
surrender voluntarily, remnants of platoons, companies, and even 
battalions were now giving up after throwing down their arms. 

There had been nothing like it before, and its like would never 
be seen in Korea again. The enemy was on the run! General 
Van Fleet, after his retirement, summed up the double-barreled 
Chinese spring offensive and the UN counterstroke in these words: 

We met the attack and routed the enemy. We had him beaten and 
could have destroyed his armies. Those days are the ones most vivid in my 
memory— great days when all the Eighth Army, and we thought America 
too, were inspired to win. In those days in Korea we reached the heights. 1 

Communist casualties from 15 to 51 May were estimated by the 
Eighth Army at 105,000. This figure included 17,000 counted dead 
and the unprecedented total of some 10,000 prisoners, most of them 
Chinese Reds taken during the last week of the month in frantic 
efforts to escape. Such results were a vast departure from past occa- 

'Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret), "The Truth About Korea," Li\t\ 11 May 53. 



The East-Central Front 

sions when Mao Tsc-tung's troops had preferred death to surrender. 

In all probability, only the mountainous terrain saved them from a 
complete debacle. If the Eighth Army had been able to use its armor 
for a mechanized pursuit, it might have struck blows from which the 
enemy could not recover. As it was, the Communists escaped disaster 
by virtue of the fact that a platoon could often stand off a company 
or even a battalion by digging in and defending high ground com- 
manding the only approach. Every hill was a potential Thermopylae 
in this craggy land of few roads. 

It was the misfortune of the 1st Marine Division to have perhaps 
the least lucrative zone of action in all Korea for the peninsula-wide 
turkey shoot. A chaos of jagged peaks and dark, narrow valleys, the 
terrain alone was enough to limit an advance. Even so, the Marines 
inflicted 1,870 counted KIA casualties on the Communists in May and 
captured 593, most of them during the last eight days of the month. 

General Almond congratulated the Division for its accomplishment 
of "a most arduous battle task. You have denied [the enemy} the 
opportunity of regrouping his forces and forced him into a hasty 
retreat; the destruction of enemy forces and materiel has been tre- 
mendous and many times greater than our own losses." a 

The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, released from IX 
Corps reserve, arrived in the Hongchon area on 21 May and took a 
position between the 1st Marine Division on the left and the 2d 
Infantry Division on the right. Two days later X Corps gave the 
Marines the mission of securing the important road center of Yanggu 
at the eastern end of the Hwachon Reservoir (Map 13). Elements 
of the 2d Infantry Division, with the 187th Airborne RCT attached, 
were meanwhile to drive northeast to Inje after establishing a bridge- 
head across the river Soyang. From Inje the 187th (reinforced) would 
continue to advance northeast toward its final objective, Kansong on 
the coast. After linking up with I ROK Corps, the Army regiment 
might be able to pull the drawstring on a tremendous bag of prisoners 
— all the CCF forces south of the Inje-Kansong road. There was, 
however, a big "if" in the equation. The Communists were falling 

a CG X Corps msg of 1500, 3 Jun 51; IstMarDJv HD, May 51. 

The East-Cenlial Front 

back with all haste, and it was a question whether the bag could be 
closed in time. 

The 1st Marine Division jumped off at 0800 on 23 May with the 
1st and 5th Marines abreast, the 1st on the left. Both regiments 
advanced more than 5,000 yards against negligible opposition. During 
the course of this attack the 1st Marines experimented by calling an 
air strike in the hope of detonating an entire mine field. The results 
were disappointing. Live mines were blown to new locations, thus 
changing the pattern, but few exploded. 5 

The 7th Marines was relieved on the 23d by elements of the 7th 
Infantry Division (IX Corps) and moved to the east for employment 
on the Marine right flank. The KMC Regiment, relieved by other 
IX Corps units, went into Division reserve. 1 

The 1st Marines, advancing on the left, reached its objectives, about 
two-thirds of the way to the Soyang, by noon on the 26th. The regi- 
ment reverted to Division reserve upon relief by the KMCs. In the 
right half of the Division zone, resistance gradually stiffened. On the 
24th f the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines ran into trouble 
as they started their advance toward their initial objective, three hills 
about 7,000 yards north of Hangye (Map 12). Both battalions were 
slowed by heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. They requested 
immediate artillery and air support. 

Captain John A. Pearson, commanding Item Company, could ob- 
serve the enemy on Hill 1051, holding up the attack with flanking fire. 
He directed air and artillery on the crest and on the Communists dug 
in along the southeastern slopes. Soon the enemy troops were seen 
retiring northward. This eased the pressure on the center, and Captain 
Samuel S. Smith's Dog Company managed to work forward and gain 
the summit of Hill 883 by 1300. Tanks moved up in support and 
at midnight Colonel Hayward reported his portion of the Division 
objective secured.' 1 

The 7th Marines, moving forward in the right rear of the 5th, 
veered to the left and drove into the center of the Division zone, 
reaching the southern bank of the Soyang by nightfall on the 26th. 
That same day 2/7 overran an enemy ammunition dump and took 

'2/1 HD, May 51. 

' BtMarDiv HD, May 51 

6 CO 5thMar msg to CG IstMarDiv, 2359 24 May 51. 

Advance to the Punchbowl 131 

27 CCF prisoners, some of them wounded men who had been left 
behind. The captured material included the following items: 

100,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition; 
12,000 rounds of mortar ammunition; 
1,000 rounds of artillery ammunition; 
6,000 pounds of explosive charges; 
9,000 hand grenades. 

Five U.S. trucks and jeeps were "released to higher headquarters." 
Two CCF trucks, two mules, and a horse were "integrated into the 
battalion transportation system and profitably employed thereafter." 

The 187th Ai rborne RCT reported on die 24th that its advance 
was being held up by increasing enemy resistance. 7 It was already 
evident that the CCF flight had frustrated the plan of cutting off 
decisively large numbers in the X Corps zone. Air observation estab- 
lished, however, that hundreds of Chinese Reds had merely escaped 
from the frying pan into the fire. By fleeing westward along the 
south shore of the Hwachon Reservoir, they stumbled into the 
Corps zone. There die remnants of whole units surrendered, in 
some instances without striking a blow. Along the route they were 
pitilessly attacked by UN aircraft. 1st MAW units had never before 
known such good hunting as during the last week in May 195 1.* 

Despite the "murky instrument weather" of 27 May the all-weather 
fighters of VMF(N)~513 reporting the killing of an estimated 425 
CCF soldiers. Two F7F pilots killed or wounded some 200 Chinese 
Reds in the I Corps zone. On the following day the 1st MAW claimed 
a total of 454 KIA casualties inflicted on the enemy." 

Estimates of enemy dead by pilots are likely to be over-optimistic, 
but there can be no doubt that UN aircraft slaughtered the fleeing 
Communists in large numbers. Only poor flying weather saved the 
enemy from far worse casualties. So intent were the Chinese on escape 
that they violated their usual rule of making troop movements only 
by night. When the fog and mist cleared briefly, Marine | 

„ 'CO 7thMar msg to CG IstMarDiv, 2050 26 May 51; Col W. F. Mcyerhoff, Itr of 
8 Aug 58. 

CO 5thMar msg to CG IstMarDiv, 24 May 51, in 5thMar In& Out #13. 

James T, Stewart, Ah power, The Decisive Force in Konu {Princeton, N.J.: D, Van 
Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957) 13-15, 84-86; 1st MAW HD, May 51, Pts 4 and 5, 
fifth Air Force Frag orders (hereafter listed as FAF FragOs), 20-31 May; 1st MAW 
"" May 51, Pt 1, G-3 POftS for 20-11 May; Ibid,, Pt 2, Staff Jrn G-3, 25 May, 26 May, 
£3. May, 31 May; husak Cmd Kept, May 51, Sec II, Bk 4, Pts 5 and 6, Ends 20-31, 
^ORs, secticns entitled G-3 Air. 

Ibid., VMF(N)-513 HD, 27 May 51. 


The East-Central Front 

glimpses of CCF units crowding the roads without any attempt at 
concealment. Napalm, bombs, and machine guns left heaps of dead 
and wounded as the survivors continued their flight, hoping for a 
return of fog and mist to protect them. 

As the Marine ground forces advanced, they found fewer and fewer 
Chinese Reds opposing them. The explanation was given by a prisoner 
from the 12th Division, V Corps, of the North Korean People's Army 
(nkpa) . His unit had the mission, he said, of relieving troops in the 
Yanggu-Inje area and conducting delaying actions. The purpose was 
to allow CCF units to escape a complete disaster and dig in farther 
north. The North Koreans, in short, were being sacrificed in rear 
guard delaying actions in order that the Chinese Reds might save their 
own skins. 

U.S. interrogators asked NKPA prisoners why they put up with such 
treatment. The answer was that they couldn't help themselves. The 
Chinese had impressed them into service, armed them, and trained 
them after the nkpa collapse in the fall of 1950. They were under 
the thumb of political commissars holding life and death authority 
over them. Any nkpa soldier suspected of trying to shirk his duty 
or escape was certain to be shot like a dog. At least the man on the 
firing line had a chance to come out alive; the man who defied the 
system had none. 

This attitude accounts to a large extent for the many occasions when 
nkpa troops literally resisted to the last man in delaying actions. 
Marines in general, judging by their comments, considered the Chinese 
Red the better all-around soldier; but they credited the Korean Red 
with more tenacity on the defensive. 

Because of the stubborn nkpa opposition in East Korea, the Eighth 
Army staff and command gave some thought to the possibility of an 
amphibious operation in the enemy's rear by the 1st Marine Division. 
Plans were discussed on 28 May for a landing at Tongchon (Map 8). 
The Marines were to drive southward along the Tongchon-Kumhwa 
road to link up with the IX Corps units attacking toward the northeast 
along the same route. After meeting, the two forces would system- 
atically destroy the pocketed enemy units. It was decided that 6 June 
would be D-day. And then, to the great disappointment of Generals 

Advance to the Punchbowl 


Thomas and Almond, the plan was suddenly cancelled by EtTSAK on 
29 May after a single day's consideration,'" 

Another scheme for cutting off large enemy forces was abandoned 
on 28 May when the 187th Airborne got as far as Inje. Most of the 
CCF units having escaped, this regiment was given a new mission of 
securing the high ground to the north of Inje. 

During the last five days of May the 5th and 7th Marines continued 
to advance steadily. On the morning of the 31st the 7th faced the task 
of breaking through a stubbornly contested pass leading into Yanggu. 
With a battalion on each ridge leading into the pass, Colonel Nicker- 
son found it a slow yet precarious prelude to get the men down. 
Adding to their trials were some 500 enemy 76mm and mortar shells 
received by the regiment. 

General Van Fleet, an onlooker while visiting the 7th Marines OP, 
shook his head wonderingly. "How did you ever get the men up 
those cliffs?" he asked Colonel Nickerson. 

The answer was short and simple. "General," said the regimental 
commander, "they climbed." 

As the day wore on, Nickerson called for what his executive officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Davis, described as "a through-the- middle play. 
A company of tanks [Company C, 1st Tank Battalion, commanded 
by Captain Richard M. Taylor} was launched up the road with infantry 
on foot hugging the protective cover of the steep road embankments. 
As the tanks drew fire, the infantry could spot the source and , . , 
quickly cleaned the enemy out. This rapid thrust caused the enemy 
defenders to flee as fire was poured into them from our center force 
as well as the flank attackers." 11 

By nightfall on the 31st the 7th Marines had control of Yanggu, 
*ts airfield, and the hills surrounding that burnt-out town. The 5th 
Marines had reached a point 6,000 yards northeast of Yanggu, astride 
the north-south ridgeline between that road center and Inje. 

Losses for the 1st Marine Division in May added up to 75 KlA, 
8 DOW, and 731 WIA. The ratio of wounded to killed, it may be 
noted, is more than nine-to-one. This proportion, so much more 
favorable than the usual ratio, rose to an even more astonishing 1 5-to-l 

'"rus/ik Cmd lipt. May 51, 24; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.), interv of 6 Jim 
S \¥<fSl £■ M, Almond. USA (Ret.). Itr of 22 May 58. 

Ma 5°' R " G * DaV ' S| comments < a - A -i HDs for IstMarDiv, 5thMar and 7thMar for 


The East-Central Front 

in June. Various explanations have been offered, one of them being 
the spirit of cool professionalism of Marines who had learned how to 
take cover and not expose themselves to needless risks. But this 
doesn't account for the unusual ratio, and it may perhaps be con- 
cluded that the Marines were simply lucky in this operation. 

The comparatively low death rate has also been credited in part to 
the alertness with which Marine officers adapted to changing situa- 
tions. War is a grim business on the whole, but Colonel Wilburt S. 
Brown took an amusing advantage of enemy propaganda accusing 
Americans of all manner of crimes against humanity. At the outset 
he had requested colored smoke shells for signaling. But upon learn- 
ing from POW interrogations that nkpa soldiers were terrified by 
what they believed to be frightful new gases, the commanding officer 
of the 1st Marines had an added reason for using green, red, and 
yellow smoke. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Adelman, 
commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, soon had to 
inform him that the inadequate supply was exhausted." It was never 
renewed during Brown's command. 

Major David W. McFarland, commanding officer of VMO-6, also 
exploited enemy ignorance. His original purpose in initiating night 
aerial observation by OY planes was to improve artillery accuracy. 
Soon he noticed that the mere presence of an OY overhead would 
silence enemy artillery. 

"The aerial observer," McFarland explained, "was often unable 
to determine the location of enemy artillery even though he could see 
it firing, because he would be unable to locate map coordinates in the 
dark — that is, relating them to the ground. Fortunately, this fact was 
unknown to the enemy. From their observation of die OYs in the 
daytime, they had found that the safest thing to do whenever an 
OY was overhead was to take cover. This they continued to do at 
night." 13 

VMO-6 also put into effect an improvement of 1st Marine Division 
aerial photographic service at a time when the 1st MAW photo section 
had missions all over the Korean front. Lieutenant Colonel Donald S. 
Bush, commanding officer of the section, is credited with the innova- 
tion of mounting a K-17 camera on a OY. Only a 6-inch focal length 
lens could be installed on one of these small planes. This meant that 

"MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), Icr of 21 Aug 58. 
"LtCol D, W. McFarland, !tr of 21 Aug 58. 

Advance to the Punchbowl 

in order to get the same picture as a jet the OY must fly at half the 
altitude. The pilot would be in more danger but haze problems were 

The experiment was an immediate success. The Division set up a 
photo laboratory near the VMO-6 CP for rapid processing and print- 
ing. A helicopter stood by for rapid delivery to the units concerned. 14 

Not all the variations in tactics were innovations. Lieutenant 
Colonel Bernard T. Kelly, commanding officer of 3/7, revived an 
old device on 31 May by using indirect automatic weapons fire with 
good effect. Four water-cooled heavy machine guns provided long 
range (2,600 yards) plunging fires on the reverse slopes of hills in 
support of his leading elements during the final attack on Yanggu. 15 

MAG- 12 Moves to K—46 at Hoengsong 

Delay and uncertainty were still the two great stumbling blocks to 
adequate air support for the ground forces under the JOC control sys- 
tem. Marine officers contended that infantry units sometimes took 
unnecessary casualties as a consequence. Worse yet, there were occa- 
sions when the expected planes did not arrive at all. 

Statistics kept by the 1st MAW and Navy during the spring of 
1951 upheld these conclusions. During the Inchon-Seoul operation, 
the average delay in receiving air support had been 15 minutes as 
compared to 80 minutes in May and June of 1951. Approximately 
35 minutes of this time was required to process the request through 
JOC. And only 65 to 70 percent of the sorties requested were ever 
received by Marine ground forces, 1 " 

Generals Shepherd and Harris had discussed the problem during 
the early spring of 1951 with General Partridge of the Fifth Air Force. 
Several compromises were reached, and for brief periods the 1st 
Marine Division received more air support than it could use. Un- 
fortunately, these periods were at times of the least need. When the 
chips were down, the old delays and uncertainties reappeared. General 
Partridge commented: 

The 1st Marine Air Wing was assigned for operational control by the 
L Air Force and it was used just as any of the other units of the Fifth 

ia Col B, T. Kelly, interv of 9 Jim 58. 
raePh Interim Rpt No. 2, II, 523-537. 

634040 O-62-U 


The East-Central Front 

were employed, that is, in support anywhere along the battle front were it 
appeared to be most urgently needed. 

In every action such as took place in Korea when the resources and 
especially the air resources are far too few, ground commanders inevitably 
feel that they are being shortchanged, They are trying to accomplish their 
objectives under the most difficult circumstances and with the minimum 
number of casualties and they want all the assistance from the air that they 
can get. 1 am sure I would feel the same in similar circumstances. However, 
there was never enough air support to satisfy everyone and I was most un- 
happy that this was the case. 

From time to time I was called upon to denude one section of the front 
of its close air support in order to bolster some other area where the situation 
was critical, Sometimes this worked to the advantage of the Marines as in 
the case of operations near the Chosin Reservoir in December 1950, and at 
other times it worked to their disadvantage. In retrospect, however, I would 
estimate that, day in and day out, the Marine ground units had more air 
support than any other division which was engaged. 11 

With all due respect to General Partridge, Marine officers felt that 
the discussion should not be limited merely to the amount of air 
support. It was not so much the amount as the delay and unreliability 
under JOC control that constituted the problem as the Marines saw it. 
On 24 May, while on one of his periodic tours of the Far East, General 
Shepherd brought up the matter of CAS with General Ridgway. He 
agreed with the UN commander in chief that it would be improper 
for a Marine division to expect the exclusive support of a Marine air 
wing in Korea. The main difficulty, he reiterated, lay in the slowness 
and uncertainty of getting air support when needed. 18 

At this time an extensive reshuffling of Air Force commanders was 
in progress. On 21 May General Partridge relieved Lieutenant Gen- 
eral George E. Stratemeyer, CG feaf, who had suffered a heart 
attack. Partridge in turn was relieved by Major General Edward J. 
Timberlake, who assumed temporary command of Fifth Air Force 
until Major General Frank E. Everest arrived to take over a few 
days later. 

The 1st MAW was also undergoing changes in command. General 
Harris was relieved on 29 May by his deputy commander, Major 
General Thomas J. Cushman. Brigadier General William O. Brice, 
just arrived from the States, became the Wing's new deputy 

"Gen E. E. Partridge, USAF, Itr of 28 Jun 59. 
u FMFPnc Vh,i 21-31 May 51, 5, 6. 

Advance to the Punchbowl 


After several "get acquainted" discussions, the new Air Force and 
1st MAW generals agreed on a plan to cut down delays in air support. 
It was a simple solution: the aircraft were merely to be brought nearer 
to the Marine ground forces. This was to be managed by moving 
the MAG-12 forward echelon from K-16 at Seoul to K-46 at 
Hoengsong (Map 16). The new field, if such it could be called, 
Was nothing more than a stony dirt strip. But it was only 40 miles, 
or a 10- to 15-minute flight, from the firing line. The first missions 
from the new field were flown on 27 May. VMFs-214 and -323 kept 
an average of 12 Corsairs at K-46 thereafter, rotating them from 
K-l. 1 " 

On the surface this seemed to be a practical solution, especially 
a&er a four-plane alert was established at K-46 for use by the 1st 
Marine Division when needed, devastate baker was permitted to 
put in an alerting call directly to the field. The rub was that JOC 
must be called in order to make the original request. Before the planes 
could take off, the MAG-12 operations officer at the field was likewise 
required to call JOC and confirm the fact that the mission had been 

Communications were poor at first for the 40 miles between the 
field and the front, devastate baker got better results by calling 
1st MAW Headquarters at K-l, 140 miles south, and having the 
Wing call K-46 and joc. This meant delays such as General Thomas 
described in a letter to General Almond. On 29 May, he said, the 
5th and 7th Marines were up against severe enemy fire in their attack. 
The tacps had enemy targets under observation and were ready to 
control any aircraft they could get. The Marines requested 92 sorties 
and received 55. Of these, 20 were flown by Corsairs or Panther Jets, 
and 35 by Air Force jets and Mustangs. And though 55 sorties were 
considerably less than optimum air support, practically all arrived 
from two to four hours late. On the firing line the enemy's resistance, 
concluded General Thomas, was broken not by air power but by 
Marine riflemen." 

On other days the new plan made a more encouraging showing. 
There was, for instance, the occasion when the OYs discovered an 
enemy regiment near the 1st Marine Division right flank, devastate 

'"WAG-12 HD, May 51, 24, 25 and 27 May; lit MAW HD, May 51, Summary 
n £ Chronology for 19, 24, 27 and 28 May 51. 
CG UtMiirDiv Itr to CG X Corps, 31 May 51. 


The East-Central Front 

baker called the 1st MAW direct on 31 May for 16 lighters as soon 
as possible. Wing called JOC for approval to launch the flight and 
put in a call to K-46 to alert the planes. In just 48 minutes after the 
initial call from devastate baker, 16 pilots had jumped into their 
flight gear at K-46, had been briefed, and were airborne on what 
proved to be a timely strike with excellent results,"' 

A new tactic of night air support was introduced late in May when 
Marine R4D transports were outfitted to operate as flare planes. Not 
only did these unarmed aircraft light up targets along the front lines 
for the VMF(N)-513 night fighters; they were also on call for use 
by the 1st Marine Division. Later, on 12 June, the Navy provided 
the 1st MAW with FB4Y-2 Privateers for the nightly illumination 

Figki of the Hh Marines for Hill 610 

During the heyday of the battleship, every midshipman dreamed of 
some glorious future day when he would be on the bridge, directing 
the naval maneuver known as crossing the T. In other words, his 
ships would be in line of battle, firing converging broadsides on an 
enemy approaching in column. Obviously,, the enemy would be at a 
disadvantage until he executed a 90° turn under fire to bring his 
battered ships into line to deliver broadsides of their own. 

It was a mountain warfare variation of crossing the T that the 
Korean Reds were using against the Marines. Whenever possible, the 
enemy made a stand on a hill flanked by transverse ridgelines. He 
emplaced hidden machine guns or mortars on these ridgelines to pour 
a converging fire into attackers limited by the terrain to a single 
approach. It meant that the Marines had to advance through this 
crossfire before they could get in position for the final assault on the 
enemy's main position. 

There were two tactical antidotes. One was well directed close air 
support. The other was the support of tanks advancing parallel to 
enemy-held ridgelines and scorching them with the direct fire of 
90mm rifles and 50 caliber machine guns. 

il 1st MAW HD, May 51, Pt 2, Assessment Rpt for hi May 51. 
" 1st MAW HD, May 51, Pt 1, App !I, 2; Chronology. 31 May; MAG-12 HD Jun 
51, Chronology and 12 Jun, 

Advance to the Punch ba wl 


On 1 June the two regiments in assault, the 5th and 7th Marines, 
found the resistance growing stiller as they slugged their way forward 
toward Line KANSAS (Map 15). Within an hour after jumping off, 
2/5 was heavily engaged with an 'estimated 200 enemy defending 
Hill 651 tenaciously. At noon, after ground assaults had failed, a 
request was put in for air support. Four VMF-214 planes led by 
Captain William T. Kopas bombed and strafed the target. This 
attack broke the back of nkpa opposition, and 2/5 moved in to seize 
the objective." 3 

Early on the morning of the 2d, Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins' 
1/5 moved out to secure the southwest end of the long ridge line that 
stretched northeast from Yanggu (Map 15) and afforded a natural 
avenue of approach to Taeam-san and the KANSAS line on the southern 
rim of the Punchbowl. The Marine advance got under way at 0915. 
After two four-plane strikes by VMF-214 and a "preparation" by 
1/11 and the 1st Rocket Battery, the battalion attacked across a valley 
with Baker Company (First Lieutenant William E. Kerrigan) on the 
right and Charlie Company (First Lieutenant Robert E. Warner) 
on the left to seize the terminal point on the ridge leading to Hill 610 
(Map 15). Able Company (Captain John L. Kelly) followed Charlie 
as Company C (Captain Richard M. Taylor) of die 1st Tank Battalion 
moved into supporting position. 

Converging fire from transverse ridges had the Marine riflemen 
pinned down until the tankers moved along the valley road running 
parallel. Direct 90mm fire info nkpa log bunkers enabled C/l/5 to 
advance to the forward slope of Hill 610. The enemy fought back 
with machine guns and grenades while directing long-range rifle fire 
against 2/5, attacking along a parallel ridge across the valley. 

By 1945 the last bunker on Hill 610 had been overrun. Meanwhile, 
2/5 had pushed ahead some 5,000 yards to the northeast. 

The capture of Hill 610 will never have its glorious page in history. 
It was all in the day's work for Marines who could expect a succession 
°f such nameless battles as they clawed their way forward. That 
night the weary men of 1/5 were not astonished to receive a counter- 
attack in the darkness. It was all part of the job, too. After driving 
off the unseen enemy, the new tenants of Hill 610 snatched a few 

"'This section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the following sources: X Corps 
Cmd \ip ti j un 5[; HDs of 1st MarDiv, IstMar, 5thMiir, 7thMar, and VMK-214 for 
Jun 51. 


The East-Central Front 

hours of sleep. They were on their feet again at dawn, ready to go 
up against the next key terrain feature in a rocky area that seemed to 
be composed entirely of Hill 610s. 

The next knob along the ridge happened to be Hill 680, about 
1,000 yards to the northeast. VMF-214 planes from K-46 napalmed 
and strafed the enemy, and Able Company led the 1/5 attack. During 
the air strike the Koreans had taken to cover in their holes on the 

They were back in previously selected forward slope firing positions 
by the time the Marines came in sight. Close-in artillery support en- 
abled the attackers to get within grenade range and seize the last 
nkpa bunker by 1400. Able Company pushed on. 

Midway from Hill 680 to the next knob, Hill 692, the advance was 
stopped by enemy small-arms and mortar fire. An air strike was 
requested on the bunkers holding up the assault, but fog closed in and 
the planes were delayed more than two hours. 

At 1600, after Able Company had renewed the assault without 
air support, four VMF-214 Corsairs started a target run controlled 
by a liaison plane from VMO-6. The foremost Marines, almost at 
the summit by this time, had to beat a hasty retreat to escape the 
napalm and 500-pound bombs being dumped on Hill 692. Fortunately, 
there were no friendly casualties. Some were caused indirectly, how- 
ever, when hostile mortar fire caught Marines withdrawing along a 
connecting saddle to the comparatively safe reverse slope of Hill 680. 
When the danger passed, Able Company returned to the attack on 
692 and routed the remaining defenders. 24 

The 1st Marine Division made it a policy thereafter that only the 
forward air controllers on the ground were to direct close air support 
along the front. Control of air strikes farther behind the enemy lines 
was reserved for the OYs. 

1st MAW in Operation strangle 

Sightings of enemy vehicles during the month of May totaled 54,561 — 
seven times those of January. This increase prompted General 
Van Fleet to ask the Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet to initiate a 

m 5thMar VmtKeport (URpt), Jun 51, 35. 

Advance to the Punchbowl 


program of cutting off all possible enemy road traffic between the 
latitudes 38° 15' N and 39° 15' N. 

Earlier in 1951 the interdiction program had been aimed chiefly 
at the enemy's rail lines and bridges. The Communists had countered 
by using more trucks. The new program, known as Operation 
strangle, was to be concentrated against vital road networks. Flight 
leaders were briefed to search out critical spots where truck and 
ox cart traffic could be stopped. Roads skirting hills were to be blocked 
by landslides caused by well placed bombs. Where cliffside roads 
followed the coast, as they so often did in East Korea, naval gunfire 
started avalanches of dirt and rocks which sometimes reached a depth 
of 20 feet. Roads running through a narrow ravine or rice paddy could 
often be cut by a deep bomb crater. 25 

The 1st MAW was given the assignment of stopping traffic on 
three roads in East Korea — from Wonsan to Pyonggang, from Kojo 
to Kumhwa, and along a lateral route linking the two (Map 16). 
Since Kumhwa and Pyonggang were two of the three Iron Triangle 
towns, these roads were of more than ordinary importance. 

The Communists reacted to the new UN pressure by increasing their 
flak traps. UN pilots were lured with such bait as mysterious lights, 
tempting displays of supposed fuel drums, or damaged UN aircraft 
that called for investigation. The cost of the UN in planes and pilots 
showed an increase during the first two months of Operation stran- 
gle. From 20 May to the middle of July, 20 Marine planes were shot 
down. Six of the pilots returned safely; two were killed and 12 listed 
a s missing. 2 " 

The demands of Operation strangle added to the emphasis on 
interdiction and armed reconnaissance by the Fifth Air Force. Statistics 
compiled by the 1st Marine Division for 1-17 June 1951 show that 
984 close air support sorties had been requested and 642 received — 
about 65 percent. The ratio of Marine planes to other UN aircraft 
reporting to the Division was about four to one." 7 

The statistics of the 1st MAW indicate that out of a total of 1,875 
combat sorties flown from 1 to 15 June 1951, about a third were close 

Descriptions of Operation STRANGLE are based on Pac Fit Interim Rpt No. J, 
ha Pter 10, 10-45 to 10-47; and on 1st MAW HDs, May to Jul 51, G-3 PORs, 
"~3 Journal entries, Assessment Rpts. 

1st MAW HDs May-Jul 51, Summaries; MAG-12 and MAG-33 HDs May-Jul 

Summarization from DivAirO memo of 26 Jun 51 to CG IstMarDiv. 

144 The East-Central Front 

air support— 651 day CAS and 19 night CAS. Of this number, 377 
sorties went to the 1st Marine Division, which received more than 
half. Next in line were the 7th Infantry Division (41 sorties), the 
3d Infantry Division (31 sorties), and the 25th Infantry Division 
(28 sorties) . SB 

The effect of Operation strangle on the enemy must be left largely 
to conjecture. There can be no doubt that it added enormously to the 
Communists' logistical problem. It is equally certain that they solved 
these problems to such an extent that their combat units were never 
at a decisive handicap for lack of ammunition and other supplies. 
Operation STRANGLE, in short, merely added to the evidence that 
interdictory air alone was not enough to knock a determined adversary 
out of the war, as enthusiasts had predicted at the outbreak of hos- 
tilities in Korea. 

KMC Regime fit Launches Night Attack 

On the night of 1-2 June, Colonel Nickerson was notified that the 
7th Marines would be relieved next day by the 1st Marines, which 
would pass through and continue the attack. The 1st Marines moved 
into assembly areas at 0630. Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Hire, 
commanding officer of 3/1, went forward at 0800 with his command 
group to make a reconnaissance of the area. As his staff paused for a 
conference in a supposedly enfiladed location, a Communist mortar 
barrage hit the group by complete surprise. The artillery liaison 
officer was killed instantly. His assistant, two forward observers, four 
company commanders, the S-3 and 32 enlisted men were wounded. 
So hard hit was the battalion that its attack had to be postponed 
until the following day."' 

The first Division objective was designated x-ray. 2/1 had the 
mission of taking the high point, Hill 516 (Map 15). Across the 
valley 3/1 advanced up a parallel ridge. Planes from VMF-214 and 
VMF-323 cleared the way for the securing of this battalion's objective 
at 1900. Aircraft from these same squadrons also aided 2/1 in over- 

** 1st MAW HD, Jun 51. Pt 1, Chronulujjiy, 15 Jun. 
B, CO IstMar msg to CG IstMarDiv, 1|?15 2 Jun 51. 

MAP 16 


23 MAY - 15 JULY 1951 



The East-Central Front 

running the last opposition on Hill 516, where 80 nkpa dead were 
counted. 3 " 

The KMC regiment, in reserve only two days, was ordered to relieve 
the 5th Marines on 4 June. This would permit Colonel Hayward to 
shift over to the right flank, thus extending the 1st Marine Division 
zone 5,000 yards to the east with a north-south boundary of the Soyang 
river valley (Map 15). The purpose of this maneuver was to free 
2d Infantry Division troops for a mission of mopping up in the 
X Corps rear area. 

Three Marine regiments were now in line, the 1st on the left, the 
KMCs in the center, the 5th on the right, and the 7th in reserve. 
A reshuffling of units also took place in the 1st MAW when VMF-312 
ended its tour of duty on the CVL Bataan. The replacement involved 
a change of carriers when VMF-323 was alerted for west coast duty 
on the CVE Sicily a week later* 1 

Ahead of the KMCs stretched the most difficult of the regimental 
zones of action — the main mountain range extending northeast from 
Yanggu to Hill 1316, known to the Koreans as Taeam-san. Along 
these ridges the Chinese had placed North Korean troops with orders 
to "hold until death." s * 

From the air, the ground in front of the KMCs resembled a mon- 
strous prehistoric lizard, rearing up on its hind legs. The 1st Battalion 
was to ascend the tail and the 2d the hind legs. The two would meet 
at the rump, Hill 1122 (Map 15). From this position the backbone 
ran northeast to the shoulders, Hill 1218. Still farther northeast, 
along the neck, was the key terrain feature — Taeam-san, the head of 
the imagined reptile. 

The 1st and 2d Battalions ran immediately into the opposition of 
an estimated nkpa regiment. In an effort to outflank the enemy, the 
3d Battalion swung over to the east and attacked up the ridge forming 
the forelegs. Seizure of the shoulders (Hill 1218) would render 
enemy positions along the back, rump, hind legs, and tail untenable. 
Major General Choe Am Lin, commanding the 12th nkpa Division, 

""CO IstMar msg to CG IstMarDiv, 1830 3 Jun 51; HDs of VMF-214 and VMF- 
323, Jim 51. 

31 PmFIi Interim Rpt No, 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; IstMarDiv Special Action Report (SAR), 
Jun 51. 

""The account of the KMC attack is based upon these sources: IstMarDiv HD, Jun 51 ; 
"KMC Operations in Korea, Jun 51," n.d., by Col C. W. Harrison, tben KMC senior 

Advance to the Punchbowl 147 

was quick to recognize the tactical worth of this height and exact 
a stiff price for it. 

That the KMCs could expect little mercy from their fellow country- 
men was demonstrated when the bodies of ten men reported missing 
were found. All had been shot in the back of the head. 

For five days the fight raged with unabated fuiy. The terrain 
limited the advance to a narrow front, so that the attack resembled the 
thrust of a spear rather than a blow from a battering ram. When the 
KMCs did gain a brief foothold, the enemy launched a counterattack. 

At 2000 on 10 June, after six days of relatively unsuccessful fight- 
ing, the KMCs decided to gamble on a night attack. This had hereto- 
fore been the enemy's prerogative, and the Korean Reds were caught 
unaware in a devastating surprise. Most of the nkpa troops were 
attending to housekeeping duties at 0200 when all three KMC bat- 
talions fell upon them like an avalanche. Hill 1122, the rump of the 
lizard, was seized; and under pressure the enemy withdrew from the 
shoulders. This made the fall of Taeam-san inevitable, and only 
mopping-up operations remained for KMCs who had suffered more 
than 500 casualties. General Thomas sent the regiment this message 
on 12 June: 

Congratulations to the KMC on a difficult job well done. Your seizure 
of objectives on the KANSAS Line from a determined enemy was a magnificent 
dash of courage and endurance. Your courageous and aggressive actions 
justify our pride in the Korean Marines, 

Logistical support of the three regiments in the attack presented a 
problem to the Division supply echelons. The KMCs in the center and 
the 1st Marines on the left could be supplied over a narrow, winding 
mountain road that scaled a high pass before dropping down into an 
east-west valley giving relatively easy access to the center and left. 
*«fi 5th Marines had to receive its supplies over another mountain 
r oad leading north of Inje, then west into the regimental zone." 

Both of the Division supply routes needed a good deal of engineer- 
ing work before trucks could move over them freely. Landslides were 
f^quent and many trucks skidded off the slippery trail while rounding 
the hairpin turns. 

The 1st Marines moved northward on north-south ridges, and the 

, The KMCs drew fuel and ammunition from the Marine Division and rations 
Ji"? ROK Army. Other classes of supplies were obtained generally on a catch-ss- 
'"l-Can b as 'S with some aid from KMC Headquarters in Pusan. 


The East-Central Front 

KMCs in the center had spurs leading to their objectives. It was the 
misfortune of the 5th Marines to have a topographical washboard 
effect ahead. The axis of advance was south to north, but the ground 
on the way to the final objectives on the Kansas Line consisted of five 
sharply defined ridgelines running northwest to southeast. Instead of 
attacking along the ridgelines Colonel Hay ward's men had to climb 
some 1,200 feet, then descend 1,200 feet, five separate times while- 
covering an advance of 8,000 yards (Map 15). 

Artillery fired for more than two hours on the morning of 6 June to 
soften defenses on the next regimental objective, Hill 729. An air 
strike was attempted but fog with low-hanging clouds forced the 
flight leader to abort the mission. At 1300 the assault battalions moved 
across the LD against small-arms and machine gun fire. The fog 
lifted sufficiently at 1400 to allow four F9Fs from VMF-3H to 
deliver an effective attack. And by 2100 both 2/5 and 3/5 were 
consolidating their positions on the first of the five ridges. 

This assault is typical of the fighting as the 5th Marines took the 
remaining four ridges, one by one, in a slugging assault on an enemy 
defending every commanding height. The advance resolved itself 
into a pattern as the Korean Reds probed the Marine lines at night 
and continued their tough resistance by day. For 10 days the regiment 
plugged ahead, step by step, with the support of artillery, air, mortars, 
and 75mm recoilless rifles/ 14 

1st Marines Moves Up to brown Line 

On the left flank, the 1st Marines devoted several days to consolidating 
its position and sending out reconnaissance patrols in preparation for 
an attack on the ridge just north of the Hwachon Reservoir. From 
this height the Communists could look down the throats of Colonel 
Brown's troops. 

From 6 to 8 June, Lieutenant Colonel Hire's 3d Battalion led the 
attack against moderate but gathering resistance. A gain of 1,500 
yards was made on the right flank by 2/1, commanded by Major 
Clarence J. Mabry after the evacuation of Lieutenant Colonel McClel- 
lan, wounded on the 5th. On the left, Lieutenant Colonel Robley E. 
West's 1/1 held fast as the 5th ROK Regiment, 7th ROK Division, 

"HDs of IstMarDiv and IstMir. Jun 51. 

Advance to the Punchbowl 

X Corps, passed through on its way to a new zone of action to 
the west. 

Early on the 9th, as 2/1 was preparing to launch its attack, an 
intense artillery and mortar barrage fell upon the lines, followed by 
the assault of an estimated nkpa company. The Korean Reds were 
beaten off with heavy losses. And though the enemy fire continued, 
2/1 jumped off on schedule, fighting for every inch of ground. 
Colonel Brown committed 1/1 on the left. It was an all-day fight 
for both battalions. After taking one ridge in the morning, it was used 
as the springboard for an assault on the second objective. The weapons 
of the regimental Anti-Tank Company built up a base of fire that 
enabled this ridge to be secured by 1600. 

The 5 th ROK Regiment took its objectives by the morning of the 
10th, The 1st Marines provided additional fire support by diverting 
all its antitank guns and tank rifles to the aid of the ROKs. 

The pressure, which had been building up for several days, reached 
a new high on 10 June. Late that morning Colonel Brown met Gen- 
eral Almond and the Division G-3, Colonel Richard G. Weede, at a 
conference. By 1100 the entire 2d Battalion of the 1st Marines was 
committed. On the left, Lieutenant Colonel West had to hold up 
the 1st Battalion until 1330, when the ROKs completed the occupation 
of the high ground dominating the route of advance. 

For several hours it appeared that the Marines had met their match 
this time, A tenacious enemy defended log bunkers expertly, refusing 
to give ground until evicted by grenade and bayonet attacks. At 
every opportunity the Communists counterattacked. So effective was 
their resistance that at dusk the two Marine battalions were still short 
of their objectives in spite of casualties draining the strength of 
both units. 

Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff, commanding officer of the 11th 
Marines, remained on the telephone for hours with Colonel Brown. 
He gave all possible artillery support, not only of his own regiment 
but also nearby Corps units. By nightfall, with the attacking battalions 
s hU held up, the atmosphere was tense in the regimental forward CP. 
Lieutenant Colonel Adelman, commanding the supporting artillery 
battalion, 2/11, helped to coordinate air strikes and artillery with 
Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck, executive officer of the 1st 
Marines, and the air liaison officers. 

"Everything I had ever hoped to see in years of teaching such 

1 50 The East-Central Front 

co-ordination of fires seemed to come true that night," commented 
Colonel Brown at a later date. "I stayed in my regular CP until I was 
sure all I could do through Winecoff was done, and then went forward 
to see the finale. It was a glorious spectacle, that last bayonet assault. 
In the last analysis 2/1 had to take its objective with the bayonet and 
hand grenades, crawling up the side of a mountain to get at the 
enemy. It was bloody work, the hardest fighting I have ever seen." ** 
This was no small tribute, coming from a veteran officer whose 
combat service included three major wars, not to mention Nicaragua 
and China. It was nearly midnight before Mabry's battalion took 
its final objective. Casualties for the day's attack were 14 KIA and 
114 WIA exclusive of slightly wounded, who were neither counted 
nor evacuated. West's battalion, which seized Hill 802, overlooking 
the Soyang River, had won its all-day fight at a cost of 9 KIA and 
97 WIA. 

Unfailing support had been given throughout the daylight hours 
by aircraft of VMF-214. VMF(N)-513 took over on the night shift, 
and planes came screeching in as late as 2200 to attack moonlit targets 
a hundred yards ahead of the leading infantry elements. 

The 1st Marines had outfought and outgamed a tough enemy. 
Never again, after the 10th, was the NKPA resistance quite as deter- 
mined. The 3d Battalion led the other two during the next few days. 
There was plenty of fighting for all three, but the result was never 
again in doubt. 

By the late afternoon of 14 June the regiment was in position on 
the brown Line. This was the unofficial name for an extension of 
the Kansas Line some 3,000 yards north. It had been requested by 
Colonel Brown when he realized that positions along the Kansas 
Line were completely dominated by the next ridge to the north. 

The change made necessary a continued advance by the KMCs on 
the right to tie in with the 1st Marines. The so-called drown Line was 
then officially designated the modified Kansas Line, 

7 th Marines Committed to the Attack 

For several days General Thomas had been concerned over the heavy 
casualties suffered by his command. In order to give greater impetus 

]tr of 8 Jun 58. Other sources for this section 
/I, 3/1, and VMF-214. 

Advance to the Punchbowl 


to the Division effort, he decided to commit the reserve infantry 
regiment, the 7th Marines (minus one battalion held back as Division 
reserve) to complete the occupation of the modified Kansas Line. 

On 8 June, Colonel Nkkerson's regiment (minus 3/7) moved into 
an assembly area between the 1st Marines and the KMCs, ready to 
attack in the morning, Ahead stretched a narrow but difficult zone 
of advance up the valley of the So-chon River (Map 15). Tank-infan- 
try patrols went forward to select favorable positions for the jumpoff, 
and engineers worked throughout the daylight hours to clear the valley 
roads of mines. Despite their best efforts, 10 Marine tanks were lost to 
mines during the first week. 3 " 

As the two battalions advanced on the morning of the 9th they came 
under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Nevertheless, they 
secured Hill 420 and dug in before nightfall. 

On the 10th Rooney's 1/7 advanced along the ridgeline to support 
the attack of Meyerhoff's 2/7 up the valley floor. The maneuver was 
carried out successfully in spite of nkpa automatic weapons and 
mortar opposition. Contact was established with KMC forward units 
at dusk. Sixteen POWs were taken by the 7th Marines and 85 North 
Korean dead were counted on the objectives. 

The two battalions continued the attack throughout the next week. 
The 3d Battalion of the 7th Marines remained General Thomas' sole 
Division reserve until he committed it on the afternoon of 18 June. 

The newcomers got into the fight just in time for the enemy's 
all-out effort to defend the steep east-west ridge marking the BROWN 
Line. The nature of the terrain made maneuver impossible — a frontal 
assault was the only answer. Defending the ridge was the 1st Bat- 
talion, 41st Regiment, 12th nkpa Division. Waiting on the reverse 
slope, the enemy launched a counterattack when the Marines neared 
crest. George Company, commanded by First Lieutenant Wil- 
liam C. Airheart, met five successive repulses at the hands of superior 
numbers. Item Company (First Lieutenant Frank A. Winfrey) also 
took part in the fifth assault, and both companies held their ground 
near the summit when the fighting ended at dusk. They expected to 
resume the attack at dawn, but the enemy had silently withdrawn 
during the night. All three 7th Marines battalions occupied their 
designated positions on the brown Line without further interference. 

i /■, M", 1 " 5 °'herwise noted, this section is based on the //Ds of the IstMarDiv, 7thMar, 
V7, 2/ 7l and 3/7 for Jim SI. 



The East-Central Front 

By early afternoon on the 20th, the Division was in complete control 
of the modified Kansas Line and construction of defenses began in 
earnest. The next day the 1st Marines and KMCs extended their right 
and left flanks respectively and pinched out the 7th Marines, which 
dropped back into reserve. 

Thus ended two months of continuai hard fighting for the 1st 
Marine Division, beginning on 22 April with the great CCF offensive. 
Few and far between were the interludes of rest for troops which saw 
both defensive and offensive action. After stopping the enemy's two 
drives, they launched a month -long counterstroke that had the enemy 
hardpressed at times for survival. Only the ruthless sacrifice of nkpa 
troops in defensive operations enabled the Chinese Reds to recover 
from the blows dealt them in late May and early June. 

The cost in Marine casualties had been high. Throughout the entire 
month the 1st Marines alone suffered 67 KIA and 1,044 WIA, most 
of them being reported during the first 2 weeks. This was a higher 
total than the regiment incurred during the Chosin Reservoir opera- 
tion. Reflecting on the caliber of these men, their regimental com- 

They were war-wise when I got command; I contributed nothing to their 
training because they were in battle when I joined them and I left them when 
they came out of the lines for a rest. They used cover, maneuvered beauti- 
fully, used their own and supporting arms intelligently, were patient and not 
foolhardy; but when it came to the point where they had to rely on them- 
selves with bayonet, hand grenade and sheer guts, they could and did do that 
too. I have long ago given up telling people what I saw them do on many 
occasions. Nobody believes me, nor would I believe anyone else telling the 
same story of other troops. 37 

Colonel Brown, of course, paid this tribute to the troops of his 
regiment. But it is safe to say that any commanding officer of the 
1st Marine Division would have felt that these sentiments applied 
equally to his own men. All the combat Marines of the 60-day battle 
had shown themselves to be worthy heirs of the traditions of Belleau 
Wood, Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and the Chosin Reservoir. 

"MajGen W. S. Bro Wn , USMC (Ret.), ltf to Maj W. T. Hickman, 22 Apr 57. 


The Truce Talks at Kaesong 

Communists Ask for Truce Talks — Patrol Bases on badger 
Line — Red Herrings at Kaesong — 1st Marine Division in 
Reserve — Marine Helicopters Take the Lead — Marine 
Body Armor Tested in Korea — MAG-12 Moves to K-1X 
— The Division Back in Action Again 

|"T is not likely that the date 25 June 1951 meant much to the 
* Marines on the Kansas Line, In all probability few of them 
recalled that it was the first anniversary of the Communist aggression 
which started the war in Korea. 

Since that surprise attack on a June Sunday morning in 1950, some 
1 .250,000 men had been killed, wounded or captured in battle — a 
million of them from the Communist forces of Red China and the 
North Korean People's Republic. This was the estimate of J. Donald 
Kingsley, Korean reconstruction agent general for the United States. 
He reckoned the civilian victims of privation, violence, and disease at 
™p million dead. Another three million had been made homeless 
refugees. 1 

On 25 June 1951 the Communists held less territory by 2,100 square 
miles than they occupied when they began their onslaught with an 
Overwhelming local superiority in arms and trained troops. Losses of 
Communist equipment during the first year included 391 aircraft, 
1*000 pieces of artillery, and many thousands of machine guns, auto- 
matic rifles, and mortars. North Korea, formerly the industrial region 
01 the peninsula, lay in ruins. Cities, factories, and power plants had 
D£ en pounded into rubble. 

short, the thrifty conquest planned by the Koreans and their 

lV,Ih i \f t ? ti0n is based on b y Peter Kihss > "° ne Yt,ar ' n Korea, " UnilrJ Nation! 
World, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1951, 21-23. 



The East-Central Front 

Soviet masters had backfired. Not only had the Communist offensives 
of April and May been stopped; the United Nations forces had 
rebounded to win their greatest victory of the war's first year. While 
X Corps was advancing to the Punchbowl, other major Eighth Army 
units had also gained ground. Perhaps the most crushing blow was 
dealt by I Corps in its attack on the Iron Triangle. Units of two U.S. 
infantry divisions fought their way through extensive mine fields into 
Chorwon and Kumhwa on 8 June. By the end of the month, I Corps 
held defensive positions about midway between the base and apex of 
the strategic triangle that had been the enemy's, main assembly area 
for the troops and supplies of his spring offensives. 8 

On the east-central front, units of IX Corps pushed within 10 miles 
of Kumsong while I ROK Corps advanced along the east coast to 
Cbodo-ri. Thus the UN forces occupied the most favorable line they 
had held since the great CCF offensive early in January. From the 
mouth of the Imjin this line ran northeast to the middle of the Iron 
Triangle, eastward across the mountains to the southern rim of the 
Punchbowl, then northeast to the coast of Chodo-ri (Map 14). 

Communists Ask for Truce Talks 

The first anniversary of the Korean conflict was overshadowed two 
days earlier by the news that the Communists had taken the initiative 
in proposing truce talks. The suggestion was made in a New York 
radio address of 23 June by a Soviet delegate to the United Nations — 
Jacob Malik, Foreign Minister of the USSR. On the 25th the idea was 
unofficially endorsed in a radio broadcast by the Chinese Communist 
government. UN officials immediately indicated their willingness to 
discuss preliminary terms. The outcome was an agreement that 
representatives of both sides would meet on 7 July at Kaesong, then 
located between the opposing lines in west Korea. 

Why had the Communists been first to ask for a truce conference? 
Both Generals Van Fleet and Almond believed that the answer might 
have been traced to military necessity rather than any genuine desire 
for peace. "I felt at that time that the Chinese Communists and the 
North Korean armies were on the most wobbly legs that they had 
been on to that date," said General Almond when interviewed shortly 

* eusak Cmd Rfrt, Jun 51. 

The Truce Talks at Kaesong 


after his retirement in 1953. "They were punch drunk and ineffective, 
and I, personally, thought at that time that it was the time to finish 
off the effort." 3 

Raymond Cartier, representing a Paris newspaper, probably spoke 
for most of the correspondents at the front when he suspected that the 
proposal for truce talks "was possibly just a crafty trick devised by the 
Communists to gain time and build up again the badly mauled 
Chinese armies." * 

It might have been recalled at this time that the Communists had 
used truce negotiations for military purposes during the Chinese 
Civil War. In 1945 and 1946, when prospects for a Nationalist 
victory were bright, the enemy took advantage of American peace 
efforts by agreeing on several occasions to meet for truce conferences. 
And while prolonging the talks by all manner of subterfuges, the 
Communists profited from the breathing spells by regrouping their 
forces and planning new offensives. Their final triumph, in fact, 
owed in no small measure to interludes when the conference table 
s erved a military purpose. 15 

History repeated itself in June and July 1951 when events of the 
oext two years were shaped by the political decisions of a few summer 
w eeks. Indeed, Admiral C. Turner Joy believed that the war was 
actually prolonged rather than shortened as a result of the negotiations, 

'Military victory was not impossible nor even unusually difficult 
of achievement," wrote the Senior Delegate and Chief of the UN 
Command delegation at the truce talks. "Elimination of the artificial 
restraints imposed on United States forces, coupled with an effective 
blockade on Red China, probably would have resulted in military 
victory in less time than was expended on truce talks." * 

Mao Tse-tung's forces had lost face by the failure of their long 
^raided 5th Phase Offensive. They had been badly beaten during the 
P counteroffensive. Pretensions of high CCF morale could no longer 
b e maintained when troops were laying down their arms without a 

* mm llnd r ° r W 13 f*b 53, 40-11. 

UN Wnthl, Vol. 5, N». 10, Oct 51, 10, 

„ u.b, State Depaitmtnt Publications 3573, Far East Serf*? JO, pp. 352-363, 
milh ,t C prntrJOK USN (Ret.), How Cummttnius Nggaftae (New York: Matr- 
H-rv./ 1 ' i t' 1 ,76 ' *W«?«frJt»yi ftptf Communist* tfirgiHfaht, One of Admiral Joy's last 
snurr r° r ""ntry before his death in iy56 was the writing of this book. Other 
Kor " th ' s secli "' 1 William H. Viitcher, Jr., "Inside Story (if Our Mistakes in 
Pen, t ^' S ' N** 1 a » d lr ' orlJ ?3 J^n 1953, 35-36; E. Weintal, "What Hap- 

Co| j a £ K ^'«>n£ and What is to Prospect," tfeum&j 23 Jul 1951, 38; Comments n.d.. 


The East-Centra/ Front 

fight. Nor could charges of low UN morale be supported when the 
fighting spirit of the Eighth Army was being shown every day at 
the front. 

In view of these circumstances, it would appear that the Communists 
had poor cards to play against United Nations trumps at a truce 
conference. But they played them so craftily, with such a sly sense of 
propaganda values, that the victors of the May and June battles were 
soon made to appear losers begging for a breathing spell. 

To begin with, the Chinese knew that the mere public announcement 
of the possibility of truce talks would have a tremendous appeal in 
the United States, where the war was unpopular. Pressure would be 
brought upon Washington to meet the enemy immediately for nego- 
tiations. And while a cease fire remained even a remote prospect, 
American public opinion would demand a slackening of offensive 
military operations with their attendant casualties. 

From the outset it was apparent that the United Nations Command 
was no match for the Communists in low cunning. The UN suggested, 
for instance, that the truce teams meet on the Danish hospital ship 
jtitland'ia. Here, surely, was neutral ground, since the Danes had no 
combat forces in Korea. Moreover, the ship was to be anchored in 
Wonsan harbor within range of CCF shore batteries. 

The Reds won the first of many such concessions with their refusal. 
They insisted that the talks be held at Kaesong, and the UN Command 
let them have it their way. The reason for the Communist decision 
was soon made evident. Kaesong was in the path of the advancing 
Eighth Army, which meant that an important road center would be 
immune from attack. And though the ancient Korean town was 
originally in no man's land, the Communists soon managed to include 
it within their lines. 

All delegates were requested to display white flags on their vehicles 
for identification. Communist photographers were on hand to snap 
countless pictures of UN delegates which convinced Asia's illiterate 
millions at a glance that the beaten United Nations had sent repre- 
sentatives to plead for terms. If any doubt remained, other photo- 
graphs showed the unarmed UN delegates being herded about Kaesong 
by scowling Communist guards with burp guns. 

No detail of the stage setting was too trivial to be overlooked. 
Oriental custom prescribes that at the peace table the victors face 
south and the losers face north. Needless to add, the UN delegates 

The Truce Talks at Kaesor/g 


were seated at Kaesong with a view to enhancing Communist prestige.' 

Some of the propaganda schemes bordered on the ridiculous. "At 
the first meeting of the delegates," Admiral Joy related, "I seated 
myself at the conference table and almost sank out of sight. The 
Communists had provided a chair for me which was considerably 
1 - than a standard chair. Across the table, the senior Communist 
, General Nam II, protruded a good foot above my cagily 
led stature. This had been accomplished by providing stumpy 
Ham II with a chair about four inches higher than usual. Chain- 
smoking Nam II puffed his cigarette in obvious satisfaction as he 
glowered down on me, an obviously torpedoed admiral. This condi- 
tion of affairs was promtply rectified when I changed my foreshortened 
chair for a normal one, but 
exposed reels of film." a 

Patrol Bases on badger Line 

The war went on, of course, during the negotiations. But the tempo 
was much reduced as the UN forces consolidated their gains, and the 
enemy appeared to be breaking off contact at every opportunity. 
Generally speaking, the Eighth Army had shifted from the offensive 
to the defensive. In keeping with this trend, the 1st Marine Division 
°ccupied the same positions for nearly three weeks after fighting its 
*ay to the brown Line. 

On 22 June all three infantry regiments were directed to establish 
battalion-size patrol bases on the badger Line— 1-| to 1\ miles forward 
°f their present positions. In the 1st Marines sector 3/7 was attached 
to Colonel Brown and ordered to relieve 3/1 on the left flank of the 
regiment. The purpose was to free 3/1 to move forward and establish 
a patrol base on Hill 761, about 1,000 yards forward of the MLR. 

While these arrangements were being carried out, General Almond 
called at the 1st Marines CP. He expressed surprise that the establish- 
ment of patrol bases was being contemplated by eusak when some 
of the front-line units were still in contact with the enemy. 

Execution of these orders was accordingly suspended. The follow- 

"IbJd HOU> CommU "' m tfhpflfrfc 4 " 5 - 

'laMwDiv HD, Jun 51, 55. 


The East-Central Front 

ing day, however, Division again alerted the infantry regiments to 
be prepared to occupy patrol bases on order. This was by direction of 
Corps, which in turn had been directed by EUSAK. 

The Marine regimental and battalion commanders were not happy 
about this turn of affairs. The patrol base concept had been tried out 
early in May, during the lull between the enemy's two offensives, 
and found wanting. In theory it was a good means of keeping contact 
with an enemy who had pulled back out of mortar and light artillery 
range. In practice the enemy had shown that he could bypass patrol 
bases at night for probing attacks on the MLR. The bases themselves 
ran the constant risk of being surrounded and overwhelmed. As a 
final objection, a regiment was often deprived of its reserve battalion, 
which was the logical choice for such duty. 

In compliance with orders, 3/1 moved out on 26 June and estab- 
lished a patrol base on Hill 761. This position received such a bom- 
bardment of large caliber mortar fire that Colonel Brown pulled the 
battalion back to the MLR the following day. 1 " 

General Thomas gave his opinion of the patrol base concept after 
his retirement when he summed it up as "an invitation to disaster." n 
He could only carry out orders, however, when Corps directed early 
in July that a patrol base be established on Taeu-san. 

This 4,000-foot peak, located some 2 miles north of the MLR, af- 
forded excellent observation eastward into the Punchbowl and west- 
ward into the So-chon River Valley. The enemy, of course, was aware 
of these advantages and had made Taeu-san a strongpoint of his 
MLR. This was clearly indicated by the stiff resistance encountered by 
KMC reconnaissance patrols, 12 

Nevertheless, Division G-3 was suddenly alerted on the morning 
of 7 July by the Marine Liaison Officer with X Corps to expect an 
order directing the setting up of a patrol base on Taeu-san the follow- 
ing day. The KMC Regiment, warned by telephone, had little time 
for planning and organizing an attack. Since the KMCs could not be 
relieved for responsibility for their sector, it was necessary to form a 
composite battalion of the three companies that could most conveni- 

10 CO IstMar msg tu CG IstMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51. 

* Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6" Feb 58. It is interesting to note that there was no 
mention of the patrol base concept in the then current Field Service Regulations, Opera- 
tions, FM IQ0-5, published by the Department (if the Army in August 19-19. 

11 Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section is based on IstMarDiv HD, 
Jul 51, 7-11; Col C. W. Harrison's account, "KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July 
1951;" Col G. P. Groves, Itr of 9 Apr 58. 

The Truce Talks at Kaesong 


ently be relieved. Unfortunately, they contained a large proportion o£ 
recruits, and the battalion commander was a new arrival. 

There were two avenues of approach. One was along an open, 
fairly level, ridgeline that extended from the KMC positions. The 
other called for a descent into the stream-bed generally paralleling the 
MLR and a steep climb up a ridge leading directly north to Taeu-san. 

Both routes of approach were used. One company advanced on the 
right by way of the stream bed and two companies took to the ridge- 
hoe on the left. The assault was to have been preceded by air strikes 
and an artillery bombardment, but bad weather kept the aircraft 

The attack jumped off at 1030 on 8 July. All three companies were 
greeted by enemy mortar and machine gun fire that pinned down the 
company on the right. The two companies on the left won a foothold 
on Hill 1100, about a mile in front of Taeu-san. Here the advance 
ground to a halt. 

These KMCs dug in for the night and repulsed a series of counter- 
attacks. On the morning of the 9th the KMC regimental commander, 
Colonel Kim Tai Shik, committed the entire 1st Battalion to the attack 
on the right. It had no better success than the company of the day 
before. Meanwhile, the two companies were driven off Hill 1100. 

Colonel Gould P, Groves, senior liaison officer with the KMCs, 
recommended that the remnants of the two companies be withdrawn. 
The 1st Battalion had managed to capture Hill 1001, but it was plain 
that the KMC regiment could not come close to Taeu-san. On 12 July 
the 1st Marine Division informed X Corps that the position held by 
the KMCs just forward of Hill 1001 fulfilled the requirements of an 
advance patrol base. As far as the Marines were concerned, the sad 
affair was permitted to rest there. 

As evidence of the valiant effort made by the KMCs, they suffered 
222 casualties. A sequel to this story was written [ate in July after the 
2d Infantry Division relieved the Marines. X Corps again ordered 

e capture of Taeu-san as a patrol base, and it required the commit- 
ment of the major part of the division to accomplish the task." 

Although the fighting had not been severe for other units of the 
st Marine Division during the first two weeks of July, the casualties 
Including KMC losses) were 55 KIA, 360 WIA, and 22 MIA— a 
rotal_of_437. Relief of the Marines was completed by the 2d Infantry 

13 X Co tps Cmd Rpt, Jul 51, 13; HdlnfD.v HD, Jul 51, 13-19. 


The East-Central Front 

Division on 15 July, and by the 17th all units were on their way back 
to assembly areas in X Corps rear. 

It was the second time since the landing of the 1st Provisional 
Marine Brigade on 2 August 1950 that the Marines had been away 
from the firing line for more than a few days. 

Red Herrings at Kaesong 

It is not changing the subject to switch to the truce talks. Kaesong 
was actually a second UN front. 

After the preliminaries had been settled— most of them to Com- 
munist satisfaction — the UN delegation, headed by Admiral Joy, held 
a first meeting on 10 July 195 1 with his opposite number, nkpa Major 
General Nam II, and the Communist truce team. This was the first 
of the talks that were to drag on for two dreary years. 

Nam II, a Korean native of Manchuria, bom in 1911, had been 
educated in Russia and had served with the Soviet army in World 
War II. His career in Korea began when he arrived as a captain with 
Soviet occupation troops in 1945. Rising to power rapidly, he took a 
prominent part in the creation of a Soviet puppet state in North Korea. 

An atmosphere of sullen hatred surrounded the UN delegates at 
Kaesong. The CCF sentinel posted at the entrance to the conference 
room wore a gaudy medal which he boasted had been awarded to him 
"for killing forty Americans." When Admiral Joy tried to send a 
report to General Ridgway, the messenger was turned back by armed 
Communist guards. These are samples of the indignities heaped 
upon the UN truce team. After several UN delegates were threatened 
by guards with burp guns, Joy protested to Nam II, "demanding 
prompt elimination of such crudities." 

In order to give their battered armies more time for recuperation, 
the Communist delegates met every issue with delaying tactics. They 
proved themselves to be masters of the ancient art of dragging a red 
herring across the trail. Going back on their word did not embarrass 
them in the least if they found it to their advantage to renege. 14 

The truce negotiations were bound to have an immediate effect on 
military operations. In the United States it seemed a pity to newspaper 

"This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: 
Joy, How Communists Negotiate, 6-1(1, 129, 140; Carl Berger, The Korean Knot 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 1<( 1-151; Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray. 

The Truce Talks at Kaesong 161 

readers that American young men should have to die in battle at a time 
when headlines were hinting at the possibility of peace. Mothers 
wrote to their congressmen, requesting a halt in Korean operations. 

General Van Fleet minced no words after his retirement when he 
commented on the effect of the truce talks on strategy; 

Instead of getting directives for offensive action, we found our activities 
rnore and more proscribed as time went on. Even in the matter of straighten- 
ing out our tines for greater protection, or capturing hills when the Reds were 
poking down our throats, we were limited by orders from the Far East 
Command in Japan, presumably acting on directives from Washington. 18 

It was the opinion of Admiral Joy that more UN casualties were 
suffered as a consequence of the truce talks than would have resulted 
mm an offensive taking full advantage of Red China's military 
weaknesses in June 1951, 

As soon as armistice discussions began," he wrote, "United Nations 
Command ground forces slackened their offensive preparations. In- 
stead, offensive pressure by all arms should have been increased to 
e maximum during the armistice talks. ... I feel certain that the 
casualties the United Nations Command endured during the two long 
years of negotiations far exceed any that might have been expected 
rom an offensive in the summer of 1951." lfl 

1st Marine Division in Reserve 

Most of the 1st Marine Division units were in X Corps reserve during 
he last two weeks of July 1951. The 5th Marines, however, remained 
J° ready reserve" near Inje under the operational control of X Corps, 
toward the end of the month, the 3d Battalion of the 11th Marines 
passed to the operational control of the 2d Infantry Division. Mean- 
one, the 7th Marines and Division Reconnaissance Company dis- 
puted to the Yanggu area to aid in the construction of defensive 
Positions and undergo special training. 

ls t Marine Division Training Order 2-51, covering the period 
"om 23 July to 20 August 1951, provided for a stiff daily schedule of 
b era! and specialist military subjects. The objectives were "to 
^^aineach individual and unit of the command at a very high state 

"fe 1 li A - X an Fleet ' USA < Rel *>' " The Tnltfl About Korea -" 11 May 53, 133. 
J°y, How Communists NevtSliete. 

The East-Central front 

of proficiency, while emphasizing rest and rehabilitation of personnel 
and repair and maintenance of equipment. ... A minimum of 5Y/o 
of all technical training was to be conducted at night, stressing indi- 
vidual and unit night discipline. Formal unit schools and on-the-job 
training were utilized extensively." " 

Most thoroughly covered among general military subjects were 
mechanical training, capabilities, tactical employment, and firing of 
individual and infantry crew -served weapons. Lectures and demon- 
strations were combined to good effect with instruction in basic 
infantry tactics. 

"The prescribed periods of physical conditioning," the Division 
report continued, "were supplemented by extensive organized athletic 
programs outside of training hours, resulting in the maintenance of a 
high degree of battle conditioning of all hands. Special military sub- 
jects encompassed the whole range of activities necessary to the 
accomplishment of any mission assigned the Division, Building from 
the duties of the individual Marine, infantry, artillery, engineer, and 
tank personnel progressed through small unit employment and tactics 
as it applied to their respective specialities. Meanwhile such diverse 
training as tank repair and watch repair was conducted in various 
units." ia 

Fortification came in for study after a tour of the Kansas Line by 
Major General Ctovis E. Byers, who had relieved General Almond as 
X Corps commander. He listed the weaknesses he found and directed 
that "special attention {be] given to the thickness, strength and 
support of bunker overheads, and to the proper revetting and draining 
of excavations." 1Q 

The KMC Regiment received the most thorough training it had 
ever known, considering that it had been in combat continually since 
its organization. Each of the Division's three other regiments sent 
four training teams consisting of a lieutenant, an NCO, and an 
interpreter to the KMCs on 22 July. The 12 teams had orders to 
remain until 20 August. Attached to various KMC companies, they 
acted as advisers for the entire training period. 

Another organization of Koreans that had won its way to favorable 
recognition was the newly formed Civil Transport Corps (CTC) . The 

"IstMarDiv HD, Jul 51, 18. 

"CG X Corps, CITE X 21568. 

The Truce Talks at Kaesong 

use of indigenous labor for logistical purposes dated buck to March 
1951, when the Eighth Army's advance was slowed up by supply prob- 
lems caused by muddy roads. Plans were made to equip and train a 
special corps to assist in the logistical support of combat troops in areas 
inaccessible to normal motor transportation. 2 " 

The project begaji on 29 March witb 720 South Koreans— all from 
the Korean National Guard — beinrr assigned to 1 Corps. Plans were 

1 T 1 * 

uev eloped for a Civil Transport Corps of 82 companies, each con- 
taining 240 men. The CTC was to be supervised by a staff of eight 
U.S. Army officers and four enlisted men under the operational control 
of the Transportation Section, eusak. 

The ROK Army had the added responsibility for logistical support, 
°f hospitalization and medical services other than emergency treatment 
m forward areas. Support for the CTC from UN units was to be 
provided in a manner similar to that in effect for the ROK forces.' 1 
No difficulty was found in filling the CTC ranks, for the pay meant 
food and clothing to a Korean and his family. 

The Marines were always astonished at the heavy loads the Korean 
targadores could carry uphill on their "A-frames," which looked like 
sturdy easels with a pair of arm-and-shoutder carrying straps. Humble 
; md patient, these burden bearers were the only means of supply in 
remote combat areas. 

Marine Helicopters Take the Lead 

The truce talks continued to be front-page news in August. Some of 
the more impulsive newspaper and radio commentators hinted at the 
possibility of a cease fire before the end of summer. As for the Marine 
command and staff, they were not so optimistic, judging from this 

^SftS* a repott: 

All Division units were notified on 14 August that requisitions had 
been sent to eusak for cold weather clothing and equipment." 

The training period afforded an opportunity to glance back over the 
nrst year of fighting in Korea and evaluate the results. There could 
e no doubt that the war's foremost tactical innovation so far was the 
combat helicopter. The Marine Corps had taken the lead in its de- 

*f§f K Cmd R/ "' Apr 51 - 


The East-Central Front 

velopmetit when VMO-6, made up of OYs and Sikorsky H03S-1 
lielicopters in roughly equal numbers, got into action with the 1st 
Provisional Marine Brigade in the Pusan Perimeter. Brigadier General 
Edward A. Craig had the historical distinction, insofar as is known, 
of being the first commanding general to see the advantages of a 
"chopper" as a command vehicle. 

Evacuation of casualties was the principal job of the rotary-wing 
aircraft, and 1,926 wounded Marines were flown out during the first 
year. No less than 701 of these mercy flights took place during the 
three months from 1 April to 30 June 1951, covering the period of 
the two CCF 5th Phase offensives and the UN counterstroke. By that 
time the Bell HTL-4, with its built-in litters on both sides sheltered by 
plexiglas hoods, had taken over most of the evacuation missions from 
the H03S-1. 

The zeal of the pilots contributed substantially to the successful 
results. Captain Dwain L. Redalen gave a demonstration of the 
VMO-6 spirit at the height of the first CCF offensive in the spring of 
1951. During the t£| hours from 0600 to 1930 on 23 April, he was 
in the air constantly except for intervals of loading or unloading 
casualties. Logging a total of 9.6 flight hours, he evacuated 18 
wounded men under enemy fire that left bullet holes in the plexiglas 
of his HTL-4, 22 

Practically all the helicopter techniques put into effect by VMO-6 
had originally been developed by the Marine experimental squadron, 
HMX-1, organized late in 1947 at Quanrico. Despite the enthusiasm 
for rotary-wing aircraft then prevailing, HMX-1 decided that an 
observation squadron should combine OYs with helicopters. The 
wisdom of this conclusion was proved in Korea, where the test of 
combat showed that both types were needed. The OYs were the 
superiors at reconnaissance and artillery spot missions, while the 
helicopters excelled at transportation and liaison and evacuation flights- 

VMO-6 as a whole was the only Marine organization linking the 
ground and air commands. An administrative unit of the 1st MAW, 
the squadron was under the operational control of the 1st Marine 
Division. 113 

31 VMO-6 Daily Flight Log, 23Apr51. 

a This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: 
Elizabeth L Tierney, Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, statistics compiled from VMO-o 
reports of Aug 50 to Jul 51; HMR-161 HD, Sep 51; IstMarDiv type "C 1 rpt on as- 
sault helicopters, 4 Oct 51; Lynn Monttoss, Cavalry of the Sky (Harper, 1954), based 
on Marine records, 151-158. 

The Truce Talks at Kaesong 165 

Thanks to the ability of the helicopter to land "on a dime," staff 
haison missions and command visits were greatly facilitated. The 
helicopter had become the modern general's steed, and the gap 

etween staff and line was narrowed by rotary wings. 
The importance of wound evacuation missions can hardly be over- 
estimated. Surgeons stressed the value of time in treating the shock 
resulting from severe wounds. The sooner a patient could be made 
ready for surgery, the better were his chances of survival. Definitive 
<^re had waited in the past until a casualty was borne on a jolting 
S r ^* c her from the firing line to the nearest road to begin a long 
ambulance ride. Such a journey might take most of a day, but there 

ere ins tances of a helicopter evacuee reaching the operation table 
on ly an hour after being wounded at the front, 15 or 20 miles away, 
shi ^' W ' - McElr °y> USNR, commanding the famous hospital 

JJ Consolation, asserted that his experience had "proved conclusively 

e superiority of the helicopter method of embarking and evacuating 
casualties to and from the ship." 2 * A helicopter loading platform 

as installed on the Consolation in July 1951, during an overhaul at 

Sr § Beadl Navai Shi Py afd in California. Marine helicopter 
P Qts advised as to landing requirements, and eventually all the 
n °spital ships had similar platforms. 

VMo conservative estimate, the 1,926 wounded men flown out by 
7 helicopters during the squadron's first year in Korea included 
■ veral hundred who might not have survived former methods of 
ev acuation. 

Marine Body Armor Tested in Korea 

pother far-reaching tactical innovation was being launched at this 
sudp ^ ^ eutenant Commander Frederick J. Lewis (MSC) USN, 
arm ? a j° int Army-Navy three-month field test of Marine 
■nnored vests made of lightweight plastics. 

ished f ^ at the P aSt reveaIs tiiat body armor had never quite van- 
cuff- *k modern warfare. European cavalry lancers wore steel 
asses throughout the 19th century. During the American Civil 
plah cornm ercial firms in Connecticut manufactured steel breast- 
^LJ* P Uf chased by thousands of Union soldiers. So irksome were 

ion rpt to ComNavFe, 26 Jan 52. 

166 The East-Central Front 

the weight and rigidity of this protection, however, that infantrymen 
soon discarded it. 

World War I dated the first widespread adoption of armor in the 
20th century. The idea was suggested when a French general noted 
that one of his men had survived a lethal shell fragment by virtue of 
wearing an iron mess bowl under his beret. France led the way, and 
before the end of 1915 steel helmets were being issued to all armies 
on the Western Front. 

When the United States entered the war, General John J. Pershing 
put in a request for body armor. Some 30 prototypes using steel or 
aluminum plates were submitted but rejected. ' In every instance the 
weight and rigidity were such that too high a price in mobility would 
be paid for protection.- 5 

During the 1930's new possibilities were opened up by developments 
in lightweight plastics. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor inter- 
rupted experiments that were not resumed until 1943. Then a new 
start was made with the formation of a joint Army-Navy committee 
headed by Rear Admiral Alexander H. Van Kueren and Colonel 
George F. Doriot. 

Wound statistics indicated that the great majority of fatal wounds 
were received in a comparatively small area of the body. The follow- 


Percent Percent 

Hesd ...................... 10 Head , 20 

Chest 10 Chest 50 

Abdomen 10 Abdomen 20 

Upper Extremity 30 Upper Extremity 5 

Lower Extremity ............ 40 Lower Extremity 5 

Shell, mortar, or grenade fragments caused 60 percent of the fatal 
wounds, the statistics revealed, with the remainder being charged to 
rifle or machine gun fire. It was futile to hope for lightweight protec- 
tion against high-velocity bullets. But researchers hoped that plastic 
body armor could stop enough shell or mortar fragments to reduce 
serious wounds to light wounds while preventing light wounds 

31 Tin's section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: 
Rpt of Joint Army. Navy Mission at HQMC, 9 Nov 51, in G— i Files; luittitaiunal 
htfontmion, Veil, Armored, M-1951. G-t Files, HQMC; LCdr F. J. Lewis (MSG) USN, 
Itr of 21 Jun 54; Capt Louis Kirkpatrick (MC) USN, llr of 22 jun 54; Capt D. Gi 
McGrew. Itr of 2 Jul 54; LtCol G. A. Hard wick, USMC, Itr of 30 Jun 54. 


The Truce Talks a! Kaesong 167 

Doron and nylon were the materials approved by the joint Army- 
Navy committee. The first, named in honor of Colonel Doriot, 
consisted of laminated layers of glass cloth filaments, bonded under 
heavy pressure to form a thin, rigid slab. That a |~inch thickness 
could stop and partially flatten a submachine gun bullet with a muzzle 
velocity of 1,150 feet per second was demonstrated by ballistic tests 
a t a range of eight yards. 

The committee recommended 12-ply, laminated, basket-weave nylon 
for use where flexibility was required. Both the doron and nylon 
protected the wearer by offering enough resistance to absorb the energy 
of the missile, which spent itself at the impact. Thus the shock was 
s pread out over too large a surface for a penetration, although the 
wearer could receive a bad bruise. If a penetration did result from 
a missile of higher velocity, its effects would be much reduced in 

Aircraft pilots and crewmen, who could tolerate more weight than 

oot-sloggers, were first to benefit. Flak suits and curtains were being 
manufactured in quantity for airmen by 1944, and the Eighth Air 

orce claimed a 50 percent reduction in casualties as a result. 
( The infantry stood most in need of protection. Statistics from 57 
U-S. divisions in the European theater of operations during World 
War II indicated that foot soldiers, comprising 68.5 percent of the 

°tal strength, suffered 94.5 percent of the casualties. It was further 
established that shell or mortar fragments caused from 61.3 to 
WM percent of the wounds. 

Unfortunately, progress lagged for the ground forces, owing to 
conflicting requirements. Several prototype armored vests were sub- 
mitted and rejected. The Marine Corps planned to conduct combat 

ests in the spring of 1945 by providing the ordinary utility jacket 
jSSI sfle aths to hold slabs of doron. A battalion of the 2d Marine 

Vision had been selected to wear the garment on Okinawa, but the 
experiment was interrupted by the end of the campaign. 

I he Navy and Marine Corps renewed their research in 1947 at 

-amp Lejeune. There a new ballistics center, established for the 
^v^lopment and evaluation of body armor, was set up by the Naval 
judical Field Research Laboratory (nmprl) . Lieutenant Commander 

e Wis was placed in charge of experiments, 
uentific precision seemed more important than haste in time of 
Peace ' the nmfrl was not ready with an armored vest when 



The East-Central from 

Communism challenged the free world to a showdown in Korea. Five 
hundred of the armored utility jackets of the proposed Okinawa test 
were available, however, and were air-shipped to the 1st Marine 
Division during the Inchon-Seoul operation. 

Many of them went astray during the sea lift to Wonsan and 
subsequent Chostn Reservoir operation. Only the 50 garments issued 
to the Division Reconnaissance Company were worn in combat. And 
though this unit kept no records, the doron slabs were credited by 
Major Walter Gall, the commanding officer, with saving several lives. 

By the summer of 1951, Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his 
researchers had designed a new Marine armored vest, weighing about 
8-^ pounds, combining curved, overlapping doron plates with flexible 
pads of basket-weave nylon. This garment, according to the official 
description, was capable of "stopping a .45 caliber USA pistol or 
Thompson submachine gun bullet; all the fragments of the U.S. hand 
grenade at three feet; 75 percent of the U.S. 81mm mortar at 10 feet; 
and full thrust of the American bayonet." 

Only 40 vests were available for field tests in the summer of 1951. 
Lewis rotated them among as many wearers as possible in the three 
regiments selected for the test, the 5th Marines and the 23d and 38th 
regiments of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. There was, as he saw it, 
a psychological question to be answered — would body armor win the 
acceptance of troops in combat? The hackneyed phrase "bullet-proof 
vest," for instance, put the wearer in a class with the buyer of a gold 
brick. Nylon was associated in the minds of the men with alluring 
feminine attire rather than protection from shell fragments. Finally, 
there could be no denying that undesired weight had been added, 
that doron plates hampered movement to some extent, and that nylon 
pads were uncomfortably warm for summer wear. 

Despite these drawbacks, Lewis found that troop acceptance was 
all that could be asked. The locale of the tests was the Inje area and 
the approaches to the KANSAS Line in June and early July. "By keeping 
these few vests almost constantly in use," the Medical Service Corps 
officer commented, "the maximum amount of troop wear was obtained. 
Included in the wide sampling were company aid men, riflemen, BAR 
men, mortar (60mm) men, radio (backpack type) men— each carry- 
ing his basic weapon, ammunition load and a one-meal ration." 

When Lewis returned to Camp Lejeune, he reported "that body 
armor, protection of some type for the vital anatomic areas, is almost 

The Truce Talks at 


unanimously desired by alt combat troops, particularly the combat 
veteran of several actual fire fights with the enemy." * 

Infantry body armor had at last made the transition from a dream 
to a reality. The M-1951 was put into production by a Philadelphia 
sportswear firm. And it was estimated that by the spring of 1952 
nearly all Marines would be protected by the vest in combat. 

Saving of American lives, of course, was a primary consideration. 
But there was a tactical as well as humanitarian advantage to be 
gained. For if body armor could reduce fatal and serious wounds 
b y as much as 50 percent, as nmfrl researchers hoped, it would mean 
fhat a large percentage of the enemy's best antipersonnel weapons had 
m effect been silenced. 

MAG-12 Moves to K-18 

There was no respite for 1st MAW while the 1st Marine Division 
remained in reserve. Operation strangle was at its height, and inter- 
diction flights called for nearly all the resources of Marine aviation 
during the summer of 1951. 

Close air support missions were made secondary. This principle was 
upheld by Air Force Major General Otto P. Weyland: 

1 might suggest that all of us should keep in mind the limitations of air 
forces as well as their capabilities. Continuous CAS along a static front re- 
quires dispersed and sustained fire power against pinpoint targets. With 
onventional weapons there is no opportunity to exploit the characteristic 

°biljty and fire power of air forces against worthwhile concentrations, In 

static situation close support is an expensive substitute for artillery fire. 

pays its greatest dividends when the enemy's sustaining capability has been 
Rippled and his Jogrstics cut to a minimum while his forces are immobilized 
I lnte tdiction and armed reconnaissance. Then decisive results can be 

tamed as the close-support effort is massed in coordination with determined 
ground actions 

Marine aviation officers, of course, would have challenged some 
a A r e °P m ' ons ' But General Weyland insisted that in the summer 
nd fail of 1951 "it ^ouid have been sh eer folly not to have con- 
centrated the bulk of our air effort against interdiction targets in the 

«ued T^'™ art fn,m lw'< tufa ■m.u„m, Vm Armored, M-t9Sl, The (ft* 

*©i«ifcSr- ln the ordinal. 
N I ■ n \, ln J ;lfI)(;s T - Stewart, Air Power, The Decisive Fane in Korea (Princeton, 
u - Van Nostrand Company, 1957), 22-23. 


The East-Central Front 

enemy rear areas. Otherwise, the available firepower would have been 
expended inefficiently against relatively invulnerable targets along 
the front, while the enemy was left to build up his resources to launch 
and sustain a general offensive." aB 

The UN interdiction program was costly to die Communists. Yet 
it remained a stubborn fact that the enemy had not only maintained but 
actually increased his flow of supplies in spite of bombings that might 
have knocked a Western army out of the war. That was because CCF 
and nkpa troops could operate with a minimum of 50 short tons 
per day per division — an average of about 10 pounds per man. It was 
about one-fifth of the supply requirements for an equal number of 
U.S. troops. 

Try as they might, the UN air forces could not prevent the arrival 
of the 2,900 tons of rations, fuel, ammunition, and other supplies 
needed every day by the 58 Communist divisions at the front. 

The enemy during this period was increasing his own air potential. 
On 17 June the Fifth Air Force warned that the Communists had 
stepped up their number of planes from an estimated 900 in mid-May 
to 1,050 in mid-June. Their Korean airfields were being kept under 
repair in spite of persistent UN air attacks. 

In June enemy tight planes made night raids along the UN front 
lines and even into the Seoul area. VMF(N)-513 pilots, flying the 
nightly combat patrol over Seoul, had several fleeting contacts with 
these black-painted raiders. The Marines were unable to close in for 
the kill, since the opposing planes were nonmetal and difficult to 
track by radar. Soon, however, the VMF(N)-513 pilots had better 
hunting. On 30 June Captain Edwin B. Long and his radar operator, 
CWO Robert C. Buckingham, shot down a black, two-place PO-2 
biplane. And on 13 July Captain Donald L. Fenton destroyed 
another. ao 

Despite the Air Force emphasis on interdiction, better close air 
support remained a major objective of the 1st MAW. One of the 
requirements was a shorter flying distance from air base to combat 
area. K-46, the MAG- 12 field near Hoengsong, had qualified with 
respect to reduced flying time. Maintenance problems caused by the 
dusty, rocky runway of this primitive strip led to its abandonment. 

=" tm 

* MAG-l 2 HD, Jun 51, Summary and Chronology. 30 Jun; MAG-12 HD, Jul 51. 
Chronology, 13 Jul. 

The Truce Talks at Kaesoiig 


On 14 J u jy t h e squadrons pulled back temporarily to K-l, and on the 
26th MAG- 12 withdrew its maintenance crews. 

The Group's new field was K-18, a -1,400- foot strip on the east 
coast near Kangnung and just south of the 38th Parallel. Situated 
°nly 40 miles behind the 1st Marine Division and on the seacoast, 
the new field seemed to be ideally located. The runway, reinforced 
with pierced steel planking, extended inland from a beach where 
waterdjome supplies could be delivered, as at K-3. M 

The Division Back in Action Again 

Political causes had a good deal to do with the renewal of activity for 
the 1st Marine Division late in August 1951- Apparently the Com- 
niunist armed forces had been given enough time to recuperate from 
th eir hard knocks in May and June. At any rate, the Red delegates 
walked out on the truce talks after falsely charging on 22 August that 
U N planes had violated the neutrality of the Kaesong area by dropping 
napalm bombs. Although the Reds were unable to show any credible 
evidence, the negotiations came to an abrupt end for the time being. 31 

On the 26th all Marine units received a Division warning that 
offensive operations were to be initiated in the immediate future. The 
effective strength, of the Division (including the KMCs) had been 
reported as 1,386 officers and 24,044 enlisted men on 1 August 1951. 
Attached to the Division at that time were 165 interpreters and 4,184 
Korean CTC cargadores. 

^ n the 26th the regiments were disposed as follows: the 1st 
Marines near Chogutan; the 5th Marines near Inje; the 7th Marines 
near Yanggu; and the 1st KMC Regiment at Hangye. Service units 
and the Division CP were located along the Hongchon-Hangye road in 
the vicinity of Tundong-ni. 

The 11th Marines (-), with the 1 96th FA Battalion, USA, attached, 
constituted the 1 1th Marine Regiment Group, an element of X Corps 
artillery. Throughout the training period 2/11 remained under the 
control of the 1st Marine Division and 3/1 1 was attached to the 
z<1 Infantry Division. 

Auo ^ Pt a{ Viiit to Far East b y CG, FMFPac, and his staff during tbe period 27 
*rL™° 12 September 1951," 17 #. 
*«ger. Tbe Ka, ear , Knoi, op. at, 144-145. 


The Easl-Central Front 

The 5 th Marines, 7th Marines, and KMCs were alerted to be pre- 
pared to move up to the combat areas south and west of the Punchbowl 
on 27 August. The 1st Marines was to remain in Division reserve, and 
the 11th Marines reverted to parent control. 3 " 

It was only about a five hour motor march from Tundong-ni to the 
forward assembly area under normal road and weather conditions. But 
recent rains had turned roads into bogs and fordable streams into 
torrents. Bridges were weakened by the raging current in the Soyang, 
and landslides blocked the road in many places. 

The 1st Marine Division was back in action again. But it would 
have to fight its first battles against the rain and the mud. 

82 IstMarDiv HD, Aug 51, 3-5. 


Renewal of the Attack 

Crossing the Soyang in Flood — Light Resistance at First — 
Supply Problems Cause Delay — Resumption of Division 
Attack — The Mounting Problem of CAS — First Helicop- 
ter Stipply Operation of History— The Fight for Hill 749 
~~Uh Marines Attack Hill 812— The Struggle for the 


IT Was to a large extent a new 1st Marine Division on 27 August 
1951. Very few veterans of the Reservoir campaign were left, 
and even the Marines of the hard fighting in April and May had 
been thinned by casualties and rotation. Whatever the new arrivals 
Jacked in experience, however, they had made up as far as possible 
intensive and realistic training while the Division was in reserve. 
The new Marine zone of action, in the Punchbowl area, was as 
bleak and forbidding as any expanse of terrain in Korea. Dominating 
the Punchbowl from the north and blocking any movement out of it 
Wa s yoke Ridge, looking somewhat like an alligator on the map 
(See Map 17). Hill 930 represented the snout. Hill 1000 was the 
head, and the body extended eastward through Hills 1026 and 924. 

Two smaller hills, 702 and 602, spread off southeast and northeast 
respectively to the Soyang River and its unnamed tributary from the 
*est. On either side of YOKE Ridge were numerous sharp and narrow 
r, dges. Some of the hills were wooded with enough scrub pine to 
afford concealment for outposts and bunkers. Altogether, it was an 
ar ea eminently suited to defense. 

The defenders were identified by Division G-2 as troops of the 
otjj Regiment, 2d Division, II nkfa Corps. Apparently they did not 
la ck supporting weapons, for 3/7 positions on Hill 680 were hit by 
ar } estimated 200 mortar and artillery rounds during <" 
°f the 30th. 


Renewal of (be Attack 


Crossing the Soyang in Flood 

The 7th Marines and KMC Regiment, ordered to relieve U.S. and 
KOK Army units on the Kansas Line, started their march in a down- 
pour on 27 August. The 5th Marines (less 1st Battalion) at Inje 
bad orders to follow the 7th up the narrow Soyang valley. 

rypi ca [ of the wet weather difficulties were those experienced by 
V?- Scheduled to depart early for the forward positions, the com- 
panies struck tents. Trucks failed to arrive and they remained to eat 
the noon meal, a gustatorial bonus of all food the galley crew could 
n ot carry with them. Unfortunately, the trucks were delayed further 
a nd the men shivered in the rain as they ate an evening meal of 
^ rations. 

When the vehicles finally arrived at 2100 the rain had reached 
orrential proportions. Progress was so slow over muddy roads that 
' e Jook until 0330 on the 28th to reach the CP of the 7th Marines at 
^onwan (Map 18), just southeast of the junction of the Soyang and 
a tributary from the east. 
The bivouac area assigned to 3/7 for the night proved to be a foot 
ee P m water, and Lieutenant Colonel Kelly directed his men to 
catch what sleep they could in the trucks while he and his staff 
"ernpted to straighten out the snarled traffic situation. 1 

of f!° 0lC rCSt ° f the ni £ ht for the 5 / 7 officers t0 walk the ' eil g tn 
Q j e ™nvoy, cutting out trucks with less essential cargo. With 

n ty a small space available for a turn-around, the 3/7 vehicles were 

alo^ t0 * nt ° un ^ oac ^ ^eic troo P s anc > equipment, and return 
a narrow road, which had been churned into a quagmire, 
ii battalion assembly area was on the other side of the rain- 
en Soyang. How Company and the command group managed to 
DT!^-w Ver 3 wa ' s t-ci e ep ford, but the crossing was so perilous that 
Ws were requested for the other two rifle companies. Lieutenant 
onel Louis C. Griffin's 2/7 also found the river crossing an opera- 
g* re S ui nng DUKWs. By the afternoon of the 29th all elements of 
two 7th Marine battalions were on the west bank, occupying their 
assigned assembly areas. 

thj 116 rel ' ef P roceeded sl °wly. Two KMC battalions on the left of 
e 7th Marines took over the zone formerly held by elements of the 

"Note U ^ S m ar c '? ,MarDiv HD, Aug 51, 3-5; Col B. T. Kelly** contemporary 
on my Service in Korea, 14 Apr- 13 Sep 1951" (hereafter Kdly, Nous). 

176 The East-Central Front 

2d Infantry Division and the 8th ROK Division. The cosmopolitan 
character of the Eighth Army was revealed when 2/KMC relieved the 
French Battalion of the 2d Infantry Division. Linguistic chaos was 
averted only by the best efforts of the exhausted interpreters. 

By the 30th, the 1st and 3d KMC Battalions were behind the line of 
departure on Hill 755, ready to attack in the morning. The 2d Bat- 
talion assumed responsibility for the regimental zone on the KANSAS 

The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 7th Marines had meanwhile com- 
pleted the relief of elements of the 8th ROK Division. On the other 
side of the river Lieutenant Colonel James G. Kelly's 1 /7 had relieved 
units of the ROK division on the hill mass a mile and a half north 
of Tonpyong (Map 17). These Marines were first to come under fire 
as the enemy sent over a few mortar rounds after dark on the 29th. 

Division OpnO 22-51 directed the two assault regiments, the 
7th Marines and KMCs, to attack at 0600 the following morning and 
seize their assigned positions on Corps Objective YOKE, the ridgeline 
running from Hill 930 on the west through Hills 1026 and 924 on the 
east (Map 17). Objective 1, the hill mass lj miles northeast of 
Tonpyong, was already occupied by 1 /I. 

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was ordered to seize Objective 2, 
generally that part of yoke Ridge east of Hill 924. The KMC 
Regiment was assigned Objective 3, consisting of Hills 924 and 1026. 

Other 1st Marine Division units had the following missions on 
31 August: 

5//j Marines — to patrol the Division zone along the KANSAS Line and protect 

defensive installations; 
1st Marines — to remain in the rear in the Hongchon area in X Corps reserve; 
1st Tank Battalio?i — to move up in readiness to support the assault regiments; 
Division Reconnaissance Company — to continue to patrol the Punchbowl and 

mop up bypassed enemy. 

Land mines were a constant menace to troop movements as the 
assault regiments adjusted positions in preparation for the attack. As 
usual, neglected "friendly" mines were encountered as well as those 
planted by the enemy. 2 

POW information and air reports indicated a southward movement 
of two to three enemy regiments with artillery and supplies. Prisoners 

"This section, except when otherwise specified, is based on IstMarDiv HD, Aug and 

zs^gr&ftJt^ ™ d 3/7 HD> Aus and Sep * Kellyi 




The East-Central front 

distance at First 

Priority of air support on 31 August was assigned to the two KMC 
battalions. They jumped off in column against light to moderate 
resistance, widi Hill 924 as their first objective. Mine fields gave the 
KMCs more trouble at first than scattered nkpa mortar and machine 
gun fire. Forward movement and maneuver were restricted as 
1/KMC passed through 3/KMC at 1445 to continue the attack against 
stiffening resistance. 

On the right 3/7 also encountered light resistance in the morning 
which increased as the assault troops neared the objective. The slopes 
of Hill 702 proved to be heavily mined, and forward elements of 
3/7 were hit by a concentration of mortar and artillery fire. 

East of the river, on the regimental right flank, where Objective 1 
had been occupied without a fight, 1/7 supported the attack of 3/7 
with mortar fire. Both 3/7 and the KMCs were within 1,000 yards of 
their objectives late in the afternoon when a halt was called for the 
day. Casualties had been light, thanks in large measure to excellent 
air and artillery support. 

When the attack was resumed on 1 September, 3/KMC moved 
through positions of 3/7 to reach a ridgeline on the flank of the 
regimental objective. While 3/KMC advanced from the northeast, 
1/KMC closed in from the southeast. Both battalions took heavy 
losses from enemy mines and mortars as well as machine guns and 
automatic weapons fired from hidden bunkers. The converging attack 
made slow but steady progress, however, until one company of 
3/KMC drove within 200 meters of the top of Hill 924 at 1700. Even 
so, it took four more hours of hard fighting to secure the objective. 
That evening 2/KMC was relieved of its defensive responsibility along 
the Kansas Line by 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, enabling the KMC bat- 
talion to join in the attack. 

Throughout the day 3/7 slugged it out in the vicinity of 702 with 
an nkpa battalion. Four counterattacks were launched from Hill 602, 
the northeastern fork of yoke Ridge. More than 500 men were em- 

Renewal of the Attack 179 

ployed in this effort, some of them penetrating briefly into 3/7 
positions. Two air strikes, called by patrols of 1/7 from across the 
fiver, helped to break up die main nkpa attack, and the 1 1th Marines 
(Colonel Custis Burton, Jr.), poured in a deadly concentration of 
artillery fire. Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly's battalion continued to 
be engaged until dusk. 

The tenacity of the nkpa defense was demonstrated at the expense 
°f the KMCs when they were driven from the top of Hill 924 by a 
surprise enemy counterattack at midnight. The Korean Marines came 
back strongly at daybreak and a terrific fight ensued before the North 
Koreans were in turn evicted shortly before noon. As a measure of the 
artillery assistance rendered, Major Gordon R. Worthington's 1st 
Battalion, 11th Marines, fired 1,682 rounds of 105 ammunition in 
support of the KMCs during the 24 hours ending at 1800 on 2 Sep- 
tember . During the same period Lieutenant Colonel William McRey- 
nold's 3/11 fired 1,400 rounds in support of 3/7. The other battalions 
°f the Marine artillery regiment, reinforced by the 196th, 937th, and 
780th Field Artillery Battalions, USA, brought the number of rounds 
t0 a grand total of 8,400 for this 24-hour period. 

After the securing of Hill 924, the 2d Battalion of the KMC Regi- 
Went passed through the 1st and 3d Battalions to spearpoint the attack 
w est toward Hill 1026. In the zone of 3/7, an NKPA counterattack 
Was repulsed at 0700 on 2 September. Two hours later George Com- 
pany, supported by How Company with mortar and machine gun fire, 
Reived out to resume the attack on Hill 602. Lieutenant Colonel 
ft T. Kelly ordered his battalion heavy machine guns set up in battery 
° deliver overhead supporting fires. 

In slightly less than two hours the Marines of 3/7 swept the crest 
ot Hill 602, securing Division Objective 2. Three company-size enemy 
counterattacks were repulsed before the North Koreans withdrew to 
th e north at 1500. 

The 2d KMC Battalion fought its way to a point within 800 yards 
Y Hill 1026 before dusk. So aggressive and persistent was the nkpa 
^etense that several light enemy probing attacks were launched during 
tie night of 2-3 September, not only against forward Marine elements 
ut als o against the 5th Marines units on the Kansas Line, 5 miles to 

e rear. The front was where you found it. 

While 3/7 constructed emplacements and obstacles on Hill 602, 
e KMCs continued their attack on the morning of 3 September 

The East-Central Front 

toward Hill 1026. With the extending of the 7th Marines zone to the 
left to decrease the width of the KMC front, 2/7 was brought up from 
regimental reserve to help cover a new sector that included Hill 924. 

The attack led by 2/KMC collided with a large-scale enemy counter- 
attack. It was nip and tuck for 3j hours before the North Koreans 
broke, but, by mid morning, the KMCs were in possession of Division 
Objective 3 and consolidating for defense. They were not a moment 
too soon in these preparations, for the enemy counterattacked at 1230 
and put up a hot fight for two hours before retiring. 

This action completed the battle for Corps Objective YOKE. At 
1800 on 3 September, the 1st Marine Division was in full possession 
of the HAYS Line, dominating the entire northern rim of the Punch- 
bowl (Map 18) . Reports from the U.S. 2d Infantry Division and 
5th ROK Division, attacking in sectors to the west, indicated that the 
pressure exerted by the Marines was assisting these units. Large gains 
had been made on the west side of the Punchbowl against compara- 
tively light resistance. 

On 4 September, with all objectives consolidated, 1st Marine Di- 
vision units patrolled northward from defensive positions. Plans were 
being formed for the second phase of the Division attack — the advance 
to seize the next series of commanding ridgelines, 4,000 to 7,000 yards 
forward of the present MLR. 

The victory in the four -day battle had not been bought cheaply. A 
total of 109 Marine KIA and 494 WIA (including KMCs) was 
reported, nkpa casualties for the period were 656 counted KIA and 
40 prisoners. 

As evidence that the enemy had profited by the breathing spell 
during the Kaesong truce talks, it was estimated that nkpa artillery 
fire in the Pnnchbowl sector almost equalled the firepower provided 
by the organic Marine artillery and the guns of attached U.S. Army 
' s. nkpa strength in mortars and machine guns also compared 

Supply Problems Cause Delay 

Logistical shortages made it necessary for the 1st Marine Division to 
call a six-day halt and build up a new reserve of artillery and mortar 

Renetval of the Attack 181 

During the first phase of the Division attack, the main burden of 
transport and supply had fallen upon three Marine units — the 1st 
Ordnance Battalion (Major Harold C. Borth), the 1st Motor Trans- 
port Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. Wertman), and the 
7th Motor Transport Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Carl J. Cagle). 
The extraordinary expenditure of artillery shells for these four days 
posed a resupply problem that was aggravated by an almost impassable 
supply route. The three Marine battalions had to strain every resource 
to meet minimal requirements. 

Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) 60-B, a U.S. Army installation 
manned by elements of the Marine 1st Ordnance Battalion, was 
located about five miles behind the gun positions. From this dump it 
Wa s 48 miles to Hongchon, the source of supplies for ASP 60-B. 
r We H maintained, two-lane dirt road led from that base to Inje, 
but northward it deteriorated into a narrow, twisting trail following 
the Soyang valley. Recent rains, resulting in earth slides and mudholes, 
"ad reduced the road to such a condition that the round trip between 
ASP 60-B and Hongchon took 25 hours/' 

As an added complication, it was necessary to build up a 10-day 
reserve of ammunition at ASP 60-B so that Division transport would 
oe available for lifting 2,000 rotated troops to Chunchon some time 
between 3 and 1 5 September. This meant that 50 to 60 Marine trucks 
^ust be employed daily to haul ammunition, with the result of a 
rustic shortage of motor transport for other purposes. 

Only human transport was available for supplying Marines on the 
£ ri »g line. X Corps started the month of September with 20,070 

orean Service Corps, the successor to CTC, and civilian contract 
aborers— the equivalent in numbers of a U.S. Army infantry division. 
" Ven S(J j 14 air drops were necessary during the month, only one of 
*hich went to a Marine unit. This took place on 1 September, when 
-0 Air Force cargo planes from Japan dropped ammunition and ra- 
t'ons to the KMCs. A 90 percent recovery was reported. 1 

It generally took a full day in the 1st Marine Division zone during 
1e first week nf September for a cargador to complete the trip from 

bat talio n supply point to the front lines and return. This made it 
necessary to assign from 150 to 250 Korean laborers to each infantry 

;'l*M„rDiv "A Sep 51. 1, 7. 

Ujr P s C>»d Rpl, Sep 51, <11-<12; IstMnrDiv //D, Sep 51, 5-6. 

182 The Enst-Centfal Front 

battalion. And as the Marines advanced farther into the rugged 
Korean highlands, the logistic problem was increased. 

Resumption of Division Attack 

Enemy groups moving southward into the zone of the 1st Marine 
Division during the six-day lull were sighted by air observation, PO^f 
interrogations and other G-2 sources established that the 2d NKPA 
Division, II Corps, had been relieved by the 1st NKPA Division, M 
Corps. Accurate 76mm fire from well-hidden guns was received by 
the Marines throughout the interlude, and patrols ran into brisk 
mortar fire when they approached too near to enemy bunkers on 
Hill 673. 

For the second time, during the night of 4-5 September, 5* 
Marines units were assailed on the KANSAS Line, 5 miles to the rea* 
of the 7th Marines troops similarly deployed along the hays Line- 
Yet a large 7th Marines patrol ranged forward some 2,000 yards the 
next day without enemy contacts. A like result was reported by a 
patrol representing almost the entire strength of the Division Recon- 
naissance Company (Major Robert L. Autry) after it scoured the area 
north of the Punchbowl/' 

1st Marine Division OpnO 23-51, issued on the morning of 
9 September, called for the 7th Marines to jump off at 0300 on the 
3 1th and attack Objectives able and baker- — Hills 673 and 749 
respectively — while maintaining contact with the 8th ROK Division 
on the right. Other Division units were given these missions: 

1st Marines — to be released from X Corps reserve near Hongchon to Divi- 
sion control; to be prepared to pass through the 7th Marines, when that 
regiment secured its objectives, and continue the attack to seize Objective 
CHARLIE, the ridgeline leading northwest from Hill 1052, 

5th Marines — to maintain one company on Kansas Line while occupying 
positions in Division reserve along havs Line in rear of 7th Marines. 

KMC Regiment— to patrol aggressively on Division left to exert pressure o° 
enemy defenses south and southeast of Objective char lie. 

11th Marines— to displace forward to support attack of the 7th Marines. 

Division Reconnaissance Company — to patrol northward in the Soyang 
valley as far as Hwanggi to deny the enemy this area. 

"This section, except when otherwise specified, is haseil on the following sources' 
eusak Cwd Rpi, Sep 51. 38-5i; X Corps Cmd Rpi, Sep 51, 9-12; IstMarDiv HD, &? 
St, B-Vt{ 7th Mar HD, Sep 51 ; 1st, 2d, and Id Bns of 7th Mar. HDi for Sep 51. 

Renewal of the Attack 183 

I he area ahead of the 7th Marines was ideal for defense. From 
Voke Ridge the assault troops had to descend into a narrow valley 
formed by a small tributary of the.Soyang-gang, cross the stream, and 
climb Kanmubong Ridge on the other side. This formidable piece of 
terrain was dominated by three enemy positions, Hills 812, 980, and 
1052 (Map 17). Thus the attack of the 7th Marines had as its 
primary purpose the securing of initial objectives on Kanmubong 
Judge that would give access to the main NKPA defense line, some 
4,000 yards to the north. 

The 7th Marines was to seize the eastern tip (Objective able) of 
™s commanding terrain feature and "run the ridge" to Hill 749, 
Objective baker. While Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. Griffin's 2/7 
maintained its patrolling activities on the left, tied in with the KMCs, 
Lieutenant Colonel B. T. Kelly's 3/7 in the center and Lieutenant 
Colonel J. G. Kelly's 1/7 on the right were to attack. 

As an intermediate regimental objective on the way to Kanmubong 
Kidge, the 680-meter hill directly north of B. T. Kelly's position on 
"ill 602 was assigned to his battalion. He ordered How Company 
to move forward under cover of darkness and be prepared to attack 
a t dawn. Rain and poor visibility delayed the attempt until surprise 
Was lost, and after a fierce fire fight How Company was stopped half- 
Wa y up the southeast spur. 

In order to relieve the pressure, the battalion commander directed 
en i Company to attack on the left up the southwest spur. This 
maneuver enabled How Company to inch forward under heavy mortar 
a "d machine gun fire to a point with 5D yards of the topographical 
Ues t. Item Company became confused in the "fog of war" and finally 
Wound up on How's spur at 1245. 

Twice the two companies made a combined assault after artillery 
»d mortar preparation and air strikes with napalm, rocket, and 
? ra fing fire. Both times the North Koreans swarmed out of their 
linkers to drive the Marines halfway back to the original jump oil 
1J ie. It was anybody's fight when the two battered companies dug 
111 at dusk. 

. Across the valley to the east, J. G. Kelly's L /7 had no better fortune 
!" Its attack on Hill 673. Heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire 
, c pt . th e assault troops pinned down until they consolidated for 
tne night. 

Wi th both attacking battalions in trouble, Colonel Nickerson 

f >M().)o 0-62-14 


The Ectst-Cenital Front 

ordered 2/7 to advance up the narrow valley separating them. His 
plan called for the reserve battalion to move under cover of darkness 
around the left flank of 1/7 and into a position behind the enemy 
before wheeling to the northeast to trap the North Koreans defending 
Hill 673. 

The maneuver succeeded brilliantly. Griffin's troops were unde- 
tected as they filed northward during the night, making every effort 
to maintain silence. By daybreak on 12 September 2/7 had two 
platoons in position behind the enemy to lead the attack." 

The assault exploded with complete surprise as 2/7 swept to the 
crest of Hill 673 against confused and ineffectual opposition. Griffin's 
battalion and 1/7 had the enemy between them, but the jaws of the 
trap could not close in time because of nkfa mine fields. Thus 1/7 
continued to be held up on the forward approaches to Hill 673 by 
nkpa mortar and small-arms fire. Grenades were the most effective 
weapons as J. G. Kelly's men slugged their way to the summit at 1415 
while 2/7 was attacking Objective baker, Hill 749. 

On the other side of the valley, 3/7 had seized its initial objective. 
While How and Item Companies attacked up the southeast spuii 
where they had been stopped the day before, George Company 
launched a surprise assault up the southwest spur. This was the blow 
that broke the enemy's will to resist. George Company knocked out 
seven active enemy bunkers, one by one, thus taking the pressure off 
the troops on the other spur. At 1028 all three companies met o« 
the summit. 

The 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, radioed that Objective baker had 
been secured at 1710 after a hard fight, but this report proved to be 
premature. Enough NKPA troops to give the Marines a good deal of 
trouble were still holding the wooded slopes of Hill 749, and it 
would take the attack of a fresh battalion to dislodge them. Along 
the ridgeline from Hill 673 to Hill 749, an undetermined number of 
enemy soldiers had been caught between 2/7 and 1/7, and events 
were to prove that they would resist as long as a man remained alive- 
Casualties of the 1st Marine Division on 11 and 12 September 
were 22 KIA and 245 W1A, nearly all of them being suffered by the 
assault regiment. Enemy losses included 30 counted KIA and 22 

"LtGil g G. Kurdiiel interv, 13 Juii W. 

Renewal of the Attack 



With the Division in reserve from 15 July until the latter part of 
August, close air support (CAS) was not a vital problem; however, 
j l P° u return to the Punchbowl area the situation became serious. The 
difficulties arose from the time lag between the request for air support 
to the time the planes arrived over target. The 1st Marine Aircraft 
wing operating under the control of the Fifth Air Force was busily 
employed on interdiction missions. On 30 August, a tactical air ob- 
server, spotting what appeared to be a division of NKPA troops mov- 
m fi toward the Marines, hurriedly flashed back a request for a multi- 
plane strike. The enemy troops were beyond artillery range, but 
they were bunched up— a good target for a concentrated air strike. 

t was more than three hours later that four fighter bombers arrived on 
the scene; by that time, the enemy formation had dispersed and the 
desired number of casualties could not be inflicted/ 

The reason for this lack of timely air support was apparent. Most 
°f the UN air power was being funneled into Operation strangle, 

"e interdiction operation designed to cut off the enemy's vehicular 
and rail traffic in the narrow waist of North Korea. With the emphasis 
°u air interdiction, close air support sorties were limited to only 96 
Per day for the entire Eighth Army.* The 1st Marine Division received 
0nl y a proportionate share. 

Marine close air support was needed because of the enemy's deter- 
mi ned resistance to the Division's attack. The Reds hurled frequent 
m ght counterattacks and pounded the Marine positions with artillery 
. mortars hidden in the precipitous Punchbowl area. At one time 
' Was estimated that the enemy was using 92 pieces of artillery. The 
Marines had only 72 field pieces, but in one 24 -hour period they 
^pended more than 11,000 rounds of artillery ammunition on a 

• 00-yard frontage. The enemy emplacements, hewn out of solid 
rock, were hard to knock out. 

To support the hard-working infantrymen, Marine Aircraft Group 
* 2 (MAG-12) had moved VMF-214 and VMF-312 from the 

"san area to K-18, an airfield on the east coast at Kangnung. By 
Moving closer to the Division area, planes were able to extend their 

Air C s? lstMar Div ltr to CinCPacFlt, 4 Oct 51, enclosure (1) "Observations on Close 
-P, £ p0rt for the Ist Marine Division during 5-23 September 1951." 
P**jfl Interim Rpi No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; IstMarDiv BAR, Jun 51. 


The East -Central Proni 

time over the target area and render more effective support to the 
infantry. Also, Marine Air Support Radar Team One (MASRT-l) 
was sent to Korea and established positions to support the Division. 
Using its support radar the team began to evaluate its capability of 
guiding unseen lighter- bombers at night or under conditions of poor 

Even though the Corsairs at K-18 were less than 50 miles from 
the 1st Marine Division, very few were available to the Marines. 
Operation strangle, in full swing, was not achieving the desired 
results. Since sightings of enemy vehicles were increasing, more and 
more Marine and Navy air sorties were channeled into interdiction. 
During 18 days of rugged fighting from 3 to 21 September, forward 
air controllers made 182 tactical air requests. Fighter-bombers were 
provided on 127 of these requests; however, in only 24 instances did 
the planes arrive when needed. The average delay time in getting CAS 
in response to requests during September was slightly less than two 
hours, but in 49 cases the planes were more than two hours late. 1 " 
As a consequence, General Thomas reported, many of the 1,621 
casualties suffered by the 1st Marine Division during the hard fighting 
in September were due to inadequate close air support. Furthermore, 
he said, the tactical capabilities of his battalions were strongly 

During the planning of attacks, infantry commanders almost always 
desired and requested close air support. It was also desirable to have 
planes on station overhead should an immediate CAS need arise, for 
the lack of an air strike when needed could jeopardize success. How- 
ever, with restricted availability of CAS planes due to participation in 
STRANGLE, many times desired air cover was not to be had. Attacks 
under those circumstances were often costly. 

First Helicopter Supply Operation of History 

The relief of the three battalions of the 7th Marines by their corre- 
sponding numbers of Colonel Thomas A. Wornham's 1st Marines 
took place during the night of 12-13 September. By daybreak 3/ 1 

" PacFlt Interim Rpt No. 3, Chap, % 9-18; Chap. 10, 10-12, Chap. 15, 15-20, 60-61: 
Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 21 Jan 59. 

la PacFtt Interim Rpt No. 3, Chap. 9, 9-14. 

Renewal of the Attack 187 

and l/i had assumed responsibility for the zones of 3/7 and 1/7, 
which were on their way to Division reserve at Wontong-ni at the 
junction of the Inje and Kansong roads. In the center, however, 
2/ 1 could not complete the relief of 2/7. Not only was that battalion 
engaged most of the day with the enemy, but the units were separated 
~-one company south of Hill 749 being unable to join the other two 
companies on separate spurs northwest of that height. Alt three were 
under persistent nkpa mortar and 76mm fire.' 1 

The attack of the 1st Marines, originally scheduled for 0500 on 
*3 September, had been changed to 0900 by Division orders. One 
reason for the postponement was the- serious shortage of ammunition 
and other supplies after the urgent demands of the last two days. 
Another reason was the inability of VMO-6 helicopters, lifting two 
wounded men at most, to cope with the mounting casualty lists, 

nemy interdiction of roads added in several instances to the compli- 
cations of a major logistical problem, particularly in the zone of 
L »eutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart's 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. 

The hour had struck for HMR-161, and the world's first large-scale 
helicopter supply operation in a combat zone would soon be under 
Way. ft was not the development of a day. On the contrary, its roots 
Went all the way back to 1945, when the atomic bomb of Hiroshima 
rendered obsolescent in 10 seconds a system of amphibious assault 
tactics that had been 10 years in the making. Obviously, the concen- 

ations of transports, warships, and aircraft carriers that had made 
possible the Saipan and I wo Jima landings would be sitting ducks 
°r an enemy armed with atomic weapons. 

The problem was left on the doorstep of the Marine Corps Schools, 
which had reared the Fleet Marine Force from infancy to maturity 
the 1930's. A Special Board and Secretariat were appointed 
°r studies. They assigned two general missions to Marine Helicopter 
Experimental Squadron 1 (HMX-l), organized late in 1947 before 

e fim rotary-wing aircraft had been delivered. These missions were: 

(1) Develop techniques and tactics in connection with the movement of 
assault troops by helicopter in amphibious operations; 
___( 2 ) Evaluate a small helicopter as a replacement for the present OY type 

Cw ( /°i?T eS . f " r this section are as follows: rusak Cmd Rpt, Sep SI, }5-55; X Corps 
I/, J)? 1 ' ie P 51, 9-12; IstMarDiv HD, Sep 51, 10-16; 1st Marines HD, Sep 5!; 

llnd V 1 WO, Sep 51 ; Class "C" Rpt, Employment of Aswnlt Heticoptm, 1-6; 
%y mrOSS ' Cuvatt > "I ihi ' % < New Vwk - 1934 >> W-Mfc (h«eoAei cWr> of 


The East-Central Front 

aircraft to be used for gunfire spotting, observation, and liaison missions in 
connection with amphibious operation. 12 

The second mission resulted in the small Sikorsky and Bell heli- 
copters of VMO-6 which landed in Korea with the 1st Provisional 
Marine Brigade in August 1950. Although it was originally believed 
that rotary wing aircraft might replace the OYs, combat experience 
soon demonstrated that the best results were obtained by retaining 
both types in fairly equal numbers. 

Landing exercises under simulated combat conditions were con- 
ducted by HMX-1 in fulfillment of the first mission, At first the 
squadron had only three-place helicopters. Later, when the usefulness 
of the helicopter was fully realized, even the new 10-place "choppers" 
were never available in sufficient numbers. The capacity designations 
of these machines, however, were more ideal than real, for the heli- 
copters could lift only four to six men in addition to the pilot, copilot, 
and crewman. Despite such drawbacks, HMX-1 developed tactical 
and logistical techniques for helicopter landings to be made from 
widely dispersed carriers against an enemy using atomic weapons. 

Belated deliveries of aircraft delayed the commissioning of the 
world's first transport helicopter squadron, HMR-161, until 15 Janu- 
ary 1951 at El Toro. Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring was 
designated the commanding officer and Lieutenant Colonel William P. 
Mitchell the executive officer. 

Nearly three months passed before the first three transport helicop- 
ters arrived, The squadron was gradually built up to a strength of 43 
officers and 244 enlisted men with a full complement of 15 HRS-1 
helicopters. These Sikorsky aircraft, designed to Marine specifications, 
were simply an enlarged three- place H03S in configuration, with a 
similar main rotor and vertical tail rotor. About 62 feet long with 
maximum extention of rotor blades, the HRS-1 was llf feet wide 
with the blades folded. Following are some of the other statistics: 

Gross weight at sea level, 7,000 pounds; cruising speed, 60 knots; 
payload at sea level, 1,420 pounds; troop-lifting capacity, four to six 
men with full combat equipment or three to five casualties in litters. 1 * 
Capabilities varied, of course, according to such factors as altitude, 
temperature, and pilot experience. 

Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 161 arrived in Korea on 

u CMC Itr to CO MCAS, Quantito, 3 Dec 47. 
™ Cavalry of ike Sky, 157. 

Renewal of the At tuck 


Hie last day of August, and by the 10th of September it had moved 
l! p to the front, sharing Airfield X-83 (see Map 18) with VMO-6. 11 
The 11th was devoted to reconnaissance flights in search of landing 
sites, and on the 12th the transport squadron was ready for its first 
combat mission. A new means of logistical and tactical support that 
was to revolutionize operations and create front page headlines had 
arrived in Korea, 

Prior to the squadron's arrival, the Division chief of staff. Colonel 
Victor H. Krulak, had held numerous planning conferences with 
Division staff officers, and preparations for the employment of 
HMR-161 had made noteworthy progress. Then General Thomas 
ordered executed the first operation of the squadron under combat 
conditions, and the major logistical problem of moving supplies and 
evacuating casualties was well on the way to being solved. At 1600 
on 13 September 1951 — a date that would have historical signifi- 
cance — Operation windmill i was set in motion. 

Lieutenant Colonel Herring had attended the final planning con- 
ference at Division headquarters at 0830 on the 13 th, and he was 
told that the operation would involve a lift of one day's supplies to 
2/1 over a distance of seven miles. The commanding officer of 2/1 
Was to select suitable landing points and the commanding officer of 1st 
Shore Party Battalion had the responsibility of providing support 
teams to operate at the embarkation and landing points. 10 

Only two days had been available for training and rehearsals, but 
not a minute was wasted, All morning on the 13th the embarkation 
point section separated the supplies into balanced loads of about 800 
pounds per helicopter. Loading commenced at 1520. Half an hour 
later, seven aircraft were ready to depart while four others went 
ahead to carry the landing point section to the previously reconnoitered 

The route followed the valleys as much as possible, so that the 
helicopters were in defilade most of the way. Smoke was laid down by 
the 11th Marines for concealment. 

The landing point section managed in 20 minutes to clear an area 
of 20 x 40 feet (later enlarged to 100 x 100 feet) and mark it with 
fluorescent panels. At 1610 the first HRS-1 hovered with cargo nets 
suspended from a hook released by manual control. A few minutes 

11 Auxiliary airstrips in Korea had an "X" designation and fields in the "K" category 
were imjur installations. Those in proximity to U.S. Army centers were designated "A." 
" LtCol H. W. Edwards, interv of 20 Feb 61. 


The East-Central Profit 

aircraft to be used for gunfire spotting, observation, and liaison missions in 
connection with amphibious operation." 

The second mission resulted in the small Sikorsky and Bell heli- 
copters of VMO-6 which landed in Korea with the 1st Provisional 
Marine Brigade in August 1950, Although it was originally believed 
that rotary wing aircraft might replace the OYs, combat experience 
soon demonstrated that the best results were obtained by retaining 
both types in fairly equal numbers. 

Landing exercises under simulated combat conditions were con- 
ducted by HMX-l in fulfillment of the first mission. At first the 
squadron had only three-place helicopters. Later, when the usefulness 
of the helicopter was fully realized, even the new 10-place "choppers" 
were never available in sufficient numbers. The capacity designations 
of these machines, however, were more ideal than real, for the heli- 
copters could lift only four to six men in addition to the pilot, copilot, 
and crewman. Despite such drawbacks, HMX-l developed tactical 
and logistical techniques for helicopter landings to be made from 
widely dispersed carriers against an enemy using atomic weapons. 

Belated deliveries of aircraft delayed the commissioning of the 
worlds first transport helicopter squadron, HMR-161, until 15 Janu- 
ary 1951 at El Toro. Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring was 
designated the commanding officer and Lieutenant Colonel William P. 
Mitchell the executive officer. 

Nearly three months passed before the first three transport helicop- 
ters arrived. The squadron was gradually built up to a strength of 43 
officers and 244 enlisted men with a full complement of 15 HRS-1 
helicopters. These Sikorsky aircraft, designed to Marine specifications, 
were simply an enlarged three-place H03S in configuration, with a 
similar main rotor and vertical tail rotor. About 62 feet long with 
maximum extention of rotor blades, the HRS-1 was ll£ feet wide 
with the blades folded. Following are some of the other statistics: 

Gross weight at sea level, 7,000 pounds; cruising speed, 60 knots; 
payload at sea level, 1,420 pounds; troop-lifting capacity, four to six 
men with full combat equipment or three to five casualties in litters. 13 
Capabilities varied, of course, according to such factors as altitude, 
temperature, and pilot experience. 

Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron 16 1 arrived in Korea on 

u CMC Itr to CO MCAS, Quantico, 3 Dec 47. 
"Cavalry of the Sly, 157. 


Renewal of the Attack 

the last day of August, and by the LOth of September it had moved 
"p to the front, sharing Airfield X-83 (see Map 18) with VMO-6. 14 
The 11th was devoted to reconnaissance flights in search of landing 
sites, and on the 12th the transport squadron was ready for its first 
combat mission. A new means of logistical and tactical support that 
was to revolutionize operations and create front page headlines had 
arrived in Korea. 

Prior to the squadron's arrival, the Division chief of staff. Colonel 
Victor H. Krulak, had held numerous planning conferences with 
Division staff officers, and preparations for the employment of 
HfvtR-161 had made noteworthy progress. Then General Thomas 
ordered executed the first operation of the squadron under combat 
conditions, and the major logistical problem of moving supplies and 
evacuating casualties was well on the way to being solved. At 1 600 
on 13 September 1951 — a date that would have historical signifi- 
cance^ — Operation windmill i was set in motion. 

Lieutenant Colonel Herring had attended the final planning con- 
ference at Division headquarters at 0830 on the 13th, and he was 
told that the operation would involve a lift of one day's supplies to 
2/1 over a distance of seven miles. The commanding officer of 2/1 
was to select suitable landing points and the commanding officer of 1st 
Shore Party Battalion had the responsibility of providing support 
teams to operate at the embarkation and landing points. 11 

Only two days had been available for training and rehearsals, but 
not a minute was wasted. All morning on the 13th the embarkation 
point section separated the supplies into balanced loads of about 800 
pounds per helicopter. Loading commenced at 1520. Half an hour 
later, seven aircraft were ready to depart while four others went 
ahead to carry the landing point section to the previously reconnoitered 

The route followed the valleys as much as possible, so that the 
helicopters were in defilade most of the way. Smoke was laid down by 
the 11th Marines for concealment. 

The landing point section managed in 20 minutes to clear an area 
of 20 x 40 feet (later enlarged to 100 x 100 feet) and mark it with 
fluorescent panels. At 1610 the first HRS-1 hovered with cargo nets 
suspended from a hook released by manual control. A few minutes 

" Auxiliary airstrips in Korea had an "X" designation and fields in the "K" category 
were major installations. Those in proximity to U.S. Army centers were designated "A." 
,B LtCol H. W. Edwards, interv of 20 Feb 61. 

190 The East-Central Front 

later it took off with five walking wounded and two litter cases. 

Each helicopter carried out as many casualties as possible, depending 
on the amount of gasoline in the fuel tanks. Only 30 minutes passed 
from the time one Marine was wounded and the time of his arrival at 
a hospital clearing station 17 miles behind the firing line. 

Radio provided communications between helicopters in flight, 
HMR-161 headquarters, 2/1 CP, and the Shore Party team at the 
landing site. 

Fifteen aircraft were employed for one hour, three for two hours, 
and one for two hours and 45 minutes — a total of 28 flights in over-all 
time of 2-|- hours. The helicopters landed at intervals of two minutes 
and took off as soon as the landing point section could put the casualties 
aboard. And though an altitude of 2,100 feet restricted loads, 18,848 
pounds of cargo had been lifted into the area and 74 casualties 
evacuated when the last "chopper" returned to X-83 at 1840. 

To even the most pessimistic observer Operation windmill i was 
a complete success, so successful that a similar operation, WINDMILL n 
was conducted on the 19th. Two days later the first helicopter lift of 
combat troops was completed. A new era of military transport had 

Although 2/1 alone had 240 Korean cargadores attached, the 7$ tons 
of helicopter-borne supplies, largely ammunition, were vitally needed 
by the two assault battalions of the 1st Marines. After relieving Fox 
Company of 2/7 south of Hill 749 at 1100 on the 13 th, Lieutenant 
Colonel Nihart's 2/1 jumped off to the attack an hour later, Stiff 
opposition was encountered from the beginning. The relief of the 
remaining two companies of 2/7 was complicated by the fact that they 
were some 400 yards from the position reported, on the reverse slope 
of Hill 749. Throughout the day these Marines were heavily engaged 
with the enemy. 111 

On the left of 2/1, the 3d Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. 
La Hue) could not make much progress toward its regimental objec- 
tive, Hill 751, while the enemy was active on Hill 749- A second 

*■ Sources for this section are the same as for the previous section except when other- 
wise noted. 

Renewal of the Attack 


attack of 2/1 at 1500 drove to the summit of that height after fierce 
fighting with small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades. 
There was still much fighting to be done before the entire objective 
would be secured since many enemy bunkers hidden among the trees 
remained to be neutralized. 

At 1600 a gap of about 300 yards separated 2/1 from the two 2/7 
companies. So fierce was enemy resistance in this area that it took 
until 2025 for Nihart's men to complete the relief after fighting for 
every foot of ground. 

Air and artillery support had been excellent on the 13th despite the 
fact that neither could be called by 2/1 in some instances because of the 
danger of hitting elements of 2/7. Even so, 2/11 (Lieutenant Colonel 
Dale H. Heely) and other artillery units fired 2,133 rounds and 
Company C of the 1st Tank Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly H. 
Evans) contributed 720 rounds of 90mm fire which knocked out six 
enemy bunkers. The 4.2" mortars had a busy day firing 261 HE and 
28 WP rounds, and Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion (Lieu- 
tenant Colonel John V. Kelsey) supported the attack by clearing 
mine fields. 

Mortar fire was received by the 1st Marines throughout the night, 
and 3/1 repulsed a series of counterattacks by an estimated 300* enemy. 
Colonel Wornham's regiment continued the attack at 0800 on 14 Sep- 
tember. Both the 2d and 3d Battalions inched their way forward 
against a heavy volume of well-aimed enemy mortar, artillery, and 
automatic weapons fire. 

nkpa resistance persisted on the wooded northern slope of Hill 749, 
where hidden bunkers had to be knocked out, one by one. It took 
constant slugging for 2/1 to advance 300 meters before dusk, enabling 
3/1 to fight its way to the summit of Hill 751. Again the flat tra- 
jectory fire of Company C tanks had been helpful as 400 rounds were 
directed again nkpa bunkers, while the 11th Marines fired 3,029 

The 15th was a relatively quiet day as compared to the previous 
48 hours. In preparation for an expected passage of lines, the action 
took a slower tempo as units consolidated their positions. The princi- 
pal fight of the day was a continuation of the attack by 2/1 north of 
Hill 749. Although the battalion commander had arranged for a 
heavy artillery preparation, the attack, which jumped off at 1710, was 
stopped at 1800 by a terrific pounding from NKPA mortars and artillery 


The East-Central Front 

coupled with a crossfire of machine guns from concealed bunkers. 
The assault troops withdrew under effective covering fire by the 11th 
Marines to positions occupied the previous night. Objective baker 
yet remained to be secured. 

The Marines could not help paying reluctant tribute to the skill 
as well as obstinacy of the nkpa defense. Enemy bunkers were so 
stoutly constructed that the North Koreans did not hesitate to direct 
well aimed mortar fire on their own positions when the Marines closed 
in for the final attack. 

Nkpa fields of fire were laid out for the utmost effect Marines 
with recent memories of college football referred to the enemy's 
effective use of terrain as the "North Korean T Formation." On 
Hill 749, for example, the main ridgeline leading to the summit was 
crossed by another wooded ridgeline at right angles. Attackers fight- 
ing their way up the leg of the "T" came under deadly crossfire from 
the head of the imaginary letter — a transverse ridgeline bristling with 
mortars and machine guns positioned in bunkers. 

In accordance with Division OpnO 25-51, the 5th Marines (Colonel 
Richard C. Weede) moved up to assembly areas on 15 September in 
preparation for passing through 3/1 on the 16th to continue the 
attack. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in turn would relieve 1/1 
(Major Edgar F. Carney, Jr.), so that it could pass through 2/1 and 
carry on the assualt to complete the securing of Hill 749. 

The KMCs and Division Recon Company were to relieve the 5th 
Marines of responsibility for the hays Line, while the 7th Marines 
remained in reserve at Wontong-ni, 

The comparative quiet of the 15th was shattered a minute after 
midnight when the enemy launched a savage four-hour attack to drive 
2/1 off Hill 749. The nkpa hurricane barrage that preceded the at- 
tempt, according to the Division report, "reached an intensity that was 
estimated to surpass that of any barrage yet encountered by the 1st 
Marine Division in Korea." 17 

The thinned companies of 2/1 took a frightful pounding from 
76mm, 105mm, and 122mm artillery supplemented by 82mm and 
120mm mortars. Bugles and whistles were the signal for the on- 
slaught. It was stopped by weary Marines who demonstrated at nkpa 
expense that they, too, could put up a resolute defensive fight. 

Wave after wave of attackers dashed itself at the thinned Marine 

" IstMarDiv HD, Sep 51, 19-20. 

Renewal of the Attack 


platoons, onJy to shatter against a resistance that could be bent but 
not broken. The fight was noteworthy for examples of individual 
valor. When one of the forward Marine platoons was compelled to 
give ground slowly, Corporal Joseph Vittori of Fox Company rushed 
through the withdrawing troops to lead a successful local counter- 
attack. As the all-night fight continued, "he leaped from one foxhole 
to another, covering each foxhole in turn as casualties continued to 
mount, manning a machine gun when the gunner was struck down 
and making repeated trips through the heaviest shell fire to replenish 
ammunition." 18 

Vittori was mortally wounded during the last few minutes of the 
fight, thus becoming the second Marine of 2/1 within a 48-hour period 
to win the Medal of Honor. His predecessor was Pfc Edward Gomez 
of Easy Company. When an enemy grenade landed in the midst of 
his scjuad on 14 September, he "unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice him- 
self and, diving into the ditch with the deadly missile, absorbed the 
shattering violence of the explosion in his own body." 10 

Not until 0400 on the 16th did the enemy waves of attack subside 
on Hill 749. Nkpa strength was estimated at a regiment. A combined 
assault by an estimated 150 enemy on 3/1 positions to the west in the 
vicinity of Hill 751 was repulsed shortly after midnight, as were three 
lesser efforts during the early morning hours of the 16th. 

When the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines moved out at 0830 to pass 
through 2/1 and continue the fight, it was the first day of command 
for Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman.-' The passage of lines was 
slowed by enemy mortar fire, and nkpa resistance stiffened as 1/1 
attacked along the ridgeline leading toward Hill 749. At 1800, after 
a hard day's fighting, Objective baker was occupied and defensive 
positions were organized for the night. 

Thus was the attack of the 1st Marines terminated. Around Hill 
751, 3/1 remained in control. The regiment's other two battalions, 
1/1 and 2/1, held a defensive line about 1,500 yards long on both 
sides of Hill 749. 

Hill 749 had finally been secured. A number of mutually supporting 

"Jane- Blakcncy, ed., Ilereo, L\S. Mtirnm Carp<, 1 Ml -1955 (Washington, L957), 
Joseph Vittori Medal nf Hunu: Citalion, -15, 
'" I hid., Pfc Edward Gomez citation, 38. 

311 On 14 September, LtCol Horace I:. Knapp, Jr., the previous commanding officer of 
1/1, was severely wounded while reconnoiterinu, forward positions. He was evacuated, 
and the executive officer. Major I:dgar F. Carney, Jr., commanded until UCol John E. 
Gorman assumed command ar noon on the 16tli. 

194 The East-Central Front 

hidden enemy bunkers had been knocked out in a ruthless battle of 
extermination, and veterans of the World War II Pacific conflict were 
reminded of occasions when Japanese resistance flared up in similar 
fashion after ground was thought to be secure. 

Casualties of the 1st Marine Division during the four-day fight for 
Hill f4% most of them suffered by the attacking regiment, were 
90 KIA, 714 WIA, and 1 MIA. Enemy losses for the same period were 
771 counted KIA (although more than twice that number were esti- 
mated KIA) and 81 prisoners. 

Uh Marines Attack Hill S12 

Division OpnO 25-51 assigned the 5th Marines the mission of pass- 
ing through 3/1 tn the vicinity of Hill 751 and attacking to secure 
Objective dog, the bare, brown hill mass which loomed approximately 
1,000 yards ahead. The last few hundred yards were certain to be 
long ones, for the main east-west ridgeline leading to Hill 812 was 
crossed by a north-south ridgeline — the leg and head of another "T" 
formation. Again, as on Hill 749, the attackers had to fight their 
way through a vicious crossfire. 

Lieutenant Colonel Houston Stiff's 2/5 on the right bad the main 
effort. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. 
Kennedy) was to advance on Stiff's left with the mission of supporting 
his attack on Objective doc, prepared to seize Hill 980 on order. 
Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston's I /5 remained in regimental 
reserve. 21 

Fox Company spearheaded the 2/5 attack by moving initially up 
the low ground between Hill 673 on the right hand and 680 on the 
left. Owing to delays in completing the relief of 1st Marines elements, 
it was early afternoon on 16 September before the assault got under- 
way. Progress was slow against heavy mortar and machine gun fire, 
and a halt came at 1700 for regrouping and evacuation of casualties. 

Dog Company, in support on the ridge to the left, sighted troops 
approaching the objective and recj nested that the positions of the 
assault company be identified. In order to pinpoint the locations, 

Sources For this suction, unless otherwise specified are iss follows: IstMaiDiv 11D. 
Sep 51, l f )-2 3; 5thMiii HO, Sep 51, 14-19; 1st, 2d, ujd IdHn, 5th M.\r, I ID, Sep SI; 
UG>1 Houston Stiff, inteiv of 25 Jun 58; Maj G. P. Avcrill. "Final Object ive," 
Marine Corpi Gazette, vol. 41), no. 8 (Auk 56), 10-16. 

lletifu'ctl of the Aitiick 


a white phosphorous grenade was used as a murk. It attracted the 
attention of aircraft summoned by 3/5 against Hill 980 (Map 17), 
from Which fire had been received. The planes, assuming that another 
target had been designated, attacked the forward platoons of Fox 
Company with napalm and machine guns. By a miracle, recognition 
panels were put out before a single casualty resulted, but the men 
found it a harrowing experience. 

Darkness fell before the attack could be resumed, and Fox Com- 
pany pulled back along the ridgeline to set up a perimeter defense and 
evacuate the wounded. The night passed without enemy action. Bright 
moonlight made for unusual visibility which discouraged enemy at- 
tacks and permitted the Marine assault platoons more sleep than might 
otherwise have been expected. 

Regimental orders called for 2/5 to resume the attack at 0400 on 
the 17th, supported by the fires of 3/5, while 1/5 continued in reserve. 
Fox Company of 2/5 had some difficulty in orienting itself after the 
confusion of the night before and was delayed until 0700 in jumping 
off. This proved to be a stroke of luck, for dawn gave the Marines a 
good view of unsuspecting enemy troops eating breakfast and making 
ready for the day's fighting. Fox Company called artillery on them 
with good effect. 

Surprise gave the attack an opening advantage and rapid progress 
was made at first along the main ridgeline leading west to Hill 812. 
Then Fox Company was stopped by the cross-fire from the head of 
the "T." Easy Company passed through at 0830 to continue the 
assault, reinforced by a platoon of Fox Company that had become 
Separated from its parent unit, although it kept in touch by radio. 

An air strike was called but did not materialize. After waiting for 
it in vain, Easy Company drove toward the summit with the support 
of artillery and mortars. 

Two hours after passing through Fox Company, the attackers 
had advanced only about a hundred yards against the nkpa cross-fire. 
At 1100, Lieutenant Colonel Stiff ordered an all-out drive for the 
objective, following a preliminary barrage of everything that could 
be thrown at the enemy — artillery, 75mm recoilless, rockets, and 81mm 
and 4.2" mortars. As soon as the bombardment lifted, Easy Company 
was to drive straight ahead along the ridgeline while the 2d Platoon 
of Fox Company made a think attack. 

This maneuver turned the trick, The blow on the flank took the 


The East-Central Front 

enemy by surprise, and in just 36 minutes the assault troops were on 
the summit after a hard fight at close quarters with automatic weapons 
and grenades. Since regimental orders had specified "before night- 
fall," Objective DOG had been seized ahead of schedule. 

With scarcely a pause, Easy Company continued along the ridgeline 
leading west from Hill 812 toward Hill 980. Remarkably fast progress 
was made against an enemy who appeared to be thrown off balance. 
Permission was asked to seize Hill 980. The regimental commander 
refused because of instructions from Division to the effect that this 
position could not be defended while the enemy remained in possession 
of Hill 1052, the key terrain feature. Easy Company was directed to 
withdraw 600 yards toward Hill 812, 

Late in the evening of 17 September, Colonel Weede directed his 
two assault battalions to consolidate on the best ground in their 
present locations and prepare to hold a defensive line. 

When the brakes were put on the attack, 3/5 was strung out over 
a wide area to the north of Hill 751. This battalion was not tied in 
with 2/5, which occupied positions coordinated for the defense of 
Hill 812— Easy Company to the west, on the ridgeline leading to 980; 
Dog and Weapons Company to the south, protecting the left flank; 
and Fox Company to the east. 

Both Easy and Fox Companies were under fire from Hills 980 and 
1052, and daytime movement on 812 was restricted to the northern 
slope. Even so, sniping shots from well aimed North Korean 76mm 
mountain guns inflicted a number of casualties. 

The Struggle for the "Rock" 

An abrupt change in the enemy's strategy became evident throughout 
these September operations. Where he had previously contented him- 
self with an elastic defense, every position was now bitterly fought for 
and held to the last man. When it was lost, counterattacks were 
launched in efforts to regain it. 

One of these attempts hit the western outpost of 2/5's Easy Com- 
pany at 0430 on 18 September, compelling the Marines to give ground. 
A second counterattack at 0840 was repulsed. Enemy fire from 
Hills 980 and 1042 continued all day long, and Colonel Stiff's battalion 
suffered most of the 16 KIA and 98 WIA casualties reported by the 
Division for 18 September. 

Renewal of the Attack 


The night of 18-19 September passed in comparative quiet, but at 
daylight the enemy on Hills 980 and 1052 was still looking down the 
throats of the 2/5 Marines. None of the participants will ever forget 
a landmark known simply as "the Rock" — a huge granite knob 
athwart the ridgeline approximately 700 yards west of Hill 812. Only 
12 feet high, its location made it visible from afar. The Marines 
outposted the top and eastern side, while the enemy held tenaciously 
to the western side. Along the northern slope of the ridge leading 
west to the Rock were the only positions affording protection to the 
dug-in forward elements of the battalion. 

The need for fortification materials such as sand bags, barbed wire, 
and mines aggravated the already serious supply problems of 2/5. 
A request for helicopter support was sent at 1100 on the 19th and 
approved immediately by General Thomas. Loading commenced early 
the same afternoon, and Operation windmill ii was launched. A total 
of 12,180 pounds were lifted by 10 HRS-i aircraft in 16 flights 
during the overall time of one hour. 2 - 

Again, on 19 September, 2/5 incurred most of the casualties re- 
ported by the Division. During the day 1/5, after relieving the 1st 
and 2d Battalions of the 1st Marines, moved up on the right of 2/5 
to occupy a defensive line stretching two miles east along the ridge 
almost to the Soyang-gang. 

Nkpa action was confined to incessant long-range fire during the 
daylight hours of the 19th, but at 0315 the following morning the 
enemy made a desperate effort to retake Hill 812. After a brief but 
intense mortar and artillery barrage, North Koreans in at least com- 
pany strength came pouring around the northern side of the Rock to 
attack with grenades and burp guns at close range. The left platoon 
of Easy Company counterattacked but was pushed back by superior 
numbers to positions on the left flank of the hill. 

The enemy immediately took possession of evacuated ground which 
enabled him to fire into the front lines of Easy Company. At 0500 
another Marine counterattack began, with Easy Company making a 
frontal assault and the 2d Platoon of Fox Company striking the enemy 
flank. It was the same platoon that had delivered the flank attack 
resulting in the capture of Hill 812. Again 2/Fox: struck the decisive 
blow with grenades and automatic weapons. The surprise was too 

* Cavalry oj iht Sty, 


The En si -Central Firm! 

much for enemy troops who hastened back to their own side of the 
Rock, leaving 60 counted dead behind. 33 

This was the last action of a battle that had occupied all three 
Marine regiments from 11 to 20 September inclusive while the KMC 
Regiment patrolled aggressively on the Division left flank. Three of 
the four Division objectives had been secured after savage fights, but 
Objective charln; (the ridgeline northwest of HiU 1052 in the KMC 
zone) had yet to be attacked when Division OpnO 26-51 put an 
abrupt stop to offensive movement. 

Not only was the fight west of HiU 812 the last action of the 
1st Marine Division's nine-day battle; it was the last action of mobility 
for Marines in Korea. As time went on, it would become more and 
more apparent that 20 September 1951 dated a turning point in the 
Korean conflict. On that day the warfare of movement came to an 
end, and the warfare of position began. 

■ 1st Marine Division losses of 33 killed and 235 wounded during the three-day attack 
were incurred for the must part by the 5th Marines in general and 2/5 in particular. 
Enemy casualties of this period were reported as 972 K1A (265 counted) and 113 


The New Warfare of Position 

Sectors of Major eusak Units — Statement by General Van 
Fleet— Hill 854 Secured by 3 / 1— Helicopter Troop Lift to 

TWO AND A HALF weeks of hard fighting had taken place along 
the X Corps front when General James A. Van Fleet paid a visit 
on 16 September 1951. The commanding general of eusak wished 
to inspect the operations and determine the morale of the 1st Marine 
Division and 2d Infantry Division, both of which had suffered heavy 
casualties. He found the morale of these X Corps units good and 
had no adverse criticisms of their operations. While on this tour of 
inspection, however, he issued the following three directives to X 

(1) That replacements would be integrated into units only when the bat- 
talion or larger-si2ed unit to which they were assigned was in reserve; 

(2) that certain choke points' [General Van Fleet pointed out the loca- 
tions on the map] be interdicted to prevent enemy reinforcements or with- 
drawals through these points; 

(3) that the Corps Commander firm up his line by 20 September and to 
plan no further offensives after that date, as it was unprofitable to continue 
the bitter operation. 1 

Italics have been added to emphasize the importance of 20 Septem- 

1 eusak Cmd Rpt, Sep St, 47. Other sources for this chapter art* comments and 
criticisms by the following officers, all but one of whom are U.S. Murines. Ranks in 
each instance are thuse held at the time of interview or correspondence. 

General J, A, Van Fleet, USA (Ret.); General G. C. Thomas, Lieutenant General 
J. T. Selden; Brigadier Generals V. H. Krulak, S. S. Wade, R. G. Weede; Colonels 
G. P. Groves, B. T. Hemphill, K. L. McCutcheon, J. H, Tinsley, F. B. Nihart, G. D. 
Gayle, W. P. Mitchell, j. F. Stamm, F. P. Hager, Jr.; Lieutenant Colonels H. W. 
Rdwards, J. G. Kelly; Major R. L. Autry. 



The New War fare of Posit ion 


ber 1951 as the turning point when a warfare of position replaced a 
warfare of movement throughout the remaining 22 months of the 
conflict in Korea. There are few dates as important in the entire 
history of the war. 

General Van Fleet reiterated his instructions on the 18th in :t 
confirming directive to the effect that X Corps continue making limited 
attacks "until 20 September, after which . . . units were to firm up 
the existing line and to patrol vigorously forward of it." * 

Sectors of Major eusak Units 

At this turning point the Eighth Army had 14 divisions from four 
corps committed along a 125-mile front across the peninsula. These 
units were distributed (Map 19) as follows: 


ROK 1st Division holding the left anchor in the Munsan-ni area and con- 
trolling the 5th KMC Battalion on the Kimpo Peninsula; 

British 1st Commonwealth Division across the river Imjin to the northeast; 

U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Greek and Thai Battalions attached) still farther 
to the northeast in the Yonchon area ; 

U.S. 3rd Infantry Division (Belgian Battalion and Philippine 20th BCT 
attached) having the responsibility for the vital Chorwon area; 


US. 25th Infantry Division (Turkish Brigade attached) defending the area 

west of Kumhwa ; 
ROK 2d Division holding a sector east of Kumhwa; 
U.S. 7th Infantry Division (Ethiopian Battalion attached) on the right; 
ROK 6th Division with a narrow sector as far east as the Pukhan River, the 

Corps boundary; 

U.S. 24th Infantry Division (Colombian Battalion attached) in Corps reserve 
south of Hwachon; 


ROK Sih Division on the left fluk; 
a eusak Cmd Rpt, Sep 51, 53. 


The East-Central Front 

US. 2d Infantry Division (French and Netherlands Battalions attached) in 

left-central portion of Corps front; 
ROK Division occupying a narrow sector to the east; 
US. 1st Murine Division holding eastern portion of the Corps sector; 


ROK nth Division responsible for left of the Corps front; 

ROK. Capitol Dii-hion holding the line eastward to the Sea of Japan; 

ROK id Division in reserve at Yangyang for a period of training. 3 

Some rather complicated juggling of units took place on the X Corps 
front, giving the effect of a game of musical chairs in the tactical 
sphere. From 18 to 21 September the 1st Marine Division extended 
its line eastward to relieve the Sth ROK Division on the extreme right 
of the Corps area. That Division in turn relieved the 5th ROK Di- 
vision on the extreme left, whereupon the latter leapfrogged the 
2d Infantry Division to occupy a new sector on the left of the Marines. 

Statement by General Van Fleet 

"Theirs not to reason why" could never have been written about 
American fighting men. From 1775 to the present day, they have 
always taken a keen interest in the high-level strategic and tactical 
decisions governing their operations. This applies with particular 
force to the Marines, who have seldom had a voice in the shaping of 
operations above the division level. 

As if in direct reply to unspoken questions, the commanding general 
of the Eighth Army made a statement on 30 September explaining 
the purpose of his strategy. "My basic mission during the past four 
months," he said, "has been to destroy the enemy, so that the men of 
Eighth Army will not be destroyed. . . . Each loaded enemy weapon 
was a definite threat to the Eighth Army. It was imperative that we 
knock out as many of those weapons as we could find, . . ." 

"In prodding the enemy in the deep belly of the peninsula," con- 
tinued General Van Fleet, "we have taken many casualties. ... It 
was mandatory that we control the high ground features, so that we 
could look down the throat of the enemy and thereby better perform 

'eusak CW Rfn. Oct 51, 5-6 and Plate I; IstMarDiv HD, Sep 51, 3. 

The New War jure of Pmitim 


our task of destruction. ... In seizing these hills we Inst men, but 
in losing a comparative few we saved other thousands." 

Estimated casualties, inflicted on the enemy by UN ground forces 
alone from 25 May to 25 September, were announced as 188,237 by 
the eusak commander. "As we open our autumn campaign," he 
added, "die enemy potential along the front line has been sharply 
reduced by our hi 11 -hopping tactics. The Communist forces in Korea 
are not liquidated but they are badly crippled." * 

Even so, eusak G-2 summaries credited the enemy on 1 October 
1951 with more than 600,000 troops at the front, or in reserve and 
available as immediate reinforcements. Six CCF armies and one 
nkpa corps were capable of reinforcing the units on the MLR or par- 
ticipating in an offensive. The enemy also had an estimated 7,000 
men in guerrilla forces behind the UN lines. G 

The maximum strength of UN forces in Korea during October was 
607,300. This total included 236,871 U.S. Army troops, 21,020 Fifth 
Air Force personnel, 30,913 U.S. Marines (including 5,386 officers 
and men of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing), 286,000 men in ROK 
units, and 32,172 Allied troops. 11 

Although it might appear that the opposing forces were about 
etjual, it must be remembered that well over one-fourth of the UN 
troops were engaged in administrative or maintenance duties behind 
the front. Thus the Communists had a numerical advantage of at least 
four to three on the firing line. This was not at all unusual, since they 
had enjoyed a preponderance in manpower from the beginning. 

Hill 854 Secured by 3/1 

In accordance with eusak instructions, X Corps 01-235 directed the 
1st Marine Division to organize and construct defensive positions after 
relieving the 8th ROK Division on the right and taking over its sector. 
On the Corps boundary, elements of the 11th ROK Division, I ROK 
Corps, were to be relieved on Hill 884 (Map 20). This meant the 
addition of some 9,000 yards to the Marine front, making a total 
of about 22,800 yards or more than 13 miles. 

1 Ibitt., 29-30. 

'■ }hiit., 7-9 and Plate No. 4. 
'■m„ 5-6. and Phte No. 1. 


The East-Central Front 

First Marine Division OpnO 27-51, issued on 18 September, relayed 
the X Corps directions. It also called for such offensive action as might 
be necessary to complete the securing of Hill 854, in the sector of the 
8th ROK Division, if not in friendly hands at the time of the relief. 7 

That the enemy had put up a desperate fight to hold this position 
is indicated by the EUSAK report for 15-16 September: "The ROK 
8th Division, employing all three regiments, attacked against heavy 
and stubborn resistance to wrest Hill 854 from the three battalions 
of North Koreans who held the position. The ROK 21st Regiment 
forced one of these battalions to withdraw and occupied a part of the 
hill, but at the close of the day were engaged in heavy hand-to-hand 
fighting to retain the position." 8 

On 20 September, after three weeks of continual combat, the major 
units of the 1st Marine Division were disposed from left to right 
(Map 20) as follows: 

1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dae Shik, commanding; Colonel 
Walter N. Flournoy, senior adviser) occupying the hays line on the 
left flank and patrolling vigorously to the north; 

5th Marines (Colonel Richard G. Weede) holding a wide sector 
in the center, with Hill 812 as the principal terrain feature; 

1st Marines (Colonel Thomas A. Wornharn) in process of extend- 
ing eastward to the Corps boundary just beyond Hill 884; 

7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John J. Wermuth) in Division 
reserve at Wontong-ni," 

Division OpnO 27-51 designated the 1st Marines to relieve the 
ROKs on Hill 854 and complete the seizure of that terrain feature, 
if necessary. As a preliminary, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Marines 
(Lieutenant Colonel William P. Alston) took over the front of the 
1st Marines on the hays line. This enabled 1/1 and 3/1 to enlarge 
the Division sector by side-slipping to the east while Lieutenant 
Colonel Franklin B. Nihart's 2/1 went into immediate reserve just 
behind the main line of resistance. 1 " 

The 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel John E. 
Gorman) relieved two battalions of the 10th ROK Regiment in the 
Hill 854 area. No opposition from the enemy was encountered, but 

' lstMarDiv HD, Sep if, 3. 

"eusak Cmd lipt, Sep 51, 47. 

" lstMarDiv HD, Sep 51. 3-t, 18-22. 

10 The balance of this section is based un the lstMarDiv HD, Sep SI, 18-24, and on 
1/1 and 3/1 HD, Sep 51. 

MAP 20 


The East-Central Front 

the Marines suffered 11 casualties from mines as a consequence of 
incorrect charts supplied by the ROKs. 

By this time it had become an open question whether "friendly" 
mines did more harm to friend or foe. Certain it was, at any rate, that 
the prevailing system — or lack of system — resulted in Marine casual- 
ties during nearly every offensive operation in zones where the action 
shifted back and forth. 

Lieutenant Colonel Foster C. La Hue's 3/1 relieved two battalions 
of the 21st ROK Regiment. Although the ROKs had fought their 
way to the summit of Hill 854 , the ridgeline to the southwest re- 
mained in the enemy's hands. An attack by 3/1 was planned for 1530 
on 20 September, supported by artillery and an air strike. Delays in 
the arrival of the planes caused a postponement until 1720. How 
Company jumped off and had advanced 50 yards when a man was 
killed and another wounded by mines. The attack was called off at 
dusk so that the ROKs could remove the explosives they had planted. 

Air support was requested for 0700 on the morning of the 21st, 
but it was 1040 before four Air Force F-51s arrived for a strike 
directed by an observation plane of VMO-6 and a forward air con- 
troller. At 1220, following a 10-minute artillery preparation, How 
Company spearpointed a battalion attack which met stiff resistance. 
Another air strike was requested but did not materialize. The assault 
continued with mortar and artillery support until 1745, when How 
Company reported the ridge line secured. 

Casualties of 3/1 for the two days were nine KIA and 55 WIA. 
Enemy losses totaled 159 counted and 150 estimated KIA, 225 esti- 
mated WIA, and 29 prisoners." 

"A large number of mines and booby traps were discovered within 
the battalion sector," the 3/1 report for the 23d concluded, "most of 
these being U.S. types which were placed by ROK troops, with only 
a few enemy mines scattered in the central portion of the sector." ,z 

Helicopter Troop Lift to Hill 884 

Division OpnO 27-51, it may be recalled, had directed the Marines 
to extend the X Corps boundary eastward by taking over the sector of 

"Sources for the action on Hill 854 are the 1/1 and 3/1 historical diaries for Sep- 
tember 1951. 
11 3/1 HD, Sep 51, 8. 

The New Warfare of Position 


the nth Regiment, I ROK Corps. Even under ordinary circumstances 
this would have meant an exhausting 15-hour march for the relieving 
troops merely to climb Hill 884 (Map 20) . The position was accessi- 
ble only on foot, and supplies had to be brought on the backs of 

Because of the isolation of this wildly mountainous area, a recon- 
naissance was deemed essential. Major General Gerald C. Thomas, 
commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, assigned that mission 
to the Division Reconnaissance Company after deciding on a troop 
lift by helicopter. 

He was aware, of course, that no such operation had ever been 
undertaken during the brief history of rotary-wing aircraft. Large- 
scale helicopter troop lifts were still at the theoretical stage. 

Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring, commanding officer of 
HMR-161, had but 48 hours for preparation. He and his executive 
officer, Lieutenant Colonel William P. Mitchell, worked out a tactical 
and loading plan with the commanding officer of Recon Company, 
Major Ephraim Kirby-Smith, and die acting Division Embarkation 
Officer, First Lieutenant Richard C. Higgs. i;i 

An air reconnaissance of Hill 884 disclosed only two acceptable 
locations for landing sites, both approximately 50 feet square with a 
sheer drop on two sides. About 100 yards apart and some 300 feet 
below the topographical crest, each could be cleared sufficiently for 
the landing of a single aircraft. 

Major Kirby-Smith decided on the order in which troops of his 
company and attached units would be landed. The assignment and 
loading tables were completed on 20 September in time for a rehearsal. 
All participants were instructed as to their team numbers and em- 
barkation points. 

H-Hour of Operation summit (Map 21) was set for 1000 on 
21 September. The plan called for a preliminary landing of a Recon 
Company rifle squad to provide security. Next, a landing point team 
from the 1st Shore Party Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Harry W, 
Edwards) had the mission of clearing the two sites. These two 
groups were to disembark from hovering helicopters by means of 
knotted 30-foot ropes. Strong winds at the 2,900-foot altitude made 
landing quite hazardous. 

1:1 Sources fur this sect inn, unless otherwise specified, lire the following; DivReconCo 
HD, IstShorePariyBn I ID, HMR-lf,l UD, Sep 51 1 Type "C Spec Upt, "I:mpl(iynirnt of 
Assault Helicopters," 7-13; Cmtefyj of the Sty. 162-165. 


The East-Central Front 

The execution was delayed half an hour by the ground fog so 
prevalent at this time of year. As soon as the two landing sites were 
cleared (about 40 minutes), word was transmitted by radio for the 
loading to begin at Field X-83 (Map 21), about 14 miles southwest 
of Hill 884 by the defiladed route of flight. 

Control over the landings and takeoffs on the two Hill 884 sites 
was exercised by a hovering helicopter. Aircraft landed at 30-second 
intervals, each carrying five fully equipped men who disembarked in 
average time of 20 seconds. Two radio nets maintained communica- 
tions between the landing sites and orbiting aircraft. Voice contact 
could not be established between the landing point team and X-83, 
however, and it became necessary for a helicopter to return within 
sight of the field to restore communications for incoming aircraft. 

A total of 224 men, including a heavy machine gun platoon from 
2/7, was lifted in flight time of 31.2 hours and over-all time of 
four hours. In addition, 17,772 pounds of cargo were landed. 

Operation SUMMIT ended with the laying of two telephone lines 
between Recon Company on Hill 884 and the CP of the 1st Marines, 
about eight miles to the rear. Fifteen minutes were required for 
dropping each line. The ROKs, following their relief, proceeded on 
foot to their own Corps area. 

From a tactical viewpoint, the importance of Hill 884 lay in its 
domination of enemy- held terrain. The difficulty of reaching the 
remote position had been overcome by the helicopter, and Operation 
SUMMIT was recorded in front page headlines by Stateside newspapers. 

Congratulations poured in from all sides. Lieutenant General 
Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of FMFPac, compli- 
mented HMR-161 on "a bright new chapter in the employment of 
helicopters by Marines." Major General Clovis E. Byers, commanding 
X Corps, praised the "organic and attached units of the 1st Marine 
Division that participated in the first relief of units on the battle posi- 
tion. Your imaginative experiment with this kind of transport is cer- 
tain to be of lasting value to all the services." 14 

Nobody was more enthusiastic than General Thomas. "Operation 
summit, the first helicopter-borne landing of a combat unit in history, 
was an outstanding success," said his message. "To all who took 
part, well done!" 

" Messages of congratulation are quoted from HMR-161 HD, Sep 51. 


The East-Central front 

Helicopter Operation blackbird 

It is not surprising, considering their training, that the Marines found 
it a difficult transition from offensive to defensive operations after 
20 September. As evidence that patrols were conducted with customary 
aggressiveness, Marine casualties (including the 1st KMC Regiment) 
for the last 10 days of the month were 59 KIA, 1 MIA, and 331 WIA. 
Enemy losses for the same period were 505 counted KIA, and 237 

1st Marine Division casualties of 2,4 16 (including 594 reported 
by the KMCs) for September as a whole were the most severe suffered 
during any month of the war so far with the exception of December 
1950 and June 1951. nkpa losses of the month were 2,799 counted 
KIA and 557 prisoners. 1 ' 

On the 23d the 1st Marines extended to the eastern boundary of 
X Corps and relieved the Division Reconnaissance Company on Hill 
884. That same day the enemy was treated to a novelty when 100 
well aimed 16-inch projectiles, fired from a range of 40,000 yards, 
roared in like meteors on his positions in the area of Hill 951 (Map 
20), Naval gunfire from the USS New Jersey was being conducted 
by Marine spotters in forward OPs, who reported good coverage for 
the 2,000-pound rounds. Ammunition dumps and artillery pieces were 
destroyed while nkpa troops in the open suffered heavy personnel 
casualties, according to observers. 

Several more bombardments were contributed by the New Jersey 
at the request of 1/1 and 3/t during the balance of the month. 
Marine and attached Army artillery also gave excellent support with 
fire so accurate as to break up enemy counterattacks before they could 
be launched. Ammunition restrictions hampered the efforts of the 
11th Marines (Colonel Custis Burton, Jr.) but the cannoneers never 
failed to respond to an emergency. The 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank 
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Holly H. Evans) continued to show 
good results with direct observed fire on enemy bunkers. Air support 
in September, concluded the Division report, was "generally inade- 
quate and unsatisfactory." 

By the last week of September the Division right (east) flank was 
well protected, considering the rugged terrain. Not as much could 

« i^tMarDiv HD, Sep 51, 4, 51-32. 

« turn. 

The New Wdrjitre of Position 


be said for the other flank, northwest of the Punchbowl, where the 
sector of the Marines joined that of the 5th ROK Division. Since the 
Division sector was divided by high, roadless mountains, there was 
no rapid way of moving reserves other than by helicopter. In short, 
the 1st Marine Division was hard pressed to man a 22, 800-yard MLR 
while keeping in reserve enough troops to help defend this sensitive 
area in an emergency. 

Plans were completed by General Thomas and the Division staff 
for the rapid displacement of a company from 2/1, the reserve bat- 
talion of the 1st Marines, to meet any such threat. Since a surprise 
attack was most likely to occur at night, it was decided that a helicopter 
lift of an element of the Division reserve should be made in the 
darkness of 27 September after a detailed daytime rehearsal. 17 

In contrast to former Marine helicopters, which had no night-flying 
aids, the HRS-1 was equipped with few attitude of flight instruments. 
They were primitive compared to the sophisticated instrumenta- 
tion of fixed-wing planes, and Lieutenant Colonel Herring sent his 
pilots on preliminary night indoctrination flights to memorize terrain 

The route, five air miles in length, amounted to a round trip of 13 
miles because of the detours necessary for purposes of concealment. 
The aircraft were to take off from a dry river bed southeast of Hill 702 
(Map 21) and land near the nordiwestern rim of the Punchbowl, 
where the troops would march a mile to their final assembly area. 

The infantry unit selected for Operation blackbird was Easy Com- 
pany of 2/1, commanded by Second Lieutenant William K. Rockey. 
Lieutenant Colonel Nihart and Major Cart E. Walker, the battalion 
commander and his executive officer, supervised the daylight rehearsal 
on the morning of the 27th. Six helicopters lifted 200 men in the over- 
all time of two hours and 10 minutes to a landing site of 50 by 100 feet 
cleared by a team of the 1st Shore Party Battalion. The troops were 
proceeding on foot to their assembly area when an antipersonnel 
mine wounded a man. Nihart called a halt immediately and investi- 
gation revealed that the area was filled with mines. Plans were 
changed to abandon the march, although the landing site remained 
the same. 

,: The remainder of this SBCtSs is based upon f(w Type "C" Spit Rpt, "rmployniL-nt 
(if Assault l-k4n.upn.-is," Part II, 1-9; HMR-Ifil and istSlion-PariyBn IIP, Sup and 
Oct 51; Casmhy o\ the Sky, 165-167. 


The East-Central Front 

Operation blackbird got under way at 1930 on 27 September. The 
night was dark when the first HRS-1 took off with five combat- 
equipped men. Three-minute intervals were required between air- 
craft operating on a shuttle system, so as to avoid the danger of 
collisions. Different altitudes were assigned to outgoing and incoming 
helicopters which used running lights only two minutes before entering 
or leaving the debarkation zone. 

A total of 223 troops were landed in over-all time of two hours and 
20 minutes instead of the nine hours a movement by foot would have 
required. Nevertheless, some of the results were not reassuring. 
Rotor wash blew out many of the flare pots lighting the embarkation 
area, and the battery-powered beach lanterns on the landing site 
proved inadequate. Pilots were temporarily blinded by the glare on 
windshields; and artillery flashes bothered them while making their 
way through three mountain passes. Fortunately, good radio communi- 
cations aided pilots who had trouble in locating the landing site in 
spite of night rehearsals. 

Operation blackbird remained the only night helicopter troop lift 
during the war in Korea. "Present equipment," said the Marine 
report, "indicates that under present conditions in Korea these night 
lifts should be limited to movements within friendly territory," 1S 

"To Organize, Construct and Defend" 

"The Division continued to organize, construct and defend positions 
along a 13^-mile front; patrol forward of the MLR and screen rear 
areas; and maintain one U.S. Marine regiment which could not be 
committed without authority from X Corps in a reserve area 17 miles 
behind the lines." 

The above quotation, from the opening paragraph of the report of 
the 1st Marine Division for October 1951, sums up in a nutshell the 
new trend of operations since 20 September. It is significant that for 
the first time in 1951 the Division Historical Diary departs from a 
daily account of events and divides the month into two equal parts for 
a chronicle of operations. Not enough had happened to justify a 
day-by-day summary. 

This does not mean that the Marines neg 

'"Type "C" Spec Rpt, "The Employment of 

Part II. 4. 

The New Warfare of Position 

do the enemy hurt. It means only that the opportunities of defensive 
warfare were limited as compared to the preceding six months of 
offensive operations. That the Marines made the best of such oppor- 
tunities is shown by the fact that the ratio of enemy to friendly 
casualties increased from the 4-to-l of September to the 20-to-l 
of October, even though the totals of the former month were larger. 

As a result of his new defensive policies, the enemy often avoided a 
fight. Day after day passed during the first two weeks of October 
without far-ranging Marine patrols being able to make contact. 

Line Minnesota, the new MLR (Map 20), ran roughly parallel to 
the hays line but included advanced positions taken in the September 
offensive. During the first 10 days of October the 2d Battalion of the 
1st Marines continued to be the Division forward reserve in readiness 
for a quick shift to any threatened point in the MLR, and the Division 
Reconnaissance Company had the mission of maintaining daily contact 
with the lUh ROK Division on the Marines' right flank. 

It might seem that the 7th Marines, 17 miles to the rear at Won- 
tong-ni, would be entirely becalmed. Yet this regiment saw as much 
action on some days as any of the three regiments ranging forward of 
the MLR. The explanation was that the rear area was infested with 
elusive North Korean guerrillas who kept the 7th Marines patrols busy. 

Early in October the question arose as to how quickly a reserve 
battalion could be shifted from one point to another. By this time a 
company-size helicopter lift had become commonplace, having been 
successfully completed twice by HMR-161 since Operation summit. 
It remained to be seen whether a battalion could be transported with 
comparable celerity, and, on 9 October, Division issued an order 
warning of 3/7's move, 

The 7th Marines was due to exchange places with the 5th Marines 
on the 11th after relieving that regiment in the center of the Division 
front. While 1/7 and 2/7 completed a conventional relief of their 
opposite numbers, 3/7 was selected for a helicopter lift. Lieutenant 
Colonel Edwards, the new commanding officer, had recently com- 
manded the Shore Party Battalion and helped to train its landing site 
and loading point teams. He took part in the planning along with 
Colonel Krulak, Lieutenant Colonels Herring and Mitchell, and the 
new commanding officer of the Shote Party Battalion, Lieutenant 
Colonel George G. Pafford. 

» IstMirDiv I ID, Oct 51, 1-3. 


The East-Central Front 

Planning went on as if for an amphibious operation. Assignment 
and loading tables were worked out, and each Marine of the six-man 
embarkation teams had his designated place in the helicopter. On 
10 October all officers and men of 3/7 attended a familiarization class 
at which trial teams were loaded. 

Operation bumblebee began at 1000 on the 11th. Field X-77 
(Map 21 ) bad been selected as the loading zone because of its prox- 
imity to the assembly area of the 7th Marines. The landing site was 
just behind the 5th Marines MLR, northeast of Hill 702. A flight path 

defiladed areas. 

The two dispatchers in the loading zone were provided with a 
checkoff (light list containing the names of every team of 3/7. In 
order to avoid delays, replacements could be summoned from a casual 
pool to fill understrength teams to plane capacity. Average time for 
loading was 20 seconds. 

Ten to 12 minutes were required for the flight. As the helicopters 
landed at intervals of a minute, a team could exit and allow the craft 
to be airborne in an average time of 17 seconds. "Time was saved," 
according to one Marine report, "when the Shore Party personnel, 
after opening the door, vigorously assisted the passengers by grasping 
their arms and starting them away from the craft. The last man out 
checked to see if any gear had been forgotten. Guides furnished by 
the battalion directed the passengers toward their respective company 
assembly areas, thus keeping the landing areas clear at all times." 2 " 

Twelve helicopters were employed in 156 flights. The flight time 
was 65.9 hours and over-all time five hours and 50 minutes. A total 
weight of 229,920 pounds included 958 combat-equipped troops 
averaging 240 pounds. 

These statistics of Operation bumblebee made it certain that 
Stateside headlines would proclaim another Marine "first." Only 
four days later HMR-161 demonstrated its ability to carry out on 
short notice an emergency resupply and evacuation operation in a 
combat zone. Help was requested in the IX Corps sector to the west 
for a completely surrounded ROK unit in need of ammunition and of 
casualty evacuation. Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell led six HRS-1 
aircraft which flew in 19,000 pounds of ammunition. Lieutenant 

""Type "C" Spec Rpt, "Employment of Assault Helicopters, " Part II, 5-9, Other 
sources for Operation bumblebee are HMR-lfil and 1st ShorePurcyBn !ID, Oct 51, 
and Cavalry o) the Sky, 167-170. 

DD MC A 132540 

Helicopter In The Hills— A large Sikorsky helicopter hovers over the moun- 
tainous terrain of Korea. This type of aircraft has been extensively, used for 
many types of transport missions. 

Generals Confer— Above, MajGen Gerald C. Thomas (left) and MajGen 
Field Harris discuss the situation in April, 1952. Below, MajGen John T, 
Selden (right) briefs Army MajGen R. D. Palmer. 

DD MCA 159084 

DD MC A 8410 

On The Planning Level— Above, BrigGen Whaling, MajGen Thomas, and 
BrigGen Puller enjoy a bit of humor, while, below, MajGen Thomas, 
LtGen Shephard, and Col Wade pose for the photographer. 

MC A 157916 

DD MCA 161585 

Ready For Action— Above, a Marine 105mm howitzer battery preparing 
to fire a mission. Below, exterior and interior views of a heavy and light 
machine gun emplacement. 

DD MC A 155525 

DD MC A 1695&4 

DD MC A 159J04 

The Lifeline— Above, a view of the MSR of the 1st Marine Division during 
January, 1952. Below, during the rainy season it is difficult to move 
supplies over the poor roads. 

DD MC A 164552 

DD MC A 162316 

Terrain Features— Above, a Marine helicopter flies behind ice-covered slopes 
to avoid enemy fire. Below, an enemy stronghold nicknamed "Luke The 
Gook's Castle." 

°D MC A 160372 

USN 439970 USN 441346 

Panmunjom "Talkathon" —Above (left) Gen Nam II starts for the truce 
talks. Above (right) United Nations' sentries. Below, the Chinese and 
North Korean Communist negotiators. 

USN 431929 

USN 432414 

Watchful Waiting— Above, MajGen L. C. Cragie and VAdm C. T. Joy 
talk to correspondents at Panmunjom, Below, Communist and UN sentries 
walk posts around the peace talk site. 

U SN 9S5646 USN 4?5646 

DD MC A 163575 

DD MC A 164145 

Lifesaver — Above, bruised Marines show the armored vests that saved their 
lives. Below, a 45 caliber bullet test-fired into cotton contrasted with three 
removed from an armored vest. 

DD MC A 46216 

Torso Protection— Above, a Marine rifleman lies prone to exhibit the pro- 
tective torso armor. Below, a helicopter evacuates a corpsman who was 
wounded while treating a buddy. 

°D MCA 167282 

DD MCA 156301 

Papa-sans and Pills— Above, a group of Korean patriarchs gaze curiously 
at a Marine tank. Below, an Army nurse administers medication to a 
grimacing Marine. 

SC J58063 

DDMCA 159786 

A Dog's Life— Above, Marines line up with their pets all packed and ready 
to go. Below, troops gather for the ever-tvelcome mail call. 

DD MC A 7468 

DD MC A 684} 

At The Front—Above, Marines advance across a fog-filled valley while 
supported by machine gun fire. Below, a group of Communist prisoners wait 
for interrogation by trained experts. 

DD MC A 157686 

DD MCA 408351 

CCF Propaganda— A bove, one of the thousands of attractively-colored CCF 
Christmas cards dropped on the mlr in December, 195 1. Below, a mortar 
observer crew in action. 

DD MC A 6627 

DD MC A 162989 

Life's Little Problems-PFC Henry A. Friday pauses to rest in a trench and 
reflect upon the progress of his own particular efforts towards fighting the 

The New Warfare of Position 


Donald L. Hilian (MC) t USN, surgeon of HMR-161, landed to 
supervise the evacuation of 24 wounded ROKs, several of whom 
would otherwise have died. Captains James T. Cotton and Albert A. 
Black made four flights each into the beleaguered area, and all Marine 
pilots of Operation WEDGE were congratulated in person by Major 
General Claude F. Ferenbaugh, commanding general of IX Corps."' 

Seven infantry battalions, with 2/1 in immediate reserve, manned 
the MLR from 1 to 13 October— three KMC battalions on the left 
of the Division sector; two 5th Marines battalions (relieved by the 
7th Marines on the 11th) in the center; and two 1st Marines battalions 
on the right. Scout and sniper teams were employed throughout the 
period, with contacts few and far between. More destruction was 
inflicted on the enemy by observed artillery, tank, and mortar fire.* 2 

A new emphasis was placed on psychological warfare during these 
defensive operations. Eighty-seven NKPA soldiers surrendered from 
1 to 13 October, but whether they responded to leaflets fired by the 
11th Marines could not be determined. 

Early in October the 1st Marine Division was granted permission by 
EUSAK to use Sokcho-ri (Map 19) as a port of embarkation and 
debarkation instead of Pusan. The change proved satisfactory even 
though troops had to be lightered from ship to shore. A 68-mile 
truck movement through the I ROK Corps zone replaced the airlift 
of 200 miles from Pusan to Chunchon, followed by a motor march of 
70 miles. It was estimated that the new routing would add from 
8,000 to 10,000 man-days a month to the combat potential of the 

An improvement in logistics resulted when the Division asked and 
received permission from EUSAK to use field K-50 near Sokcho-ri for 
an airhead instead of K-51 at Inje. Although the Marines were 
limited to five or six sorties a day while sharing K-50 with I ROK 
Corps, they were able to transfer many airhead activities to the new 

The mission of the Division remained essentially unchanged from 
14 to 31 October. Foot patrols ranged farther into enemy territory, 
and tank-infantry raids in company strength, supported by air and 
artillery, were launched at every opportunity. 

21 Cavalry of the Sky, 171. 

23 The remainder of this section, unless otherwise specified, is based (Ml tlic IstMnrDiv 
WD, Oct 51, 3-12. 



The East-Central front 

Typical of these operations was the raid staged on 16 October by 
elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, (Lieutenant Colonet 
James G. Kelly) supported by tanks, air, artillery, and engineers. 
Captain John R. McMahon's Charlie Company was the principal unit 
involved. The Marine column had as its objective an nkpa strong 
point overlooking the village of Changhang (Map 2) on the east and 
the flats on both sides of the Sevang-gang to the south and southwest. 
Captain McMahon's mission was "to reduce all fortifications and 
installations . . ." [and) ". . . to seize, occupy and hold ground 
until the area was thoroughly mined, booby-trapped and infested 
with trip flares."' " 

A small-scale battle flared up for a few minutes as the enemy put up 
a stiff resistance with artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire. 
Superior Marine firepower soon prevailed, and at 1540 the attackers 
reached their objective. During the next hour and 20 minutes enemy 
installations were destroyed and the strong point rendered untenable 
by mines and booby traps. The Marines withdrew at 1700 after 
sustaining casualties of 3 KIA and 18 WIA, Enemy losses were 35 
counted KIA. 

The next day a reinforced KMC company, supported by tanks, air, 
artillery, and engineers made a similar raid on enemy positions about 
875 yards northwest of Hill 751 and 1,500 yards south of Hill 1052 
(Map 20). Twenty-five nkpa bunkers were destroyed with losses 
to the enemy of 15 counted KIA, 3 prisoners, and 5 captured 
machine guns." 

On 21 October the front of the 1st Marine Division was reduced 
a mile when elements of the 3d ROK Division relieved the 2d KMC 
Battalion on the Marine left flank in accordance with instructions of 
X Corps, Six infantry battalions now manned an MLR of 12£ miles. 

A strong enemy position, menacing the forward elements, had 
developed to the north of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines sector. 
Three days of reconnaissance and detailed preparation preceded the 
destructive raid carried out on 30 October. Captain George E. 
Lawrence's Charlie Company, reinforced with heavy machine guns, 
was held up by nkpa resistance in estimated company strength. The 
Marines fought their way up a ridgeline, throwing white phosphorus 

-"This account uf the raid is derived from the 1/7 HD, Oct 51, and the IstMarDiv 
HD, Oct 51, 7. 

»' IstMarDiv HD, Oct 51, 7-8. 

The New Warfare of Position 


grenades into enemy bunkers. Pinned down momentarily by nkpa 
mortar and small-arms fire, they reached a defiladed position and 
withdrew under cover of Marine artillery, air, mortars, and heavy 
machine guns. At a cost of only one WIA, the raiders inflicted 65 
counted KIA casualties on the enemy and destroyed an estimated 40 
nkpa bunkers." 

All three Marine regiments on Line MINNESOTA were directed by 
General Thomas to fight the enemy whenever possible with his own 
weapons in the form of ruses and night ambushes. On 31 October the 
3d Battalion of the 1st Marines feigned preparations for an attack 
even to the extent of a brief artillery barrage. When the firing let 
up, the Marines sounded an nkpa bugle call as a signal for enemy 
troops to rush out of bunkers and man open trenches. Thus exposed, 
they became the victims of intense Marine mortar and artillery fire 
which inflicted an estimated 47 KIA and 48 WIA casualties. 

During the last 2 weeks of October, 1 1 missions were fired by the 
battleship USS New Jersey and 41 missions by the heavy cruiser 
USS Toledo. Appreciation was expressed in a message to the Toledo 
by General Thomas: "Your accurate and effective fire during period 
24-29 October made an important contribution to operations of this 
division. Many thanks and come again." "" 

Antiguerrilla raids behind the MLR were carried out by Marine 
ground forces relying upon HMR-161 helicopters for transportation. 
In Operation bush beater teams from 1/1 were landed on the Divi- 
sion's east flank to sweep westward toward the Soyang-gang on 
22 October while teams from Recon Company patrolled from the 
opposite direction. 

Operations houseburner I and n were planned to deprive guer- 
rillas of shelter during the coming winter. As the name implies, 
helicopter- borne teams set Korean huts afire with flame throwers and 
incendiary grenades. 27 

Enemy forces facing the Marines at various times in October were 
believed to comprise the 2d Division, II nkpa Corps, the 1st and 11th 
Divisions of III Corps, and the 19th Division of VI Corps. Nkpa 
casualties during the month were announced by the 1st Marine Divi- 
sion as 709 counted and 2,377 estimated KIA, 4,927 estimated WIA, 

* l/l HD, Oct 51, 16; IsiMarDiv II D, Oct 51, 7. 

'■"'CO IstMarDiv msg to USS Toltda, 1232 30 Oct 51 in G-3 msj»s, Oct 51. 

07 (Wr> of the Sky, 172-173. 


The East-Central Front 

and 571 prisoners. The Marines (including the 1st 
suffered losses of 50 KIA, 2 MIA, and 323 WIA.*' 

Marine Operations of November 1951 

On 1 November 1951 the front line strength of the opposing forces 
was nearly equal — 195,000 for the UN, and 208,000 for the enemy. 
In reserves the Communists held their usual numerical advantage with 
nine CCF armies totaling 235,000 men plus 138,600 in four nkpa 
corps. All were readily available either as reinforcements or as assault 
troops for a great offensive.-" 

Even though the Eighth Army was committed to a warfare of 
position, General Van Fleet meant to keep the initiative. "If we had 
stagnated on any one of our many positions since the tide turned in 
April," he said in a recorded statement of 3 November, "the hydra- 
headed Communists — who seem to grow two soldiers for each one 
cut down- — would soon have been at our throats. With the enemy's 
prolific capacity posing an ever-present threat, we had no choice but 
to destroy the menace before it matured." 3n 

Throughout November the 1st Marine Division continued to occupy 
the eastern portion of the X Corps defense sector in east-central Korea. 
From left to right the 1st KMC Regiment, 7 th Marines, and 1st 
Marines held the 12^-miIe MLR with two battalions each. The 5th 
Marines remained in reserve until the 11th, when it relieved the 
1st Marines. That regiment went into the new reserve area at Mago-ri 
(Map 19) 

Elements of the 1st, 15th, and 19th Divisions, III nkpa Corps, 
manned the opposing lines. The Marines continued to organize 
artillery- and air-supported tank-infantry-engineer task forces in com- 
pany strength for raids. Squad-size patrols were sent out nightly to 
ambush the enemy, employing ruses whenever possible. 

The howitzers of the 11th Marines and the 90mm rifles of the 1st 
Tank Battalion were kept busy throughout the month. On 7-8 
November, for instance, Marine artillery fired 257 observed missions 

" IstMarDiv HD, Oct Si, 2, 
"BUSAK Cmtt Rpt. Nov 51, 9. 
m lbid., 32. 

1,1 The remainder of this section, unless otherwise specified, is derived from the 1st- 
MarDiV HD, Nov 51, 1-20, 

The New Warfare of Position 


in 24 hours — including 34 on enemy artillery positions, 32 on mortar 
positions, 25 on bunkers, 22 on machine gun positions, 4 in support of 
friendly patrols, 3 on supply dumps, 2 on trucks, and 1 each on a 
bridge, a CP, and a 57mm recoilless rifle position. 

In spite of such daily pounding, aerial photographs proved that 
NKpa defenses in depth had become more intricate and formidable 
in November 1951 than during any previous month. 

On the 7th the 14th Replacement Draft added 2,756 officers and 
men to the 1st Marine Division. Within a few hoars 2,066 officers 
and men of the tOth Rotation Draft were detached. And on the 
27th the 11th Rotation Draft represented a further loss of 2,468 
Marines whose departure was hastened so that they could be home 
by Christmas. 

A note of grim humor crept into proceedings on 9 November. 
Division OpnO 50-51 directed that all supporting arms and weapons 
commemorate the Marine Corps Birthday the next day by firing a TOT 
on Hill 1052. the key enemy observation point overlooking the friendly 
sector. 31 ' While the cruiser USS Los Angeles contributed naval gunfire, 
the Commanding General of 1st MAW, Major General Christian F, 
Schilt, led an air strike of 83 Marine planes to blast this enemy strong 

The performance was embellished on the 10th when Marine tanks, 
mortars, and machine guns added their fire to the grand crescendo of 
exploding shells and bombs. The Communists were also bombarded 
with 50,000 leaflets inviting them to the Marine birthday dinner that 
evening. Twenty Korean Reds actually did surrender, though some 
doubt remained whether they had responded to the invitation or the 
TOT. General Van Fleet sent a message to all Marines in his com- 
mand, congratulating them on "a job well done" in Korea. 3 ' 1 

On 11 November the 5th Marines carried out its relief of the 1st 
Marines on Line Minnesota. This was the occasion for the largest 
helicopter troop lift so far, involving the transportation of nearly 
2,000 combat-equipped men. 

Operation switch began at 0635 on D-Day when three helicopters 
took off from Field X-83 with Shore Party specialists to signal air- 
craft into landing sites and supervise the unloading and reloading 

" The initials TOT stand fur Time on Target- — an artillery order calling for all guns to 
time their firing so that projectiles will liit the tarfier simultaneously, 
"eusvUC CW Rpi, Nov 51, 42. 


The East-Central Front 

of troops. Twelve helicopters were employed, each carrying five men 
and supplies from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel 
Kirt W. Norton), and returning to Field X-83 with a like load from 
Lieutenant Colonel Clifford E. Quitici's 2d Battalion, 1st Marines." 

Naval gunfire from the USS N«c Jersey helped to keep the enemy 
quiet during the relief. All told, 950 men were flown to Hill 884 — 
soon to be known unofficial ty as "Mount Helicopter"— -and 952 lifted 
to Field X-83 in return flights. Total flight time was 95.6 hours and 
over-all time 10 hours. Once again the Marine Corps had made 
tactical history. 

Ground forces operations throughout November seldom varied 
from the familiar pattern of squad-size patrols nightly and an occa- 
sional daytime raid by a company -size task force with the support of 
artillery and air. Supporting arms kept enemy strongholds under 
almost constant fire, and North Korean activity in the construction 
or improvement of bunkers provided frequent targets of opportunity. 

Contacts seemed to be avoided by enemy troops. On the night of 
29 November, for instance, 11 Marine ambush patrols ranged from 
1,500 to 2,500 yards ahead of the MLR with only a single contact 
before returning at daybreak. One enemy KIA was inflicted and one 
prisoner taken at a cost of four Marine WIA casualties. 

Total Marine casualties (including the KMCs) during November 
were 34 KIA and 250 WIA. Enemy losses amounted to 408 counted 
and 1,728 estimated KIA, 2,235 estimated WIA, and 104 prisoners. 

The Second Marine Christmas in Korea I 

Marine operations in December were shaped in advance by the resump- 
tion of armistice negotiations. This time Panmunjom was agreed 
upon as a conference site instead of Kaesong. Literally a wide place 
in the road, the tiny hamlet was located just north of the 38th 
Parallel between Munsan and Kaesong (Map 19). In the lack of 
houses, tents provided shelter for the UN and Communist delegates 
who renewed their meetings on 25 October 1951 for the first time 
since the Reds walked out at Kaesong on 23 August. 

Discussions during November were largely devoted to the question 
of a cease fire based upon a line of demarcation. On the 23d it was 

31 HMR-161 HD, Nov 51; Cavalry of the Sky, 174. 

The New Warfare of Position 221 

agreed to accept a line linking up the farthest points of repeated con- 
tacts up to 2,000 yards forward of the United Nations MLR. Three 
days later, representatives of both sides initialed maps to indicate 
acceptance. 1 " 

The effect of the so-called cease fire on eusak. operations was 
immediate. General Van Fleet sent his corps commanders a letter 
of instructions warning that active defensive operations were to 
continue until a full armistice had been concluded. If such an event 
took place within 30 days after 27 November 1951, the demarcation 
line would not be altered. But if an agreement had not been reached 
by that time, the line would be revised in accordance with actual 
changes. 30 

Eusak instructions to corps commanders were relayed in a X Corps 
message of 27 November to the 1st Marine Division: 

Pan 1. The conference at Panmunjom has fixed a military demarcation 
line as a preliminary step to ending hostilities within a 30-day period. 

Part U. Every US, UN, and ROK soldier will be informed that hostilities 
will continue until armistice agreement is signed. 

Part III, While negotiations continue, X Corps will: (1) Demonstrate its 
willingness to reach an agreement by reducing operations to those which are 
essential to insure maintenance of present positions. Counterattacks to regain 
key terrain lost to enemy assault are authorized, but other clearly offensive 
actions will be taken only by direction of this Headquarters ; patrolling only 
to that line beyond which contact has been repeatedly established; limiting 
supporting fires, including air strikes, to destruction of those targets which 
appear to constitute a major threat, or to improve the enemy's offensive capa- 
bility. (2) Prepare for offensive action by: Conserving ammunition; main- 
taining combat effectiveness through intensified training; preparation for and 
rehearsal of limited -objective attacks, to be launched near the end of the 30- 
day period in order to improve the mlr. 

Pari IV. Every effort will be made to prevent unnecessary casualties." 

In view of these instructions, it is understandable that a lull set 
'n along the X Corps front in December 1951. Most of the cold 
Weather clothing had been issued during the preceding month, and 
Work was largely completed for the "winterizing" of bunkers. It 
remained only to improve defensive installations as front line elements 

M References to the Panmunjom decisions are based upon the following sources : 
william H. Vatcher, Jr., Ritim/mjom, The Story nj the Korean Military Armistice 
(New York: F. Praetor. 1958), 72-94, 232-237; Joy, How Communists 
Negotiate, 40-52. 

fiUSAK Cmd Rfit, Nov 51, 58. 
"X Corps Cmd Rpt. Nov 51, 15-16. 


The East-Central Front 

continued to send out patrols to maintain pressure against the enemy. 
And since the Communists were putting similar military policies into 
effect, both sides kept in contact with relatively small units."* 

The enemy also busied himself with extending already formidable 
defenses in depth. And though he did not seek a fight, he showed no 
hesitation about accepting one. 

From 5 to 20 Marine patrols went out nightly during December, 
some of them manning night outposts called "duck blinds;" a " occa- 
sional raids continued with relatively few contacts. In the rear of the 
Division area, helicopter patrols continued against guerrillas. 

The 13 aircraft of HMR-161 had a busy month with 390 missions 
and 621 flights. Six thousand pounds of rations, 9,000 pounds of 
fuel oil in drums, 15,000 pounds of fortification material, and 15,000 
pounds of cold weather clothing were among the supplies flown to 
the front. Personnel to the number of 2,022 were lifted, and cargo 
to the amount of 149,477 pounds. 

The first breakthrough in truce negotiations, at Kaesong, occurred 
on 18 December, when lists of prisoners held by both sides were 
exchanged. Prior to this exchange of lists the UN Command could 
only speculate on the number carried as missing in action who were 
in reality held as prisoners of war. The Communists had previously 
reported only a few dozen names, and then only if it suited their 
propaganda purposes. Radio Peking, in releasing names piecemeal, 
had broadcast recordings made by UN prisoners under duress. Far 
Eastern monitors reported these broadcasts were slanted to give the 
Communist viewpoint. 

The 18 December list of 3,198 American POWs revealed only 61 
Marines including 2 Navy hospital corpsmen. (Information received 
from 18 Marines who gained their freedom in May 1951 was sketchy 
concerning others held at the time and was never accredited as official 
or authoritative.) 4 " Interestingly enough when the Communist nego- 
tiators saw the list given them by the UN representative they became 
irate and tried to withdraw their list. The names of the Chinese and 
Korean prisoners had been Anglicized and caused considerable diffi- 
culty in retranslating the names into oriental characters. 

""The source fur the remainder of this section, unless otherwise stated, is the IstMar- 
Div HD, Dec 51, 1-17. 

M fctCfcl Harry W. Edwards, memo to G-J dtd 3 Feb 1959. 

ln Maj J. Angus MacDonald, 'The Pmblems of Marine POWs," Mia available in His- 
torical Archives, G-3, HQMC. 

The New Warfare of Position 


Negotiations hit a snag at this point, and no other list was offered 
by the Red officials until the first prisoner exchange (Operation 
little switch in April 1953). Notwithstanding the protracted and 
exasperating tactics of the Reds at the truce table, the exchange of 
prisoner of war lists presaged infinitely better treatment to the UN 
prisoners than had been accorded them prior to that time. The so- 
tall ed lenient treatment policy by the Chinese, promulgated in July 
1951, was initiated after the exchange of lists. 11 

The lists given by the Communists did not include several Marines 
captured during the months of October, November, or December of 
1951, The families of these men were to sit in anguish waiting for 
these names until April of 1953. These and other instances of perfidy 
and treachery at the truce table by the Communist negotiators were 
to become legion/ 2 

On 19 December the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines (Major William E. 
Baugh) was relieved just behind the MLR by Lieutenant Colonel 
Norton's 1/5 in helicopter Operation farewell. It was the last 
flight in Korea for Lieutenant Colonel Herring, who returned to 
Quantico as commanding officer of Marine Helicopter Experimental 
Squadron (HMX)-l. His relief as commander of HMR-1 was 
Colonel Keith B. McCutcheon, and Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell re- 
mained as executive officer." 

The Marine helicopters of VMO— 6 had also been setting records 
during the last half of 1951 under four commanding officers, Major 
David W. McFarland (5 ApriI-5 October) Major Allan H. Ringblom 
(6 October-3 1 October) , Major Edward R. Polgrean ( 1 November- 
25 November), and Major Kenneth C. Smedley (26 November- 
31 January 1952). A total of 1,096 Marine wounded had been flown 
out during this period, many of whom would otherwise have lost 
their lives/ 1 

The supposed vulnerability of the helicopter was whittled down 
to a myth by VMO-6 experience. Returning from a front line mission 
with bullet holes was too commonplace for mention, yet the year 

Maj G. Fink, interview of 16 Dec I960; Extract of Interim Historic! Report, 
Korea War Crimes Division, cumulative to 50 Jun 1953, 18. 

"Joy, How Communist! Negotiate, 104-105; Maj J, A. MacDonald, The- Problems 
l " Marine POWs," op. ch. 

"HMR-161 HD. Dec 51; Cavalry t>f the Sky, 175-176. Two of the original 
'5 HRS-I aircraft had been J amazed in accidents, but one was later restored to action 
W«h parts cannibalised from the other. 

VMO-6 HD. Jim-Dec 51; Cat-airy of the Sky, M6, 180-lHl. 


The East-Central Prom 

1951 passed without a single helicopter pilot being lost to enemy 
action, even though several aircraft were shot down, The experience 
of these 12 months also proved anew the wisdom of combining 
rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft in an observation squadron in 
fairly equal numbers. When it came to reconnaissance and artillery 
spotting, the nimble little OYs and OEs (both types are light observa- 
tion planes) were much better suited than the "choppers." 

As for close air support, increased Air Force emphasis on an inter- 
diction campaign beyond artillery ranges added to the limitations 
imposed on Marine requests. Of the 22 strikes requested in December 
1951, only five were approved. 

From the 1st to the 10th, units of the Division along the MLR 
consisted from left to right of the 1st KMC Regiment, 7th Marines, 
and 5th Marines. The only major change took place on the 11th, 
when the 1st Marines relieved the 7th and the latter went into 
Division reserve. Enemy units were believed to be the 1st, 15th, and 
19th (soon relieved by the 47th) NKPA Divisions with an estimated 
strength of 25,750. 

Permission was rarely granted by X Corps for Marine raids to cross 
the eusak military limiting line known as Line DUCK, which gen- 
erally coincided with the line of demarcation. Christmas passed like 
any other day except for the holiday feast. Nineteen patrols went out 
on Christmas Eve, two of which had brief fire fights with enemy 
patrols before returning at dawn. During the day 40 rounds of naval 
gunfire from the heavy cruiser USS St. Paul were credited with 
destroying seven enemy bunkers. 

More than a third of the Marines partaking of Christmas turkey 
were comparative newcomers who had reached Korea since the warfare 
of movement ended on 20 September. The 15th Replacement Draft 
brought 38 officers and 2,278 men early in December, and 127 officers 
and 1,805 men departed with the 12th Rotation Draft. No Marines 
who had arrived prior to 1 January 1951 were left among the 1,495 
officers and 23,040 men in Korea at the close of the year. 

Heavy snow on 26 December impeded foot-patrol activity and 
increased the danger of mines. Next day, when the 30-day cease-fire 
agreement ended, it was announced at Panmunjom that the terms had 
been renewed and that operational restrictions would be extended 

Thus December came to an end on a note of troubled uncertainty. 

The New Warfare of Position 


Not a single large-scale combat had been reported, yet 24 Marines 
were killed (including KMCs) and 139 wounded in patrol actions. 
That the enemy had sometimes succeeded in the grim quest of both 
sides for prisoners is shown by the unwonted entry of eight Marines 
missing in action, nkpa losses for the month consisted of 246 counted 
KIA, and 56 prisoners. 

The year 1951 passed into history at 2400 on 31 December as the 
11th Marines saluted 1952 by firing a "toast" at enemy strongholds. 
The thud of the snow-muffled howitzers was also a fitting farewell 
to the past year of a war that was not officially a war. Indications 
were that it would doubtless be concluded by a peace that was not 
a peace, judging from the attitude of the Communist delegates at 
Panmunjom. And meanwhile the Marines and other Eighth Army 
troops would keep on fighting in accordance with the terms of a 
cease fire was not a cease fire. 


Winter Operations in East Korea 

Ambush Patrol on New Year's Eve- — Marine Raid in Com- 
pany Strength — Major General John T. Seidell Assumes 
Command — Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated — 500 Ar- 
mored Vests Floivn to Korea— Helicopter Operations 
muletrain and changie-changie — The Five Days of 
Operation clam-up 

A the new year began, the 1st Marine Division occupied prac- 
tically the same front it had held along Line Minnesota for the 
last three months (Map 20) and would continue to hold for the next 
two and a half. The major units were disposed from left to right on 
1 January 1952 as follows: 

1st KMC Regiment (Colonel Kim Dong Ha commanding, LtCol Alfred H. 

Marks, senior advisor) ; 
1st Marines {Colonel Sidney S. Wade) ; 
5th Marines (Colonel Frank P. Hager, Jr.) ; 
1 1th Marines (Colonel Bruce T. Hemphill) in artillery support. 

The 7th Marines (Colonel John J. Wermuth) was in reserve until 
10 January, when it relieved the 5th Marines on line. That regiment 
then went into reserve and could not be committed to action without 
the approval of X Corps. 1 

Tactical units not organic to the 1st Marine Division but attached 
at this time were, in addition to the 1st KMC Regiment, the 1st 
Korean Artillery Battalion, the 1st Platoon, 92d U.S. Army Searchlight 
Company, and Battery C, 1st 4.5" Rocket Battalion. 

The new Korean artillery battalion consisted of two medium 
( 155mm) and two light (105mm) howitzer batteries. Major General 

* IstMarDiv WD, Jan 52, 1-2. 



The East-Central Pront 

Gerald C. Thomas, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, 
approved a plan for placing this unit in the Punchbowl on 9 January 
to reinforce Lieutenant Colonel Sherman W. Parry's 1st Battalion, 
11th Marines. 

Enemy units opposing the 1st Marine Division up to 23 January 
1952 were the 1st, 15th, and 47th nkpa Divisions with an estimated 
combined strength of 25,750 men. On the 23d the 15th Division was 
relieved by the 45th. 

The enemy, according to the Division report, showed "greater 
caution than he had in previous months, and friendly outposts and 
ambuscades noted fewer contacts. His harassing mortar and artillery 
fires increased in volume through the month. Meanwhile, extensive 
efforts to improve his defenses continued with particular attention 
being given to reverse slope installations." 3 

The new year was but a few minutes old when the first Marine action 
took place. Captain Charles W. McDonald's Baker Company had 
been directed by Lieutenant Colonel Kirt W. Norton, commanding 
the 1st Battalion, 5 th Marines, to send out an ambush patrol on 
New Year's Eve. 

A rifle squad, a light machine gun squad, an interpreter, and a corps- 
man composed the little column wearing white camouflage clothing 
which made the men all but invisible against a background of snow. 
After getting into position, the patrol settled down for the usual long 
wait. Darkness was the enemy's element, and Marine ambusbers ran 
the risk of being ambushed themselves, This time, however, a six-man 
North Korean patrol came within five yards before the Marines let the 
enemy have it with machine gun and rifle fire which inflicted one KIA 
and four estimated WIA casualties. Efforts to take a prisoner were 
frustrated as the nkpa survivors melted away into the darkness. The 
Baker Company patrol returned without casualties at 04 00." 

Marine operations were still limited by the eusak "cease fire" 
directive which went into effect for a month on 27 November 1951 
in accordance with a decision reached during the armistice negotiations 

a Jfojrf 16 7 

'1/5HD, faec 51, 31; UtMarDiv HD, Jan 52, 3. 

Winter Operations m East Korea 229 

at Panmunjom. UN and Communist delegates agreed on a line of 
demarcation, known to the Eighth Army as Line duck. It linked up 
points of repeated EUSAK. patrol contacts, not to exceed 2,000 yards 
beyond the MLR. Operations past this fine, running generally parallel 
with Line Minnesota, could not be launched without permission 
from corps commanders. 

When the agreement expired on 27 December, it was renewed 
indefinitely. Actually, it brought about few changes in the warfare of 
position which had replaced a warfare of movement on 20 September 
1951. Each Marine infantry regiment on the MLR continued to send 
out several squad-size patrols nightly for such purposes as ambush, 
reconnaissance, and taking prisoners. Raids were employed for special 
missions where formidable enemy resistance might be expected. These 
forces usually ranged from a platoon to a company in strength, rein- 
forced by supporting weapons. Operations of this sort were planned 

1 out V 

Marine Raid in Company Strength 

The first company-size raid of the new year was conducted by units 
°f the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Spencer H. 
Pratt) in the darkness of 1-2 January 1952. Captain James B. Ord, Jr.'s 
How Company was alerted on 30 December to prepare for a night 
raid with a mission of reconnaissance and capturing or destroying any 
enemy that might be encountered. On the afternoon of the 30th, Ord 
made a preliminary reconnaissance with Second Lieutenants Milo J. 
See and John E. Watson, commanding the 2d and 3d Platoons 
respectively. That evening the company commander held a briefing 
at his OP (observation post) which was attended by the sergeants and 
squad leaders of the two platoons selected for the raid. 4 

This command group carried out a second reconnaissance forward 
of the MLR on 31 December, proceeding until they ran into enemy 
Sniper fire. Captain Ord requested aerial reconnaissance and three 
missions were flown by observation planes of Major Kenneth C. 
Smedley's VMO-6. 

. * Sources for this account of the raid, unless otherwise specified, are Maj J. B, Ord, Jr., 
"itervs of 3 Sep and 24 Oct 5S; and Appendix VI, IstMarDiv II D, Jan 52, a five-page 
special action report of the operation. 

230 The East-Central Front 

Line DUCK and Hie assigned battalion sector limited the objective 
area. On a basis of these restrictions as well as reconnaissance reports, 
Ord recommended an operational area containing three objectives, 
each of which represented a point where the enemy was not likely to 
be encountered. These objectives were approved by Lieutenant Colonel 
Pratt and formed the basis of the battalion order. 

The task organization for the raid included two attached How 
Company units, the machine gun platoon (-), and 60mm mortar 
section, commanded by Second Lieutenants John D. Koutsandreas and 
James J. Hughes respectively. Another infantry unit, the 1st Platoon 
of Item Company, 3/1 (Second Lieutenant William E. Harper), 
was also attached. 

First Lieutenant Francis E. White, How Company executive officer, 
remained at the OP with the tactical air-control party, which had an 
observation plane on strip alert in case the raiders ran into artillery 
or mortar fire. A forward air controller with radioman accompanied 
the raiding party as well as artillery, 4.2", and 81mm mortar forward 
observers. An interpreter, the assistant battalion surgeon, and a corps- 
man were included, and wiremen had the assignment of laying a line. 

Hill 812 (Map 20) was the jumping-off place for the column of 
files in ghostly white snow suits with hoods. Boots were dark in 
contrast but the snow was deep enough to hide them. The drifts 
slowed up the wiremen and an infantry fire team protected them at 
their work. 

The first objective consisted of bunkers and suspected mortar posi- 
tions which had been repotted by tactical air observers as recently 
occupied by the enemy. They were empty when the raiding party 
reached them, and the Marine column proceeded toward Objective 2, 
an ambush site overlooking and commanding a crossing of the 

The selected area for the support group was located nearby, and 
there the machine gun section and riflemen took positions on a nose 
with the wiremen, radiomen, and corpsman in the center. While these 
elements peeled off, the raiding party continued toward the ambush 
site, where it was planned to lie in wait two hours for the enemy. A 
suspected mine field had to be crossed and Captain Ord directed his 
men to advance in single file, stepping carefully in the footprints 
ahead. Twelve Marines had passed safely when the 13th became the 
victim of a mine explosion. The corpsman found broken bones but 

Winter Operations m East Korea 


none of the usual torn flesh and hemorrhaging, thanks to the new 
thermal boots issued during the winter of 1951-1952." 

The temperature was zero with a sharp wind blowing. Some of 
the Marines had to shed clothing to keep the casualty warm during 
the forced immobility, and the raiding party commander broke radio 
silence by requesting permission of Captain Ord, in the support group 
area, to pull back to that position and set up the ambush. 

Permission was granted by Ord after radio consultation with the 
battalion commander on the How Company OP. The raiding party re- 
mained in ambush formation on Objective 2 for two hours without 
seeing or hearing an enemy. By that time the condition of the mine 
casualty had deteriorated to such an extent that Lieutenant Colonel 
Pratt gave permission for a return to the MLR without proceeding to 
Objective 3. 

He directed that the raiders split and take two routes in the hope of 
capturing a prisoner, since a light enemy probing attack on the MLR 
had just been reported by Item Company of 3/1. This proved to be 
a fortunate decision, for two nkpa soldiers were seized. The main 
object of the raid had thus been fulfilled, even though little action 
was seen during the five-hour operation. 

Raids of this sort may seem anticlimactic when compared to the 
fights in the same area during the first three weeks of September. But 
the Marines were showing adaptability in conforming to a warfare of 
position that was contrary to all their offensive training. Careful 
reconnaissance, detailed planning, and minimal risks— these were the 
elements of defensive tactics in which large forces had to content 
themselves with small gains. 

Major General John T. Selden Assumes Command 

On 11 January 1952 the 1st Marine Division had its second change 
of command in Korea when Major General John T. Selden relieved 
General Thomas. The new commanding general was born at Rich- 
mond, Virginia, and educated there at McGuire's University School. 
Before the Linked States entered World War I, he tried to join the 
Canadian Army but was warned that he would lose his American 
citizenship. In January 1915, at the age of 21, he enlisted as a private 

"Later in the chapter this innovation will be described. 
fij.10.ltl O-GZ-IB 


The East-Centra! Front 

in the Marine Corps and saw two years of active duty on jungle patrols 
in Haiti. Commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1918, he served in 
ocean convoys during World War I. 

Sea duty, China duty, and more Haiti duty occupied him during the 
postwar years. The outbreak of World War II found him a Scouting 
Force Marine Officer aboard the Indianapolis. After that he had three 
main assignments: personnel and intelligence officer of I Marine 
Amphibious Corps; commanding officer of the 5th Marines in the 
New Britain operation; and chief of staff of the 1st Marine Division 
at Peleliu. 

Brigadier General William J. Whaling remained on duty as Assist- 
ant Division Commander. The new staff officers were Colonel 
Richard G. Weede, Chief of Staff; Colonel Walter N. Flournoy, G-l ; 
Lieutenant Colonel James H. Tinsley, G-2; Lieutenant Colonel 
Gordon D. Gayle, G-3; and Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., G-4. 

A change of FMFPac command had taken place on 1 January. 
Lieutenant General Franklin H. Hart relieved General Shepherd, who 
became Commandant of the Marine Corps as General Gates finished 
his four-year term. General Hart paid his first visit to the 1st Marine 
Division late in January. 

The new FMFPac commander found the Marines occupying essen- 
tially the same positions they had defended since late September, 
About two-thirds of the l2-£-mile MLR on Line Minnesota (Map 20) 
was good defensive ground. It had been strengthened by an elaborate 
system of trenches and bunkers behind miles of barbed wire." 

In the left-central portion of the Marine sector, the enemy held the 
dominating terrain. This was particularly true of the rugged area 
just west of Hill 812, where the opposing trenches were only 50 to 
150 yards apart. There a fire- raked landmark, known to the Marines 
as Luke the Gook's Castle, had been made into a strong point by 
the enemy. Its base was a maze of trenches and bunkers, and the 
20-foot granite knob could have been taken only at an excessive cost 
in casualties. Although this bastion was hit repeatedly by almost 
every type of supporting ordnance, it was never completely destroyed 
nor denied to the enemy. 

Operations of trench warfare had inevitably shaken down into a 
daily routine of sniping by day and patrols or raids by night. Marine 

"Sources for ihis section, unless otherwise indicated, are the IstMarDiv HD, Jan, 
Feb, and Mar 52, aod PacFIt Interim Rpi No. 4, IX. 

Winter Operations in East Korea 


artillery, mortars, and stationary tank fire, occasionally reinforced by 
naval guns, played an increasingly important part in the coordinated 
destruction of nkpa defenses. As a result the enemy was limited for 
the most part to well camouflaged reverse slope positions. 

Because of the 1st Marine Division's defensive mission and the 
constant rotation of the more experienced personnel back to the 
United States, it was considered that men assigned to infantry elements, 
in particular, needed additional training in small unit leadership and 
offensive tactics. Consequently the regiments were rotated at monthly 
intervals to the reserve area near Wontong-ni, where Camp Tripoli 
had been established for training. An average of 84 NCOs a week 
completed a 168-hour special course of instruction over a four-week 
period. The program for the rank and file was so intensive, according 
to one report, that "it was considered a relief by some Marines to 
cease training and return to the relatively quiet life on the front 
lines." 1 

The truce talks at Panmunjom continued to influence operations at 
the front. A demilitarized zone having been proposed in anticipation 
' of an armistice, preparations were begun by the 1st Marine Division 
to develop the defenses along Line Iceland, generally conforming to 
the Line Kansas of Marine fights early in September. It was to be 
used as a new line of defense if the UN and Communist delegates 
reached an agreement. 

Perhaps because other offensive tactics were so curtailed, psycho- 
logical warfare had its heyday in the winter months of 1952. Propa^ 
ganda leaflets were dropped from planes or fired by 105mm howitzers. 
At vantage points along the front, loud speakers bombarded the 
Communists with surrender appeals in their own language. The 
effects could not be evaluated with any degree of certainty, but it was 
hoped that the enemy did not respond with the amused .indifference 
shown by the Marines toward Red propaganda. 

Boot, Combat, Rubber, Insulated 

The average low temperature for January 1952, was 1 1 degrees 
Fahrenheit. This was mild weather as compared to the subzero read- 

'PacFIt interim Rpi Nil, A, IX, 9-11. 


The Edsl-Centrd Front 

mgs of the previous winter. Only 10 slight frostbite cases were reported 
for the month in contrast to the 3,083 nonbattle casualties, nearly 
all frostbite cases, incurred during the two weeks (27 November to 
10 December 1950) of the Chosin Reservoir breakout. 

The improvement in January 1952 could not be credited entirely 
to more clement weather. It was due in greater measure to one of the 
most noteworthy innovations of the Korean war — the insulated rubber 
combat boot, which proved much superior to the shoe pac of the 
past winter. 

U.S. Army experiments dated back to 1944. They were dropped 
three years later after efforts to perfect a boot with sealed insulation 
failed to meet the test of long marches. The Navy had more promis- 
ing results with the boot during the winter of 1948-1949 when Arctic 
clothing tests were conducted at Point Barrow, Alaska. Army and 
Navy tests at Mt. Washington, New Hampshire, the following winter 
were inconclusive. Marine Corps tests were held during the first 
four months of 1951 at the following places: MCEB, Quantico; Fort 
Churchill, Manitoba; Big Delta, Alaska; Pickel Meadows, California; 
and the Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory (nmfrl), Camp 

"In addition to engineering tests," states the Marine report, "the 
insulated rubber boots have been worn by test subjects selected from a 
variety of backgrounds; under conditions of activity varying from 
strenuous marching for 20 miles to complete immobility; in ambient 
temperatures from 58 ,J to — A2° F.; over terrain ranging from soft 
snow [to] hard snow, ice, sand, rocky ground, mud, gravel, water, and 
iced river banks; for periods of time corresponding to a notmal work- 
ing day and more than 72 hours. As now constructed, the insulated 
rubber boot, employing the vapor barrier principle, meets the require- 
ments outlined previously and is satisfactory for use by Marine 
Corps ground troops in cold climate areas, supplanting the shoe-pac 
combination. . , ." * 

The distinguishing feature of the "thermal boot," as it came to be 
popularly known, is an air space between the inner and outer layers 

' LtCol G. W, Hard wick, "Summary tff Murine Corps Experience with 1RB [' n5U ' a t e d 
Rubber Boot], Rpt tif H May 1951." Other sources for the development of the boot, also 
found in G— 1 files, Headquarters Murine Corps, arc as follows: G, E, Folk, Abstract 
of Bnwdotn Collect Rpt, Jun 1951, "The Penetration of Water into die Human Foot;" 
G-f Rpt, "Resume of Activity re Insufafed Ruhber Bum," 7 Feb 1952; G-l Rpt, "Boot, 
Rubber, Insulated. Cold Weather." 28 Nov 5 1 ; £M Rpt, "Fact Data Sheet, Boot, Insu- 
lated, Rubber," n.d,; MajGen J. T. Selden memo tu CMC, 26 Apr 52. 

Whiter Q per attorn m East Korea 


of wool pile insulation, both of which are completely sealed off by 
latex from any contact with moisture. This air space, under pressure, 
produces a vapor barrier such that heat cannot readily escape when it 
is emitted from the foot. Thus the wearer of the boot supplies his 
own warmth, which is retained as long as he is active, regardless of 
prevailing temperatures. If, however, the wails of the air space are 
punctured and the insulation becomes wet, the moisture collected 
within the boot freezes at low temperatures if the wearer remains 
inactive. In such cases, severe frostbite may result. 

Some of the tests were spectacular. One subject poured water 
containing pieces of ice into his boots and donned frozen socks before 
putting on the footgear. After 10 minutes of walking, the ice in the 
boots had turned to warm water, and there was no harmful effect on 
the man. 

Another subject waded across a knee-deep creek at a temperature 
of zero. Before he had marched a mile in the snow, his feet had 
warmed the water in the boots, although his pants were frozen so 
stiff that he could scarcely walk. 

Seldom has a military innovation been tested so thoroughly and 
scientifically in such a short time. Colonels Ion M. Bethel and John F. 
Stamm of Marine Corps Headquarters took a leading part in the 
development and procurement phases along with Lieutenant Colonel 
Gordon A. Hardwick. Major Vernon D. Boyd and Captain David R. 
McGrew, Jr. were active in the troop acceptance tests. 

A good many "bugs" had to be eliminated before the boot met with 
complete Marine approval. The manufacturer's modifications were 
effected with minimal delay. 

It is perhaps needless to add that the thermal boot was not fool- 
proof. Protection continued in subzero weather for at least an hour 
after the termination of activity, but it was inviting frostbite to remain 
motionless much longer. Socks had to be changed every 12 hours, 
and foot cleanliness and hygiene could not be neglected. 

If a few such simple rules were observed, a man had virtually perfect 
frostbite protection in the coldest weather. In fact, it was seriously 
proposed that a Marine casualty of this sort should be charged with 
misconduct if he acquired his frostbite while provided with thermal 
boots and a change of socks. 

In view of the tests and negotiations with the manufacturers, it 
was a marvel of promptness when the first shipment of boots reached 


The East-CetUral front 

the 1st Marine Division in August 1951, long before the advent of 
cold weather. 

Distribution to the Division was completed by 15 November. 
Throughout the winter the experience of all units concerned was 
reported to Division headquarters. And in a memorandum of 
26 August 1952 to the Commandant, General Selden expressed his 
approval: "The boot, rubber, insulated, is considered an excellent 
item of cold weather equipment. It is far superior to the shoe pac." 

The acceptance by the rank and file went so far that the "Mickey 
Mouse boot," as it was sometimes dubbed, acquired a reputation for 
protecting the wearer against antipersonnel mines. Some wounds 
apparently were reduced in severity by this protection, but it could 
not be claimed that the boot qualified as armor. 

Production by the manufacturer kept pace with Division and Air 
Wing requirements in Korea. By 14 December 1951 about 90,000 
pairs of boots and 2,000 patching kits had been received at San 
Francisco— more than enough to take care of the 6,500 pairs needed 
monthly for resupply under combat conditions. 

The thermal boot was here to stay. 

500 Armored Vests Flown to Korea 

Marine body armor was just then about to meet its first large-scale 
test in the field. It had cleared its preliminary hurdle during the tests 
from 14 June to 13 October 1951 (see Chapter VIII) when a joint 
Army-Navy Medical Commission endorsed 40 vests worn in action 
by troops of the 5 th Marines and two Army infantry regiments. 

On 9 November, at Marine Corps Headquarters, Marine officers 
were briefed on the successful results in Korea by the two Navy offi- 
cers who helped supervise the tests, Commander John S. Cowan (MC) 
USN, and Lieutenant Commander Frederick J, Lewis (MSC) USN. 

That same day the commanding general of FMFPac stated an 
operational requirement for 500 armored vests to be sent to the 1st 
Marine Division. And on 16 November the Commandant approved 
the standardization and procurement of vests to be designed by the 
Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune and air- 
shipped to Korea not later than 31 January 1952." 

"Sources for this section, except when otherwise specified, are the following: ACofS, 

Winter Operations in East Korea 


So many problems remained to be solved that it was nip and tuck 
whether Lieutenant Commander Lewis and his NMFRL colleagues 
would make the deadline. On II December 1931 another body armor 
meeting was held at Marine Corps Headquarters, attended by Marine 
representatives. Lieutenant Commander Lewis and Mr. John F. 
Quinlan, reporting for the NMFRL, explained that as a consequence of 
changes in design to speed up manufacture, samples submitted to 
them weighed as much as 10 pounds. 

Under no circumstances, said Lewis, would he approve a vest weigh- 
ing more than eight pounds, since its success depended so much on 
troop acceptance. Despite the fact that only a few weeks remained be- 
fore the deadline, Lewis exhibited a vest that he and Quinlan had rede- 
signed by working around the clock until the armor came within the 
weight limit without any sacrifice in protection. This vest was im- 
mediately put into production as the M-1951. 

A plastic fibre manufacturer agreed to supply 70,000 Doron plates, 
and a Philadelphia sportswear company contracted to manufacture 
the first 500 vests, plus an additional 2,500 to be delivered by 30 March 
1952. The M-1951 was described in Marine reports as "a kippered, 
vest-type, sleeveless jacket constructed of water-resistant nylon incor- 
porating two types of armor. One, a flexible pad of basket-weave 
nylon, covers the upper chest and shoulder girdle; the other, over- 
lapping curved Doron plates, covers the lower chest, back and abdo- 
men, These Doron plates consist of several layers of fibre glass cloth, 
bonded or laminated together with a resin. . . . Although the ballis- 
tic properties of die flexible pads of basket-weave nylon and the Doron 
plates are virtually the same, by using the rigid plates where flexibility 
is not mandatory the problem of protrusion and the resultant wounds 
under the armor is reduced." 10 

Marine wearers of the M-1951 were warned that it would not 
stop rifle or machine gun bullets unless they had lost much of their 
velocity at long ranges. The vest was protection against most grenade, 
mortar, and artillery fragments, as well as .45 caliber pistol and 
burp gun slugs of less than 1,000 feet per second initial muzzle 
velocity. Wearers did not escape entirely unscathed, for the impact 
of the fragment or slug left painful bruises. 

G— 4, Rpts of 2 Jan, 29 Feb, and ] 5 Mxy 52 (in files, Headquarters Marine Corps) ; 
Rpt of Test (Project 671) by MCF.B, Qmmtico, Vn., 3 Jan 1052; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, 
Itr of 30 jun 1954; LtCdr F, J. Lewis (MSG) USN, Itr nf 21 Jdn 195-1. . 

(ion, Vest, Armored, M-1951," 5-6. 



The East-Central Front 

It was a close squeak but the first 500 vests reached Korea with 
only a few days to spare. Captain David R. McGrew, Jr. accompanied 
the shipment as project officer with a mission of supervising and 
observing the use made of the M-195 1 in action. His first letter to 
Headquarters Marine Corps, dated A February 1952, commented that 
"up to tonight we have had nine men hit while wearing the vest. One 
was killed outright as a 120mm mortar round landed right in his 
lap. However, the other eight showed excellent results. All of the 
eight were wounded in other places not covered by the vest — but 
they are all WIA instead of KIA." 11 

Captain McGrew cited the instance of a Pfc of the 2d Battalion, 
7th Marines, wounded by the explosion of an 82mm mortar shell only 
15 feet in front of him. He received several fragments in the face 
and his leg was fractured. But there were some 45 holes in his vest, 
without any penetrations. Fifteen of the fragments had been large 
enough to inflict mortal chest or abdomen wounds. 

The 500 vests were issued only to troops in particularly hazardous 
situations, such as patrols to the enemy lines. Upon returning from 
a patrol or raid, the wearers turned in their armor to be worn by other 
Marines under fire. 

"The reaction of the user to the vest," reported McGrew, "is closely 
related to the amount of enemy activity. In sectors of the OPLR and 
MLR [outpost and main lines of resistance] where heavy incoming 
mortar and artillery fire was received, there were no complaints re- 
garding the weight or restrictive features of the vest. In other sectors 
where there was little or no enemy activity, approximately 15 percent 
of the personnel complained that the vest was heavy and restricted 
movement to some degree. Approximately 2 percent of the wearers in 
these sectors thought the vest was not worth the trouble and would 
wear it only when ordered to do so." 

The project officer believed that a "significant reduction" in KIA 
casualties could be credited to the M-195 1, but that WIA figures were 
only slightly lessened. That was because so many wearers were 
wounded who would have been killed save for the armor. Captain 
McGrew listed the following case histories, confirmed by medical 

Men who would have been killed instead of wounded if they had lacked 
armor protection— 25: 

" Opt D. W. McGrew, jr. to LtCol G. W. Hardwick, Itr ,.f 4 Feb 52. 

* ACofS, G-4, "Report of Field Test of Armored Vest, M-195 1," 15 May 51. 

Whiter Operations in East Korea 239 

Men who had potentially severe wounds reduced to superficial wounds 

Men who had superficial wounds prevented altogether — 3 1. 

The project officer had no opportunity to compare the casualties 
of vest wearers with those of an equal number of unprotected Marines 
taking part in the same action. It was his conclusion, based on observa- 
tion, that "use of the vest by all personnel who are habitually forward 
of battalion command posts may result in as much as a 30 percent 
reduction in battle casualties. Because many WIA cases are the 
result of wounds of the extremities and /or multiple wounds, there 
probably will not be a large reduction of casualties in this category. 
It is believed that the largest reduction will occur in the KIA category 
and that this reduction will be substantial." ** 

The introduction of body armor was not heralded in the press by 
page one headlines such as had announced the first transport heli- 
copter operations in Korea. Occasionally a photograph on page eight 
showed a Marine grinning triumphantly while pointing to a hole 
m his armored vest and holding aloft the jagged mortar fragment that 
might otherwise have killed him. But it is safe to say that a majority 
of Stateside newspaper readers and radio listeners in 1951 were 
unaware of the Marine revival of armor adapted to 20th-century 

Press correspondents in Korea did not appear to grasp the tactical 
significance of an innovation which they regarded entirely as a hu- 
manitarian achievement. From a strictly military viewpoint, however, 
't was apparent that if the M-1951 could reduce casualties by 30 per- 
cent, as Captain McGrew estimated (and his estimate was later 
regarded as conservative), it would mean that a like reduction had 
been effected in the destructive potential of the enemy's best anti- 
personnel weapons. It was as if the Marines were able to slip behind 
the enemy's lines and silence 3 out of 10 of his howitzers, mortars, 
burp guns, and grenades. 

This was of particular importance in overcoming the numerical 
superiority of the Communists, Not only did each American wound 
casualty reduce the effectiveness of a unit, but four or more comrades 
were often neutralized as stretcher bearers in Korean mountain terrain. 
If body armor could prevent 3 casualties out of 10, therefore, it 


The East-Central Front 

would be a significant addition to a unit's numerical strength as well 
as combat morale. 

Any doubts about Marine troop acceptance of the M-1951 were 
laid to rest by the approval of the 300 vests issued early in February 
L 9 5 2 . An additional 2,500 arrived early in March and on the 13th of 
that month the Division ordered 25,000 more. The armored vest, like 
the thermal boot, had needed only a thorough trial to become standard 

Helicopter Operations muletrain and 


The combat helicopter, oldest of the three Marine tactical innovations 
in Korea, had already managed to make routine performances out of 
operations that once claimed headlines. Battalion troop lifts were no 
longer a novelty, and supplying a front-line company by air was taken 
for granted. But nothing quite as ambitious as Operation MULETRAIN 
had ever been attempted — the mission of completely supplying a 
battalion on the MLR for a week with a daily average of four 

Hill 884 was again the objective. Colonel Keith B. MoCutcheon's 
HMR-161 was given the task of flying tentage, stoves, rations, and 
ammunition from supply dumps to the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marines, 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John E. Gorman. 

It was the first opportunity for HMR-161 to try out improvements 
in helicopter "flying crane" techniques credited to Major Charles E. 
Cornwell. He had adapted the underslung nets, controlled manually 
from the cabin, which did a better job than the pallet, or portable 
platform, for many types of cargo. 

An average altitude of 2,300 feet for the five landing places made 
it necessary to reduce the pay load to 850 pounds. Yet HMR-161 
handled the assignment during the first week of 1952 with about 
one-third of its aircraft while the remainder went about routine 
chores. So well did four helicopters keep ahead of schedule that 
sometimes they flew in more cargo than could be immediately un- 
loaded at the objectives. Following are the statistics of the seven days: 

Pounds lifted, 150,7 JO; Hours of flight time, 91.7; Loads lifted, 219; 
Average of miles flown, 9.6 

Winter Operations hi East Korea 


Three days later, Operation changie-CHANGie began on 10 January 
1952. Like Operation bumblebee three months earlier, this was a bat- 
talion relief lift. Yet it differed from its predecessors in that troops 
were to be flown from Field X-83 to sites on the company instead 
of battalion level, the former being only 200 yards behind the front 
line. 1 " 

In December the loading zone and landing site duties formerly 
assigned to a platoon of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, were taken 
over by the 1st Air Delivery Platoon, Service Command, FMFPac. 
First Lieutenant William A. Reavis and 35 enlisted men had a mission 
to prepare and deliver supplies by air, whether by parachute, air 
freight, or helicopter." These specialists were in charge during Opera- 
tion CHANGIE-CHANGIE when the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Edward G. Kurd2iel) relieved Lieutenant Colonel 
Norton's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, The operation was conducted 
smoothly by helicopters flying in defdade throughout the approach, 
landing, and return phases. 

Operation mousetrap, from 14 to 17 January, was planned pri- 
marily as a test of the ability of HMR-161 to launch an antiguerrilla 
attack on short notice. Colonel McCutcheon and Lieutenant Colonel 
Mitchell were alerted at 0100 in regard to a two-company lift sched- 
uled for 1000 that same morning. With "only minor difficulties" 
they transported 500 Marines to a landing site cleared by the Air 
Delivery Platoon. Three similar troop movements were completed 
by HMR-161 during the next three days. 

If ever a bronze plaque is awarded in commemoration of the first 
history -ma king helicopter troop and supply lifts, it would be fitting 
to install it on Hiil 884. That bleak and roadless height had its 
fifth large-scale operation on 24 February when Lieutenant Colonel 
Harold C. Howard's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, relieved the 2d Bat- 
talion, of that same regiment on "Mount Helicopter." Operation 
Rotate was completed without incident as further evidence that 
battalion reliefs by helicopter were now routine. 

In spite of the demands made upon HMR-161 helicopters in cold 
Weather and mountainous terrain, it is noteworthy that no serious 

■ Sources fur the helicopter operations described in this section are the following: 
HMR-161, !1D, Jan and Feb 51; Cn.itry of ike Sty. 176-175. Veterans of the Korean 
conflict will recall that "changie-changie" meant "swap" in the pidgin English serving 

a conversational medium between Americans and Orientals. Hence it was applicable 
to a relief operation. 


The lutst-Ceutrai From 

mechanical defects had developed. This six- month record came to an 
end on 24 February 1952 when Captain John R. Irwin was returning 
from Seoul to X-83. Warned by alarming vibrations, he landed to 
discover that the broken remnants of the tail assembly had dropped 
behind him in the snow. 

Four days later, while Hying a load of logs for bunkers, Captain 
Calvin G. Alston's aircraft was so shaken by vibrations that he 
suspected damage from enemy artillery fragments. He made a forced 
landing in the snow only to discover another instance of a tail assembly 

Colonel McCutcheon grounded all HMR-161 aircraft until the 
trouble could be corrected. Not until 14 March, after 16 modified tail 
assemblies had been flown to Korea did the Marine transport heli- 
copter squadron take to the air again. 

The Five Days of Operation clam -up 

Ground operations continued with little change during February and 
the first two weeks of March. The only departure from the well-worn 
tactical norm came on 10 February, when eusak put Operation 
CLAM-UP into effect across the entire UN front. 

The purpose was to feign a withdrawal and lure the enemy into 
sending out patrols which would yield prisoners to Eighth Army units. 
A EUSAK letter of instruction, dated 4 February 1952, asserted that 
"a policy of aggressive patrolling has led the enemy to rely upon our 
patrols for the maintenance of contact. This situation enables him to 

or casualty." K ' 

All corps were directed to ". . . attempt to decoy the enemy into 
dispatching patrols against our lines and ambush and capture such 

First Marine Division orders called for an elaborate series of decep- 
tions. Immediately prior to clam-up, on 9-tO February, the 11th 
Marines fired 471 harrassing and interdiction missions, as if to cover 
a large-scale withdrawal. Over 12,000 artillery rounds were ex- 
pended."' Then clam-up commenced, and the three regiments on the 

'"This section, unless otherwise specified, is based upon the IstMarDiv HD, Feb 52, 
1-12 ; and PmFIi Interim lift No. 4, 5>~U to 9-14, 

'"llthMar IW, Feb 52, 13; Oil B. T. Hemphill comments, 20 Jan 59. 

Winter Operations in East Korea 

MLR — from left to right, the KMCs, 1st Marines, unci 7th Marines— 
did their part to hoodwink the enemy. Reserve battalions executed 
daylight marches on foot to the rear and returned after dark by means 
of motor lifts. The 5th Marines, in Division reserve at Camp Tripoli, 
executed similar feigned withdrawals. 

After the Marine cannoneers completed their supposed covering 
fires, the front was plunged into an eerie silence. It did not take long, 
of course, for the enemy's curiosity to be aroused, nkpa patrols 
reconnoitred the Marine lines on the night of 10-11 February without 
being fired upon. The following night a patrol attempted to draw 
Marine fire in the Hill 812 urea by advertising its presence with loud 
talk. The enemy's fire was not returned until the patrol attacked a 
Marine position with white phosphorous grenades. In sheer self- 
defense the Marines retaliated, and the North Koreans made a hurried 
exit, leaving behind 10 dead and 2 wounded men who became 

At first light on the 12th another enemy patrol tried to penetrate 
the wire in front of a 1st Marines position and paid the penalty with 
nine men killed and three wounded in a 15-minute fire fight. 

On 13 February the Marines were pounded with the month's 
heaviest concentration of nkpa fire — 344 artillery and 1,469 mortar 
rounds. Thus did the enemy serve notice of his realization that Marine 
positions on the MLR were being held in strength. NKPA patrol ac- 
tions on the nights of the 13th and l4rh were launched at Marine 
trenches on Hills 812 and 854 at the estimated cost of heavy 

When Operation clam-up came to an end on 15 February, it had 
admittedly fallen short of r-USAK expectations. Although nkpa 
patrol losses had been considerable, they were offset by fewer casualties 
in rear areas enjoying a five-day immunity from UN artillery fire. 
Worse yet, the enemy was enabled during this period of grace to bring 
up ammunition and other supplies without interference. As a final dis- 
illusionment, it was reckoned that across the whole Eighth Army front 
the Communists bad lost fewer prisoners than during the preceding 
five-day period. 

In the Marine combat zone a gain was recorded in enemy casualties. 
General Selden congratulated the Division on "the fire discipline 
practiced by MLR troops and by platoon and company commanders. 
As a consequence of the fire discipline, the line companies were able 


The East-Central Front 

to kill 56 enemy and wound 54." These totals, it was pointed out, 
were larger than the losses normally inflicted on the enemy in a 
five-day period." 

On the other hand, five deserters from the mortar company of the 
1st Battalion, 91st Regiment, 45 th nkpa Division revealed that ad- 
vantage had been taken of Operation clam-up by detailing mortar 
personnel and men from the rifle companies to carry ammunition. 
During the five-day lull, according to the prisoners, 2,600 rounds were 
brought up for the company's nine mortars. 1 " 

After the brief flurry of Operation C1.AM-UP the front quickly 
settled down to its old routine of patrols. An average of eight Marine 
night ambush patrols and five daylight reconnaissance patrols forward 
of the MLR was maintained. The results left much to be desired. Of 
the last 110 ambuscades and 75 reconnaissance patrols reported in 
February, only 1 of the former and 6 of the latter claimed contacts. 
All but one of the contacts had negligible results. 

The Marine fire attack did the enemy more damage. Artillery fired 
679 observed missions during the month — 211 on troops, 175 on 
bunkers, 121 on mortars, 96 on artillery, and 75 on such miscellaneous 
targets as OPs, vehicles, machine guns, and supply points. This total 
was recorded in spite of an ammunition shortage which would ulti- 
mately become the subject of debate in Congress. 

Even with supplies of ammunition limited by X Corps orders, 
Marine artillery drove the enemy from untenable forward-slope posi- 
tions to underground fortifications on the reverse slope. 

Naval gunfire was limited by the extreme range to the Division 
zone of action. 1 " Only large targets forward and to the right of center 
could be taken under fire. Even so, the Wisconsin and the St. Paul 
scored some devastating hits in February on enemy reverse slope 

On one occasion, the Wisconsin erroneously calculated its deflection. 
Two 16-inch rounds landed between the front line and the 3/7 mortar 
positions before the fire could be stopped. Fortunately, no one was 
injured. The Wisconsin Marine officer happened to be visiting the 
Division CP that day, and on hearing the news he came up to 3/7 and 

" istMarDiv HD, Feb 52, 3. 

» IstMarDiv P1R No. 486, Feb 52. 

'"The battleship If' is com in had a main battery of 16-inch guns with a maximum 
range of about 2} miles. The heavy cruiser St. Paul had a main battery of 9-inch 
guns with a maximum range of 16 miles. 


Whiter Operations hi East Korea 

collected a large shell fragment. He stated that he intended to mount 
the jagged piece of steel in the ship's CIC room as a reminder to future 
gunners to make no errors in plot. 

Observed direct fire by the 90mm rifles of the 1st Tank Battalion 
(Major Walter E. Reynolds, Jr.) continued to be effective against 
NKpa bunkers and gun emplacements. Utilizing the high ground 
along the MLR, particularly on Hills 812 and 854, tanks sniped at the 
enemy both by day and night. 

This was made possible by the powerful lights of a platoon from 
the 92d U.S. Army Searchlight Company, attached to the Llth 
Marines. The mountainous terrain in East Korea was not particularly 
suited to "artificial moonlight" — the indirect illumination of a large 
area which results from "bouncing" the rays of searchlights off low- 
lying clouds. But direct illumination permitted aimed 90mm fire in 
the darkness and had the further advantage of blinding the enemy to 
the tanks themselves as well as to troop movements behind them. 
Not a single light was shot out during the winter in spite of persistent 
NKpa attempts. 

The lessons taught by battlefield illumination in Korea were to be 
incorporated into two instructive bulletins after the war. "The enemy 
does not have any better night vision than we do," asserted USMC 
Landing Force Bulletin No. 6. "No racial or national group of people 
has any inherent physical advantage over another as to capability for 
seeing in darkness. . . , ?q The apparent advantage which the enemy 
sometimes displays in night operations is due only to a difference 
in training. In the case of the Oriental soldier, or the Eskimo, for 
example, training usually begins early in life, where he does not have 
the convenience of artificial light to the degree we have, and has 
been forced to make maximum use of his natural night vision in many 
of his normal activities. 

"U.S. Forces have conducted many successful night operations after 
adequate training. Some units have reported that after intensive night 
training, personnel have become so proficient that they sometimes 
prefer night operations to daylight operations," 

In support of this conclusion, records for the winter of 1951-1952 
reveal that the Marines held their own very well in the night combats 

""U.S. Marine Corps Landing Force Bulletin No. 6, "Night Vision and Night Corn- 
bat," 5 Dec 53. See also Bulletin No, 18. "Battlefield Illumination," 4 Jun 36. 


The East-Central Front 

of no man's land, where the outcome depended upon immediate de- 
cisions based upon seeing in the dark. 

Marine casualties for February, the last full month in East Korea, 
were 23 KIA, 102 WIA, and 1 MIA, including the KMC Regiment. 
Enemy losses were reported as 174 counted and 381 estimated KIA, 
606 estimated WIA, and 63 prisoners. 21 

After a winter of positional warfare, the Marines could recall with 
better understanding the tales their fathers had told them about France 
in World War 1. For history was staging one of its repetitions; and, 
allowing for improvements in weapons, the trenches of Korea in 
1951-1952 differed but slightly from the trenches of the Western 
Front in 1917-1918. 

!l IstMarDiv I ID, Feb 51, App No, 5. Other sources for this chapter are comments 
and criticism by the following officers: {Ranks listed are those held at time nf interview 
or comment.) Gen G. C. Thomas; LtGen J. T. Selden; BrigGen S. S. Wade; BrigGen 
C. R. Allen; Oil J. H. Tmsley; Col F. B. Nihart; Col J. F. Stamm; Col B. T. Hemphill. 


The Move to West Korea 

Truce Talks— Tactical Innovations— T he Marines in 
Operation mixm aster— Operations of Fifteen Months in 


No chronicle of activities in Korea would be complete without a 
discussion of the truce talks which began in the summer of 
] S>51. When the Communists proposed these meetings early in June, 
their motives were transparent; they were hurt, staggering, and badly 
in need of a breathing spell. Pretending a sudden interest in peace, 
the hard-pressed enemy requested talks at Kaesong for the purposes 
of recuperation. 

The enemy would never admit the real damage he suffered. A 
typical excuse for the smashing CCF defeat was given in a book by 
Wilford G. Burcbett, an Australian Communist who was a press 
correspondent behind the Chinese lines. 

"Immediately prior to the beginning of the talks," he explained, 
'the Korean-Chinese troops had withdrawn extensively along the 
East Coast, hoping to entice the Americans as deep as possible into 
a trap which would be sprung and would cut them off by an encircling 
move. The Americans were seriously nibbling at the bait when the 
proposal for cease-fire talks was made. The line was immediately 
frozen and Korean-Chinese troops started to dig in." 1 

This beginning of static warfare was unquestionably the great turn- 
lri g point of a war whose course from that time on was to be decided 
at the conference table of Kaesong and later Panmunjom. Any doubts 
as to the actual motives of the Communists might have been dispelled 

' Wilford G. Burchett: This Monstrous War (Melbourne, 1953): J. Waters, 121-122. 
B *>rchett was a Communist free lance correspondent for left-wing newspapers, He wrote 
several books and articles lauding the Communist cause in the Korean War. 


The East-Central Front 

upon reading in Burchett's book this naive boast of the advantage 
taken of the truce talks by the Reds: 

Digging in is an understatement of the way the Korean -Chinese troops 
literally burrowed into the mountains, constructed two and three story 
dwellings underground, linked mountains and hills by underground tunnels 
and carved deep communication trenches linking flank with flank and front 
with rear. They raked the insides out of mountains as you would rake ashes 
out of a furnace. Each hill, mountain or ridge was connected with its 
neighbors by deep, zigzagged inter-communication trenches, at least two 
yards below ground level and with yard-high antiblast walls. In emergency, 
troops could be switched from hill-top to hill-top with the enemy never 
knowing. Similar trenches extended well to the rear, so that supplies could 
be brought up and withdrawals if necessary made in comparative safety. , . . 
Everything was deep underground with many yards of rock and earth between 
them and shells and bombs, atomic or otherwise. Back of the front line 
positions, similar scooped -out mountain ridges stretched all the way back to 
Pyongyang and further. It was against these positions that Van Fleet began 
hurling his troops in August, 1951.'^ 

The breathing spell provided by preliminary truce talk discussions 
gave the Communists an opportunity they had not previously enjoyed. 
Not only did they have time to prepare sturdy and effective entrench- 
ments, but they were able to bring up additional mortars and artillery 
to equal those of the Allied forces. As a further advantage, while "free 
from the compulsion of impending military disaster," 3 they made use 
of the interlude to reorganize and train nkpa divisions to a new and 
increased level of effectiveness. 

Communists are never embarrassed in the least to deny an agree- 
ment already reached, and once having accomplished their inter- 
mediate goal, the Red delegates broke off the Kaesong talks for a 
while. Once the pressure on them was reduced, the enemy was in a 
position to try to obtain the most favorable terms for armistice talks, 
even if it meant prolonging the fighting. 

The change in tactics soon became apparent. "Since the opening 
of the Kaesong conference," commented a FECom G-2 report, "the 
enemy has deviated from his usual tactics of 'flexible defense which 
he so skilfully employed during the buildup period prior to all his 
past offensives — to that of a more orthodox 'fixed defense.' Where the 
"enemy in the past has defended key terrain features with relatively 

'Ibid. General Van Fleet did not "hurl" his troops against anything. He began 
limited offensives for the purpose of improving Eighth Army morale and maintaining 
offensive spirit. See Gen James A. Van Fleet, Itr of 28 Feb 59. 

■ C. Turner Joy, How Communist: Negotiate, 28. 

The Move to West Korea 

small groups to delay friendly forces, he has now changed over to 
tactics of a fixed line of defense to be defended at all costs." * 

"The most extended delay imposed upon the Korean Armistice Con- 
ference by the Communists was in connection with the exchange of 
prisoners of war," 5 which subject will be discussed in Volume V of 
this series. The United Nations contended that all prisoners should be 
"screened" to determine whether they wished to return to their side 
of origin. No prisoner was to be returned against his wishes. The 
Communists claimed this treatment consisted of a reign of terror in 
which CCF prisoners were held at gunpoint. 

Some prisoners held in UN camps rioted and injuries and deaths 
resulted. This provided the Communists with excellent propaganda 
on which to denounce our principles of no forced repatriation." In 
the end, after a delay of more than 14 months of war, the Communists 
finally did accept this principle, and an armistice was achieved. 

The Communist delaying tactics were not entirely without benefits to 
the Allied forces, for the major part of the 1st Marine Division had 
the opportunity to go into reserve and engage in several weeks' 
intensive training. While the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was busily 
participating in the interdiction activities of Operation strangle, 
General Van Fleet and his ground commanders felt frustrated over 
their orders to "sit tight" rather than attack and prevent further enemy 

An agreement to resume cease-fire talks, this time at Panmunjom, 
led to a eusak order which committed the 1st Marine Division and 
other major units to a defensive stand behind a fixed line of demarca- 
tion on 20 September 1951 (Map 19). Further negotiations resulted 
in a month's lull which was brought about by the fact that the dele- 
gates could not agree on where the lines would remain if the fighting 
stopped. The United States delegates pressed for a settlement within 
a 30-day period. The Communists continued to stall. The United 
States then consented to accept the present (then current) demarcation 
line if the Communists agreed within the 30-day period. 7 

The significance of these dates was to become more and more plain 
a s the conflict dragged on into 1952 with both sides on the defensive, 
limiting themselves to the raids and patrols of positional warfare 

^FECom G-2 Intelligence Summary, 18 Sep 51. 
n Jny, How Communius Negothtte, 53. 

Col J. C. Murray, Comments, Jan 59. 


The East-Central Front 

while the appointed representatives haggled for a truce. Although the 
Marines did not realize it, the war had already turned into a contest 
of watchful waiting and fierce local fights. 

This line of demarcation left the Eighth Army holding a MLR 
across one of the narrowest parts of the peninsula (Map 22). Just 
behind the Communist MLR the peninsula bulged to the west. This 
meant that the enemy had to devote much of his effort to mining the 
waters and defense of many beaches against a surprise amphibious 
attack, and it necessitated keeping in operation long and vulnerable 
supply lines. 

It is probable that a UN breakthrough or successful amphibious 
operation could have been mounted at this time," for several high 
ranking officers expressed such opinions. All the necessary ingredients 
were available, yet the high level decision for such an operation was 
not made. 

Tactical Innovations 

Until World War II, it had been a deserved reproach throughout the 
brief history of our country that Americans were never prepared at 
the outset of a war. A welcome departure from this tenet came in 1942 
when the Marine Corps and Navy introduced the new amphibious 
tactics they had developed during the 1930s. Victory in the Pacific 
War was due in large measure to the techniques, landing craft, and 
vehicles of the Navy-Marine Corps ship-to-shore attack. 

As a result, North Africa, Europe, and the Japanese-occupied islands 
of the Pacific were opened to invasion without a single major reverse. 
In contrast, Hitler s Webrmacht lacked both the techniques and equip- 
ment to launch a cross-channel attack on England in 1940, and 
Operation sea lion was of necessity abandoned by an army that 
dominated the rest of Europe as a result of victories in land warfare. 

Again, in Korea, the Marines demonstrated their foresightedness 
by taking a prominent part in the development of such important 
innovations as combat helicopters, body armor, and thermal footwear." 
By the first month in 1952 the combat helicopter had proved to be of 
immeasurable assistance in modern warfare. In the beginning of the 
Korean War the "chopper" was initially used for command and 
liaison flights and reconnaissance missions. Evacuation of casualties 

" BGen V. H. Krulak, Comments, Jan 59. 

"Previous chapters discuss the background and development of these innovations. 

The Move to West Korea 

and rescue missions also became routine duties, and within a short time 
the helicopter became the favorite "workhorse" for a variety of tasks. 
In September of 1951 tactical troop movements began. These opera- 
tions made newspaper headlines everywhere. 

Of greater tactical importance, at least in the opinion of the front- 
line rifleman, was the physical protection provided him. The armored 
vest and the new thermal boots were first tested by Marines late in 
1951 and soon came to be highly desired items of equipment. 

The fighting men in Korea would not disagree with Benjamin 
Franklin's statement that "there never was a good war," but modern 
inventions certainly improved conditions by providing for the safety 
and comfort of the fighting men. Marine transport helicopters and 
body armor were of particular importance because they added to the 
human resources of UN forces opposed by an enemy with a contempt 
for life, based on seemingly endless reserves of manpower. UN com- 
manders in their fight against the Communist forces could not reck- 
lessly expend lives as did the enemy; therefore, the Allies had need 
Of tactical innovations and life-saving devices in order to compensate 
for a lack of numbers. 

The Marines in Operation mix master 

In the spring of 1952, when the UN and Communist forces were facing 
each other from static positions and fighting local engagements, 
Operation mixm aster took place. MIX MASTER was a complicated 
rearrangement of UN divisions across the entire Korean front during 
March, and involved the shuffling of about 200,000 men and their 
equipment over distances from 25 to 180 miles. It was a severe test 
of Eighth Army mobility. 1 " 

General Van Fleet visited the 1st Marine Division CP on 12 March 
1952, and announced an important command decision. After six 
months of defensive warfare in the same sector along Line Minnesota 
(20 September 1951 to 16 March 1952) the Division was to move 
across the peninsula to West Korea. 

The Marines had orders to relieve the 1st ROK Division and take 
Over a sector at the extreme left of the Eighth Army line under the 
operational control of I Corps (Map 22) . There they would have the 

,0 Col B. T. Hemphill, Comments, 30 Jan 59. 

The Move to West Korea 


responsibility for blocking Korea's historic invasion route to Seoul, 
The reasons behind this eusak. decision were summarized in the 1st 
Marine Division report as follows: 

(1) The abandonment of plans to carry out an amphibious envelopment 
somewhere on the east coast; 

(2) Concern over weaknesses in the Kimpo area defenses; 

(3) The overall situation would not permit loss of ground on the 
eusak left (South Korea) as this would endanger the capital at Seoul; that 
if retraction of lines was necessary, territory could better be sacrificed on the 
right (North Korea) where the country was mountainous and had little 
economic or strategic value. 11 

Up to this time the four corps of the Eighth Army had defended 
a 125-mile front across the peninsula (Map 22) with the following 
units in line from left to right on 15 March 1952. 

1 CORPS— ROK 1st Division; British Commonwealth Division; U.S. 3d 
Infantry Division (-) ; U.S. 45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma National 
Guard) ; ROK 9th Division. In reserve were the ROK 8th Division and 
RCT-65 of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division. 

IX CORPS— U.S. 2d Infantry Division; ROK 2d Division; U.S. 40th In- 
fantry Division (California National Guard) ; ROK 3d Division. In 
reserve were the U.S. 7th Infantry Division (-), RCT-17 of that Division, 
and the ROK Capitol Division. 

X CORPS— ROK 7th Division; U.S. 25th Infantry Division; U.S. 1st 
Marine Division (including 1st KMC Regiment). In reserve was the 
ROK 6th Division (-) . 

1 ROK CORPS— ROK 5th Division (-). In reserve was the ROK 11th 
Division (-). 12 

Allowing for a few changes, these were the positions held by major 
EU&ak units through the winter of 1951-1952. 

The Marine move was launched by Division Operation Plan 2-52 
and provided that the 1st Marine Division would be relieved by the 
8th ROK Division as a preliminary to movement overland and by sea 
h> the relief of the 1st ROK Division and defense of Line jamestcwn 
In the I Corps sector in the west. According to verbal orders later 
confirmed by eusak 01 272, transportation by truck and ship was 
specified, and the move was to be completed prior to 1 April. 1 " 

Obviously such a transplacement — moving entire divisions great 
distances from one sector of the MLR to another — necessitated careful 

^istMarDiv HD, Mar 52, 1-2. 
eusak Cmd Rpl, Mar 52, 13- 1 4. 

Sources for this section are IstMarDiv HD, Mar 52, 9-10; Isf MT Bn HD, Mar 
7th MT Bn HD, Mar 52. 


The East-Central Front 

timing and close coordination, but the planners involved were equal 
to the task. In referring to detailed plans by the Division G-3 Section 
(Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle) and the G-4 Section (Colonel 
Robert A. McGill), several unit commanders expressed the opinion 
that "the move from east to west was a masterpiece of logistical effi- 
ciency with no unnecessary paper work and no undue harrassment." u 
In addition to transporting the Division, the arrival of replacements 
and departure of personnel to be rotated to the United States were 
smoothly coordinated into the over-all plan. The transport General 
W. H. Gordon anchored at Sokcho-ri on 16 March with 174 officers 
and 1,135 enlisted men of the 18th Replacement Draft. The newly 
arrived Marines scarcely had time to drop their seabags before they 
joined the motor march to West Korea. The Gordon departed with 
103 officers and 1,135 Marines homeward bound, and the 2d Logistical 
Command (Army) received a 1st Marine Division request to route 
the 19th Replacement Draft, due in April, to Inchon instead of 

At K-50, near Sokcho-ri on the east coast, air freight and passenger 
service was discontinued and diverted to the new Division airhead, 
K-16, at Seoul. The Division railhead was changed to Munsan-ni 
(Map 22). 

The first Marine unit to depart for West Korea was the KMC Regi- 
ment with its organic battalion of artillery. Since the artillery had 
to be moved and repositioned all across the front with as little inter- 
ruption as possible in overall support available at any one time, the 
11th Marines CO planned to move his battalions directly into their 
new firing positions. This was preceded by an initial detailed 

Elements of the U.S. 25th Infantry sideslipped to the right and 
assumed responsibility for the Marine sector on the 17th (Map 22), 
and the KMCs and the 1st Battalion, 1 1th Marines moved into their 
new positions on 18 March. The other artillery battalions followed 
at two-day intervals, all battalions firing from their new positions by 
24 March. 

The movement of the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion (less 
Company A), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John T. O'Neill, 
was an unforgettable experience. Embarking on LSTs manned by a 
skeleton Japanese crew, the vessels headed for the Kimpo Peninsula. 

" Col T. A. Culhane, Jr., Comments, 4 Mar 59, and others. 

2" be Move to West Korea 


The weather was squally and foggy throughout, and the ships were 
completely blacked out at night with no facilities for emergency trans- 
mission of messages. There were many navigational hazards, but 
in spite of this, and the lack of adequate navigational equipment, the 
LSTs arrived at their destination without incident. 

Two days later, on 20 September, the 1st Tank Battalion and the 
antitank companies of the three infantry regiments also took the sea 
route to the new Division area in the west. 

Division Operation Order 8-52, dated 18 March, directed the 1st 
Marines to proceed by motor march from the Division reserve area 
at Camp TRIPOLI to the new Division area east of Munsan-ni, and 
there to move into front Sine positions. The 7th Marines, after being 
relieved on the 20th by elements of the 8th ROK Division, assembled 
at Camp Tripoli and moved by truck to .West Korea. Colonel 
Austin R. Bmnelli, who had replaced Colonel Custis Burton, Jr., as 
chief of staff, moved the forward CP personnel and prepared the new 
Division command post. 

After being relieved by the ROKs on the 23d, the 5th Marines 
departed their east coast area. Two days later the regiment arrived 
in the Munsan-ni area behind the 7th Marines and the remaining 
elements of the artillery regiment. 

The 5th Marines had originally been scheduled to occupy reserve 
positions on the Kimpo Peninsula, but plans were changed en route, 
The commanding general and his G-3 were appalled at the Division 
sector's width, and after General Selden had a chance to inspect the 
areas to be defended and talk over the situation with the commanders 
of the 1st and 7th Marines (Col Sidney S. Wade and Col Russell E. 
Honsowetz) , he decided that the 5th Marines should go into the line. 1 " 

A few hours after the 5th Marines convoy left the east coast on 
their 140-mile trans-Korea move, helicopters picked up the regimental 
and battalion commanders from their respective vehicles in the convoy 
and took them to the new Division CP. There they were assigned 
new defensive sectors and immediately reconnoitered the ground while 
awaiting the arrival of their units. By the time the regiment arrived, 
all preparations were made for them to move into positions and relieve 
a portion of the thinly stretched line of the 1st Marines. 

It had been a busy week for the 1st and 7 th Motor Transport 
Battalions, commanded respectively by Lieutenant Colonel Howard E. 

11 ibid. 


The East-Central Front 

Wertman and Major Herbert E. Pierce. Two hundred Division trucks 
and a like number of U.S. Army vehicles made up the long columns 
that shuttled back and forth across the peninsula. The plan provided 
for moving an infantry regiment every third day. For the drivers this 
meant a 140-mile trip, a return trip the following day, and a one-day 
layover for maintenance before commencing the new cycle. The 
artillery battalions, by order of X Corps, were retained until the 
latest possible date. 

The statistics of Operation mixmaster are impressive. It took 
5,716 truck loads and 80 DUKW loads to move most of the Division 
personnel, gear, and supplies. Sixty-three lowboys (flat-bed trailers) 
and 83 railroad cars were also utilized in addition to hundreds of jeeps 
and jeep trailers. Three LSDs and 11 LSTs sailed from Sokcho-ri to 
Inchon with the heaviest equipment. 

During the previous winter a sizable number of prefabricated shel- 
ters had been set up for supporting and headquarters units. Since 
timber, logs, and salvage materials were in short supply, the 1st 
Marine Division moved large quantites of these materials to the west 
coast in order to live as comfortably as possible under static warfare 

The operations of the 1st Marine Division in defense of the western 
sector of Line Jamestown do not come within the scope of Volume 
IV. The account of Marine activities in the new sector, under the 
operational control of I Corps, will be discussed in the fifth and final 
volume of this series. 

During 1951 the Korean War became a most unpopular military 
venture among Americans. As a consequence, letters and newspapers 
from home caused a certain amount of anxiety among citizen-soldiers 
in Korea. To counter any spirit of doubt which may have arisen, 
military leaders issued frank and honest replies to inquiring politicians. 

The esprit de corps of Marines was high, and they were well aware 
of their purpose in Korea. One noted author, on spending a couple 
of days among front-line Marines during January of 1952, told a 
group of officers at the Division CP that he "was impressed with the 
morale of the Marines on the MLR." He stated that he "had been 
prepared to find that they didn't know what they were fighting for 

The Move to West Korea 


or why they were there," However, he was encouraged to find that 
they knew exactly their purpose in the Korean fighting. 18 

The period of nearly 15 months covered by Volume IV was at that 
time the longest stretch of land warfare ever experienced by a major 
Marine unit. Even during the numerous island-hopping campaigns 
of World War II, the periods of combat were relatively brief for each. 

Glancing back over the year 1951 with the benefit of hindsight, it 
is evident that Marine "uncommon valor" during this period was 
supplemented by such outstanding innovations as helicopter-borne 
assaults and lightweight body armor, concepts brought to fruition by 
the pressure of combat. 

It is also apparent that Marine training, both for officers and en- 
listed men, paid off handsomely under the demands of practically 
every type of land warfare. The Division chalked up a commendable 
record of service fighting on the east-central front. Since the UN 
commander desired to have eusak's only amphibious trained and 
equipped division near a coast offering a suitable selection of landing 
beaches, the Division was originally positioned in the east. Not since 
the Inchon landing, however, had the Marines been employed in their 
specialty, amphibious assault. 

Subsequent to the unprecedented Chosin Reservoir campaign of 
late 1950 the Division reorganized and refitted in South Korea near 
Masan, Then in January and February of 1951 came the prolonged 
guerrilla-hunting campaign (Map 5) some 60 air miles north of 
Masan. Division operations in this area covered more than 1,000 
square miles." 

The mountainous terrain offered cover and concealment for the 
clandestine operations of far too many enemy groups. A solution to 
this problem was found in "rice paddy patrols"— groups ranging from 
a fire team to a squad in size which penetrated the mountain areas on 
foot to flush out small enemy bands. In retrospect, had one squadron 
of helicopters been available at that time, and its quick lift capabilities 
utilized, the increased mobility and surveillance would have made 
quite a difference in the conduct of the action, 

Although land-based Marine air power had been under operational 
control of the Fifth Air Force during the Chosin Reservoir fighting, 
a verbal agreement allowed the 1st MAW commander to provide 

, 10 Col F. B. Nihart, Comments regarding author James Micliener's visit to IstMarDiv, 
Ht of 23 Mar 59. 
"Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret.), Itr of 28 Jan 59. 


The East-Centfiil Fran! 

directly necessary support to the 1st Marine Division. At the same 
time, carrier-based Marine planes were flying on the west coast along 
with other Allied planes harrassing enemy traffic. 

During the guerrilla hunt VMO-6 planes provided air support to 
the 1st Marine Division while Marine attack aircraft were busy else- 
where along the Eighth Army front. Marine pilots, operating under 
JOC control, felt frustrated because they were unable to provide the 
timely close air support desired by the infantry. The Marine viewpoint 
held that too many links in the Air Force system of control caused 
an excessive delay in bringing air power over the target. This system 
continued for the remainder of the year. 

As an operation, the guerrilla hunt was merely a series of minor 
engagements, but it accomplished its purpose of clearing out most 
of the North Korean irregulars who had been a constant threat in 
the Eighth Army's rear. In addition, the numerous small patrols 
provided excellent training for the newly arrived replacements. 

The Eighth Army seemed to gain new vitality under General 
Ridgway. On the 18th of February, when the general learned that the 
enemy was withdrawing, he ordered a limited offensive. Operation 
KtLLER began three days later, and was followed by Operation ripper 
on 7 March. The purpose of these operations was twofold: (l) 
General Ridgway wanted to restore his army's fighting spirit after 
its two defeats during the 1950-1951 winter; and (2) he wished to 
keep the Chinese Reds off balance while they prepared for another 
Communist offensive. 

For the Marines these two operations were an experience with a 
strictly limited offensive. The advance was "buttoned up" as major 
units paid close attention to lateral contact. As the advance continued 
in March and April, mud proved to be an adversary second only to a 
formidable enemy using delaying tactics, and the Division as a whole 
had a thorough workout in the logistics of the offensive under adverse 

In early April the Division, as part of the Eighth Army, crossed the 
38th parallel and continued the attack to the north, the purpose being 
to threaten the suspected enemy buildup for an offensive. EusAK 
forces rolled onward while the enemy, using his roving defensive 
tactics, fought vigorously and withdrew. 

The long-expected enemy counterblow fell on the night of 22 April 

The Move to West Korea 


and resulted in the 1st Marine Division bearing the brunt of a ■18-hour 
attack (Map 10), This opening CCF assault in the IX Corps area 
of east-central Korea was intended to throw the Eighth Army off 
balance as a preliminary to aiming the main blow at 1 Corps in 
west Korea. 

The CCF attack opened a hole in the MLR large enough for a major 
breakthrough, and the Communists apparently expected to exploit 
this success to the fullest. However, the Allied line pulled back, 
consolidated, and held, as the Division's reserve regiment was thrown 
in to stem the tide. As the Marine flank was refused, the units on the 
left found themselves facing to the west while stopping the enemy 
thrust. Slowly, trading space for time, the Marines contained the 
enemy attack while the entire Eighth Army line organized new 

The enemy effort ground to a halt in the east-central sector, and the 
Chinese Reds were contravened in their attempt to take Seoul by 
May Day. Surprise and impetus were lost on the western front when 
they struck several days later, only to be stopped with frightful losses 
after a few gains on regimental fronts. The Allied line now held firm. 

The Division's war of maneuver had worked well in halting this 
round of the CCF offensive, but the Communists were far from 
finished. As 17 enemy divisions were still available to attack, the 
Marine division was shifted to the east on 1 May in preparation for 
an expected battle. 

On the 16th of May the Chinese offensive again opened, with the 
enemy hitting more to the east than had been expected, and making 
a deep but narrow penetration near the coast. The Marines moved 
eastward, established blocking positions, and engaged fringe units of 
the drive. This allowed the right flank Army division to move farther 
east and brake the enemy's rush. 

The enemy was dangerously overextended when the UN counter- 
stroke hit him late in May. For a month the Eighth Army attacked and 
advanced, the Marines slugging ahead day after day in the X Corps 
2one of action. CCF casualties mounted high, and Marine veterans 
of only a few months of Korean service saw scores of enemy corpses 
'eft behind on the battlefield as the enemy withdrew northward, 

This great UN counteroffensive netted prisoners all along the EUSAK 
front as remnants of CCF platoons and even companies threw down 
their arms. Marines captured their share. Upwards of 10,000 Chinese 

The East-Central Front 

surrendered to the Allies in a 10-day period— more prisoners than had 
been taken up to this time. 

As the Chinese withdrew northward they left determined NK.PA 
troops behind. The 1st Marine Division moved slowly forward, fight- 
ing for every inch of ground. So fierce was the enemy's resistance that 
at times during June the division commander was forced to commit 
all four regiments (the KMCs included) in the attack at the same 
time in order to seize designated objectives. This was a modification 
of accepted tactical doctrine, necessitated by the situation. 

Throughout March, April, and part of May, Marine pilots con- 
tinued to provide close air support not only for the 1st Marine Divi- 
sion, but also for other Allied units as directed by JOC. From the 
beginning of Operation strangle on 20 May this interdiction effort 
had first priority, and close air support to all infantry units was 
secondary. Difficulties in air-ground communication continued as 
radio frequencies were heavily burdened with traffic. Although the 
1st Marine Division received a proportionate share of the few air 
support missions flown, the frustrating time lag between requests for 
air support and the arrival of planes on target continued into the 
next year, 

Some planes were always available for front line support, although 
rarely ever enough according to infantrymen's opinion. When they 
had the chance, 1st MAW pilots viciously attacked the fleeing enemy 
to ease the way for advancing ground troops. During June the unre- 
lenting pressure of combined air-ground attacks sometimes caused 
large groups of enemy to surrender. Marines also captured thousands 
of rounds of enemy ammunition and other equipment. 

By the last week in June the Marines had entrenched themselves 
along the Division's assigned portion of the MLR and "caught their 
breath" after two months of hard fighting. In driving from the 
Hwachon Reservoir area to the Punchbowl, they had employed practi- 
cally every weapon and tactic that could be used in an all-out offensive. 
The Division then settled down to stable positions for a while, and 
some units had the opportunity to go into reserve and train. 

It was a recharged 1st Marine Division (the 5th and 11th Marines 
did not go into reserve during this period) which moved back into 
the lines at the end of August. The offensive which opened northeast 
of the Punchbowl on the 30th and lasted with few and brief interludes 
until 20 September was the equal of the June fighting in sustained 

The Move to West Korea 

ferocity. All four infantry regiments (including the KMCs) went up 
against seemingly impregnable opposition. 

The enemy's "stubborn defense of strong positions and many well- 
placed log and earth bunkers was similar to the tenacious tactics of the 
Japanese in World War II," according to a Navy report. "His artillery 
and mortar fires were effective, his minefields continued to be hazard- 
ous for many weeks, and his ability to dig in and fortify his positions 

After the^Oth^f September the EUSAK commander ordered that no 
further offensives be launched and that the MLR be stabilized. This 
■was a period of aggressive patrolling, local attacks for more advan- 
tageous pieces of terrain, and watchful waiting to determine the out- 
come of truce negotiations. In spite of Operation strangle, enemy 
vehicular movements increased at the end of the year, but 1st MAW 
pilots continually attempted to provide more support for all the 
infantry divisions. 

The mission of the 1st Marine Division at this time was to organize, 
construct, and defend its sector of the MLR, a front of more than 
13 miles. Although there were heavy local skirmishes, during the 
latter months of 1951 and the first 3 months of 1952, no great offensive 
drives were launched. Essentially, the Marines were engaged in an 
aggressive defense of their positions until they moved to West Korea. 

While all Marines were hoping that the conflict would soon end, 
there was no slackening of the customary vigilance. All hands 
remembered General Ridgway's words of the previous year, that it 
was "... a fight for our own freedom, our own survival . . . ," 10 
and this was their creed. 

These lines would have made a fitting epitaph for Marines who 
gave their lives in Korea. They had as worthy a cause as any fighting 
men of our history, for it had become increasingly plain since World 
War II that a stand must eventually be made against Communist 
encroachments. By going halfway around the world to fight the enemy 
°n his own doorstep, Americans may well have spared themselves a 
more bloody and costly future struggle nearer to their own homeland 
if not actually on their own soil. The designs of Red China and Soviet 
Russia were unmasked in Korea, and the people of the United States 
awakened to their peril after neglecting the Nation's defenses since 
1945. To that extent, therefore, the operations in Korea were a 
defeat for Communism. 

" PacFlf Interim Rpt No. 3, 15-25. 
See Ridgway's Declaration of Faith, Chapter 1. 


of Technical Terms 
and Abbreviations 

ADC— Assistant Division Com- 

AdmO — Administrative Order 

AD— Douglas "Skyraider" single en- 
gine attack plane 

AF — -Air Force 

AH— Hospital Ship 

AirDelPlat — Air Delivery Platoon 

AirO — Air Officer 

AirSptSec— Air Support Section 

AmphTracBn — Amphibian Tractor 

AmphTrkBn— Amphibian Truck 

ANGLICO— Air and Naval Gunfire 
Liaison Company 
' VmphBn— Armored 
ian Battalion 
AT — Antitank 

AutoMaintCo — Automotive Mainte- 
nance Company 

AutoSupCo — Automotive Supply 

BB— Battleship 

BIT — Battalion Landing Team 
Bn — Battalion 

BuMed— Bureau of Medicine and 

C-47 — Douglas Transport used by 
Air Force (same as R4D) 

CA — Heavy Cruiser 

CCF — Chinese Communist Forces 

CG — Commanding General 

CIC— Counter Intelligence Corps, 

CinCFE — Commander in Chief, Far 

CinCPac Fit— Commander in Chief, 

Pacific Fleet 
CinCUNC— Commander in Chief, 

United Nations Command 
CL — Light Cruiser 
CO — Commanding Officer 
Co — Company 

Com FltAirWing— Commander Fleet 

Air Wing 
ComNavFe- — Commander Naval 

Forces Far East 
ComPacFlt— Commander Pacific 


ComPhibGruOne — Commander Am- 
phibious Group One 
ComSeventh Fit— Commander Sev- 
enth Fleet 
ComUNBlockandCortFor — Com- 
mander United Nations Block- 
ade and Escort Force 
CP— Command Post 
CR — Command Report 
C/S— Chief of Staff 
CSG — Combat Service Group 
CSUSA— Chief of Staff, U. S. Army 
CTF — Commander Task Force 
CTG— Commander Task Group 
CVE— Escort Aircraft Carrier 
CVL— Light Aircraft Carrier 
DD — Destroyer 
DE — Destroyer Escort 
Det — Detachment 
DOW— Died of Wounds 
EmbO— Embarkation Order/Officer 
EngrBn— Engineer Battalion 
Eusak— Eighth U.S. Army in Korea 
FABn — Field Artillery Battalion 


634040 O62-20 


The East-Central Front 

FAC— Forward Air Controller 

FAF— Fifth Air Force 

FEAF — Far East Air Force 

fecom — Far East Command 

F4U — Chance- Vought "Corsair" Sin- 
gle-Engine Fighter-Bomber 

IMLM N— Chance- Vought "Corsair" 
Single-Engine Night Fighter 

F7F-3N— Grumman "Tigercat" 
Twin-Engine Night Fighter 

FMFPac — Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 

FO— Forward Observer 

FragOrder— Fragmentary Order 

Fum&BathPlat— Fumigation and 
Bath Platoon 

GHQ— General Headquarters 

Gru — Group 

H&SCo — Headquarters and Service 

HD — Historical Diary 
Hedron— Headquarters Squadron 
H03S— Sikorsky Helicopter 
HoBn — Headquarters Battalion 
HQMC — Headquarters, U.S. Marine 


InfDiv — Infantry Division (USA) 
I nterv— Interview 
ISUM — Intelligence Summary 
janis — Joint Army -Navy Intelli- 
gence Studies 
JCS— Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JMS — Japanese Minesweeper 
jspoG — Joint Strategic Planning and 

Operations Group 
JTF— Joint Task Force 
Kl A— Killed in Action 
KMC — Korean Marine Corps 
Ln — -Liaison 

LSD — Landing Ship, Dock 
LSM — Landing Ship, Medium 
LSMR — Landing Ship, Medium- 

LST— Landing Ship, Tank 
LSTH — Landing Ship, Tank-Casu- 
alty Evacuation 
LSU— Landing Ship, Utility 
Ltr — Letter 

LVT— Landing Vehicle, Tracked 

MAG— Marine Aircraft Group 

MAW — Marine Aircraft Wing 

MS — Manuscript 

MedBn — Medical Battalion 

Med AmbCo— Medical Ambulance 

Company (USA) 
MIA — Missing in Action 
MISD— Military Intelligence Service 

Detachment (USA) 
MLR — Main Line of Resistance, the 

main front line 

uito — North American AT— 6 
'Texan" Trainer; Single Engine 
Plane used as Airborne FAC and 
Target Spotting 
MP — Military Police 
MRO — Movement Report Office 
Msg — Message 
MSR— Main Supply Route 
MSTS— Military Sea Transport Serv- 

mtacs — Marine Tactical Air Control 

MTBn — Motor Transport Battalion 
NavBchGru — Naval Beach Group 
NavFE — Naval Forces Far East 
NCO— Noncommissioned Officer 
NK— North Korea (n) 
NKPA — North Korean People's Army 
N.d. — Date not given 
N.t. — Time not given 

0— Officer; Order 

OCMH— Office of the Chief of 
Military History (USA) 

01— Operation Instruction 
OpnO— Operation Order 
OpnPlan — Operation Plan 
OrdBn — Ordnance Battalion 

OY — Consolidated-Vultee Single- En- 
gine Light Observation Plane 
PhibGru— Amphibious Group 
PI R— Periodic Intelligence Report 
PL A — People's Liberation Army 
Plat — Platoon 

POL — Petroleum, Oil, Lubricants 
POR— Periodic Operation Report 

Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations 265 

POW— Prisoner of War 

Q M S u bs i stSu p Co — Quartermaster 

Subsistence Supply Company 


R4D — Douglas Twin -Engine Trans- 
port (Navy and Marine designa- 
tion of C~Al) 

R5D — Douglas Four-Engine Trans- 

RCT— Regimental Combat Team 

Recon— Reconnaissance 

Reinf — Reinforced 

RktBn — Rocket Battalion 

RM— Royal Marines 

ROK — Republic of Korea 

R&O File— Records and Orders File 

ROKA— Republic of Korea Army 

ROKN — Republic of Korea Navy 

Rpt- — Report 

SAC— Supporting Arms Coordinator 
SAR— Special Action Report 
Sec — Section 

SecDef — Secretary of Defense 

ServBn — Service Battalion 

SigBn— Signal Battalion 

SigRepCo — Signal Repair Company 

SitRpt — Situation Report 

SP— Shore Party 

SMC— Marine Supply Squadron 

TAC — Tactical Air Coordinator; 

Tactical Air Commander 
tacp— Tactical Air Control Party 


tadc — Tactical Air Direction Center 
T-AP— Transport operated by MSTS 

TBM— General Motors ' Avenger" 
Single-Engine Torpedo Bomber. 
Also used for Utility Purposes. 

TE — Task Element 

T/E — Table of Equipment 

Tel — Telephone Message 

TF — Task Force 

TG— Task Group 

TkBn— Tank Battalion 

Trk — Truck 

T/O— Table of Organization 
TU— Task Unit 

UDT — Underwater Demolition 

U/F— Unit of Fire 
UN— United Nations 
UNC— United Nations Command 
URpt— Unit Report 
USA — United States Army 
USAR — United States Army Reserve 
USAF — United States Air Force 
USMC— United States Marine Corps 
USMCR— United States Marine 

Corps Reserve 
USN— United States Navy 
USNR— United States Navy Reserve 
VMF— Marine Fighter Squadron 
VMF(N)— Marine All-Weather 

Fighter Squadron 
VMO— Marine Observation Squad- 

VMR — Marine Transport Squadron 
WD— War Diary 
WD Sum— War Diary Summary 
WIA— Wounded in Action 


Effective Strength of 
1st Marine Division 

Listed below are selected dates and figures wliicli represent the effective strength 
of the 1st Marine Division throughout the period 1951-1952. 


and USN 




30 Mar 51 





30 May 51 





30 Sep 51 





30 Mar 52 







Command and Staff List 
December 1950— March 1952 
1st Marine Division 

Commanding General MajGen Oliver P. Smith (to 23 Feb 1931 ) 

BrigGen Lewis B. Puller (from 24 Feb) 
MajGen Oliver P. Smith (from 5 Mar) 
MajGen Gerald C. Thomas {from 25 Apr) 
MajGen John T. Selden {from 11 Jan 1952) 

Asst Division Commander. .BrigGen Edward A, Craig {to 20 Jan 1951) 

MajGen Edward A. Craig {from 21 Jan) 
BrigGen Lewis B. Puller {from 2 Feb) 
BrigGen William J. Whaling (from 20 May) 

Chief of Staff Col Gregon A. Williams (to 22 Jan 1951) 

BrigGen Gregon A. Williams (from 23 Jan) 
Col Edward W. Snedeker (from 27 Jan) 
Col Francis M. McAlister (from 23 May) 
Col Richard G. Weede {from 10 Jun) 
Co! Victor H. Krulak (from 29 Jun) 
Col Richard G. Weede (from 26 Nov) 
Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 15 Feb 1952) 
Col Austin R. Brunelli (from 23 Mar) 

G-l LtCol Bryghte D. Godbold (to 13 Feb 1951) 

Col Bryghte D. Godbold v(from 14 Feb) 
Col Wesley M. Piatt (from 31 May) 
Col Gould P. Groves (from 27 Sep) 
Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 20 Nov) 

G-2 Col Bankson T. Holcomb, Jr. (to 5 Feb 1951) 

LtCol Ellsworth G. Van Orman (from 6 Feb) 
LtCol Joseph P. Savers (from 8 Mar) 
LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 13 Aug) 

G-3 Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., (to 7 May 1951) 

Col Richard G. Weede (from 8 May) 
Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 30 Jul) 
LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (from 14 Nov) 

G-4 Col Francis M. McAlister (to 25 Jan 1951) 

LtCol Charles L. Banks (from 26 Jan) 
Col Charles L. Banks (from 14 Feb) 
Col Frank P. Hager (from 24 May) 
Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 19 Nov) 
Col Robert A. McGill (from 9 Feb 1952) 


The East-Central front 

Special Stajj 

Adjutant Maj Philip J. Costello (to 18 Feb 1951) 

LtCol Foster C LaHue (from 19 Feb) 
LtCol Homer E. Hire (from 19 Jun) 
Maj James K, Young (from 15 Oct) 

Air Officer , . . Maj James N. Cupp (to 20 Apr 1951) 

LtCoi Edward V. Finn (from 21 Apr) 

Amphibian Tractor Officer. .LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. (to 26 Sep 1951) 

LtCol Michiel Dobervich (from 27 Sep) 

Anti-Tank Officer Maj John H. Blue (to 27 Apr 1951) 

Maj William L. Bates (from 28 Apr) 
Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 3 Sep) 
Maj Franklin J. Harte (from 9 Nov) 
Maj John P, Lanigan (from 31 Dec) 
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 2 Mar 1952) 

Armored Amphibian Officer. LtCol Francis H. Cooper (to 15 Jun 1951) 

Maj George M. Warnke (from 16 Jun) 
LtCol John T. O'Neill (from 2 Oct) 

Artillery Officer , . . LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 5 Mar 1951) 

Col Joseph L. Winecoff (from 6 Mar) 
LtCol Cusds Burton, Jr. (from 5 Aug) 
LtCol George B. Thomas (from 8 Nov) 
LtCol Dale H. Heely (from 1 Jan 1952) 
Col Bruce T. Hemphill (from 11 Jan) 
Col Frederick P. Henderson (from 27 Mar) 

Chaplain Cmdr Robert M. Schwyhart, USN (to 17 Feb 


Cmdr Francis W. Kelly, USN (from 18 Feb) 
Cmdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN (from 8 Oct) 

Chemical Warfare and 
Radiological Defense 

Officer Maj John H. Blue (to 15 Jul 1951) 

Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 3 Sep) 
Maj Luther H. Hake (from 21 Nov) 
Maj John P. Lanigan (from 31 Dec) 
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 29 Feb 1952) 

Dental Officer Capt Mack Meradith, USN (to 20 May 1951) 

Cmdr James L. Bradley, USN (from 21 May) 
Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (from 15 Jul) 

Embarkation Officer Maj Jules M. Rouse (to 9 Mar 1951) 

LtCol Louis C. Griffin (from 10 Mar) 
LtCol Clifford E. Quilici (from 11 Aug) 
LtCol Corbtn L. West (from 26 Oct) 
LtCol John H. Papurca (from 6 Dec) 
........ .LtCol John H. Partridge (to 10 Jun 1951) 

LtCol John V. Kelsey (from 11 Jun) 
LtCol August L. Vogt (from 19 Sep) 

Command and Staj] List 


Food Director 

Inspector * . 

Exchange Officer Capt Wilbur C Conley (to 16 May 1951) 

WU Prank C Trumble (from 17 May) 
IstLt George W. Krahn (from 29 Aug) 
Capt Robert W. Schmidt (from 26 Oct) 
Capt Robert J. McKay (from 6 Mar 1952) 
Capt Benjamin Reed (from 26 Mar) 
. LtCol Norman R. Nickerson (to 6 May 1951) 
LtCo! George G, Pafford (from 7 May) 
IstLt Herbert E. McNabb (from 16 Aug) 
.IstLt John M. Patrick (to 26 Jun 1951) 
IstLt Theodore L. Richardson (from 27 jun) 
2dLt Francis X. Goss (from 8 Jan 1952) 
.Col John A. White (to 26 Apr 1951) 
Col Gould P. Groves (from 27 Apr) 
LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 21 jun) 
Col Russell N. Jordahl (from 30 Jun) 
LtCol Alfred H. Marks (from 1 Oct) 
Col William K. Davenport, Jr. (from 19 Nov) 
.LtCol Albert H. Schierman (to 8 May 1951) 
LtCol Randolph S. D. Lockwood (from 9 May 
Cmdr Geoffrey E. Carlisle, USN (from 28 Oct 
LtCdr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (from 6 Mar 

.LtCol Henry W. Seelcy, Jr. (to 26 jun 1951) 
LtCol Howard E. Wertman (from 27 Jun) 
Maj Herbert E. Pierce (from 17 Aug) 
Maj Walter R. O Quinn (from 3 Jan 1952) 
. LtCol Loren S. Fraser (to 12 Aug 1951) 
Maj Charles A. Lipot (from 13 Aug) 
Maj John V. Downes (from 23 Mar 1952) 
.Capt Donald L. Shenaut (to 9 Jul 1951) 
Maj Frank W. Keith (from 10 Jul) 
Maj James M. Rogers (from 1 Nov) 
Maj Harold G. Borth (from 11 Jan 1952) 
.Maj Frederick Bove (to 13 May 1951) 
IstLt Robert P. Sanders (from 14 May) 
IstLt Robert W. Blum (from 26 Jul) 
IstLt Edward D. Gelzer, Jr. (from 10 Aug) 
CWO George C. Hunter (from 9 Feb 1952) 
.Capt John H. Griffin (to 20 Apr 1951) 
Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 21 Apr) 
Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 6 Aug) 
LtCol William F. Pulver (from 18 Oct) 
.Capt Michael C. Capraro (to 14 Apr 1951) 
IstLt Jeremiah A. O'Lcary, Jr. (from 15 Apr) 
IstLt Robert S. Gray (from 27 Dec) 

Legal Officer 

Motor Transport Officer. . , 

Naval Gunfire Officer 

Ordnance Officer 

Postal Officer 

Pruvost Marshall 

Information Officer. 


The East-Central front 

Shore Party Officer LtCol Henry P. Crowe (to 10 May 1951) 

LtCol Horace S, Figuers (from 1 1 May) 
LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 7 Jul) 
LtCol George G. Pafford (from 29 Sep) 
LtCol Franklin B, Nihart (from 20 Dec) 
LtCol Warren S. Sivcrtsen (from 9 Mar 1952) 

Signal Officer LtCol Robert L. Schreier (to 7 Jun 1951) 

LtCol Jino J. D'Alessandro (from 8 Jun) 

Special Services Officer LtCol John M. Bathum (to 10 Sep 1951) 

Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 11 Sep) 
LtCol Franklin B, Nihart (from 28 Oct) 
IstLt Joseph H. McDannold (from 20 Dec) 
Capt John W. Algeo (from 1 6 Feb 1952) 
LtCol John E. Gorman (from 9 Mar) 

Supply Officer Col Gordon E. Hendricks (to 29 Jun. 1951) 

Col Chester R. Allen (from 30 Jun) 

Surgeon Capt Eugene R. Hering, USN (to 24 Jan 1951) 

Cmdr Howard A. Johnson, USN (from 25 Jan 

Capt Louis R. Kirkpatrick, USN (from 10 Jul 

Tank Officer LtCol Harry T. Milne (to 22 Apr 1951) 

LtCol Holly H. Evans (from 23 Apr) 
Maj Walter E. Reynolds (from 9 Feb 1952) 

Commanding Officer, Di- 
vision Rear Echelon 

Headquarters Col Harvey S. Walseth (to 23 Jul 1951) 

Col Wilburt S. Brown (from 24 Jul to 19 Nov) 

Commanding Officer LtCol Marvin T. Starr (to 23 Apr 1951) 

LtCol William P. Alston (from 24 Apr) 
Col Gould P. Groves (from 11 May) 
LtCol Charles W. Harrison (from 29 Jun) 
LtCol Alfred H. Marks (from 29 Aug) 
Col William K. Davenport, Jr. (from 19 Nov) 
Maj Corbin L. West (from 15 Jan 1952) 
Col Robert T. Stivers (from 18 Feb) 

Executive Officer Maj Frederick Simpson (to 15 Aug 1951) 

Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 16 Aug) 
Maj Corbin L. West (from 10 Dec) 
Capt "J" E. Hancey (from 22 Jan 1952) 
Maj Corbin L. West (from 18 Feb 1952) 

Command and Staff List 


Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Company . . .Maj Frederick Simpson (to 15 Aug 1951) 

Maj William O, Cain, Jr. (from 16 Aug) 
Maj Corbin L. West (from 10 Dec) 
Capt "J" E. Hancey (from 21 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Military Police Company. .Capt John H. Griffin (to 20 Apr 1951) 

Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 21 Apr) 
Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 19 Sep) 
LtCol William F. Pulver (from 18 October) 

Commanding Officer, 

Reconnaissance Company, .Maj Walter Call (to 26 Mar 1951) 

Capt Robert L. Autry (from 27 Mar) 
Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (from 10 Sep) 

1st Marines 

Commanding Officer .Col Lewis B. Puller (to 24 Jan 1951) 

Col Francis M. McAltster (from 25 Jan) 
Col Wilburt S. Brown (from 19 May) 
Col Thomas A. Wornham (from 18 Jul) 
Col Sidney S, Wade (from 13 Oct) 

Executive Officer LtCol Robert W. Rickert (to 7 Jan 1951) 

LtCol Alan Sutter (from 8 Jan) 

LtCol Robert W. Rickert (from 16 Jan) 

LtCol Alan Sutter (from 12 Feb) 

LtCol Donald M. Schmuck (from 31 May) 

LtCol John A. McAlister (from 3 Sep) 

LtCol Clifford F. Qui lid (from 7 Jan 1952) 

S-l Capt William G. Reeves (to 8 Jan 195 1 ) 

Capt David M. Cox (from 9 Jan) 

Capt John S. Court (from 5 Sep) 

Maj Elizia M. Cable (from 21 Oct) 

Capt Thomas C. Palmer (from 12 Feb 1952) 

Capt Leroy V. Corbett (from 28 Feb) 

S-2 Capt Stone W. Quillian (to 10 May 1951) 

Capt Glenn F. Miller (from 1 1 May) 
Capt Robert G. Cadwallader (from 2 Oct) 
Capt Fred K. Cottrell (from 15 Dec) 
Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 4 Mar 1952) 

s -3 Maj Robert E. Lorigan (to 20 Jul 1951) 

Maj Ralph "C" Rosacker (from 21 Jul) 
Maj John P. Lanigan (from 4 Mar 1952) 

S-4 Maj Thomas T. Grady (to 27 Apr 1951) 

Capt Augustine B. Reynolds, Jr. (from 28 Apr) 
Maj Thomas A. Burns (from 5 Jul) 
Maj John L. Kelly (from 5 Oct) 
Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 27 Dec) 


The Eiut-Cent-ra! Front 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company . , Maj Robert K. McClelland (to it Mar 1951) 

Maj Carl E. Walker (from 12 Mar) 
Capt George E. Petro (from 11 May) 
IstLt Roscoe L, Barrett, Jr. (from 15 Aug) 
IstLt James L. Burnett (from 3 Oct) 
Capt James P. Egan (from 2} Feb 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Anti-Tank Company Capt George E. Petro (to 10 May 1951) 

IstLt John A. Dudrey (from 1 I May) 
IstLt Magness W, Marshall (from 2 Oct) 
Capt Frederick A. Hale (from 27 Nov) 

Commanding Officer, 
4.2 Inch Mortar 

Company Capt Frank J. Fatircck (to 8 Feb 1951) 

IstLt Edward E. Kauffer (from 9 Feb) 

Capt Otis R. Waldrop (from 5 Mar) 

Capt Edward E. Kauffer (from 4 Jun) 

IstLt Robert W. Jorn (from 9 Aug) 

IstLt Thomas J. Holt (from 2 Oct) 

Capt Robert G. Cadwallader (from 23 Dec) 

Capt George E. Lawrence (from IS Mar 1952) 

1 1/ Battalion, 1st Marines 

Commanding Officer LtCo! Donald M. Schmuck (to 27 Feb 1951) 

LtCol Robley E. West (from 28 Feb) 
Maj Thomas T. Grady (from 15 Jun) 
LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr. (from 7 Jul) 
Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr. (from 14 Sep) 
LtCol John E. Gorman (from !6 Sep) 
LtCol John H. Papurca (from 7 Mar 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Robley E. West (to 27 Feb 1951) 

Maj David W, Bridges (from 28 Feb) 
Maj Thomas T. Grady (from 10 Jun) 
Maj Wesley C, Noren (from 15 jun) 
Maj Edgar F. Carney, Jr. (from 20 Jul) 
Maj Leo V. Gross (from 18 Dec) 
Maj Ralph "C" Rosacker (from 4 Mar 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company ........ Capt William B. Hopkins (to .30 Jan 1951) 

IstLt Btuce E. Geisert (from 31 Jan) 
IstLt Norman W. Hicks (from 1 Jul) 
IstLt John B. Franklin (from 18 Aug) 
IstLt Stuart P. Barr. Jr. (from 22 Oct) 
IstLt Nicholas J. Sheppard (from 28 Nov) 

Command and Staff List 


IstLt Harry A. Spaight (from 26 Dec) Edwin H. Heim (from 20 Feb 1952) 
2ndLt Vinton L. Spencer (from 4 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company A Opt Robert H. Barrow (to 30 Jan 195 1 ) 

Capt Thomas J. Bchannon (from 31 Jan) 
IstLt Calvin R. Baker (from I Jul) 
Capt Edwin H. Heim (from 20 Oct) 
IstLt Clifton M. Grubbs (from 20 Feb 1952) 
Capt Anthony Novak (from 17 Mar) 
IstLt Morace M. Dritley (from 26 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company B Capt Wesley C. Noren (to 12 Mar 1951) 

Capt John F. Coffey (from 13 Mar) 
IstLt James H. Cowan, Jr. (from 8 Jun) 
IstLt Robert G. Work (from 1 Aug) 
IstLt Richard S. Kitchen (from 18 Aug) 
Capt Roy J. Wride (from 16 Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company C Capt Robert P. Wray (to 9 May 1951) 

IstLt William A. Craven (from 10 May) 
IstLt William F. Koehnlein (from 12 Jun) 
Capt Michael D. Harvath (from 21 Jul) 
Capt George E. Lawrence (from 10 Oct) 
Capt Kenneth F. Swiger (from 7 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Weapons Company . , Maj William L. Bates (to 28 Feb 1951) 

IstLt William F. Koehnlein (from 1 Mar) 

Capt Wesley C. Noren (from 13 Mar) 

Maj John F. Coffey (from 8 Jun) 

Capt Benjamin W. Muntz (from 5 Jul) 

Maj William O. Cain, Jr. (from 14 Jul) 

Maj John F. Morris (from 14 Aug) 

Maj Fletcher B. Wycoff (from 9 Sep) 

Capt James P. Egan (from 27 Dec) 

Capt George E. Lawrence (from 21 Feb 1952) 

IstLt Joseph E, Lee (from 18 Mar) 

Maj Stanley N. McLeod (from 27 Mar) 

2d Bat ted ion, 1st Marines 

Commanding Officer LtCol Allan Sutter (to 7 Jan 1951) 

Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 8 Jan) 
LtCol Allan Sutter (from 15 Jan) 
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 13 Feb) 
LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from 15 Mar) 
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 5 Jun) 
LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from 20 Jun) 


The East-Central Front 

LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 14 Aug) 
LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 28 Oct) 
LtCol Theil H. Fisher (from 3 Jan 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Clarence J. Mabry (to 7 Jan 1951) 

Maj Whitman S. Bartley (from 8 Jan) 
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 15 Jan) 
Maj Whitman S. Bartley (from 13 Feb) 
Maj Clarence J. Mabry (from 15 Mar) 
Maj Jules M, Rouse (from 10 Jun) 
Maj John P. Lanigan (from 6 Aug) 
Maj Franklin J. Harte (from 26 Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company Capt Raymond DeWees, Jr. (to 9 Sep 1951) 

2dLt Robert A. Arning (from 10 Sep) 
IstLt George H, Benskin, Jr. (from 30 Oct) 
IstLt Frank E. Guthrie (from 3 Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company D Capt Welby W. Cronk (to 4 Mar 1951) 

IstLt Theodore Culpepper (from 5 Mar) 
IstLt Alexander L. Michaux, Jr. (from 19 Apr) 
IstLt jay "J" Thomas (from 11 Jun) 
IstLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from 9 Aug) 
IstLt Robert E. Lundberg (from 15 Sep) 
2dLt Arthur H. Woodruff (from 25 Sep) 
IstLt Richard A. Bonifas. (from 5 Oct) 
IstLt George H. Benskin, Jr. (from 16 Oct) 
Capt Richard A. Bonifas (from 30 Oct) 
IstLt Robert J, Lahr (from 3 Nov) 
Capt Robert N. Kreider (from 13 Nov) 
Capt John H. Lauck (from 26 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company E Capt Jack A. Smith (to 9 Mar 1951) 

IstLt Johnny L, Carter (from 10 Mar) 
IstLt Donald L. Evans, Jr. (from 9 Aug) 
Capt Ralph V, Harper (from 14 Aug) 
IstLt Robert J. Lahr (from 14 Sep) 
2dLt William K. Rockey (from 25 Sep) 
IstLt Kenneth E, Will (from 5 Oct) 
Capt James H. Reedet (from 16 Oct) 
Capt Charles J. Irwin, Jr. (from 21 Feb 1952) 
Capt Jack H. Hagler (from 17 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company F Capt Goodwin C. Groff (to 9 Jun 1951) 

IstLt Patrick McGrotty (from 10 Jun) 
Capt Frederick A. Hale, Jr. (from 4 Sep) 
Capt Neville G. Hall, Jr. (from 21 Nov) 

Command and Staff List 


IstLt John A. Barry (from 29 Dec) 
lstLt Robert J. Lahr (from 11 Mar 1952) 
Capt Victor A. Kleber, Jr. (from 18 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Weapons Company Capt William A. Kerr (to 28 Feb 1951) 

IstLt Russell A. Davidson (from 1 Mar) 
Maj Carl E. Walker (from 12 May) 
Capt Russell A. Davidson (from 2 Jul) 

Mai J° lin 1 Ke % ( fronl 22 J ul ) 

Maj William S. Witt (from 5 Oct) 

Capt John W. Algeo (from 20 Nov) 

Maj William S. Witt (from 20 Jan 1952) 

Capt John W. Algeo (from 3 Feb) 

IstLt Clarence G. Moody, Jr. (from 17 Feb) 

Capt Charles J. Irwin, Jr. (from 18 Mar) 

3d Battalion, 1st Marines 

Commanding Officer LtCol Thomas L. Ridge (to 15 Feb 1951) 

LtCol Virgil W. Banning (from 16 Feb) 
Maj Joseph D. Trompeter (from 25 Apr) 
Maj Edwin H. Simmons (from 8 May) 
LtCol Homer E, Hire (from 15 May) 
LtCol Foster C LaHue (from 19 Jul) 
LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (from 13 Nov) 

Executive Officer Maj Reginald R, Myers (to 25 Apr) 

Maj Edwin H. Simmons (from 26 Apr) 
Maj Joseph D. Trompeter (from 15 May) 
Maj Ralph "C" Rosacker (from 7 Jun) 
Maj Rodney V. Reighard (from 22 July) 
Maj Thell H. Fisher (from 3 Oct) 
Maj Robert V. Perkins (from 4 Jan 52) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company Capt Roy N. Courington (to 16 Feb 1951) 

IstLt Edgar A. Crum (from 17 Feb) 
IstLt Daniel R. Evans (from 3 Mar) 
Capt Clarence E. Corley, Jr. (from 20 Mar) 
IstLt Thomas J. Holt (from 9 Aug) 
Capt Earle E. Carr (from 1 Sep) 
2dLt Joseph D. Reed (from 3 Oct) 
2dLt Robert C. Morton (from 4 Jan 1952) 
Capt Harold R. Connolly (from 22 Feb) 
Capt Donald C. Mack (from 15 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company G Capt Carl L. Sitter (to 13 Feb 1951) 

IstLt Horace L. Johnson (from 14 Feb) 
IstLt Thomas J. Holt (from 26 May) 


The EaSl-CvtUrai Front 

IstLt Fred G, Redmon (from 1 Jun) 

Capt Varge G. Frisbie (from 5 Jun) 

IstLt Harold R. Connolly (from 20 Jul) 

Capt Fred A. Kraus (from 8 Nov) 

IstLt Richard A. Krajnyak (from 19 Feb 1952) 

Capt Wilford L. Stone (from 17 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company H Capt Clarence E. Corley, Jr. (to 19 Mar 1951) 

IstLt Wiiliam J. Allert (from 20 Mar) 
IstLt Daniel R. Evans (from 8 May) 
IstLt James L. Burnett (from 8 Jun) 
IstLt Herbert M. Anderson (from 15 Jun) 
IstLt James L. Burnett (from 21 Sep) 
Capt Earle E. Carr (from 5 Oct) 
Capt James B, Ord, Jr. (from 17 Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company I IstLt Joseph R. Fisher (to 7 Apr 1951) 

IstLt William Swanson (from 8 Apr) 
Capt Stone W. Quill ian (from 15 May) 
IstLt Norbert D, Carlson (from 5 Aug) 
Capt Leroy V. Corbett (from 7 Sep) 
Capt Donald C. Mack (from 19 Jan 1952) 
Capt Richard B. Smith (from 22 Feb) 

Commanding Officer, 

Weapons Company Maj Edwin H. Simmons (to 25 Apr 1951) 

IstLt James F. Williams (from 26 Apr) 
Capt Otis R. Waldrop (from 6 Jun) 
Maj Henry Brzezinslu (from 19 Jun) 
Capt Varge G. Frisbie (from 6 Aug) 
Maj Thell H. Fisher (from 31 Aug) 
IstLt Thomas C. Holleman (from 2 Oct) 
Maj Robert V, Perkins (from 15 Nov) 
Capt Earle E. Carr (from 4 Jan 1952) 
IstLt Hugh P. Murphy (from 25 Jan) 

5 ih Marines 

Commanding Officer LtCol Raymond L. Murray (to 23 Jan 1951) 

Col Raymond L. Murray (from 24 Jan) 

Col Richard W, Hay ward (from 14 Mar) 

Col Richard G. Weede (from 7 Aug) 

Col Frank P, Hager, Jr. (from 19 Nov) 

Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (from 23 Feb 1952) 

Executive Officer LtCo! Joseph L. Stewart (to 13 Feb 1951) 

LtCol John W. Stevens, II (from 14 Feb) 
LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14 Mar) 
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 4 Apr) 
LtCol Francis H. Cooper (from 17 Jun) 

Command ana IStaff List 

LtCol Virgil W. Banning (from 22 Sep) 
LtCol John T. Rooney (from 13 Dec) 
LtCol John A. Saxten (from 19 Mar 1952) 

S-l Capt Alton C. Weed (to 1 Mar 1951) 

Capt Jack E. Hawthorn (from 2 Mar) 
Capt George A. Rheman, Jr. (from 17 Mar) 
Capt Harley L. Grant (from 25 Aug) 

S-2 IstLt Richard M. Woodard (to 3 Feb 1951) 

Capt Eugene F. Langan (from A Feb) 
Maj Nicholas G. W. Thome (from 9 Aug) 
Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 17 Nov) 
Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 31 Jan 1952) 

S-3 Maj Lawrence W. Smith, Jr. (to 8 Mar 1951) 

Maj Robert E, Baldwin (from 9 Mar) 
LtCol Glen E. Martin (from 24 Jun) 
Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr. (from 1 1 Jul) 
Maj Gerald P. Averill (from 10 Oct) 
Maj David A. Brewster, Sr. (from 15 Dec) 

S-4 Maj Harold Wallace (to 9 Mar 1951) 

Maj William E, Baugh (from 10 Mar) 
Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 11 Aug) 
Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 22 Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company Capt Jack E. Hanthorn (to 1 Mar 1951) 

IstLt Richard M. Woodard (from 2 Mar) 
IstLr Lee J, Cary (from 22 Jun) 
Capt Howard H. Dismcier (from 12 Sep) 
IstLt George "T" Capatanos (from I Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 

Antitank Company IstLt Almarion S. Bailey (to 8 Apr 1951) 

IstLt jo M. Van Meter (from 9 Apr) 
IstLt William E. Kerrigan (from 23 Jul) 
Capt Edgar F. Moore, Jr. (from 15 Aug) 

Commanding Officer, 
4.2 Inch Mortar 

Company IstLt Robert M. Lucy (to 25 Feb 1951) 

IstLt Robert H. Uskurait (from 26 Feb) 
IstLt John A. Buchanan (from 11 Sep) 
Capt Yale B. Davis (from 29 Dec) 

1st Bat I til ion, 5th Marines 

Commanding Officer LtCol John W. Stevens, II (to 20 Feb 1951) 

LtCol John W. Hopkins (from 21 Feb) 
LtCol William P. Alston (from 21 Jun) 
Maj Kirt W. Norton (from 9 Nov) 
Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 25 Nov) 



The East-Central Front 

Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 
Service Company . . 

i Officer, 
Weapons Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Company A 

Commanding Officer, 
Company B 

LtCol Kirt W. Norton (from 2 Dec) 
LtCoI Louis N. King (from 13 Jan 1952) 
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 12 Feb) 

. .Maj Merlin R. Olson (to 8 Apr 1951) 
Maj Donald J. Kendall, Jr. (from 9 Apr) 
Maj Kirt W. Norton (from 9 Aug) 
Maj Robert L. Autry (from 9 Nov) 
Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 2 Dec) 
Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (from 31 Dec) 

Capt George A. Rheman, Jr. (to 11 Mar 1951) 

2dLt Robert H. Corbet (from 12 Mar) 
IstLt Andrew V. Marusak (from 29 Mar) 
IstLt Frank J. Meers (from 12 Jul) 
2dLt Vincent B, Murphy, Jr. (from 3 Oct) 
IstLt Parks H. Simpson (from 25 Oct) 
IstLt Thomas J. Hermes (from 13 Nov) 

Capt Almond H. Soltom (to 5 Mar 1951) 

IstLt Poul F. Pedersen (from 6 Mar) 
Capt Donald D. Pomerleau (from 6 Apr) 
Maj Albert Hartman (from 13 Apr) 
Capt Raymond H, Spuhler (from 8 May) 
IstLt Frank J. Meers (from 4 Jun) 
Capt Lucian F. May (from 12 JuJ) 
Maj David A. Brewster, Sr. (from 1 Sep) 
Capt Harry A. Mathew (from 9 Nov) 
Capt Nicholas G. W. Thorne (from 17 Nov) 
Maj Lowell T. Keagy (from 31 Dec) 

IstLt Loren R. Smith {to 16 Feb 1951) 

Capt Walter E. G. Godenius (from 17 " 
Capt John L. Kelly (from 9 Apr) 
Capt Richard M. Woodard (from 1 Jul) 
Capt Eugene F, Langan (from 12 Aug) 
Capt Frederick B. CJunie (from 5 Nov) 
IstLt Merrill Waide, Jr. (from 24 Jan 1952) 
IstLt Ernest S. Lee (from 18 Feb) 

IstLt John R. Hancock (to 7 Feb 1951) 

IstLt Michael V. Palatas (from 8 Feb) 
IstLt James T, Cronin (from 17 Feb) 
IstLt William E. Kerrigan (from 8 Jun) 
IstLt Stuart H. Wright (from 30 Jun) 

Command and Staff List 

Commanding Officer, 
Company C 

Commanding Officer . 

Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Commanding Officer, 

IstLt John A. Hayes (from 12 Jul) 

Capt Louis R. Daze (from 21 Jul) 

Capt Charles M. MacDonald, jr. (from 2 1 Nov) 

. . .Capt Jack R. Jones (to 8 May 1951) 
IstLt Richard J. Schening (from 9 May) 
IstLt Robert E. Warner (from 29 May) 
Capt Lucian F. May (from 4 Sep) 
Capt Harry A. Mathew (from 22 Jan 1952) 

2d Bat i diem, 5th Marines 

. . .LtCol Harold S. Roise (to 19 Feb 1951) 
LtCol Glen E. Martin (from 20 Feb) 
Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr. (from 24 Jun) 
LtCol Houston Stiff (from 8 Jul) 
Maj William E. Baugh (from 3 Dec) 
LtCol George G. Pafford (from 27 Dec) 
LtCol William P. Gushing (from 14 Mar 1952) 

. . . Maj John L. Hopkins (to 20 Feb 1951 ) 
Maj Theodore F. Spiker (from 21 Feb) 
Maj Merwin H. Silverthorn, Jr. (from 9 Apr) 
Maj Robert E. Baldwin (from 25 Jun) 
Maj Gerald P. Averill (from 3 Sep) 
Maj Robert W. Rynerson (from 9 Sep) 
Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 26 Sep) 
Maj William L. Sims (from 9 Dec) 
Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 27 Dec) 
Maj William P. Gushing (from 21 Feb 1952) 
Maj Robert S. Hudson (from 14 Mar) 

. Capt Franklin B. Mayer (to 9 Jan 1951) 
IstLt Charles "H" Dalton (from 10 Jan) 
Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 21 Feb) 
IstLt John R. Hinds (from 2 Jul) 
IstLt Richard T. Hauar (from 12 Jul) 
IstLt Harold L. Michael (from 8 Aug) 
IstLt Dexter H. Kimball (from 25 Sep) 
IstLt Otis "Z" McConnell, Jr. (from 23 Dec) 
IstLt Emmett T. Hill, Jr. (from 15 Mar 1952) 

.Capt Samuel S. Smith (to 11 Jun 1951) 
IstLt John P. Cooney (from 12 Jun) 
Capt Ray N. Joens (from 28 Jun) 
Capt Victor Sawina (from 26 Sep) 
IstLt Tom G. Fagles (from 7 Oct) 

The East-Central Front 

Capt Philip A. Davis (from 23 Dec) 
IstLt Emmitt T. Hill (from 13 Feb 1952) 
Capt William A. Harper (from 25 Feb) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company E IstLt James F, Roberts (to 9 Jan 1951) 

Capt Franklin B. Mayer (from 10 Jan) 

Capt William E. Melby (from 9 Apr) 

IstLt Bernard W. Christofferson (from 20 Apr) 

IstLt Warren H. Allen (from 12 Jun) 

Capt William E. Melby (from 18 Jun) 

IstLt Warren H. Allen (from 9 Jul) 

Capt William L. Wallace (from 3 Aug) 

Capt Warren H. Allen (from 3 Oct) 

IstLt Jo M. Van Meter (from 18 Oct) 

Capt Charles C. Matthews (from 4 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company F IstLt Charles "H" Dalton (to 8 Jan 1951) 

IstLt George Janiszewski (from 9 Jan) 
Capt William O. Cain, Jr. (from 20 Jan) 
IstLt George Janiszewski (from 20 Feb) 
IstLt James H. Honeycutt, Jr. (from 9 Apr) 
IstLt Harold L. Michael (from 23 Jul) 
Capt William E. Melby (from 11 Aug) 
Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 4 Nov) 
Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 14 Mar 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Weapons Company Maj Glen E. Martin (to 19 Feb 1951) 

Capt John Stepanovich (from 20 Feb) 
Capt Elliot B. Lima (from 6 Apr) 
IstLt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 17 Aug) 
Maj Warren F. Lloyd (from 15 Sep) 
Capt Arvil B. Hendrickson (from 25 Sep) 
Maj William L. Sims (from 4 Nov) 
Capt William A. Harper (from 23 Dec) 
Capt Harold C. Fuson (from 25 Feb 1952) 
Capt Russell L. Silverthorn (from 16 Mar) 

3d Battalion, 5th Marines 

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert D. Taplett (to 13 Feb 1951) 

LtCol Joseph L. Stewart (from 14 Feb) 
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 14 Mar) 
Maj Morse "L" Holladay (from 4 Apr) 
LtCol Donald R. Kennedy (from 16 Jun) 
Maj William E. Baugh (from 23 Sep) 
LCol Bernard W. McLean (from 13 Oct) 
LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 25 Feb 

Command and Staff List 


Executive Officer . . 

Command trig Officer, 
Headquarters and 
Service Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Company G 

Commanding Officer, 
Company H 

ing Officer, 

T . ■ 

. . Maj Harold E. Swain {to 7 May 1951) 
Maj Albert Hartman (from 8 May) 
Maj William E. Baugh (from 11 Aug) 
Maj Donald D. Pomerleau (from 27 Sep) 
Maj William E. Baugh (from 13 Oct) 
Maj Donald D. Pomerleau (from 30 Nov) 
Maj Paul H. Bratten (from 4 Feb 1952) 

. . . IstLt Harold D. Fredericks (to 13 Feb 195 I ) 
IstLt Duncan McRae (from 14 Feb) 
IstLt Carlisle G. Kohl, Jr. (from 25 Mar) 
IstLt Herbert Preston (from 27 Jun) 
Capt Robert J. McKay (from 25 Aug) 
Opt Charles W. Market, Jr. (from 23 Dec) 

. . . IstLt Charles D. Mize (to 5 Mar 1951) 
IstLt August L. Camarata (from 6 Mar) 
IstLt William G. Robinson (from 18 Jul) 
Capt John M. Fallon (from 10 Sep) 
Capt James Irving, |c. (from 5 Nov) 
IstLt Wilson L. Cook (from 28 Feb 1952) 

. . . Capt Harold I. Williamson (to 1 Apr 1951 ) 
IstLt Herbert Preston, Jr. (from 2 Apr) 
Capt Clarence H. Pritchett (from 1 May) 
IstLt Bruce F. Meyers (from 5 Aug) 
Capt Raymond J. McGlynn (from A Nov) 
Capt Matthew A. Clary, Jr. (from 21 Feb 1952) 

. IstLt Donald E. Watterson (to 5 Mar 1951) 
Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (from 6 Mar) 
Capt John A. Pearson (from 1 Apr) 
IstLt Raymond J. McGlynn (from 10 Aug) 
IstLt Lawrence W. Payne (from 29 Aug) 
Capt Neil Dimond (from 5 Oct) 

. .Capt Raymond H. Spuhler (to 31 Jan 1951) 
Maj Thomas A. Durham (from 1 Feb) 
Maj llo J. Scatena (from 26 Jul) 
Maj Donald D. Pomerleau (from 20 Sep) 
Maj Ho J. Scatena (from 27 Sep) 
Maj James H. Pope (from 13 Oct) 
Capt Charles W. Marker, Jr. (from 3 Dec) 
Capt Robert J. McKay (from 23 Dec) 
IstLt Anthony R. Kurowski (from 6 Mar 1952) 
Capt Robert W. Lowe (from 17 Mar) 


The East-Central Front 

7 th Marines 

Commanding Officer Col Homer L. Litzenberg (to 15 Apr 1951) 

Col Herman Nickerson, Jr. (from 16 Apr) 

LtCol John J. Wermuth (from 20 Sep) 

Col John J, Wermuth (from 13 Dec) 

Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 11 Mar 1952) 

Executive Officer LtCol Raymond G. Davis (to 3 Jun 1951) 

LtCol Wood row M. Kessler (from 4 Jun) 
LtCol John J. Wermuth (from 30 Jun) 
LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (from 20 Sep) 
LtCol James G. Kelly (from 3 Nov) 
LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 2 Dec) 
LtCo! John D. Wiggins (from 23 Feb 1952) 

S-l Opt John R. Grove (to 15 Apr 1951) 

Capt Hugh E. McNeely (from 16 Apr) 

Maj Robert R. Sedgwick (from 5 Sep) 

Capt William K. Dormady (from 5 Jan 1952) 

S-2 Capt John D. Bradbeer (to 4 Jul 1951) 

Capt Walter E. Lange (from 5 Jul) 

Capt Clifford E. McCollam (from 29 Jul) 

Maj Henry V. Joslin (from 25 Aug) 

lstLt George W. Barnes (from 8 Nov) 

Capt Donald E. Euchert (from 19 Dec) 

Capt Harry E. Leland, Jr. (from 17 Mar 1952) 

S-3 Maj Henry J. Woessner, II (to 8 Jan 1951) 

Maj Joseph L. Abel (from 9 Jun) 
Maj George Codrea (from 22 Sep) 

S-4 Maj Maurice E. Roach (to 8 Jan 1951) 

Maj William E. Voorhies (from 9 Jan) 
Maj John D. Bradbeer (from 5 Jul) 
Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 5 Oct) 
Maj Robert B. Prescott (from 3 Jan 1952) 
Maj James K, Linnan (from 19 Jan) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company 2dLt Arthur R. Mooney (to 17 Feb 1951) 

lstLt Harrol Kiser (from 18 Feb) 
lstLt John C Beauparlant (from 6 Mar) 
lstLt Welton R. Abell (from 14 Mar) 
Capt James J. Bott (from 19 Mar) 
Capt Thomas A. Robesky (from 9 May) 
Capt Walter R. Anderson (from 18 Jun) 
Capt Hugh E. McNeely (from 5 Sep) 
Capt Donald S. McCIellan (from 20 Sep) 
Capt David A. McKay (from 28 Nov) 
Capt Robert C Hendrickson (from 17 Mar 

Command and Staff List 


Commanding Officer, 
Antitank Company 

Commanding Officer, 
4.2 Inch Mortar 

ing Officer . 

Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

. IstLt Earl R. DeLong (to 5 May 1951) 
IstLt Raymond J. Eld ridge (from 6 Mar) 
Capt Thomas Santamaria (from IV Apr) 
IstLt Francis W. Tief (from 13 May) 
IstLt William F. DyrofF (from 10 Aug) 

. . . . . Maj Rodney V. Reighard (to 1 Jul. 1951 ) 
lsttt Samuel E. Piercy (from 2 Jul) 
Capt Alvin F. Mack in (from 24 Sep) 
Capt Dean F. Johnson (from 28 Nov) 
Capt John F. McMahon, Jr. (from 28 Dec) 

tji Battalion, 7th Mamies 

Maj Webb D. Sawyer (to 25 Apr 1951) 

LtCol John T. Rooney (from 26 Apr) 
LtCol James G. Kelly (from 23 Aug) 
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 8 Nov) 
LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (from 28 Feb 

.Maj Raymond V. Fridrich (to 20 Feb 1951) 
Maj Thomas B. Tig he (from 21 Feb) 
Maj Raymond V. Fridrich (from 24 Mar) 
Maj Thomas B, Tighe (from 26 May) 
Maj Robert J. Poison (from 5 Jul) 
Maj George Codrea (from 4 Aug) 
Maj Harold C. Howard (from 15 Sep) 
Maj Henry V. Joslin (from 8 Nov) 


Commanding Officer. 

^ * ■ 

. IstLt Wilbert R. Gaul (to 19 Jan 1951) 
Capt John C. Johnson (from 20 Jan) 
Capt Nathan R. Smith (from 18 Mar) 
IstLt Eugenous M. Hovatter (from 28 Mar) 
Capt Donald F. J. Field (from II May) 
Capt Wilburt R. Gaul (from 7 Jun) 
IstLt Robert C. Taylor (from 9 Aug) 
Capt Orville E. Brauss (from 24 Nov) 
IstLt Guy R. Cassell (from 14 Dec) 
IstLt Edward L. Nadeau (from 1 Jan 1952) 
Capt Seneker Woli (from 18 Jan) 
2dLt Henry D. Bruns (from 10 Feb) 
2d Lt Lawrence P. Flynn (from 9 Mar) 

, . IstLt Eugenous M. Hovatter (to 27 Mar 1951) 
Capt Nathan R. Smith (from 28 Mar) 
IstLt Van D. Bell (from 3 Jun) 

The East-Central Front 

Capt Everett Hampton (from 2 Sep) 
2dLt Carl F. Ullrich (from 2 Jan 1952) 
Capt Earl W. Thompson (from 27 Mat) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company B Capt James J. Butt (to 5 Mar 1951) 

Capt John C. Johnston (from 6 Mar) 
IstLt Orville W. Brauss (from 22 Jul) 
IstLt Dean F. Johnson (from 23 Aug) 
IstLt James W. Sweeney (from 14 Sep) 
Capt Henry A. Glockner (from 29 Sep) 
IstLt Donald L. Smith (from 14 Dec) 
IstLt "J" Alan Myers (from 1 Jan 1952) 
IstLt Donald M. Russ (from 14 Feb) 
Capt Lyle S. Whitmore, Jr, (from 28 Feb) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company C Capt John F. Morris (to 17 Jan 1951) 

Capt Eugene H. Haffey (from 18 Jan) 
Capt Daniel F. J. Field (from 8 Jun) 
IstLt Donald E. Euckert (from 23 Jul) 
Capt John F. McMahon (from 10 Aug) 
Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from 21 Nov) 
Capt Seneker Woll (from 7 Jan 1952) 
Capt Robert W, Hughes, Jr. (from 18 Jan) 
Capt Roger L. Johnson (from 3 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Weapons Company Maj William E. Voorhies (to 5 Jan 1951) 

Capt Robert J. Poison (from 6 Jan) 

Maj Joseph L. Abel (from 1 2 Jan) 

Maj Robert J. Poison (from 15 May) 

Capt Alonzo C. Thorson (from 5 Jul) 

Capt John C. Johnston (from 5 Aug) 

Capt Dean F. Johnson (from 5 Nov) 

Capt John R. McMahon (from 22 Nov) 

IstLt Guy R. Cassell (from 31 Dec) 

Capt Robert W. Hughes, Jr. (from 4 Jan 1952) 

IstLt Frank P. Shannon (from 18 Jun) 

IstLt Carlton R. Appleby (from 1(5 Feb) 

2d Baft. tit on, 7 th Murines 

Commanding Officer LtCol Robert L. Bayer (to 15 Feb 1951) 

Maj James f, Glend inning (from 1 6 Feb) 
LtCol Wilbur F. Meyerhoff (from 21 Mar) 
LtCol Louis C. Griffin (from 21 Jul) 
LtCol Noel C. Gregory (from 1 1 Nov) 
Maj Edward G. Kurdziel (from 1 Dec) 

Command and Staff List 

Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 
Service Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Company D 

Commanding Officer, 
Company ~ 

Commanding Officer, 
Company F 

Com man d itl g Officer, 

. . Maj James I". Lawrence, Jr. (to 2 Jan 1951) 
Maj James 1, Glendinning, Jr. (from 3 Jan) 
Maj James F. Lawrence, Jr. (from 20 May) 
Maj Edward G. Kurdziel (from 4 Jul) 
Maj Edwin Madsen (from 2 Dec) 

. , IstLt Kent D, Thorup (to 19 Jan 1951) 
Capt Jerome D, Gordon (from 20 Jan) 
IstLt Kent D. Thorup (from 6 Feb) 
Capt Thomas "A" Robesky (from 15 Mar) 
IstLt Joseph R. Walsh (from 8 May) 
IstLt George G. Flood (from 8 Jun) 
1st Lt John J. Robinson, Jr (from 1 Sep) 
Capt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from 5 Nov) 
IstLt Donald D. MacLachlan (from 16 Dec) 
IstLt Edward R. Hannon (from 27 Feb 1952) 

..IstLt James D, Hammond, Jr. (to 1 Jan 1951) 
Capt Patsy Algieri (from 2 Jan) 
Capt Jerome D. Gordon (from 8 Feb) 
Capt Alvin F. Mackin (from 7 Apr) 
IstLt Thomas W. Burke (from 21 Jul) 
Capt John H. Chafee (from 15 Sep) 
Capt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from 15 Dec) 

, IstLt David H. Vanderwart (to 21 Jan 1951) 
IstLt Robert T. Bey (from 22 Jan) 
Capt Walter R. Anderson, Jr, (from 8 Feb) 
Capt Merlin T. Matthews (from 17 Feb) 
IstLt Robert W. Schmidt (from 1 4 Jun) 
IstLt Charles P. Logan, Jr. (from 18 Sep) 
Capt Embree W. Maxson (from 5 Oct) 
Capt Donald McGuire (from 21 Mar 1952) 

. IstLt Ronald J. Rice (to 1 Mar 1951) 
IstLt Ross R. Minor (from 2 Mar) 
Capt Raymond N. Bowman (from 6 Mar) 
IstLt Ross R, Minor (from 1 May) 
Capt Donald S. McCletlan (from 23 Jun) 
IstLt Don G. Phelan (from 24 Aug) 
Capt Harry E. Leland, Jr. (from 14 Oct) 
IstLt Rex C. Wells (from 17 Jan 1952) 

ng utticer, 

s Company Maj Joseph L. Abel (to 7 Jan 1951) 

Maj James P. Metzler (from 8 Jan) 
Capt John R, Grove (from 19 Apr) 


The East-Central Front 

Capt Harry L. Givens (from 20 May) 
Capt Alvin F. Mackin {from 8 Aug) 
Capt David A. McKay (from 24 Sep) 
Capt Waiter Oberg (from 26 Nov) 
IstLt Elmer R. Phillips (from 17 Feb 1952) 
Maj Dennis D. Nicholson (from 16 Mar) 
Capt Owen G. Jackson, Jr. (from 30 Mar) 

3d" Battalion, 7th Marines 

Commanding Officer Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (to 13 Jan 1951) 

LtCol Wilbur F. MeyerhofT (from 14 Jan) 
Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (from 16 Feb) 
LtCol Bernard T, Kelly (from 8 May) 
LtCol Harry W. Edwards (from 4 Oct) 
LtCol Houston Stiff (from 12 Mar 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Warren Morris (to 8 Jan 1951) 

Maj Maurice E. Roach, Jr. (from 9 Jan) 

Maj Warren Morris (from 16 Feb) 

Maj James J. Bott (from 4 Jul) 

Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 4 Aug) 

Maj Robert B. Prescott (from 6 Aug) 

Maj Franklin G, Bacon (from 3 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company IstLt Samue! B. Abston (to 7 Jan 1951) 

Capt John DeCloud (from 8 Jan) 
IstLt Samuel D. Miller (from 5 Mar) 
IstLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 15 May) 
IstLt Robert H. Starek (from 25 May) 
IstLt William R. Bennett (from 21 Jul) 
IstLt Dennis E. Youngblood (from 6 Oct) 
IstLt Raymond B. McGill (from 28 Nov) 
Capt Clayton A. Lodoen (from 2 Mar 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company G IstLt George R. Earnest (to 3 1 Dec 1950) 

Capt Walter E. Lange (from 1 Jan 1951 ) 
IstLt George R. Earnest (from 11 Mar) 
IstLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 22 Mar) 
Capt William C. Airheart (from 28 Mar) 
IstLt Edward J. Sullivan (from 22 Jul) 
Capt Robert C, Hendrickson (from 12 Aug) 
Capt Thomas D. Smith, Jr. (from 1 4 Dec) 
IstLt Harry H. Saltzman (from 11 Feb 1952) 
Capt Thomas P. O'Callaghan (from 23 Feb) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company H IstLt William C Airheart (to 19 Jan 1951) 

Capt James A. Hoey, Jr. (from 20 Jan) 
Capt Reed T. King (from 5 Jun) 


Command and Stag List 


Commanding Officer, 
Company I 

IstLt D wight A, Young (from 4 Aug) 
Capt Clayton A. Lodoen (from 9 Nov) 
IstLt William B. Stengle (from 22 Feb 1952) 
Capt William B. Cosgrove {from 17 Mar) 

. . .Capt Howard L. Mabie (to 15 Feb 1951) 
IstLt Alfred I, Thomas (from 16 Feb) 
IstLt Victor Stoyanow (from 29 Mar) 
IstLt Frank N. Winfrey (from 5 Jun) 
IstLt Thomas N. Preston (from 20 Jun) 
IstLt Richard L. Shell (from 23 Jul) 
Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (from 5 Sep) 
Capt Clifford G. Moore (from 14 Sep) 
IstLt Charles H. Hammett (from 27 Dec) 
IstLt Hubert MtEntyre (from 2 Mar 1952) 
Capt GifFord S. Horton (from 9 Mar) 

Commanding Officer, 

Weapons Company Maj Jefferson D. Smith, Jr. (to 16 Feb 1951) 

Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 17 Feb) 
IstLt Frederick Van Brunt (from 8 Apr) 
Capt Howard L. Mabie (from 19 Apr) 
Maj James J. Bott (from 4 Jun) 
IstLt Alfred I Thomas (from 4 Jul) 
Capt Claudie "M" HolHngsworth (from 8 Jul) 
Capt William C. Airheart (from 12 Aug) 
Capt Theodore E. Metzger (from 4 Nov) 
Capt Thomas P. O'Callaghan (from 27 Dec) 
IstLt Louis A. Mann (from 22 Feb 1952) 




11th Mamies 

. . LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 5 Mar 1951) 
Col Joseph L. Winecoff (from 6 Mar) 
Col Custis Burton, Jr. (from 5 Aug) 
Col Bruce T. Hemphiil (from 17 Nov) 
Col Frederick P. Henderson (from 27 Mar 1952) 
. . LtCol Douglas A. Reeve (to 5 Mar 1951) 
LtCol Carl A, Youngdale (from 6 Mar) 
LtCol Douglas A. Reeve (from 7 May) 
LtCol Merritt Adelman (from 13 Jun) 
LtCol Albert H. Potter (from 15 Aug) 
LtCol Lewis A. Jones (from 23 Nov) 
. . Maj Floyd M. McCorkle (to 10 Jun 1951) 
Capt Arthur L. Jackson (from 11 Jun) 
IstLt Jessie R. Collins (from 2 Oct) 
, . Capt William T. Phillips (to 26 Aug 1951) 

(from 27 Aug) 

The East-Central Front 



+ I ■ < H 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Battery . . . 

Capt Phillip A. Schloss, Jr. (from 17 Dec) 
Capt Marshall R. Hunter, Jr, (from 20 Feb 

. LtCol James O. Appleyard (to 19 Jul 1951) 
LtCol William H. Gilliam (from 20 Jul) 
LtCol William F. Pala (from 18 Nov) 

. Maj Donald V. Anderson (to 5 Feb 1951) 
Maj Thomas M. Coggins (from 6 Feb) 
Maj Benjamin W. Muntz (from 23 Jul) 
Capt Robert B. Carney (from 14 Sep) 

Commanding Officer, 
Service Battery 

Commanding Officer, 
Battery C, 1st 4.5 Inch 
Rocket Battalion 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Battery 

Capt Clarence E. Hixon (to 7 Apr 1951) 
IstLt Thomas C. Thompson (from 8 Apr) 
Capt Richard L. Mc Daniel (from 22 Aug) 
Maj Claudie "M" Hoi lings worth (from 24 Sep) 
2dLt Chester E. Reese (from 17 Nov) 
IstLt Samuel S. Rockwood (from 9 Mar 1952) 

. Maj Thomas M. Coggins (to 5 Feb 1951 ) 
IstLt Fred Rea (from 6 Feb) 
IstLt John F, Gresham (from 21 May) 
2dLt Chester E, Reese (from 7 Nov) 
Capt Warren G. Hopkins (from 17 Nov) 
Capt William B.Tom (from 16 Dec) 

. IstLt Eugene A. Busche (to 11 Jul 1951) 
IstLt Edward A. Bailey (from 12 Jul) 
IstLt Stephen R. Mihalic (from 2 Nov) 
IstLt Edward J. Pierson (from 30 Mar 1952) 

1st Battalion, lltb Marines 

LtCol Harvey A. Feehan (to 30 Mar 1951) 

Maj Thomas V. Cave, Jr. (from 31 Mar) 
Maj Gordon R. Worth ington (from 8 Aug) 
LtCol Sherman W. Parry (from 13 Sep) 
LtCol James R. Haynes (from 30 Mar 1952) 

Maj Thomas F. Cave (to 30 Mar 1951) 

Maj Gordon R. Worth ington (from 31 Mar) 
Maj George J. Kovicli, Jr. (from 8 Aug) 
Maj Harold E. Nelson (from 17 Sep) 

Capt Haskell C. Baker (to 2 Jan 1951) 

Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter (from 3 Jan) 
Capt Alonzo C. Thorson (from 3 May) 
Capt John McCaffrey (from 2 Jul) 
Capt Rodman E. Street (from 17 Oct) 

Command and Stag List 


Commanding Officer, 


Commanding Officer, 
A . . 

Commanding Officer, 
Battei 7 B 


Ba "ery C 


Executive Officer . 

IstLt Charles D, Branson (from 26 Dec) 
IstLt Harley "B" Riley (from I Feb 1952) 
IstLt Joseph P. McDermott, Jr. (from 26 Mar) 

.Capt Arnold C. Hofstetter (to 1 Jan 195 J) 
IstLt Kenneth H. Quekh (from 2 Jan) 
Capt Philip D. Higby (from 1 Mar) 
Capt Mont G. Kenney (from 9 Jul) 
Capt Mansfield L. Clinnick (from 9 Jan 1952) 

.Capt James D. Jordan (to 1 Apr L951 
Capt Mont G. Kenncy (from 2 Apr) 
Capt Philip D. Higby (from 10 Jul) 
Capt Joseph A. Goeke (from 22 Jul) 
IstLt Richard J. Randolph, Jr. (from 11 Sep) 
IstLt Robert O, Martin, Jr. (from 3 Oct) 
Capt Duane W. Skow (from 9 Nov) 
Capt Rodman E. Street (from 24 Dec) 

. Capt Gilbert N. Powell (to 12 Jun 1951) 
Capt Charles D. Corpening (from 13 Jun) 
Capt Leslie C. Procter, Jr. (from 27 Aug) 
IstLt Donald T, Clark (from 13 Dec) 
IstLt Jefferson S. Smith (from 1 Feb 1952) 

. . . . Capt William J. Nichols, fr. (to 14 Feb 1951 ) 
Capt Haskell C Baker (from 15 Feb) 
Capt Glenn L. Tole (from 14 Jul) 
Capt Mansfield L. Clinnick (from 12 Sep) 
IstLt Harold H. Ramsour (from 5 Jan 1952) 
Capt James C. Gasser (from 26 Mar 1952) 

2d Butialh)!, 11/b AUrines 

. . . . Maj Francis R. Schlesinger (to 4 Mar 1951) 
Maj Jack C. Newell (from 5 Mar) 
LtCot Merritt Adelman (from 1-1 Mar) 
LtCol Dale H. Heeiy (from 13 Jun) 
LtCol George B. Thomas (from 1 Jan 1952) 

Maj Nea! C. Newell (to 15 Mar 1951) 

Maj Bruce E. Keith (from 16 Mar) 

Maj Horace W. Card, Jr. (from 12 May) 

Maj Peter J. Mulroney (from 4 Aug) 

Maj Claudie "M" Hoi lings worth (from 14 Aug) 

Maj Frank W. Keith (from 11 Sep) 

Maj James R, Haynes (from 1 Nov) 

The East-Central Front 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Battery 

Commanding Officer, 
Service Battery . . . 

Commanding Officer, 
Battery D 

Commanding Officer, 
Battery E 

Commanding Officer, 


Commanding Officer 

Maj Peter J. Mulroney (from 29 Nov) 
Maj James R. Haynes (from 15 Dec) 
Maj Morris R. Snead (from 29 Mar 1952) 

.... Capt George J. Batson, Jr. (to 27 Jun 1951) 
IstLt Howard A. Blanrfieri (from 28 Jun) 
Capt Raymond D. Spicer (from 3 Oct) 
IstLt John J. Scollay (from 29 Oct) 
2dLt Arthur H. Westing (from 15 Jan 1952) 
2dLt John E. Buynak (from 16 Feb) 
IstLt Ivan B. Clevinger (from 13 Mar) 

Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (to 24 Feb 1951) 

Capt William D. Gibson (from 25 Feb) 
IstLt Walter L, Blocker (from 30 Jun) 
Capt Robert N. Kreider (from 20 juJ) 
IstLt Robert E. Santee (from 6 Oct) 
IstLt Donald F. Schaller (from 3 Feb 1952) 
IstLt James W. Bell (from 16 Feb) 

Capt Richard E. Roach (to 18 Mar 1951) 

Capt William D, Stubbs, Jr. (from 19 Mar) 
Capt Walter L. Blocker, Jr. (from 4 Aug) 
IstLt John M. Hoben (from 4 Nov) 

. . . .Capt Richard N. Aufmann (to 25 Feb 1951) 
Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (from 26 Feb) 
Capt Robt. E. Dawson (from 2 Apr) 
Capt Herbert R. Merrick, Jr. (from 27 Apr) 
Capt George J. Batson, Jr. (from 28 Jun) 
IstLt Albert "G" Harris, III (from 7 Aug) 
Capt Raymond D. Spicer (from 11 Dec) 

. , . . 1st Lt Howard A. Blancheri (to 20 Jan 195) ) 
Capt George J. Kovtch, Jr. (from 21 Jan) 
Capt Robert E. Dawson (from 3 May) 
Capt William D. Gibson (from 30 Jun) 
IstLt James F, Shea (from 13 Aug) 
1st Lt James W. Bell (from 8 Nov) 
Capt Robert E. Dawson (from 24 Nov) 
Capt John S. Adamson (from 24 Dec) 
IstLt Frederick A. Koch, Jr. (from 31 Dec) 

3d Battalion, lltb Marina 

LtCol Francis F. Parry (to 6 Feb 1951) 

LtCol William McReynolds (from 7 Feb) 
Maj James R. Haynes (from 6 Sep) 

Command and Staff List 


Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Battery 

Commanding Officer, 
Service Barterv . . . 

Commanding Officer, 
Battery G 

Commanding Officer, 
Ba ttery H 

Co ™™anding Officer, 

LtCol James F. Coady (from 23 Oct) 
LtCoi Henry E. Barnes (from 2 Mar 1952) 
. . . Maj Norman A. Miller, Jr. (to 14 Jul 1951 ) 
Maj Stephen K. Pawloski (from 15 Jul) 
Maj James R. Haynes (from 1 6 Aug) 
Maj Cari A. Neilson (from 6 Sep) 
Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from 1 Dec) 
Maj Charles A. Li pot (from 4 Mar 1952) 

, . . IstLt John J. Brackett (to 20 Jan 1951) 
IstLt Eugene H. Brown (from 21 Jan) 
IstLt Robert C, Cameron (from 6 Apr) 
Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 21 May) 
IstLt Robert H. Maurer (from 2 Aug) 
IstLt Thomas E. Driscoll (from 18 Aug) 
IstLt Hugh W. Manning (from 6 Sep) 
2dLt John B, Buynak (from 7 Oct) 
Capt Thomas L. Sullivan (from 20 Nov) 
2dLt Thomas P. McGeeney, Jr. (from 3 Jan 

2dLt Albert E, Shaw, fr, (from 19 Feb) 
IstLt William A. Barton, Jr. (from 14 Mar) 

. .Capt Samuel A. Hannah (to 25 Feb 1951) 
IstLt Lawrence T. Kane (from 26 Feb) 
IstLt David D. Metcalf (from 4 Apr) 
Capt Arthur S. Tarkington (from 10 Sep) 
Capt Charles J. Small (from 27 Nov) 

. .Capt Ernest W. Payne (to 14 Jul 1951) 
Capt Arthur S. Tarkington (from 15 Jul) 
IstLt Arthur H. Fugalsoe (from 6 Sep) 
IstLt Mervyn E. Kerstner (from 11 Sep) 
IstLt Arthur H. Fugalsoe (from 15 Sep) 
IstLt Edward S. McCabe (from 1 Nov) 
lsrLt Joseph M. Vosmik (from 13 Mar 1952) 

. .Capt Mason D. McQuiston (to 24 Aug 1951) 
Capt David D. Metcalf (from 25 Aug) 
IstLt William A. Barton, Jr. (from 1 Nov) 
IstLt George E. Chambers, Jr, (from 21 Jan 

IstLt Russell E. Blagg (from 17 Mar) 

. . Capt Robert T. Patterson, Jr. (to 13 Jun 195 X) 
Capt Floyd R. Jaggears (from 14 Jun) 
Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 2 Aug) 

294 The East-Central Front 

IstLt Homer C Wright (from 12 Aug) 
Capt Donald H. Campbell (from 25 Aug) 
IstLt Homer C. Wright (from 9 Sep) 
LstLt Charles R. Davidson, Jr. (from 19 Feb 

4th Battalion, tub Murines 

Commanding Officer Maj William McReynolds (to 6 Feb 1951) 

Maj Maurice J. Coffey (from 7 Feb) 
Maj Norman A. MiUer, Jr. (from 16 Jul) 
LtCol Louis A. Jones (from 6 Sep) 
LtCol William M. Gilliam (from 24 Nov) 

Executive Officer Maj Maurice J. Coffey (to 6 Feb 1951) 

Maj Donald V. Anderson (from 7 Feb) 
Maj Bernard W. Giebler (from 17 Aug) 
LtCol Bruce F. Hillan (from 24 Feb 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Headquarters Battery IstLt Michael B, Wier (to 10 Jun 1951) 

IstLt Frank P. Zarzeka (from 11 Jun) 

IstLt Arthur Coburn (from 21 Aug) 

IstLt Paol R. Joyce (from 28 Aug) 

IstLt Thomas C Thompson, Jr. (from 25 Nov) 

IstLt Earl C. Sc-nter (from 10 Feb 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Service Battery Capt Aldor B. Elmquist (to 9 Jun 1951) 

IstLt Matthew }. Dennin (from 10 Jun) 
IstLt William A. Mazzarella (from 1 Jul) 
Capt Matthew J. Dennin (from 2 Sep) 
Capt Eugene A. Frank (from 8 Sep) 
Capt Matthew J. Dennin (from 16 Oct) 
IstLt Leland B. Elton (from 19 Nov) 

Commanding Officer, 

Battery K Capt Arthur D. Challacombe, Jr. (to 4 Aug 


IstLt Albert E. Coffeen (from 5 Aug) 

IstLt Paul M. Rice (from 23 Dec) 

IstLt William L. Jesse (from 17 Mar 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Battery L . Capt Armond G. Daddazio (to 15 Apr 1951 ) 

Capt Eugene A. Frank (from 16 Apr) 
Capt William M. Sigler, Jr. (from 7 Sep) 
IstLt Dennis Manko (from 28 Nov) 

Commanding Officer, 

Battery M Capt Vernon W. Shapiro (to 3 Feb 1951) 

Capt Charles E. Walker (from 14 Feb) 
Capt Walter E. Magon (from 18 Jun) 

Command and Staff List 


Commanding Officer 


Commanding Officer, 
Company A 

IstLt George C. Briggs, Jr. (from 28 Nov) 
IstLt Louis M. Dunklin (from 10 Feb 1952) 
IstLt Billy J. White (from 18 Mar) 

1st Amphibian Tractor Bat tali on 

LtCol Erwin F. Wann, Jr. (to 26 Sep 1951) 

LtCol Midi id Dobervich (from 27 Sep) 

Maj Arthur J. Barrett (to 14 Sep 1951) 

Maj William L. Eubank (from 15 Sep) 

.Opt Frank E. Granucci (to 12 Jun 1951) 
Capt Lawrence H. Woods (from 13 Jun) 
Capt Thomas J. Melchcr (from 15 Sep) 
IstLt Richard R. Myers {from 9 Jan 1952) 

' am 10 J 

IstLt William H. ( 


Commanding Officer, 

Commanding Officer, 
Company C 

Commanding Officer 

Executive Officer 

, . . Maj James P. Treadwell (to 6 Apr 1951) 
Maj Thomas H. Boler (from 7 Apr) 
Capt Harry A. Steinmeyer (from 1 May) 
Capt Dudley F. McGeehan (from 17 May) 
Opt Robert L. Stuford (from 10 Jan 1952) 

. . .Capt Russell Hamlet (to 11 Apr 1951) 
Capt Dudley F. McGeehan (from 12 Apr) 
Capt John C. Crawley (from 17 May) 
Opt Carl L. Hill (from 10 Jun) 
Capt Harold W. Stroschein (from 1 Jan 1952) 
Capt Samuel L. Eddy (from 10 Jan) 

. . . Maj Arthur J. Noonan (to 8 Aug 1951) 
Maj William L. Eubank (from 9 Aug) 
Maj Edward C Nelson (from 10 Sep) 
Capt Samuel L. Eddy (from 19 Dec) 
Capt Robert T. Johnson (from 9 Jan 1952) 

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion 

. . LtCol Francis H. Cooper (to 15 Jun 1 
Maj George M. Warnke (from 1(5 Jun) 
LtCol John T. O'Neill (from 2 Oct) 

. .Maj Richard G. Warga (to 7 Apt 1951) 
Maj George M. Warnke (from S Apr) 
Maj Bernard G. Thobe (from 16 Jun) 
Maj Robert J. Murphy (from 1 Oct) 
Maj David Young (from 6 Jan 1952) 
LtCol James L. Jones (from 29 Feb) 

The East-Central Front 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Company A 

Commanding Officer, 
Company B 

Commanding Officer, 
Service Company 

Commanding Officer . . . 
Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Company 

. Capt Roger B, Thompson (to 10 May 1951) 
IstLt Jean T. Fox (from 11 May) 
Capt Richard P. Greene (from 18 Jun) 
IstLt Edward J. Sullivan (from 12 Oct) 
2dLt Newton C. Tullis (from 2 Dec) 

. . . Capt Bernard G. Thobe (to 25 Apr 1951) 
IstLt Clyde P. Guy (from 26 Apr) 
Maj Rex Z. Michael, Jr. (from 5 Sep) 
Maj David Foos (from 3 Oct) 

, . . Capt Lewis E. Bolts (to 26 Jun 1951) 
Maj Ralph H. Piatt (from 27 Jun) 
Maj John M. Scarborough (from 3 Oct) 
Capt John B. Harney (from 10 Feb 1952) 

. . . Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr. (to 4 Sep 1951) 
IstLt Presley K. Saine (from 5 Sep) 
2dLt John A. Boone (from 5 Nov) 
Capt William H. Chandler (from 16 Mar 

1st Combat Service Group 

. . Col John N. Cook, Jr. (to 10 Jun 1951) 
LtCol John M. Brickley (from 10 Jun) 
Col Joseph P. Sayers (from 9 Aug) 
Col Russell N. Jordahl (from 30 Sep) 

. .LtCol Edward A. Clark (to 17 Jan 1951) 
LtCol Randolph S. D. Lock wood (from 18 Jan) 
LtCol John H. Brickley (from 9 May) 
Maj Murray F. Rose (from 11 Jun) 
LtCol Robert K. McClelland (from 17 Aug) 
Maj John R. Blackett (from 1 Sep) 
LtCol Robert T. Stivers (from 22 Oct) 
LtCol James G, Kelly (from 6 Jan 1932) 

. .Capt Francis L. Miller (to 11 Apr 1951) 
Capt Raymond E. Wase (from 12 Apr) 
Capt Billie G, Hagan (from 19 Apr) 
Capt George M. Zellick (from 22 Jul) 
IstLt William P. Lacy (from 21 Sep) 
Capt James H. Shaw (from 15 Jan 1952) 

. .Maj Edward H. Voorhees (to 19 May 1951) 
IstLt Donald M. Dackins (from 20 May) 
Maj Berny L. Thurman (from 3 Sep) 
Capt Warren H. Allen (from 25 Nov) 
Maj John R. Blackett (from 31 Dec) 

Command and Staff List 


Commanding Officer, 
Supply Company . . . 

Commanding Officer, 

Commanding Officer, 
Truck Company 

Commanding Officer, 
1st Fumigation and 
Bath Platoon 

Commanding Officer, 1st 
Air Delivery Platoon. . 

7. Hengesbach, (to 17 Apr 1951) 
Capt Bernard L. Keiter (from 18 Apr) 
IstLt John Spiropoulas (from 24 Nov) 
Maj William D. Porter (from 29 Dec) 

.Maj Donald B. Cooley, Jr. (to 22 Jan 1951) 
Maj James T. Breen (from 23 Jan) 
Maj Mason H. Morse (from 10 Oct) 
Maj Howard T. Pittman (from 4 Nov) 

. apt Jack W. Temple (to 10 Jun 1951 ) 
IstLt Cecil C. Spencer (from 11 Jun) 
IstLt Frank W. Dicke! (from 7 Jul) 
IstLt James H. Shaw (from 8 Sep) 
Opt Jacob Stocker (from 24 Sep) 

.IstLt James L. Dumas (to 14 Aug 1951) 
IstLt Raymond S. Eason (from 15 Aug) 
IstLt Roger B. Meade (from 6 Sep) 

.Capt Hersel D, C, Blasingame (to 10 Jun 1951) 
2dLt Robert C. Morton (from 11 Jun) 
CWO John T. Eakes (from 26" Jun) 
IstLt William A. Reavis (from 30 Dec) 
2dLt William S. Daniels (from 7 Feb 1952) 

1st Engineer Battalion 

Commanding Officer LtCol John H. Partridge (to 10 Jun 1951) 

LtCol John V. Kelsey (from 1 1 Jun) 

Executive Officer Maj Richard M, Elliott (to 1 Feb 1951) 

Maj Emile P. Moses, Jr. (from 2 Feb) 
Maj Grover C. Williams (from 4 Aug) 

Commandinc Officer, /w 
Headquarters Company . . Capt Edward D. Newton (to 24 Mar 1951) 

IstLt Gerald W, Wade (from 25 Mar) 
IstLt Lee A. Kirstein (from 1.6 Jun) 
Capt Leonard L. Schultz (from 22 Aug) 
Capt Donald F. Draeger (from 24 Nov) 
Capt Robert W. Hurley (from 20 Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 
Service Company . . 

. Capt Phillip A. Terrell, Jr. (to 25 Mar 1951) 
Maj Richard M. Elliott (from 26 Mar) 
Maj Louis L. Ball (from 6 Sep) 
Capt Thirl D. Johnson (from 10 Jan 1952) 
IstLt Arthur L. Rourke (from 9 Mar) 


The East-Central Front 

Commanding Officer, 

Company A . , Capt William B. Gould (to 20 Apr 1951) 

Capt Harold R. Gingher (from 21 Apr) 
IstLt George L. Bowman (from 15 Jun) 
IstLt FJoyd L. Vuillemot (from 1 Oct) 
Capt Walter L. Hill (from 5 Nov) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company C , . . 


Commanding Officer 

Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 
Service Company ....... 

..Capt Orville L. Bibb (to 25 Mar 1951) 
Capt Phillip A. Terrill, Jr. (from 26 Mar 1951) 
IstLt Gerald W. Wade (from 17 Oct) 
IstLt Clyde R. Kolahan (from 1 Mar 1952) 

. .Capt Lester G. Harmon (to 15 Aug 1951) 
IstLt Robert L, Brown (from 16 Aug) 
IstLt Robert J. Hickson {from 4 Nov) 

. . Capt Byron C. Turner (to 30 May 1951) 
Capt Edward D. Newton (from 31 May) 
Capt Thirl D. Johnson (from 29 Jun) 
IstLt Lee A. Kirstein (from 23 Sep) 
IstLt John J. Killelea (from 23 Dec) 

1st Medical Battalion 
. .Cdr Howard A. Johnson, USN (to 22 Jan 1951) 
Cdr Clifford A. Stevenson, USN (from 23 Jan) 
Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN (from 23 Sep) 
.Cdr William S. Francis, USN (to 8 Jan 1951) 
LtCdr Gustave T. Anderson, USN (from 9 Jan) 
Cdr George A. Sclilesinger, USN (from 4 Jul) 
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9 Aug) 
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from 28 Oct) 
Cdr James C. Luce, USN (from 28 Feb 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 
Company A 

.Cdr William S. Francis, USN (to 8 Jan 1951) 
LtCdr Gustav T. Anderson, USN (from 9 Jan) 
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 7 Jun) 
Cdr George C. Schlesinger, USN (from 4 Jul) 
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9 Aug) 
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from 28 Oct) 
Lt Edgar F. Bechtel, USN (from 16 Dec) 
Lt(jg) Charles P. Richardson, USN (from 
21 Mar 1952) 

, . Cdr Byron E. Bassham, USN (to 3 Mar 1951) 
Cdr Philip L. Nova, USN (from 4 Mar) 
Cdr James A. Addison, USN (from 18 Apr) 
LtCdr Arvin T. Henderson, USN (from 22 Sep) 

Command and Staff List 


Commanding Officer, 
Company B 

Commanding Officer, 
Company C 

Commanding Officer, 
Company D 

Commanding Officer, 

. .LtCdr James A. Kaufman, USN (to 12 Jun 

LtCdr Francis M. Morgan, USN (from 13 Jun) 
Lt James F. Mumma, USN (from II Aug) 
Lt Robert Fahrner, USN (from 17 Sep) 
Lt John T. St. Mary, USN (from 20 Sep) 
Lt(jg) Leroy F. Von Lackum, USN (from 
15 Oct) 

LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from 8 Nov) 
CWO William R. Lipscomb, USN (from 
27 Nov) 

WO Clarence B. Mohler, USN (from 7 Dec) 
WO William R. Stanberry, USN (from 22 Jan 

. . Cdr Harold A. Streit, USN {to 8 Jan 1951) 
Cdr Lewis E. Rector, USN (from 9 Jan) 
LtCdc Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from 6 Jun) 
Lt John P. McDonald, USN (from 28 Oct) 
LtCdr Merrill W. Rusher, USN (from 27 Nov) 
Lt(jg) Thaddeus H. Doggett, USN (from 
26 Dec) 

LtCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN (from 11 Jan 

Lt(jg) Thaddeus H. Doggett, USN (from 

. . LtCdr Gustave J. Anderson, USN (to 7 Jan 

LtCdr Daniel M. Pino, USN (from 8 Jan) 
Lt(jg) Hermes C. Grille, USN (from 10 Aug) 
Lt(jg) Powell H. Perkins, USN (from 8 Dec) 
LtCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN (from 6 Feb 

Commanding Officer 

. , LtCdr Charles K. Holloway, USN (to 8 Jan 

LtCdr John H. Cheffey, USN (from 9 Jan) 
LtCdr Robert G. Allen, USN (from 13 Jun) 
Lt Robert J. Fahrner, USN (from 9 Sep) 
LtCdr Clifford R. Hall, USN (from 17 Oct) 

1st Motor Transport Battalion 

LtCol Olin L. Beall (to 15 Mar 1951) 

LtCol John R, Barreiro, % (from 16 Mar) 
LtCol Howard E. Wertman (from 18 Aug) 


The East-Central Front 

Executive Officer . . . 


Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 
Service Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Company A 

Commanding Officer, 
Company B 

Commanding Officer, 
Company C 

.Maj John R. Barreiro, Jr. (to 15 Mar 1951) 
Maj Edward L. Roberta (from 16 Mar) 
Maj Eero Nori (from 6 Aug) 
Capt Howard Dismeiet (from 3 Feb 1952) 
Maj Raymond L. Luckel (from 7 Mar) 

. Capt George B, Loveday (to 4 May 1951) 
IstLt John C. O'Connell (from 5 May) 
2dLt Walter R, Gustafson (from 21 Jul) 
IstLt John C, O'Connell (from 17 Aug) 
Capt Seneker Wo 11 (from I Sep) 
IstLt Eldon F. Kennedy (from 9 Jan 1952) 

. Capt Arthur W. Ecklund (to 3 May 1951) 
IstLt Mildridge E. Mangum (from 4 May) 
Capt Arnold T, Reed (from 4 Sep) 
IstLt Walter A. Knopp (from 30 Mar 1952) 

.Capt James C. Camp, Jr. (to 9 Aug 1951) 
IstLt Marshall "A" Webb, Jr. (from 10 Aug) 
IstLt Gerald W. Gruber (from 13 Sep) 

Commanding Officer, 


Automotive Support 

* - ■ 

Commanding Officer, 
Automotive Maintenance 

IstLt Norman E. Stow (to 15 Aug 1951) 
Capt Joe P. England (from 16 Aug) 

. IstLt William D. Pothoff (to 8 Oct 1951) 
IstLt Eldon F. Kennedy (from 9 Oct) 
Capt Leroy P. Oetter (from 17 Oct) 

. IstLt Mildridge E. Mangum (to 16 Feb 1951) 
Capt Walter J. Desel, Jr. (from 17 Feb) 
IstLt Marshall "A" Webb, Jr. (from 14 May) 
Capt Leon Serkin (from 1 Aug) 
Capt Charles R. Godwin (from 4 Nov) 

.Maj Edward L. Roberts (to 15 Mar 1951) 
Capt Victor E. Sellers (from 16 Mar) 
Capt Ira N. Hayes (from 10 Apr) 
Capt Harold L. Mayfield (from 3 Aug) 
Maj Marion D. Grush (from 5 Nov) 

7 th Motor Transport Battalion 

Commanding Officer LtCol Carl J. Cagle (to 1 Oct 1951) 

Maj Walter R. O'Quinn (from 2 Oct) 

Command and Staff List 301 

Maj Herbert E. Pierce (from 3 Jan 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Vernon A. Tuson (to 26 Jul 1951) 

Capt Joseph L, Bunker (from 27 Jul) 
Maj Walter R. O'Quinn (from 19 Sep) 
Maj Ben Sutts (from 2 Oct) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 

Service Company 2dLt Henry F. Finney (to 13 Jan 1951) 

2dLt Palmer B. Fordham (from 14 Jan) 
IstLt Richard J. Keeling (from 10 Feb) 
IstLt Earl H. Johnson (from 10 Apr) 
IstLt Louis C. Tauber (from 13 Aug) 
IstLt Kenneth F. Smith (from 1 Sep) 
Capt John J. Wilkinson (from 1 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company A Capt Ira N. Hayes (to S Apr 1951) 

IstLt Landon E, Christian (from 9 Apr) 
Capt Robert B, Stone (from ft Aug) 
Capt John J. Wilkinson (from 1 Sep) 
Capt Kenneth F, Smith (from 1 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company B , Capt Clovis M. Jones (to 11 Mar 1951) 

IstLt Lawrence C. Norton (from 12 Mar) 

IstLt John B. Wilson (from 1 Sep) 

IstLt Clyde H. Loveday, Jr. (from 15 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company C Capt Fred B. Rogers (to 16 Apr 1951) 

IstLt Oscar A. Bosma (from 17 Apr) 
IstLt Richard C O'Dowd (from 6 Jun) 
Capt Roscoe C. Hibbard (from 23 Nov) 
Capt Clifton G. Moore (from 28 Dec) 

Commanding Officer, 

Company D Capt Joseph L. Bunker (to 26 Jul 1951) 

IstLt Hubert J. Thomas (from 27 Jul) 
IstLt Clyde H. Stratton (from 1 Sep) 
Capt Clyde H. Stratton (from 1 Jan 1952) 

1st Ordnance Battalion 

Commanding Officer Maj Lloyd O. Williams (to 31 Aug 1951) 

Maj Harold C. Borth (from 1 Sep) 

Executive Officer Maj Samuel A. Johnstone, Jr. (to 5 Jul 1951) 

Capt Theodore Tunis (from 6 Jul) 
Capt Gordon H. Moore (from 1 Aug) 
Maj Harold C. Borth (from 13 Aug) 
Maj Eugene Anderson (from 1 Sep) 
Capt Thomas J. Belt, Jr. (from 1 Jan 1952) 
Capt Frederick V. Osborn (from 6 Feb) 


The East-Central Front 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Ordnance Supply 

, Capt Gordon H. Moore (to 9 Sep 1951) 
2dLt Willie B. Hayter, Jr. (from 10 Sep) 
IstLt Henry "H" Best, Jr. (from 7 Jan 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 
Ammunition Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Ordnance Maintenance 

Commanding Officer . . . 

Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Supply Company 

. IstLt Victor F. Brown (to 10 Aug 1951) 
Capt Simon W. Vevurka (from 11 Aug) 
Capt Thomas J. Belt (from 1 Nov) 

. Capt Richard W. Sinclair (to 6 Apr 1951) 
Capt Robert C. Holder (from 7 Apr) 
Capt David A, Malinsky (from 12 Sep) 
Capt Chestef D. Brown, Jr. (from 4 Jan 1952) 
Capt Cecil B. Smith (from 21 Feb) 

.Capt George L. Williams (to 15 Aug 1951) 
Maj James H. Pierce (from 16 Aug) 
IstLt Charles B. Haslam (from 10 Dec) 
Capt William E. L. Dormer (from 20 Jan 1952) 
Capt Dwight H. Sawin, Jr. (from 17 Mar) 

1st Service Battalion 

, LtCol Charles L. Banks (to 11 Jan 1951) 
Col Gould P. Groves (from 12 Jan) 
LtCol Horace E, Knapp (from 27 Mar) 
LtCol Woodrow M. Kessler (from 6 Jul) 
LtCol Bernard W. McLean (from 3 Mar 1952) 

. Maj John R. Stone (to 18 Jun 1951) 
Capt Victor E. Johnson, Jr. (from 19 Jun) 
Maj Louis G. Monville (from 3 Jul) 
Maj George E. Allison (from 18 Feb 1952) 

.Capt Morse "L" Holhday (to 20 Jan 1951) 
IstLt Robert E. Follendorf (from 21 Jan) 
IstLt James B, Lichtenberger (from 3 Sep) 
IstLt Peter N. Pappas (from 10 Oct) 
Capt John E. Welch (from 31 Dec) 
IstLt Joseph D. Walker (from 10 Jan 1952) 
IstLt Harry H. Saltzman (from 10 Mar) 

. Capt Robert A. Morehead (to 13 Apr 1951) 
Capt George K. Reid (from 14 Apr) 
Capt Hayward M. Friedrich (from 27 May) 
Capt Milton W. Magee (from 6 Jun) 

Command and Staff List 

Commanding Officer, 
Support Company . 

Commanding Officer 

Executive Officer 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters and 
Service Company . . 

Commanding Officer, 
Company A 

Commanding Officer, 

Maj James R. Fury (from 13 Aug) 

Capt Warren G. Hopkins (from 26 Dec) 

Capt John H. Tomlinson (from 11 Mar 1952) 

. . Capt Thomas M. Sagar (to 22 Jan 1951 ) 
Capt Morse "L" HoIIaday (from 23 Jan) 
IstLt Victor E. Johnson (from 30 Mar) 
Capt Hayward M. Friedrich (from 7 Jun) 
IstLt Glenn P. Gasaway (from 2 Jul) 
IstLt Robert W. Blum (from 3 Sep) 
Capt Robert E. Mover (from 1 Oct) 
IstLt Jack A, Mackenzie (from 13 Nov) 
IstLt Carlton R. Appleby (from 21 Dec) 
IstLt Barry D. Diamond (from 8 Jan 1952) 
Opt Seneker Woll (from 10 Mar) 

1st Shore Party Battalion 

. . LtCol Henry P. Crowe (to 10 May 1951) 
LtCol Horace H. Figuers (from 11 May) 
LtCol Harry W, Edwards (from 17 Jul) 
LtCol George G. Pafford (from 29 Sep) 
LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 20 Dec) 
LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (from 9 Mar 1952) 

. . LtCol Horace H. Figuers (to 10 May 1951) 
Maj John G. Dibble (from 11 May) 
Maj Frederick F. Draper (from 7 Aug) 
Maj Joseph T. Smith, Jr, (from 6 Sep) 
Maj Frederick F. Draper (from 7 Nov) 

, Maj James I. Glendinning, Jr. (to 2 Jan 1951) 
Maj George A. Smith (from 3 Jan) 
Maj Burt A. Lewis (from 19 May) 
Maj William T, Miller (from 20 Jun) 
IstLt Robert H, During (from 20 Aug) 
Maj Edson W. Card (from 29 Aug) 
Maj Paul R. Nugent (from 12 Sep) 
apt Quentin H. Kravig (from 19 Jan 1952) 

. Maj Charles E, Ingram (to 1 Jul 1951) 
Maj Orville L. Bibb (from 2 Jul) 
Capt Calvin Wall (from 10 Aug) 

. Maj Henry Brezinski (to 17 Jun 1951) 
Capt William A. Reno (from 18 Jun) 
Maj Charles E. Ingram (from 3 Jul) 
Maj George W. Ellis, Jr. (from 29 Jul) 
Capt Francis V. Clifford (from 8 Dec) 


The East-Central Front 

Commanding Officer, 
Company C 

.Maj Murray F. Rose (to 9 Jun 1951) 
Capt Henry J. Jadrkh (from 10 Jun) 
Maj Burt A, Lewis, Jr. (from 21 Jun) 
Maj Edson W. Card (from 4 Aug) 
Capt William A, Reno (from 29 Aug) 
Maj Edson W, Card (from 8 Sep) 
Capt Robert T. Weis (from 12 - 


1st Signal Battalion 

Officer LtCol Robert L. Schreier (to 6 Apr 1951) 

Maj Richard A, Glaeser (from 7 Apr) 
Maj Alton L. Hicks (from 31 Aug) 
LtCol John E. Morris (from 20 Oct) 

Executive Officer Maj Elwyn M. Stimson (to 9 Mar 1951) 

Maj Richard A, Glaeser (from 10 Mar) 
Capt Marion J, Griffin (from 7 Apr) 
Maj Robert W. Nelson (from 20 Apr) 
Maj Alton L. Hicks (from 20 Oct) 
Maj Ernest C Bennett (from 12 Feb 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Company 

Commanding Officer, 
Signal Company 

Commanding Officer, 

Executive Officer . , 

Commanding Officer, 
Headquarters Company 

. 2dLt Merle W. Allen (to 1 Mar 1951) 
IstLt Raymond B. Spicer (from 2 Mar) 
2dLt Richard D. Alexander (from 18 Jun) 
IstLt Frank J. Cerny (from 16 Aug) 

-Maj Richard A. Glaeser (to 8 Mar 1951) 
Capt John H, McGuite (from 9 Mar) 
Maj Harold S. Hill (from 17 Aug) 
Maj Bofish J. Kozak (from 1 Mar 1952) 

.Maj Frederick N. Steinhauser (to 24 Oct 1951) 
Maj Walter R. Miller (from 25 Oct) 
LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 13 Feb 1952) 

1st Tank Battalion 
, LtCol Harry T. Milne (to 21 Apr 1951) 

LtCol Holly H. Evans (from 22 Apr) 
Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (from 9 Feb 1952) 
.Maj Philip C. Morell (to 2 Sep 1951) 
Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (from 3 Sep) 
Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (from 9 Feb 1952) 

. IstLt John B. Lund (to 21 Sep 1951) 
Capt Robert S. Grether (from 22 Sep) 
IstLt Jack D. Sheldon (from 10 Mar 1952) 

Commanding Officer, 
Service Company . . 

Commanding Officer, 
Company A 

Command and Sta§ List 

. Maj Douglas E. Haberlie (to 3 Jul 195 1 > 
Maj George W. Bubb (from 4 Jul) 
Maj Edward C Nelson (from 27 Dec) 
Capt Robt. H. Vogel (from 9 Feb 1952) 


. IstLt Robert J. Craig (to 20 Jan 1951) 
Maj Arthur M. Hale (from 21 Jan) 
Capt Robert M. Krippner (from 31 Mar) 
Capt John E. Scanlon (from 17 Apr) 
Capt Joseph W, Luker (from 14 Jun) 
Capt Robert S. Grether (from 3 Sep) 
Capt Albert W. Snell (from 21 Sep) 
IstLt William E. Young (from 19 Feb 1952) 
Capt Milton L. Raphael (from 10 Mar) 

. Capt Bruce F. Williams (to 1 Jul 1951) 
Capt Paul F. Curtis (from 2 Jul) 
Capt John E. Lund (from 2 Oct) 
IstLt Paul A. Wood (from 5 Nov) 
Capt Jack J. Jackson (from 29 Dec) 

. Capt Richard M. Taylor (to 5 Aug 1951) 
Maj Walter Moore (from 6 Aug) 
Capt Thomas W. Clark (From 21 Nov) 

. Capt Joseph W. Malcolm, Jr. (to 2 Sep 1951) 
Capt James L. Carey (from 3 Sep) 
Capt Charles A. Sooter (from 28 Nov) 

Marine Observation Squadron 6 

Commanding Officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk (to 31 Mar 1951) 

Capt Clarence W. Parkins (from 1 Apr) 
Maj David W. McFarland (from 5 Apr) 
Maj Allan H. Ringblom (from 6 Oct) 
Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 1 Nov) 
Maj Kenneth G. Smedley (from 1 Feb 1952) 
Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (from 11 Feb) 
LtCol William T. Herring (from 27 Feb) 
.Capt Andrew L. McVicars (to 13 Jan 1951) 
Capt Clarence W. Parkins (from 14 Jan) 
Capt Kenneth C. Smedley (from 21 Jul) 
Maj William G. MacLean, jr. (from 21 Nov) 

Marine Helicopter Tratisport Squadron 161 

Commanding Officer LtCol George W. Herring (to 17 Dec 1951) 

Col Keith B. McCutcheon (from I " 

Commanding Officer, 
Company B 

Commanding Officer, 
Company C 

Commanding Officer, 
Company D 


The East-Central Front 

Executive Officer Maj William P. Mitchell {to 19 Mar 1952) 

Maj James R. Dyer (from 20 Mar) 


1 January 195 1-H March 1952 

MajGen Field Harris (to 28 May 1951) 

BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman (from 29 May) 
MajGen Christian F. Schilt (from 27 Jul) 
Asst Commanding General. .BrigGen Thomas J. Cushman (to 28 May 1951) 

BrigGen William O, Brice (from 29 May) 
BrigGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner (from 
29 Sep) 

Chief of Staff Col Caleb T. Bailey (to 18 Aug 1951) 

Col Arthur F. Binney (from 19 Aug) 
Col Carson A. Roberts (from 2 Jan 1952) 
Col Arthur F. Binney (from 26 Mar) 

Asst Chief of Staff, G-l. . . .Col Raymond E. Hopper (to 10 Feb 1951) 

Col Alexander G. Bunker (from 11 Feb) 
LtCol Owen M. Hines (from 1 Nov) 
Col Robert O. Bisson (from 27 Feb 1952) 

Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Col Roger T. Carieson (to IS Feb 1951) 

LtCol Winson V. Crockett (from 19 Feb) 
Capt John E. Buckle (from 21 Jun) 
Capt William G. Redel (from 1 Aug) 
LtCol Chester A. Henry, Jr. (from 1 Sep) 
LtCol John W. Stage (from 12 Jan 1952) 

Asst Chief of Staff, G-3. - . . Col Edward C Dyer (to 28 Feb 1951) 

LtCol Howard A. York (from 1 Mar) 
LtCol Neil R. Madntyre (from 12 Mar) 
Col Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from 26 Jun) 
Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 19 Aug) 
Col Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from 7 Sep) 
Col Guy M. Morrows (from 14 Sep) 
Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 21 Jan 1952) 

Asst Chief of Staff, G-A Col Thomas J. Noon (to 14 May 1951) 

Col Wallace T. Breakey (from 15 May) 
LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 21 Jul) 
Col Luther S. Moore (from 5 Sep) 
Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 7 Jan 1952) 
Col Robert E. Galer (from 12 Mar) 

Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33) 

Officer Col Frank G. Dailey (to 29 Dec 1950) 

LtCol Radford C. West (from 30 Dec) 
LtCol Paul J. Fontana (from 15 Jan 1951) 
LtCol Richard A. Beard, Jr. (acting) (from 
2 Apr) 

Command and Staff List 


> ■ ■ 

Col Guy M. Morrow (from 9 Apr) 
Col Carson A. Roberts (from 31 Jul) 
Col Arthur F. Binney (from 2 Jan 1952) 
Col Martin A. Severson (from 27 Mar) 

Executive Officer LtCol Richard A. Beard, Jr. (to 18 May 1951) 

LtCol James B. Moore (from IS May) 
LtCol Nathan T. Post, Jr. (from 14 Jul) 
LtCol John W. Stage (from 2 Sep) 
LtCo! Nathan T. Post, Jr. (from 12 Jan 1952) 
LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 6 Feb) 

Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33) 

Commanding Officer LtCol Nathan T, Post (to 10 Jan 1952) 

LtCol Finley T. Clarke, Jr. (from 1 1 Jan) 
Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 27 Mar) 

Executive Officer Maj George K. Harshbarger (to 24 Apr 1952) 

Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33) 

. , LtCol Joseph W. Kean, Jr. (2 Dec 1951 to 
21 Jan 1952) 
Maj Zadik Collier (from 22 Jan) 
. Maj Alton C Bennett (to 4 Dec 1951) 
Maj Zadik Collier (from 5 Dec) 
Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 22 Jan 1952) 

Headquarters Squadron 33 (HQSQ, MAG-33) 

Commanding Officer Cap! Grover C McClure, Jr. (to 14 Apr 1951) 

Maj William D. Armstrong (from 15 Apr) 
Maj Raymond F. Scherer (from 28 Jul) 
Maj Morgan C. Webb, HI (from 27 Aug) 
Capt Allen R. Schntter (from 27 Mar 1952) 

Marine Service Squadron 33 (SMS-33) 1 

Commanding Officer LtCol James C. Lindsay (to 23 Jan 1951) 

Maj Edward J. Montagne (from 24 Jan) 
Maj William M. Lund in (from 26 Jan) 
Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr. (from 1 Apr) 
LtCo! Allen T. Barnum (from 2 Jul) 
LtCol Joseph W. Kean, Jr. (from 12 Nov) 

Executive Officer Maj Edward J. Montagne, Jr. (to 13 Mar 1951)" 

Maj Elmer P. Thompson, Jr. a (from 2 Jul) 
Maj George K. Harshbarger (from 7 Aug) 

"SMS disestablished I Dee 1951 — con current ly MABS-33 and MAMS-33 formed. 

"No Exec listed after Montagne was detached sometime in March 1951 until July 1951. 
Ihornpson came aboard 13 Mar 1951 which may well be date that Montagne was 
detached as Exec — however, nothing is recorded to this effect. 

It is quite possible and logical that Thompson was Exec from 13 Mar-2 Apr 1951— 
w «en he became CO. 


The East-Central Front 

Mamie Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) 

Commanding Officer 

Executive Officer 

. Col Boeker C. Batterton (to 28 May 1951) 
Col Stanley W. Trachta (from 29 May) 
Col Richard C. Mangrum (from 1 Aug) 
Col Luther S. Moore (from 2 Jan 1952) 
Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 1 Apr) 

. LtCol Donald K. Yost (to 24 Feb 1951) 
LtCol Rivers J. Morrell, Jr. (from 25 Feb) 
LtCol Richard W. Wyczawski (from 26 Jun) 
LtCol William G. Thrash (from 18 Jul) 
LtCol Hugh M. Elwood (from 8 Aug) 
LtCol Jens C. Aggerbeck, Jr. (from 17 Nov) 
LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 27 Feb 1952) 

W Squadron, (HQSO, MAG-12) 

. . ,Maj John E. Hays (to 31 Dec 1950) 

Capt William E. Lesage (from 1 Jan 1951) 
Maj Bradley K. Schwarz (from 4 Apr) 
Maj David P. John (from 2 Sep) 
Capt Joseph E. Givens (from 9 Oct) 
Capt George Byers, Jr. (from 1 Feb 

Marine Service Squadron 12 (SMS-12) * 

Officer . 
Executive Officer 

LtCol Charles E. McLean, Jr. (to 28 Jul 1951) 

Maj Perry L. Shuman (from 29 Jul) 

Maj Joseph W. Mackin (to 2 Apr 1951) 

Maj Howard W. Bollmann (from 3 Apr) 
Maj Raphael Ahern (from 8 Aug) 
Maj Robert E. Wall (from 3 Oct) 

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12) {Commissioned 1 Dec 1951) 

Commanding Officer Maj Perry L. Shuman (to 5 Jan 1952) s 

Maj Robert L, Bryson (from 6 Jan) 
LtCol Carl M. Longley (from l Mar) 
. .Maj Floyd C. KMpatrick (to 18 Dec 1951) 
Maj Robert L. Bryson (from 19 Dec) 
Maj Floyd C, Kirkpatrick (from 6 Jan 1952) 
Maj Robert A, Collett (from 1 Mar) 
Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12) 
(Commissioned 1 Dec 1951) 

1 SMS-12 disestablished 1 Dec 1951— concurrently MABS-12 and MAMS-12 formed 
and commissioned. 

"Narrative of Jan 1952 CD MABS-12 states Shuman del 4 Jan 1952 and Bryson on 
same date took over as CO, Assumption of command order states that 6 Jan 1952 was 
date Bryson became CO. 

Command and Staff List 


Commanding Officer Maj Robert E. Wall (to 10 Feb 1952) 

LtCol Carl M. Longley (from 11 Feb) 
LtCot Joseph A. Gray (from l Mar) 

Executive Officer Capt Kenneth A. Anderson (to 26 Dec 1951) 

Maj "S" "D" G. Peterson (from 27 Dec) n 
Maj Robert E. Wall (from Feb/Mar 1952) u 

Marine Wtng Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1) (Decommissioned I Jul 1955) 


Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17) (Commissioned 1 Jul 1953) 

Commanding Officer CWO Aubrey D. Taylor (to 23 Jan 1951) 

LtCol James C. Lindsay (from 24 Jan) 
Co! Roger T. Carleson (from 19 Feb) 
Col Elmer T. Dorsey (from 9 Sep) 
Col John Wehle (from 7 Jan 1952) 

Executive Officer None shown prior to 19 Feb 1951. 

LtCot James C. Lindsay (to 16 Jul 1951) 
LtCol Alton D. Gould (from 17 Jul) 
Maj Edward J, McGee (from 13 Nov) 
LtCol Robert M. Haynes (from 2 Dec) 
LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 15 Mar 1952) 

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-J ) 

Officer Maj Harold E. Allen (to 10 Jun 1951) 

LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 11 Jun) 
Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 18 Aug) 
LtCol William T. Herring (from IS Sep) 
Maj Milton M. Cook (from 1 Feb 1952) 
LtCol Herbert D. Raymond, Jr. (from 16 Feb) 
Maj Fred A. Steele (from 28 Mar) 

Executive Officer Maj Richard Hey, Jr. (to 3 Apr 1951) 

Maj Casper F. Hegner (from 4 Apr) 

Maj Edward R. Polgrean (from 31 Jul) 

Maj William T, Porter (from 21 Nov) 

Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 11 Dec) 

Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr. (from 2 Feb 1952) 

Maj Fred A. Steele (from 16 Feb) 

Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr. (from 28 Mar) 

Marine Transport Squadron 152 (VMR-152) 

Commanding Officer Col Deane C Roberts (to 15 Jul 1951) 

LtCol John S. Carter (from 16 Jul) 
Col William B. Steiner (from 27 Jul) 

"These dates are those from the Station Lists — the diary records nothing (except in the 
of Beatty (20 Feb 1952)) that would either prove or disprove these dates as 


The East-Central Front 

Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF-212) redesignated Marine Attack 
Squadron 212 (VMA-212) on 10 fun 1952 

Commanding Officer LtCoI Richard W. Wyczawski (to 9 Mar 1951) 

LtCol Claude H. Welch (from 10 Mar) 
LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 21 Aug) 
LtCol Joseph A. Gray (from 11 Dec) 
LtCol Robert L, Bryson (from 1 Mar 1952) 

Executive Officer Ma] Elmer P. Thompson, jr. (to 18 Mar 1951) 

Maj Edward J. Montagne, Jr. (from 19 Mar) 
Maj Joseph W. Mackin (from 13 Apr) 
Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 16 Jul) 
Maj William H. Rankin (from 20 Sep) 
Maj Robert A. Colfett (from 11 Dec) 
Maj Richard B. Elliott (from 23 Feb 1952) 

1st 90mm AAA Gtm Battalion Arrived Pusan, Korea— 29 Aug 1951 

Battalion Commander LtCol Charles W. May (K1A) (to 21 Dec 1951) 

LtCoI Kenneth P. Dunkle (from 22 Dec) 
Col John F, Dunlap (from 30 Jan 1952) 
Col Max C. Chapman (from 23 Mar) 

Executive Officer Maj Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 21 Dec 1951) 

None shown 22-25 Dec 1951. 

David H. Simmons (from 26 Dec) 
' Kenneth P. Dunkle (from 30 Jan 1952) 

Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (VMF-3U) 

Commanding Officer LtCol Neil R, Maclntyre (to 10 Mar 1951 > 

LtCol John F. Kinney (from II Mar) 
Maj Frank S. Hoffecker (from 28 Jul) 
LtCol James B, Moore (from 1 Aug) 
LtCoI John S. Payne (from 1 Dec) 
LtCol Darrell D, Irwin (from 27 Feb 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj John R. Stack (to 20 Feb 1951) 

Maj Samuel Richards, Jr. (from 21 Feb) 

Maj Samuel B. Folsom, Jr. (from Apr) 7 

Maj Frank S. Hoffecker, Jr. (from 1 Jun) (KlA) 

Maj Frank C. Drury (from 25 Aug) 

Maj Carroll E. McCullah (from 1 Jan 1952) 

Maj Jay E. McDonald (from 16* Feb) 

Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513j 

Commanding Officer LtCol David C Wolfe (to 22 Feb 1951) 

LtCol James R. Anderson (from 23 Feb) 
LtCol Robert R. Davis (from 1 Jul) 

1 The absence of a specific date indicates that no specific date of assignment is 
in unit records. 

Command and Staff List 311 

LtCol Allen T. Barnum (from 22 Nov) 
Maj Frank H. Simonds (i'rorn 1 Feb 1952) 
LtCol John R, Burnett (from 1 Mar) 

Executive Officer Maj Albert L. Clark (to 18 Dec 1950) , 

Maj George B. Herlihy (from 19 Dec) 
Maj William G. Johnson * (from Feb 1951) 
Maj Evans C, Carlson (from 23 Apr) 
Maj John E, Reynolds (from 7 May) 
Maj Leo F. Tatro, Jr. (from 25 Aug) 
Maj Judson C Richardson, Jr. (MIA) (from 
4 Oct) 

Maj Frank H, Simonds (from 14 Dec) 
Maj Leroy T. Frey (from 1 Feb 1952) 
Maj Frank H, Simonds (from 1 Mar) 

Marine Night-Fight er Squadron 542 (VMF(N)-542) 

Commanding Officer LtCol Max J. Vokansek, Jr. (to 5 Feb 1951) 

LtCol James R. Anderson (from 6 Feb) 
Maj Albert L. Clark (from 23 Feb) • 
LtCol Peter D. Lambrecht (from 24 Mar) 

Executive Officer Maj Robert T. Whitten (to 23 Jan 1951) 

LtCol James R. Anderson (from 24 Jan) 

Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF-323) redesignated Marine Attack 
Squadron 323 (VMA-323) on 30 /«» 1952 

Commanding Officer Maj Arnold A. Lund (to 24 Jan 1951) 

Maj Stanley S. Nicolay (from 25 Jan) 
Maj Donald L. Clark (from 1 Mar) 
Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 3 May) 
LtCol George F. Vaughan (from 25 Sep) 
Maj John L. Dexter (from 26 Oct) 
LtCol Richard L. Blume (from 16 Jan 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Robert E. Johnson (to 31 Jan 1951) 

Maj Donald L. Clark (from 1 Feb) 
Maj Wilbur F. Evans, Jr. (from 1 Mar) 
Maj John L. Dexter (from 7 Jul) 
Maj Floyd C. Kirkpatrick (from 25 Oct) 
Maj Andrew J. Voyles (from 22 Nov) 
Maj Howard E, Cook (from 18 Dec) 
Maj Herbert D. Raymond, Jr. (from 13 Jan 

Maj Howard E. Cook (from 14 Feb) 
.._ Maj William A. Weir (from 16 Mar) 

. The absence of specific dates indicates that no specific assignment dates can be found 
'« existing records. 

24 j^ F W- 542; At sea bound foe United States 12-21 Mar 1951— arrived El Tom, 



The East-Central Front 

Marine Air Control Croup 2 (MACC-2) (Arrived Korea 11 Apr 1951 ) 

Commanding Officer LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 10 Apr 1951) 

Col Edwin P. Pennebaker, Jr. (from 30 Apr) 
Col Martin A. Severson (from 1 Jan 1952) 
Col Frederick R. Payne, Jr. (from 1 Mar) 

Executive Officer None shown during period LtCol Brilliant 

was CO. 

LtCol Manual Brilliant (from 30 Apr 1951) 
LtCol Joseph W. Kean (from 10 Jun) 
LtCol Robert R. Davis (from 4 Dec) 
LtCol Russell D. Rupp (from 6 Feb 1952) 

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2) 

Commanding Officer Maj Christian C. Lee (to 30 Apr 1951) 

Maj James A. Et he ridge (from 1 May) 
Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 6 May) 
Maj Wade W. Larkin (from 28 May) 
LtCol Henry W. Bransom (from 25 Jun) 
LtCol Hensley Williams (from 1 Dec 1951) 

Executive Officer Maj Harlen E. Hood (to Mar/Apr 1951) 

Maj James A. Etheridge (from 26 Apr) l " 
Maj Wade W. Larkin (from 1 May) 
Maj Milton M. Cook, Jr. (from 28 May) 
Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 23 Sep) 

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3 (MGCIS-3) 

Commanding Officer Maj Raymond H. George (to 15 Feb 1951) 

Maj Jack R. Moore (from 16 Feb) 
LtCol Hoyle R. Barr (from 1 Nov) 
LtCol Owen W. Hines (from 2 Mar 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj David M. Hudson (to 15 Aug 1951) 

Maj Daniel L. Cummings (from 16 Aug) 
Maj James H. Foster (from 17 Feb 1952) 

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA-121) 

(Departed El Toro— 2 Oct 1951 for Korea; 21 Oct 1951 reported to CG, 
IstMAW, for duty; 22 Oct 1951 CO arrived Pohang (K-3), Korea.) 

Commanding Officer LtCol Alfred N. Gordon (KIA) (to 17 Nov 


Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 18 Nov) 
LtCol Phillip B. May (from 1 Dec) 
LtCol William A. Houston, Jr, (from 15 Mar 

10 His date of attachment is vague. 

Command and Staff List 313 

Executive 'Officer Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 17 Nov 1951) 

' Edward B. Harrison (from 18 Nov) 
Frank P. Barker, Jr. (from 1 Dec) 
Edward B. Harrison (from I Jan 1952) 
Maj Richard J. l'lynn, Jr. (from 15 Feb) 
Maj Henry W. Horst (from 26 Mar) 



Marine fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214) 

Commanding Officer Maj William M. Lundin (to 25 Jan 1951 ) 

Maj James A. Feeley, Jr. (from 26 Jan) 
Maj Edward Ochoa (from 5 May) 
LtCol James W. Poindexter (from 16 May) 
Maj Charles M. Kunz (from 4 Nov) 11 

Executive Officer Maj Edward Ochoa (to 31 Jan 1951) 

Maj Hugh B, Calahan (from 1 Feb) 

Maj Herbert C, Langenfeld 12 (from 1 Jun) 

Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115) (Arrived Pohang (K-J), Korea 

on 25 Feb 1952) 

Commanding Officer ...... LtCol Thomas M. Coles (25 Feb-20 May 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Conrad G. Winter (25 Feb-26 Apr 1952) 

Marine Fighter Squadron (VMF-312) redesignated Marine Attack 
Squadron (VMA-312) on 1 Mar 1952 

LtCol "J" Frank Cole (to 28 Jan 1951) 

Maj Donald P. Frame (KIA) (from 29 Jan) 
Maj Frank H. Presley (from 4 Apr) 
Maj Edward J. McGee (from 20 Jun) 
LtCol Harry W. Reed (KIA) (from 22 Jul) 
Maj Edward J, McGee (from 31 Jul) 
LtCol Russell D. Rupp (from 15 Aug) 
LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (from 8 Jan 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Frank H. Presley (to 3 Apr 1951) 

Capt Phillip C DeLong (from 4 Apr) 

Maj Robert J. Shelley, Jr. (from 22 Jun) 

Maj Edward J. McGee (from 22 Jul) 

Maj Robert J. Shelley, Jr. (from 31 Jul) 

Maj Edward J. McGee (from 14 Aug) 

Maj James H. Crutchfield (KIA) (from 25 Oct) 

Maj Jay W. Hubbard (from 4 Nov) 

Maj Richard J. Webster (from 19 Dec) «* 

Maj Fred A. Steele (from Jan 1952) * 

11 VMF-214 departed Korea for ftami on 4 Nov 1951— en route to USA (El Tore) 
w*mA the Lenawee, 8-27 Nov mi; 

u Records do not indicate specific 
Records do not indicate specific 



The East-Central Front 

Maj Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (from 28 Jan) 
Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 30 Mar) 

Photographic Unit — commissioned Marine Photographic Squadron I 
(VMf-1) on 25 Feb 1952 

Commanding Officer Maj Donald S. Bush (to 14 Jun 1951) 

Maj Edgar L. Smith (from 15 Jun) 
Maj James W. Dougherty (from 27 Jul) 
Capt Edward A. Fitzgerald (from 29 Oct) 
LtCol Alton D. Gould (from 12 Nov) 
Maj Robert R. Read (from 26 Mar 1952) 

Executive Officer Maj Robert R. Read (to 25 Mar 1952) 

Maj Albert E, James (from 26 Mar) 

HQSQ, 1st MAW 

Commanding Officer Capt Earl B. Sumerlin, Jr. (to 12 Jan 1951) 

Maj John A. Reeder (from 13 Jan) 
Capt Edwin H. McCaleb, III (from 17 Jun) 
Maj Herbert C. Langenfeld (from 11 Oct) 
Maj Earl C. Miles (from 2 Dec) 


Unit Citations 


The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Presi- 
dential Unit Citation to the 

First Marine Division, Reinforced 

for service as set forth in the following CITATION: 

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea 
wring the periods 21 to 26 April, 16 May to 30 June, and 11 to 25 September 
1951, Spearheading the first counterorTensive in the spring of 1951, the First 
Marine Division, Reinforced, engaged the enemy in the mountainous center of 
Korea in a brilliant series of actions unparalleled in the history of the Marine 
Corps, destroying and routing hostile forces with an unrelenting drive of 
seventy miles north from Wonju. During the period 21 to 26 April, the full 
force of the enemy counteroffensive was met by the Division, north of the 
"waehon Reservoir. Although major units flanking the Marine Division were 
destroyed or driven back by the force of this attack, the Division held firm 
against the attackers, repelling the onslaught from three directions and pre- 
venting the encirclement of the key center of the lines. Following a rapid 
^grouping of friendly forces in close contact with the enemy, the First Marine 
Division, Reinforced, was committed into the flanks of the massive enemy pene- 
tiation and, from 16 May to 30 June, was locked in violent and crucial battle 
which resulted in the enemy being driven back to the north with disastrous 
losses to his forces in the number of killed, wounded and captured. Carrying 
Out a series of devastating assaults, the Division succeeded in reducing the 
enemy's main fortified complex dominating the 38th Parallel. In the final 
significant offensive of the action in Kotea, from 11 to 25 September 1951, the 
First Marine Division, Reinforced, completed the destruction of the enemy 
forces in Eastern Korea by advancing the front against a final desperate enemy 
defense in the 'Punch Bowl' area in heavy action which completed the liberation 
of South Korea in this locality. With the enemy's major defenses reduced, his 
forces on the central front decimated, and the advantage of terrain and the 
tactical initiative passing to friendly forces, he never again recovered sufficiently 
f o resume the offensive in Korea. The outstanding courage, resourcefulness and 
Aggressive fighting spirit of the officers and men of the First Marine Division, 
Reinforced, reflect the highest credit upon themselves and the United States 
N aval Service. " 


The East-Central Front 

The following reinforcing units of the First Marine Division participated in 
operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea during the cited periods: 

Fleet Marine Force Units and Detachments: "C" Battery, 1st 4.5 
Rocket Battalion; 1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 
7th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; "A" 
Company, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion (Redesignated 1st Amphibian Truck 
Company 18 July 1951); Team #1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st 
Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay Team, 
1st Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company; 1st Provisional 
Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company. 

United States Army Units: (For such periods not included in Army Unit 
Awards) 1st Bn, 32d Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th Truck Co; 5 nth 
Truck Co; 1st Ord Medium Maint Co, USA; 3d Pit, 86th Engr Searchlight Co 
(passed to operational control of llth Marines) ; 558th Trans Truck Co (Am- 
phibious, was attached to 7th MT Bn, FMF) ; 196th Field Arty Bn; 92 d Army 
Engr Searchlight Pit; IS 1st CIC Det USA; KM MIS Det USA; TLO Det 
USA; UNMACK Civil Affairs Team USA; 6 1st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn 
(155 Howitzer) ; 62 }d Field Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn "C" Btry; 204th 
Fietd Arty Bn "B" Btry; S4th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th US Inf 
Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2d US Div (attached to 
KPR); Recon Co, 7th US Inf Div; 46lst Inf Bn; Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf 
Div; 204th Field Arty Bn "A" Btry; 69th Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 
8th Field Arty Bn; 90th Field Arty Bn; 21st AAA AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 
441st CIC Det, USA; Prov Bn, USA (Dets 31st and 3 2d RCTS) ; Co D, 10th 
Engr (C) Bn, USA; Tank Co, 31st Inf, USA; Hqr Co, 31st Inf, USA; Co B, 
1st Bn, HUt Inf, USA; 2d Bn, 31st Inf, USA (less Co E) . 

For the President, 
Charles S. Thomas 
Secretary oj the Navy 


The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the Presi- 
dential Unit Citation to the 

First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced 

for service as set forth in the following Citation; 

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea 
from 8 March to 30 April, 18 May to 30 June, and 3 August to 29 September 

Unit- Citations 


'951. Carrying out 'round-the-clock' combat flights during these periods, often 
under hazardous conditions of weather and terrain, the First Marine Aircraft 
Wing, Reinforced, provided unparalleled close air support for friendly ground 
forces, effectively reducing the enemy's power to resist and contributing ma- 
terially to the sweeping victories achieved by our ground forces. Operating 
continuously in the most advanced areas under fire, the Wing consistently 
maintained a high degree of combat readiness and struck savage blows to 
inflict tremendous damage and heavy casualties upon the enemy. Individually 
capable and determined, the gallant officers and men of this indomitable team 
achieved a distinctive combat record during a period of vital operations against 
a stubborn foe. This record is a lasting tribute to the courage and fighting 
spirit of all members of the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, and 
reflects the highest credit upon the United States Naval Service," 

All organic units (excepting Marine Fighting Squadrons 214 and 323 for 
tfie periods 8 March to 30 April 1951 and 18 May to 30 June 1951, and Marine 
Observation Squadron 6 for the entire three periods) and the following rein- 
forcing units of the First Marine Aircraft Wing participated in operations 
against enemy aggressor forces in Korea during one or more of the above cited 
periods: 1st 90mm Ant i- Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion and Ground Control 
Approach Unit 4lM. 

For the President, 
Charles S. Thomas 
Secretary of the Navy 



Department of the Army. Joint Daily Situation Reports, December 1950- 
March 1952. Reports and Orders (1950-1952) R&O File, HQMC Histori- 


Smith, Oliver P. MajGen, USMC Chronicle of the Operations of the First 
Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950-1951, MS. Manuscript File, 
■HQMC Historical. 

" . Notes on the Operation of the 1st Marine Division During the First 

Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950-1951. MS. Manuscript File, 
HQMC Historical. 

U.S. Air Force. U.S. Air Force Historical Study Number 72 (Continuation of 
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Conflict I November 1950 to 30 June 1952." July 1955. UHR File, 
HQMC Historical. 

U.S. Marine Corps. Interviews with participants in the Korean War, 1950-54. 

— . Letters and comments from participants in the Korean War. Com- 
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~~ Letters, memoranda, narratives, and statements received by Historical 

Branch, G-3, concerning Korean operations. Monograph and Comments 
File, HQMC Historical. 

— -. Commandant of the Marine Corps letter to Distribution List: 

"Analysis of Close Air Support Systems," 19 August 1952. HQMC Histori- 

— . Report of Joint Army-Navy Mission at Headquarters U.S. Marine 

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. Instructional information, Vest, Armored, M-1951. G-4 Files, 


Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Interim Evaluation Report Number 1, 
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. U.S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report Number 2, Id Novem- 
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--- — . U.S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report Number 3, 1 May 1951 
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' — - — — . U.S. Pacific Fleet. Interim Evaluation Report Number 4, 1 January to 
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Par East Command. Allied Translator and Interpreter Service. Enemy Docu- 
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'"— , Operations Branch, Theater Intelligence Division, Military Intelli- 


The East-Central Front 

gence Section. Order of Battle Information Chinese Communist Third Field 

Army. Intelligence File, HQMC Historical. 
Chief, Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical Air Command. Joint Training 

Directive for Air-Ground Operations. UHR File, HQMC Historical. 
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in Korea. 22 

March 1951. UHR File, HQMC Historical. 
— . Staff Study: The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine Force 

Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific. 19 October 1950. R&O File, 

HQMC Historical, 

. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, HQMC 


Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. War Diaries, Command Reports, and supporting 
documents, December 1950-March 1952. Departmental Records Branch, 
The Adjutant General's Office. Alexandria, Va. (DRB, TAGO). 

1 Order of Battle Branch, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 

CCF Army Histories. 1 December 1954. Copy at OCMH. 

Fifth Air Force. Reports, orders, and supporting documents, May 1951 -March 
1952. Copies at HQMC Historical. 

X Corps. War Diaries, Command Reports, and supporting documents, De- 
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■ . G-2 Section. Periodic Intelligence Reports, December 1950-March 

1952. UHR File, HQMC Historical. 

1st Marine Air Wing, PMF. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 
Command Diary (Korea), Type B Report File (Diary File), HQMC 

1st Marine Division, FMF. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 
Diary File, HQMC Historical. 

. Periodic Intelligence Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Cor- 
respondence File, IstMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. 

. Periodic Operations Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Cor- 
respondence File, IstMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. 

. Reports, messages, journals, correspondence, orders, and miscellaneous 

matter, December 1950-March 1952, Correspondence File, IstMarDiv 
(Korea), HQMC Historical. 

-. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, HQMC 


Commander Amphibious Group One (CTF 90). Action Report Hungnam 
Operation; Period 9 December 1950 through 25 December 1950. 21 Janu- 
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Commander Amphibious Group Three (CTG 90.1). War Diary, January 
1951. UHR File (Navy), HQMC Historical. 

1st Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical. 

— . Unit Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Correspondence File, 

IstMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. 
5th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 

HQMC Historical. 



. Unit Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Correspondence File, 

IstMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. 
7th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 

HQMC Historical. 

. Unit Reports, December 1950-Match 1952. Correspondence File, 

IstMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. 
11th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952, Diary File, 

HQMC Historical. 

— . Unit Reports, December 1950-March 1952. Correspondence File, 

IstMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. 

Marine Air Group 12. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary 
File, HQMC Historical. 

Marine Air Group 53. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary 
File, HQMC Historical, 

1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, Unit Reports, Intelligence Summaries, 
Periodic Operation Reports, Periodic Intelligence Reports, Dispatch Sum- 
maries, Patrol Orders, Special Action Reports, 1951-1952. HQMC Histori- 

Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division. Unit Reports, December 1950- 
March 1952. Correspondence File, IstMarDiv (Korea), HQMC Historical. 
1st Battalion, 1st Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
2d Battalion, 1st Marines, Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
2d Battalion, 5th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, FIQMC Historical, 
3d Battalion, 5th Marines, Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
2d Battalion, 7th Marines, Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
3d Battalion, 7th Marines. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
1st Engineer Battalion. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary 

File, HQMC Historical. 
1st Tank Battalion. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary 

File, HQMC Historical. 
VMO-6. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, HQMC 


VMF-212. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical. 

322 The East-Central Front 

VMF-214. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical. 

VMF-311. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical, 

VMF-312. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical. 

VMF-323. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical, 

VMF(N)-513. Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical. 

VMF(N)-542, Historical Diaries, December 1950-March 1952. Diary File, 
HQMC Historical. 

Tactical Air Control Squadron One. War Diary, December 1950-March 1952. 

Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
Marine Wing Service Squadron One. Historical Diary, December 1950-March 

1952. Diary File, HQMC Historical. 
Mobile Construction Battalion Two, Report of Activities, January 1951. UHR 

File, HQMC Historical, 
USS Bataan (CVL-29). War Diary, January 1951. Unit Report File, HQMC 


USS Bataan (CVL-29) . Action Report, "Operations off the West Coast of 
Korea," 15 January-7 April 1951. UHR File, HQMC Historical. 

USS Consolation (AH). Commanding Officer's Report to Commander, Naval 
Forces Far East dated 26 January 1952. UHR File, HQMC Historical. 


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Macmillan, 1955. 



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Adelman, LtCol Merrilt, 122», 134. 149 
A-frames, 86, 16} 
Agan, Capt Alfred H„ 47 
Air attack, enemy, 65 
Air battle, 103 
Air control, 97 
1st MAW, 89 
System, USAP, 18 
System, USMC, 18 
Aircraft, 46, 47, 6*3, 71, 83, 89, 96, 117, 
125. 131 . 137, 159, 188-190, 208. 
Sff Helicopters and Communist 

AO (Skyraiders), 116, 122, 125 
B-26, 33 
B-29, 90 

F3D (SkyKnight), 89 

F4U (Corsair), 13, 27, 33, 49, 63, 71, 

78, 89, 96, 107, 108, 116, 125, 

137, 142, 186 
F7F (Tigercat), 49, 50. 63, 89, 131 
F9F (Panther), 63, 96, 108, 125, 137, 


(Mustang), 28,33, 116, 125, 137, 

F-80 (Shooting Star), 15, 97. 125 
P-82, 89 
F-84, 125 

Jets, 15, 49, 63, 96 

Marine, 63, 78, 103, 108, 120 

Mars, 31 

Mosquito, 18, 26-28, 47, 50, 51, 97, 107 
Observation planes 
OEs, 224 

OYs, 1, 14, A9, 63, 104, !07, 116, 
125, 134, 137, 142. 164, 187, 
188, 224 
PB4Y-2, 138 
PO-2, 170 
R4D, 55, 63, 138 
R5D, 31, 32, 63, 89 
Sabre jets, 28 
SNB (Beechcraft), 63 
SNJ, 18 

TBM (Avenger), 50, 63 
T-6, 18 
Transports, 31 
Air drop, 73, 93, 116, 181 

Air Fields 

Bofu, repair of, 33 

Kimpo, 28, 29, 59, 64 

K-l, 29, 32, 33, 35, 46, 48, 56, 62, 63, 

89. 96, 108, 137, 171 
K-2, 29, 32 

K-3, 32, 62, 63, 89, 108, 171 
K-4, 29 

K-9, 1, 15, 28, 29, 32, 46, 48-50, 52, 

56, 90 
K-10, 29 

1C-16, 28, 108, 116, 137, 254 
K-18, 171, 185, 186 
K^16, 137, 138, 142, !70 
K-50, 215, 254 
K-51, 215 
X-77, 214 

X-83, 189, 208, 219, 220, 241, 242 
Seoul, 29 
Suwon, 28, 29 
Tsuika, 33b 
Woman, 29 
Yonpo, 29 
Air Force, 28, 31, 33, 34, 63, 76, 170, 224 
Eighth Air Force, 167 
Par East Air Forces (FEAF), 14, 29, 32, 
33, 45, 47, 95 
Commander, 33 
Combat Air Command, 73 
Military Air Transport Service, 31 
Fifth Air Force, 14, 15, 18, 49, 64, 67, 
'9, 78, 135, 142 143, 170, 185, 

rol, 15 

543d Tactical Support Group, 64 
8th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 1 5 
606th Aircraft Control and Warning 
Squadron, 90 

Airheart, IstLt 
Air Liaison officer, 17 
Air lift, 31, 32, 215 

Troop, 32 
Air mattresses, 94 
Air observation, 182 
Air operations 

Control, 26 

United Nations, 33 




Air reconnaissance. 49, 50, 64, 78, 84, 101, 
143, 207 
Armed, 96 
Patrols, 28 
United States, 47 
Air strike, 17, 69, 70, 75, 91, 92, 1 19, 125, 
130, 142, 148, 149, 159, 179, 183, 
185. 186, 195, 206, 219, 221 
Control, 17, 142 
Interdiction, 27, 144 
Tactics, 64 
United States, 13, 52 
U. S. Marine Corps, 65, 70, 74, 115 
Air support, 27, 28, 45, 69, 76, 7B, 81, 86, 
96, 97, 108, 130, 135-138, 141, 
142, 148, 150, 178, 185, 191, 206, 
2 10, 220, 258, 260 
Close, 14, 18, 26, 27, 49, 71, 76, 78, 
96, 108, 114, 125, 136, 142-144, 
169, 170, 185, 186, 224, 258, 260 
Control of, 14, 15, 17. 136 
Air Force, 17 
Marine Corps, 17 
Deep, 49, 50 
Interdictory, 18 
Naval (British), 28 
Reconnaissance, 64 
United States, 56, 71, 83 
ALBANY, Phase Line, 80, 84, 85 
Allen, BrigGen C R., 246n 
Allen, Maj H. E., 90, 90n 
Allert, lstLt William J., til 
Almond. MajGen Edward M., 5, 19, 121, 
128, 133, 133», 137, 149, 154, 157, 

Alston, LtCol William P., 194, 204, 242 
Ambushes, 70, 217, 229, 231, 242 

Chinese Communist Forces, 44 

Marine, U.S., 53 

North Korean People's Army, 49 
American Civil War, 165 
Americans, Fighting for Korea, 7 
Ammunition, 72, 122, 144, 170, 179, 181, 
187, 190, 193, 210, 214, 221, 243, 
244, 260 
Artillery, 185 
Mortar, 180 
11th Marines, 122 
Dump, 104, 210 

Enemy, 130 
Mortars, 114, 244 

Shells, 104 
Shortage, 244 
Small-arms, 1 14 
Supply Point (ASP) 60-B, 181 
United States, 64, 93, 122 
U. S. Marine Corps, 113 

Assault, 257 
Attack, 250 
Landing, 45, 47 

Operation, 250 
Tactics, 250 
Anderson, LtCol James R„ 46, 63, 89 
Andong, 29, 42, 44, 49, 51, 55, 62, 66 
Andong-Taegue area, 45 
Andre wes, VAdm Sir William G„ RN, 

15, 28, 46 
Defenses, 103 
Fire, enemy, 47 
ARIZONA, Phase Line, 73, 75 
Armor, body, 165, 166, 168, 169, 237-239, 

251, 257, See Vest, Armored, 
Army, U. S„ Strength figures, 11 
Army, U. S. Units 
Eighth U. S. Army in Korea (EUSAK), 
5, 8, 10, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25- 
27, 30, 35, 37, 38, 41, 44, 49, 
51, 54,58-60, 63, 65, 67, 69, 84, 
86, 92, 93, 109, 119, 121, 122, 

127, 128, 132, 133. 156-158, 
163, 176, 185. 201. 203, 215, 
218, 225, 242, 243, 250-253, 
258, 259 

Commander, 7, 11, 12, 19, 41, 50, 58, 
60, 67, 68, 72, 73, 99, 120, 
199, 202, 261 

Fortifications, 11 

Morale, 7, 8, 156 

Tactics, 8 

Transportation Section, 163 
Units, supply of, 12 
Tenth Army, 72 

I Corps, 22, 24, 25, 44, 50, 66, 79, 84, 
108, 116, 119, 121, 131. 154, 
163, 201, 251, 253, 256, 259 
Headquarters, 50 

IX Corps, 22, 24-26, 44, 50, 58, 60, 62, 

65-67, 72, 79, 80, 84, 86, 93-95, 
99-102, 107-109, 118, 121, 126, 

128, 130-132, 154, 201, 2l4, 
253, 259 

Commander, 60, 71, 79, 215 
Command Post, 72 

X Corps, 1, 5, 19, 21, 22, 24-26, 29, 

45, 65, 66, 68, 71, 72, 79, 93. 
94, 108, 120, 121, 125, 128, 131, 
146, 149, 154, 158, 159, 161, 
181, 199, 201, 206, 210, 212, 
216, 218, 221, 224, 227, 253, 
256, 259 



Army, U. S. Units— Continued 
X Corps — Continued 
Commander, 162 
Command post, 19 
Evacuation, 2. 5 
XVMI Airb Orne Corps, 7 
1st Cavalry Division, 8, 22, 65. 80, 86, 

94-97, 102, 119, 121, 201 
2d Infantry Division, 8, 19, 22, 25, 26, 
62, 65, 66, 71, 72, 80. 119-121, 
123, 125, 126, 128, 146, 159, 
161, 168, 171, 173, 176, 180, 
202, 253 
Morale, 199 
3d Infantry Division, 8, 14, 19, 22, 25, 

121, 123. 144, 201, 255 
7th Infantry Division, 8, 19, 22, 25, 
66, 71, 72, 95, 121, 130, 144, 
201, 217. 253 
24th Infantry Division, 8, 22, 58, 59, 

65, 107, 121, 201 

25th Infantry Division, 8, 22, 41, 107, 

121, 144, 201, 253, 254 
40th Infantry Division, 253 
45th Infantry Division, 253 
2d Logistical Command, 12, 254 
5th Cavalry Regiment, 119 
7th Cavalry Regiment, 95, 97 
8th Cavalry Regiment, 95, 97 
9th Infantry Regiment, 126 
17th Regimental Combat Team, 253 
23d Regiment, 62, 168 
35th Regiment, 51 
38th Regiment, 126, 168 
65th Regimental Combat Team, 253 
187th Airborne Regimental Combat 
Team, 22, 25. 66, 68, 86, 121, 
128, 131, 133 
17th Field Artillery Battalion, 122 
92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 

66, 109 

96th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 

196th Field Artillery Battalion, 171 
987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 
111, 114 

92d U. S. Army Searchlight Company, 


4th Ranger Company, 102 
74th Truck Company, 66 
U. S. Army Searchlight Company, 245 
AniHery, 159, 176, 195 

Army, II, 59, 107, 116, 121, 210 
Chinese Communist Forces, 70, 90, 1 34 
Marine, 52, 69, 70, 74-76, 86, 92, 107, 

114, 116, 125, 180, 183, 210, 

218, 244 
North Korea People's Army, 180 

Support, 78, 92, 93, 114, 130, 142, 148, 
149, 178, 191, 195, 206, 220, 

Atomic bomb, 37, 187 
Australia, 24 

Autrey, Maj Kobert L, 103, 182, 199n 
Avert U, Maj Gerald P., 194s 

BADGER Line, 157 
Oadoeng Strait (CVE), USS. 1, 2, 15 
BAKER, Phase Line, 86, 91, 92 
Banning, LtCol Virgil W., 74, 91, 111, 

117, 118 
Barclay, Brig C N., 116« 
Barbed wire, 197, 232 
Bataa,, (CVL), USS, 1, 2, 14, 28, 35, 

41, 46, 47, 89, 103, 146 
Bates, Maj William L., ill 
Battcrton, Col Boeker C, 48 
Baugh, Maj William £., 223 
Bay of Masan, 2 
Bayonet assault, 150 
Bean Patch, 2, 3 
Belgium, 24 
Bel!. See Helicopters. 
Belleau Wood, 118, 152 
Berger, Carl, l60w, 171 n 
Bethel, Col Ion M., 235 
Black, Capt Albert A., 215 
Blakeney, fane, 195« 
Bofu, 33, 35, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56, 62 
Bohannon, Capt Thomas J., 52, 111, 113, 


Booby traps, 206 

Borth, Maj Harold C, 181 

Bougainville, 118 

Bowser, Col Alpha L., 7, 18, 19, 60*r, 62n, 

94, 94n, 102, 102*, 107s, I20w 
Boyd, Maj Vernon D., 235 
Brice, BrigGen William O,, 136 
Bridges. fi^lOi 103 

Improvised, 74 
Korean, 15 
Sections, 64 
Swiss bent, 74 
Brown, Capt Leslie E., 
Brown, Col Wilburt S., 
148-150, 150n, 

BROWN Line, 150, 151. 157 
Brunelli, Col Austin R-, 255 
Buckingham, CWO Robert C, 170 
Buckner, LtGen Simon Bolivar, 72 
BUFFALO, Phase Line, 85, 92 
Busies, NKPA, 192, 217 


126, 134, 134«, 
152, 152*. 157, 

611040 O-GI-24 



184, 191, 192, 194, 210, 217, 
219, 221, 224, 230, 232, 242, 244, 
245, 261 

Chinese Communist Farces, 70, 75, 83, 

91, 92 
Enemy, 149 

North Korean People's Army, l4l, 142, 
182, 183, 191, 216, 220 
Burehett, Wilford G., 247, 247ff, 248 
Burton, Col Custis, Jr., 179, 210, 232, 255 
Bush, 2dLt Clayton O., 83, 83» 
Bush, Maj Donald S., 63, 64, 134 
Bus he, Cant Eugene A., 119 
Butterfly bombs, USMC, 88 
Byers, MajGen Clovis E., 162, 208 

j„ 181 
92, 93 

C Rations. 175 
Cagle, LtCol < 
CAIRO, Phase 
Camel, 64 
Cameras, 92 

K-17 tamers, 134 
Camp Lejeune, 31, 167, 168, 234, 236 
Camp Pendleton, 31 
Camp Tripoli, 233, 243, 255 
Canada, 24 

Cargadores, 163, 173, 181, 190 
Cargo ship, USN, 30 
Carney, Maj Edgar F., Jr., 192, 19 in 
Cartier, Raymond, 155 
Casualties. 210, 213, 220, 221, 238, 239, 

Chinese Communist Forces, 38, 70, 75, 
76, 79, 83,84,91, 116, 118, 121. 
125-128, 131, 259 

Eighth Air Fotce. 167 

Enemy, 153, 202, 206, 210, 216, 220, 
246, 259 

Evacuating of, 165, 189, 190. 214 

Korean Marine Corps, 55, 147, 159 

IX Corps, 84 
Non-Battle, 234 

North Korean (NKPA), 51, 52. 57, 
146, 180, 184, 194, 198, 210, 
217, 220, 225, 228 

X Corps, 84 

United Nations, 34, 161, 202 
United States, 60, 156 
U. S. Marine Corps, 30, 49, 51, 57, 69, 
70, 75, 76, 81, 83, 86, 91, 111, 
116, 118, 125, 131, 133, 143, 
150-152, 159, 173, 178. 180, 
184, 186, 193, 194, 196, 199, 
206, 210, 216, 218, 220, 246 
Evacuation of, 164 
Cates, Gen Clifton B., 232 
Cltachori-dong. 52 

Chang, Gen. 109 
Changhang, 216 

Changwon, 3 
Chechon, 26 
Chiang Kai-shek, 36 
Chidi San mountain mass, 3 
China, Red. 261 

Funds for war, 37 

"Hate America" Campaign, 35, 36" 
Chinandong. 54 
Chinese Civil War, 155 
Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), 6, 58. 
59, 85, 123, 128, 154 

Air strike, 15 

Armies, 45 

Attack, 26 

Bugle calls, 113 

Concentration, 27 

Counterstroke, 63 

Entrenchments, 15, 248 

Equipment, 39, 153 

Gun positions, 15 

Infiltration, 35 

Logistical, 144 

Morale, 155 

Offensive, It, 15, 19, 33, 107, 120-122, 
126, 152, 164, 259 
Fifth Phase, 103, 105, 121, 126, 155, 

January, 19, 34, 41, 154 

Sixth Phase, 178 
Penetration, 21 
Road block, 111 
Shore batteries, 156 
Soldier, 35 
Strategy, 35, 80, 101 
Strength figures, 218 

Dumps, 19 

Lines, 41 
Tactics, 35-38, 100, 248 

Human Sea, 35 
Troops, 27, 41, 50, 51, 170 

Shelters, 15 
Uniform, 35 
Yak fighter, 103 

20th Army, 24, 101 

24th Army, 24 

26th Atmy, 24, 101 

27th Army, 24 

30th Army, 24 

3 2d Army, 24 

37th Army. 24 

38th Army, 24 

39th Army, 24, 66, 93, 101 

40th Army, 24. 60, 66, 101, 106, 115 



Chinese Communist Forces— Continued 
Units — Continued 
42d Army, 24, 101 
48th Army, 24 
491h Army, 24 
50th Army, 24 
65th Army, 24 

66th Army, 24, 60. 66, 81, 93, 101 

44th Division, 126 

58th Division, 101 

59lh Division, 101 

60th Division, 101 

76th Division, 101 

77th Division, 101 

78th Division, 301 

115th Division, 101 

116th Division, 101 

117th Division, 101 

1 18th Division, 101 

11 9th Division, 101 

120th Division, 101, 106, 115 

124th Division, 101 

125th Division, 101 

126th Division, 101 

196th Division, 66, Bl 

197th Division, 81 

198th Division, 81 

358th Regiment, 106 

359th Regiment, 115 

360(h Regiment, 115 
Chi nese Nationalists, 36 
Chinhae, 2, 54 
Chinju, 3 
Chiso-dong, 52 
Chodo-ri, 154 

Choe, MajGen Am Lin, 146 
Chogutun, 171 
Chongja-dong, 52 
Chon-San, 90 
Chorwon, 95, 154, 201 

Hwachon area, 27 
Chosin, 70 

Breakout, 3, 14, 3 01, 3 09, 234 

Campaign, 6, 32, 38, 42, 45, 52. 57, 
118, 257 

Fighting, 8 

Operation, 2, 5, 152, 168 
Reservoir, 12, 66, 136, 152, 257 
Withdrawal, 120 

Christmas in Korea, 5 

Chumunjin, 80 

Chunchon, 8, 80, 94, 117, 119, 181, 215 
Chunchon-Hongchon highway, 123 
Ch u nchon - Won} u- Chech on corridor, 26 
Chungjti, 22, 26, 58, 60, 66, 67 

^-rupyong ni, 71 
Clark, Maj Albert L., 89 


Camouflage, 228 

Cold weather, 163, 221. 222 
Coffey, Capt John, 109, 109*, 111, 111», 

Cole, LtCnl Frank j,, 46 
Commander Naval Forces, Far East (Com 
NavFE). 5 

See VAdni C. Turner Joy, USN. 
Communications, 137, 208 

Air-ground, 260 

Cause, 3 

Delaying tactics, 249 

Photographers, 156, 157 

Truce Team, 160 
Consolation (AH), USS, 57, 165 
Cornweli, Maj Charles E„ 240 
Correspondents, at Hagaru, 6 
Cotton, Capt James T., 215 
Cowan, Ctlr John S„ 236 
Craig, BrigGen Edward A., 2, 3w, 7, 8n, 

\2>i, 21, 49, 57, 164 
Cronin, Capt James T, 106, 106m 
Cronk, Capt Welby D., 9i 
Culhane, Col Thomas A., Jr., 254» 
Cushman, BrigGen Thomas J., 136 

Daigh, IstLt Harold D., 103 

Davis, Maj Daniel H-, 71 

Davis, LtCol Raymond G., 107», 123, 133 


Communist, 171, 220, 225, 229, 233 
Delaying tactics, 1 60 

United States, 248, 249 
DeLong, Capt Philip C, 103 
Demolitions, 102 
Devastate BAKER, 96 
Doriot, Co! George F., 166, 367 
Doyle, RAdm James H., 13, 14 
DUCK, Line, 224, 229, 230 

Edwards, LtCol Harry W„ 189«, 199h, 

207, 213. 222;/ 
El Toro, California, 88, 188 
England, 250 

Eighth Army, 12 

Shortages, 30 

USMC. 12 

Shortages, 11, 12 
Worn, (3 
Ethiopia, 24 
Evacuation, 1 1 5 

Casuali ties, 164, 165, 250 

Hungnam, 5 
Evans, LtCol Holly F., 1!4, 191, 210 
Everest, Maj Gen Frank E„ 136 



Feeney, Maj James A,, Jr., 46 
Fenton, Capt Donald L., 170 
Ferenbaugh, MajGen Claude P., 215 
Fink, Maj Gerald. 223« 
Fisher, Capt Don H., 52 
Fisher, IstLt Joseph R., 91 
Flak traps, 143 

CCF, 11 J 

Trip, 216 
Flournoy, Col Walter N., 204, 232 
Flying Dutchman ( legendary ship) , 57 
Fontana, LtCol Paul J., 46, 47, 62 
Ford, Capt John, USNR, 6 
Forward Air Controller (FAC), 17, 52, 
71, 96, 97, 116, 142, 186, 206, 230 
Forward Observers, 144 
Forward OPs, 210 
Fowler, Opt Del ben M., 102?; 
Frame, Maj Donald P.; 4f> 
France, 24, 65, 68, 246 
Franklin, Benjamin. 251 
Freeman, Col Paul, 62 
French, 202 

Fresh Rations, Marines, 5 
Frostbite, 234, 235 
. Casualty, Medical, 57 
Fulton, Capt Floyd K„ 52 

Gall, Maj Walter, 60, 83, 168 
Garvin, BrigGen Crump, 12 
Gases, 134 

Gasoline, 32, 34, 72, 170, 190, 222 
Gavin, Gen James M., 38, 38n 
Gayle, LtCol Gordon D., 199m, 232, 254 
Geiger, Maj Gen Roy S., 72 
General Darby, USNS, 31 
General W. H, Gordon, USS, 254 
Gtendinning, Maj James I, 74 
Gomez, Pfc Edward, 193, 193m 
Gorman, LtCol John E., 193, 193«, 204, 

Gottschalk, Maj Vincent J,, 14 
Greece, 24, 99 

Griffin, LtCol Louis C, 175, 183, 184 
Groff, Capt Goodwin C, 91 
Groves, Col Gould P., 158fl, 159, I 76m, 

Guadalcanal campaign, 118, 152 
Guam, 32 

Guerrillas, 36, 44, 203, 213. 222, 257, 258 
Anti-, 241 
Communist, 3 

Communist Chinese Forces, 35, 44, 51 
Enemy, 53, 57, 58 

North Korean People's Army, 26, 44, 
45. 48, 51. 52, 55, 56 
Gugeler, Capt Russell A., IllB, lt6» 

Haffey, Capt Eugene H., 107 
Hagaru-ri, 6 

Hager. Col Frank P., Jr., 199», 227 
Haiti, 118, 232 
Hamhung, 6 

Han River, 11, 2 5, 28, 50, 58, 59, 71, 108, 

119, 122 
Hangye, 130, 171 

Hardwick, LtCol Gordon A., 166«, 234«- 

235. 237», 238» 
Harper, 2dLt William E., 230 
Harris, MajGen Field. 14, 15, 46, 48, 49, 

50, 62, 78, 88, 89, 90, 135, 1 36 
Harrison, LtCol Charles W.. 54, 54s, 92. 

93b, 102n, l46n, 158m 
Hart, LtGen Franklin H., 232 
Hawaii, 89 

HAYS Line, 180. 182, 192, 204, 213 
Hayward, Col Richard W., 130, 146, 148 
Heely, LtCol Dale H., 191 
Helicopter, I, 14, 47, 72, 79, 111, it* 
135, 164, 165, 187-190, 207, 208, 
211. 212, 214, 219, 220, 223, 240, 
241. 250, 251, 257 
Evacuating of casualties, 49, 56 
Laying wire, 49 
Lift, 211, 213 

Troop, 207, 212 
H03S-1, 63, 164, 188 
HTL, 59, 63, 164, 188 
Helmets, steel, 166 
Hemostat, 115 

Hemphill, Col Bruce T., 199n, 227, 242W, 

246n, 25 1« 
Hering, Capt Eugene R. (MC), USNR. 


Herring, LtCol George W., 188, 189, 207. 

211, 213, 223 
Hewitt, Maj Roy R., 96, 96», 97 
Hickman, Maj William T., 152» 
Hicks, IstLt Norman W-, 115, H5w, 223« 
Higgs, IstLt Richard C, 207 
Highways, 80 
Coastal, 27 
Japanese, 33 
Traffic jams, 32 
Hilian, Lt Donald L, (MC), USN, 215 
Hill 201, 75 
Hill 208, 75 
Hill 246, 91 
Hill 313, 105-107 
Hill 321, 75 
Hill 330, 92 
Hill 333, 75 
Hill 335, 75 
Hill 356, 90 
381, 92 
399. 91 


Hill -120, 151 
Hill 428, 91 
Hill 509, 105, 106 
Hill 516, 144, 146 
Hill 536, 75 
Hill 549, 83 

Hill 6Q2, 173, 178, 179, 183 

Hill 610, 141, 142 

Hill 651, 141 

Hill 673, 182-184, 194 

Hill 680, 142, 173 

Hill 692, 142 

Hill 702, 173, 178, 211, 214 

Hill 749, 182-184, 187, 190-194 

Hill 751, 190, 191, 193, 194, 196, 216 

Hill 755, 176 

Hill 761, 157, 158 

Hill 802, 150 

Hill 812, 183, 194-198, 204, 230, 232, 
243, 245. See Kanmubong Ridge 
Hill 854, 204, 206, 243, 245 
Hill 885, 130 

Hill 884, 203, 204, 206, 208, 210, 220, 
240, 241, See "Mount Helicopter" 
Hill 902, 111 

Hill 924, t73, 176, 178-180 

Hill 930, 173, 176 

Hill 951, 210 

Hill 975, 93 

Hill 980, 183, 194-197 

Hill 1000, 173 

Hill 1001, 159 

Hill 1026, 173, 176, 179, 180 
Hill io42, 196 
Hill 1051, 130 

Hill 1052, 182, 183, 196-198, 216, 219 
Hill 1100, 159 
Hill U22, 146, 147 
Hill 1218, 146 
Hill 1316, 146 

Hire, LtCol Homer E., 1 44, 148 
Hiroshima, 187 

Hoengsong, 28, 60, 63, 66, 70, 72-74, 

80-83, 89, 137, 170 
Hoengsong-Hongchon road, 80, 81 
Hoge, MajGen William H., 79, lit* 
Hoi li day, Maj Morse L,, 126 
Hongchort, 72, 80, 86, 88, 90, 91, 94, 

96, 120, 128, 176, 181 
Hongchon-Hangye road, 171 
Honsowetz, Col Russell E., 255 
Hopkins, LtOil John L„ 106n, 141 

Clearing station, 190 

Japan, 12 

Ships, 165 
Horseshoe Ridge, 113, 115 
Hovatter, IstLt Eugenous M., 83 

Howard, LtCol Harold C, 241 
Hughes, James J., 230 
Hungnam, 2 

Beachhead, 2 

Evacuation of, 2, 5 

Redeployment, t, 8. 13, 14, 65 
Hwachon, 45, 102, 105, 109, 122, 201 

Reservoir, 27, 96, 102, 119, 128, 131, 
148, 260 
Hwanggi, 182 

Illinois Wesleyan University, 11H 

lmjin, 26, 27, 107, 108, 116, 154, 201 

River, 73, 79 
Inchon, 27. 28, 30, 47, 50, 51, 59, 63. 
80, 254, 256 

Evacuation of, 28 

Landing, 1. 63, 257 
Inchon-Seoul, 118 

Operation, 2, 44, 135, 168 
Indianapolis (CA), USS, 232 
Inje, 128, 133, 147, 161, 168, 171, 175, 

181, 187, 215 
Injc-Kansong road, 128 
Innovations, 257 

Body armor, 239 

Helicopter, 164, 240 

Tactical, 165, 251 
Iron Triangle, 95, 101, 107, 143, 154 
Irwin, Capt John R., 242 
Itami, 2, 28, 29, 32, 48, 49, 63, 89 
Itazoke, 1, 33, 49, 50, 63 
Iwo Jima, 152, 187 

japan, 1, 12, 33, 50 

JAMESTOWN, Line, 253, 256 

Johnson, Capt Horace L., Ill 

Johnston Island, 32 

Jones, Capt Jack R„ 52, 68 

Jones, Maj Jack R„ 53» 

JOC (FAF-EUSAK Joint Operations 
Center), 17, 27, 45, 47, 64, 65, 67, 
69, 70, 78, 81, 96, 135-138, 258, 

Air Control, 67, 76, 97, 135 
Joy, VAdm C. Turner (ComNavFE), 5, 
14, 155, 157, 157», 160, 160», 161, 
l61n, 22 1», 223», 248«, 249» 
Junks, enemy, 15 

jutUndist, Danish Hospital Ship, 85, 156 

Kaesnng, 154, 156, 157, 160, 171, 180. 
220, 222, 247, 248 

Kangnung, 171, 185 

Kanmubong Ridge, 183, See Hill 812. 

KANSAS Line, 94, 95, 99, 108, 115, 116. 
118. 141, 147, 148, 150-153, 162, 
168, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 233 



Kansong, 128, 187 

Kelly, LtCol Bernard T-, 123, 125n, 135, 
135», 175, 175b, 176«, 179, 183 

Kelly, LtCol James G., 176, 18}, 184, 
199«, 216 

Kelly, Capt John L., 141 

Kelsey, LtCol John V., 191 

Kennedy, LtCol Donald R., 91, 194 

Kerrigan, IstLt William E, 68, 68w, 141 

Kihss, Peter, 153b 

Kim, Col Dae Shik, 204 

Kim, Col Dong Ha, 106, 227 

Kim, 1st Lt SikTong, 93 

Kim, Co! Sung Eun, 54 

Kimpo, 253 

Peninsula, 119, 201, 254, 255 

Kingsley, J, Donald, 153 

Kirby-Smith, Maj Ephraim, 207 

Kirkpatrick, Capt Louis P., (MC). DSN, 

Krtapp, LtCol Horace E., Jr., 193b 
Kobe, 30, 62, 143 
Kopas, Capt William T„ 141 
Korea, 1 

North Korean People's Army 
(NKPA), 52, 53, 55, 85, 154 
Irregulars, 258 
Morale, 53 
Soldiers, 55 
Strategy, 196 
Strength figures, 218 
Troops, 132, 147, 152, 170, 184, 
185, 260 


I Corps, 24 
If Corps, 51, 173, 182 
III Corps, IB2, 217 
V Corps, 24, 60, 132 
1st Division, 24, 182, 217, 218, 

2d Division, 182, 217 
3d Division, 24 

10th Division, 44, 45, 48, 56, 57 
12th Division, 132, 146 
15th Division, 24, 217, 218, 224, 

19th Division, 218, 224 
45th Division, 228 
47th Division, 224, 228 
6th Regiment, 173 
25th Regiment, 44, 55 
27th Regiment, 44, 55 
29th Regiment, 44 
4lst Regiment, 151 
91st Regiment, 244 


Republic of Korea, 3, H 
Army (ROKA), 3, 19, 26, 54, 73, 
108, 116, 163, 206 

I Corps, 22, 108, 121, 123, 128, 

, 154, 202, 215, 253 

II Corps, 22 

III Corps, 22, 25, 26, 121, 123 
Civil Transport Corps, 86, 162, 

163, 181 
Korean Service Corps, 181 
Capital Division, 22, 58, 121, 

202, 253 
1st Division, 22, 24, 84, 121 

201, 251, 253 
2d Division, 22, 25, 27, 57, 201, 


3d Division, 22, 72, 121, 202, 

216, 253 
5th Division, 22, 25, 121, 123, 

180, 202, 211, 253 
6th Division, 22, 65, 66, 74, 97, 
99, 101, 105-109. 116. 
120, 121, 201, 253 
7th Division, 22, 108, 121, 123, 

148, 202, 253 
8th Division, 22, 25, 176, 182, 

201-204, 253, 255 
9th Division, 22, 121, 253 
llth Division, 121, 202, 203, 

213, 253 
5th Regiment, 148, 149 
10th Regiment, 204 
llth Regiment, 207 
2 1st Regiment, 204, 206 
National Guard, 86, 163 
Soldiers, Lack of training, 24 
Marine Corps (KMC), 54, 93, 94, 
102, 105, 106, 109, 113, 117, 
126, 146-148, 150-152, 158, 
159, 162, 171, 176, 178-181, 
243, 254, 260 

54, 58, 73, 92-95, 
101, 102, 106, 120, 126, 
130, 146, 147. 158, 159- 
162, 171, 175, 176, 178, 
182, 198, 204, 210. 218, 
224. 227, 246, 253, 254 
1st Battalion, 54, 55, 105, 146, 

159, 176, 178 
2d Battalion, 55, 93, 146, 176. 

178-180, 216 
3d Battalion, 54, 93, 146, 176, 



Ko tea- — Con tinued 
South — Continued 
Marine Corps — Continued 
1st Regiment — Continued 
5th Battalion, 55, 201 
1st Korean Artillery Battalion, 

Diet, 54 
Police, J, 52, 53 
Korean entertainers, 5 
Korean War, police action, 7 
Koto-ri, 6 

Koutsandreas, 2dLt John D., 230 
Krisky, Corpsman R, E„ 57 
Krulak, Col Victor H,, 189, 199k, 213, 

Kumhwa, 95 143, 154, 201 

Kumsong, 154 

Kunsamma Pass, 81 

Kurdziel, LtCol Edward G., \B4n, 241 

Kyongju, 19, 22, 29, 30, 42 

Kyongju- Yungchon-Uisong road, 42 

La Hue, LtCol Foster C, 190, 206 
Lavoie, LtCol Leon F.. Jr., 66, 109, 115 
Lawrence, Capt George E.> 216 
Lee, Ma j Gen Ban Nam, 45, 51, 53 
Lejeune, MajGen John A,, 72 
Lewis, LCdr Frederick J. (MSC), USN, 
165, 167, 168, 236, 237, 237« 
ICELAND, Line, 233 
Litters, 188 

Lihenherg, MajGen Homer L,, 64» 
Logistics, 72, 73, 180, 182, 215, 258. 

See Supplies. 
Long, Capt Edwin B., 170 
Los Angela! (CA), USS, 219 
Lund, Maj Arnold A., 15, 27, 46 
Lundin, Maj William M., 15, 46 

Mabry, Maj Clarence J„ 148 
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas, 
5, 8, 8», 14, 33, 50, 68, 91, 92 
Recall of, 99 
MacDonald. Maj J. Angus, 222m, 22 3« 
Maclntyre, LtCol Neil R., 15 
Mago-ri, 218 

Main line of resistance (MLR), 21, 122, 
157-159, 180, 203, 204, 211-218, 
220, 221. 223, 224, 229, 231, 232, 
238, 240, 243, 245, 250, 253, 259- 

Main Supply Route (MSR), 29, 30, 38, 
42, 44, 67, 80, 91, 123 
Hongchon-Chunchon, 119 
Malik, Jacob, Foreign Minister of the 

USSR, 154 
Manchuria, 85, 160 

Mso Tse-tung, 36, 128, 155 
Marine Corps, U. S. 

Rolt* in Korea, 6, 32 


Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, 12, 31, 

1st Air Delivery Platoon, 241 

1st Combat Service Group, 3, 241 

1st 4.5 Rocket Battalion, 119, 227 

Battery C, 119 
7th Motor Transport Battalion, 3, 
30, 60, 181, 255 
1st Marine Aircraft Wing, t, 14. 29, 
32, 33, 33«, 34, 45, 46, 50, 
56, 62, 63, 67, 71, 78, 84, 88, 
89, 96, 103, 116, 120, 125, 
131, 134-138, 143, 146, 164, 

169, 170, 185, 203, 219. 249, 
260, 261 

Commanding Officer, 257 
Headquarters Squadron, 63 
Marine Air Control Group-2, 90 
Marine Ground Control Intercept 

Squadron-1, 1, 89, 90 
Marine Ground Control Intercept 

Squadron- 3, 90 
Marine Tactical Air Control Squad- 
ron-2, t, 2, 89, 96 
Air Defense Section, 89 
Marine Aircraft Group 12, 33. 35. 
46, 48, 56, 60, 81, 83, 137, 

170, 171, 185 

Marine Aircraft Group 33, 2, 33», 
34, 45-48, 56, 62, 81, 96 
Service Squadron 33, 46 
HMR-161, 187-190, 207, 208, 213- 

215, 217, 222, 240-242 
HMX-1, 164, 187, 188, 223 
HRS-1, 188, 189, 197, 2U, 212, 214 
MASRT-t, 186 
VMF-152, 31, 32 

VMF-212, 1, 13, 14, 27, 28, 35, 41, 

46, 47, 89. 108 
VMF-214, 1, 13, 15, 28, 29, - . 

62, 91. 92, 96, 107, 137, 

142, 144, 150, 185 
VMF-311, 1 , 15, 28, 29, 49, 63, 64, 

95, 96, 148 
VMF-312, 46, 47, 50, 62, 71, 89, 

103, 146, 185 
VMF-323, I, 14, 15, 27-29, 46, 48, 

52, 55, 62, 92, 107, 108, 137, 

144, 146 
VMF-352, 31 

VMF(N)-513, 1, 49, 52, 55, 63, 89, 

131, 138, 150, 170 
VMF(N)-542, 1, 46, 49, 50, 63, 88 



Marine Corps, U. S. — Continued 
Units — Continued 

VMO-6, 1, 14, 49, 50, 56, 104, 107, 
111, 115, 116, 125, 134, 135, 
142, 164, 165, 187-189, 206, 
223, 229, 258 
VMR-152, 11, 32, 46, 89 
VMR-352, 31 

( Marine Amphibious Corps, 118, 232 
1st Provisional Marine Brigade 2, 95, 

160, 164, 1SS 
1st Marine Division, 1, 6, 8, 12, 
14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29-31, 
14, 15, 38, 42, 44, 48-50, 54, 
56-60, 65-67, 72, 76, 78, 80, 
83, 84, 86, 88, 92-96, 99, 
101, 105, 108, 109, 111, 113, 
117, 118, 120-121, 125, 126. 
128, 130, 132-135, 117, 138, 
142-144, 146, 147, 152, 157, 
159, 161, 164, 168, 169, 171, 
173, 176, 180-182, 184-186, 
192, 194, 198, 202-204, 208, 
211, 212, 215-219. 221, 227, 
228, 231-233, 236, 242, 249, 
253, 254, 256-261 

Assembly area at Masan, 2, 17 

Administrative headquarters at 
Masan, 1, 22 

Commander, 22, 260 

Command Posts, 21, 22, 34, 42, 
68, 78, 79, 244, 251, 255. 256 

EUSAK Control, 5 

Equipment, Shortage uf, 12 

Fresh rations, 5 

Headquarters, 3, 5 

Hospital, 3 

Military Police Company, 3 
Morale, 7, 199 
Personnel, Shortage of, 11 
Reconnaissance Company, 3, 56, 
60, 66, 83, 103, 105, 108, 
161, 168, 176, 182, 192, 
207, 208, 210, 213, 217 
Security Measures, 3 
Strength figures, 11, 12 
1st Marines, }0, 14, 42, 51, 54, 60, 
66, 68-75, 81, 81, 86, 90-94, 
101, 105, 117, 120, 125, 126, 
130, 134, 144, 146-152, 157, 
171. 176, 182, 186, 187, 190, 
191, 193, 194, 204, 210, 211, 
215, 218, 219, 224, 227, 229, 
243, 255 
Commanding Officer, 255 
Command Post, 157, 208 

Antitank Company, 149 

1st Battalion, 51, 69, 70, 105, 107, 
109, ill, 113-117, 119, 
148-150, 187, 192, 193, 
197, 204, 210, 216, 217. 

Command Post, 114 

Company A, ill 

Company B, 111 

Company C, 51, 70, 111, 113, 
115, 216 

Weapons Company, 111 
2d Battalion, 55, 69, 75, 83, 90, 
117, 119, 144, 148-150, 
187, 189-193, 197, 204, 
211, 213, 215, 220 

Commanding Officer, 150, 189 

Command Post, 190 

Company D, 91 

Company E, 91, 92, 211 

Company F, 91, 92, 193 
3d Battalion, 44, 55, 74, 75, 81, 91, 
109, 111, 114, 117, 118, 
144, 148, 150, 157, 158, 
186, 191-194, 204, 206, 
210, 217, 229 

Company G, 81, 111, 114 

Company H, 111, 114, 206, 229- 

Company 1, 91, 111, 114, 210, 

Weapons Company, 74, 111 
5th Marines, 2, 5, 42, 48, 51, 52, 54, 
55, 62, 66-70, 72, 73, 81, 92- 
95, 101, 105, 106, 109, 113, 
117, 120, 126, 130, 133, 137, 
141. 146-148, 161, 168, 171. 
175, 176, 179, 182. 192, 194, 
204, 213-215, 218, 219, 224, 
227. 232, 216, 243, 255, 260 
1st Battalion, 54, 68-70, 94, 106. 
141, 175, 194, 195, 197, 
204, 220, 228, 24l 
Command Post, 105 
Company A, 141, 142 
Company B, 107, 141, 228 
Company C, 52, 68, 141 
2d Battalion, 54, 70, 94, 130, 141, 
148, 194-197, 223 
Company D, 130, 194, 196 
Company F, 106, 194-197 
Weapons Company, 196 
3d Battalion, 69, 70, 91, 94, 119, 
126, 130, 148, 178, 194- 



Marine Corps, U. S.— Continued 
Units— Continued 

7th Marines, 42, 51, 52, 54, 55, 62, 
66, 72-75, 81, 83, 86, 91, 
92, 94-97, 101, 106, 107, 109, 
111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 125, 
126, 130, 133, 137, 141, 144, 
146, 151. 152, 161, 171, 175, 
176, 180, 182, 183, 186, 192, 
204, 213-215, 218, 224, 227, 
243, 255 
Commanding Officer, 255 
Command Post, 175 
Outpost, 133 

1st Battalion, 52, 75, 88, 91, Iflfi, 
107. Ill, 117, 151, 176, 

178, 179, 183, 184, 187, 

213, 216, 241 
Command Post, 51, 91 
Company A, 51, 52, 83 
Company C 107, 216 

2d Battalion, 52, 74, 75, 78, 90, 
111, 117, 130, 151, 175, 
176, 180, 183, 184, 187, 
190, 191, 208, 213, 238, 

Company F, 190 
3d Battalion, 52, 74, 75, 78, 90, 
96. 97, 111, H3-U5, 117, 
119, 123, 125, 135, 151, 
157, 173, 175, 176, 178, 

179, 183, 184, 187, 215, 

214, 244 

Company G, 123, 151, 179. 184 
Company H, 175, 179, 183, 184 
Company I, 125, 151, 183, 184 
11th Marines, 3, 42, 54, 56, 68, 75, 
81, 84, 114, 122, 149, 171, 
179, 182, 189, 191, 192, 210, 
215, 218, 225, 227, 242, 245, 
254, 260 
1st Battalion, 141, 173, 228, 254 
2d Battalion, 70, 134, 149, 171, 

3d Battalion, 92, 161, 171, 179 
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, 1, 3 
1st Armored Amphibian Battalion, 

1st Engineer Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 102 

Company C, 191 

Company D, 88 
1st Motor Transport Battalion, 3, 30, 
181, 255 

1st Ordnance Battalion, 3, 34, 42, 

181, 230 
1st Signal Battalion, 3 
1st Service Battalion, 3, 34, 42 

1st Shore Party Battalion, 3, 189, 207, 

211, 213, 241 
1st Tank Battaliun, 3, 34, 42, 62, 
176, 210, 218, 245, 255 
Company A, 81, 114 
Company B, 62, 92, 114 
Company C, 133, 141 
H & S Company, 62 
Set' also Replacement Drafts and Ro- 
tation Drafts. 
2d Marine Division, 167 
Marks, UCol Alfred H., 227 
Marquez, Cp) Leo, 113, 114 
Marshall, Col S. L. A., 6 
Martin, LtCol Glen E., 106 
Martin, Cpl Paul G„ 103, I04n 
Masan, 1-3, 5-7, 12-14, 18, 19, 22, 29, 

30, 34, 89, 257 
Massacre Valley, 70 
Matthewson, IstLl Robert E„ 115 
Mayer, Capt Franklin B., 70, 70» 
McAlister, Col Francis M., 42», 52«, 66, 

105, 114, 117, 126 
McClelland, LtCol Robert K„ 90, 91, 148 
McCutcheon, Co! Keith B., 199», 223. 

240, 241, 242 
McDonald, Capt Charles W„ 228 
McElroy, Capt John W„ USNR, 165 
McFarland, Maj David W„ 107, 134, 

134«, 223 
McGahn, 2dLt Patrick T„ 106, 106« 
McGill, Col Robert A., 254 
McGrew,^ Capt^David^G, Jr., 166*, 235, 

McGu ire's University School, 231 
McMahon, Capt John R., 216 
McRay, Capt H. G„ !15 
McReynolds, LtCol William, 92, 179 
MELLOW, Code Name, 17. See JOC. 
Meuse-Argonne offensive, 118 
Meyerhoff, Col Wilbur R, 74», 107«, 

109», 131», 151 
Michener, James, 257» 
MIG Alley, 65 
Mills, IstLt Niel B., 109m, 115 
Milne, LtCol Harry T., 62w, 114 
Mine fields, 130, 191. 230, 261 

NKPA, 184 
Mines, 130, 151, 178, 197, 206, 211, 224 

Antipersonnel, 211, 236 

Enemy, 206 

Friendly, 206 
MINNESOTA Line, 213, 217, 219, 227, 

229, 232, 251 
Miryang, 22 

Missouri (BB), USS, 27 
Mitchell, IstLt Weldon R, 64 


Mitchell, LtCol William P., 188, 199n, 
207, 213, 214, 223, 241 

Mojin, 119 

Mongolian horses, 64 

Montross, Lynn, l64w, I87w, 207«, 

Moore, MajGen Bryant E., 60, 65, 66, 68, 
71, 72 

Morae-Kogae, 123 

Moscow, 99 

Mount Helicopter, 220. See Hill 884. 
Mount McKMey (AGC), USS, 14 
Mountain warfare, 138 
Mukkye-dong, 5 1 
Munsan, 8, 220 
Munsan-ni, 201, 255 
Murray, Col James C, I55», 160/; 
Myers, Maj Reginald R. t 117, 118 

Naktong, Battle of, 2 
Nam II, Gen, 157, 160 
Napoleon, 73 
Native laborers, 11 

Naval Medical Field Research Laboratory, 
167, 169, 234, 236, 237 

Naval gunfire, 13, 50, 119, 143, 210, 219, 
220 244 

Navy, U, S., 5, 28, 34, 135, 138, 167, 234 
Role in Korea, 6 

Navai Forces Far East, 5 

Commander, (ComNavFE). See 
VAdm C. Turner Joy. 
Fleet Logistics Air Wing, 31, 32 
Seventh Fleet, 142 

Tactical^ Air Control Squadron-1, 

Tactical Air Control Squadron-3, 
27, 28 
Task Force 77, 14, 27 
Task Force 90, 13 

Commander, 13. See aho RAdm 
J. H. Doyle. 
Task Group 95.1, 15 
Escort Carrier Task Group 96.8, 2, 
27, 28 

Western Deployment Group, 28 
See RAdm Lyman A. Thackrey. 

Mobile Construction Battalion 2 (Sea- 
bees), 34, 35, 45, 46 

VR-5, 31 

VR-9, 31 

VR-21, 32 
Netherlands, 24, 202 
New Britain operation, 232 
New Jersey (BB), USS, 210, 217. 220 
New Zealand, 24 
Nicaragua, 150 

Nickerson, Col Herman, Jr., 107b, 109", 
114, ll4n, 123, 133, 144, 151, 183 

Nicolay, Maj Stanley S., 46 

Nihart, LtCol Franklin B., 187, 190, 191, 
199", 204, 211, 246« F 257h 

Nolan, 2dLt Harvey W., 106 

NO NAME Line, 120, 122, 125, 126 

Noon, Col Thomas J., 33« 

Norton, LtCol Kirt W., 220, 223, 228, 241 

Objective I t 176, 178 
Objecttve 2, 176, 179, 230, 231 
Objective 3, 176, 180, 231 
Objective ABLE, 182, 183. See also Hill 

Objective BAKER, 182-184, 192, 193. See 
also Hill 749. 

Objective CHARLIE, 182, 198 

Objective DOG, 194, 196 

Objective YOKE, 176, 180 

Okinawa, 72, 167 

O'Neill, LtCol John T., 254 

Operation BLACKBIRD, 211, 212 

Operation BUMBLEBEE, 214, 241 

Operation BUSHBEATER, 217 

Operation CHANGIE-CHANG1E. 241 

Operation CLAM-UP, 242-244 

Operation FAREWELL, 223 

Operation HOUSES URNER I. 217 

Operation HOUSEBURNER II, 217 

Operation KILLER, 65, 67, 69. 71, 7S, 
76, 79, 258 

Operation LITTLE SWITCH, 223 

Operation MIXMASTER, 251, 256 

Operation MOUSETRAP, 241 

Operation MULETRAIN, 240 

Operation ROTATE, 241 

Operation ROUNDUP, 51, 59 

Operation RIPPER, 73, 79, 80. 84, 85, 
88, 93, 258 

Operation RUGGED, 94 

Operation SEA LION, 250 

Operation STRANGLE, 143, 144. 1<59, 
185, 186, 249, 260, 261 

Operation SUMMIT, 207, 208, 213 

Operation SWITCH, 219 

Operation THUNDERBOLT, 50, 51, 59 

Operation WEDGE, 215 

Operation WINDMILL I, 189, 190 

Operation WINDMILL II, 190, 197 

Operation WOLFHOUND, 41 

Operations Research Office of Johns Hop- 
kins University, 6 

Outpost, 244 

Line of Resistance, 122, 218 

Ord, Capt James B., 229, 229«, 230, 231 

Osan, 26 



Oum Mountain, 80 
Oum San, 81 
Ozuki, 53 

Paekcha-dong, 55 

Pafford, LtCol George G., 213 

Parka, 69, 75 

Parkins, Capt Clarence W., 57 
Parry, LtCol Sh erman W., 228 
Partridge, MajGen Earle E., 14, 49, 78, 

88n, 135, 136, 136», 
Partridge, Col John H., 73", 102, 102/; 
Patrols, 91, 102, 104, 117. 122, 179, 182, 

210, 213, 218-220, 222, 224, 225, 

228, 229, 232, 238, 242-244, 249, 


Aggressive tactics, 11 
Air, 49, 50 

Ambush, 220, 228, 244 
Bases, 157-159 

Concept, 158 
Chinese Communist Forces, 11 
Coastal, British, 28 
Enemy, 224 
1st Marines, 70 
1st ROK Division, 84 
Foot, 215, 224 

C/l/5, 52 
Helicopter, 222 
Jungle, 232 
Marine, 53, 56, 70 
Motor, 49, 88, 103 
Reconnaissance, 67, 148, 158, 244 
Rice paddy, 257 
RCT-7, 53 
Sea, 50 
3/1. 44 

United States, 66, 70, 83 
United States Army, 3, 26 
Panel markings, 115 

Panmunjom, 220, 221, 224, 225, 229, 

233, 247, 249 
Patterson, Capt Russell G., Jr., 47 
Pearson, Capt John A„ 130 
Pearl Harbor, 166 
Peleliu, 232 

PENDLETON, Phase Line, 109, HI 
Pentagon, 11 

People's Tribunal, China, 36 
Pershing, Gen John J., 166 
Philippines, 24 
Photo laboratory, 135 
Pierce, Maj Herbert E,, 256 
Piner, Sgt William, 106 
Plans and Orders 

Operation Plan 20, 25 

Operation Instruction (OI)-272, 253 

IX Corps 

Operation Plan 17, 120 

X Corps 

Operation Instruction 235, 203 
1st Marine Division 
Operation Order 1-51, 30, 34 
Operation Order 2-51, 30, 34 
Operation Order 3-51, 42, 44 
Operation Order 4-51, 54 
Operation Order 5-51, 60 
Operation Order 6-51, 66 
Operation Order 22-51, 176 
Operation Order 23-51, 182 
Operation Order 25-51, 192, 194 
Operation Order 26-51, 198 
Operation Order 27-51, 204, 206 
Operation Order 50-51, 219 
Operation Order 2-52, 253 
Operation Order 8-52, 255 
Training Order 2-51, 161 
Planes, Marine, 219. See abo Aircraft, 
Pohang, 21. 30-34, 42, 44, 45, 49. 51, 54. 

62, 66 
Pohang-Andong, 50 
Pohang-dong, 19 
Pohang-Kyongju road, 42 
Pohang-Kyongju-Andong MSR, 42, 44, 49 
Police action, Korean War, 7 
Political commissars, NKPA, 132 
Political indoctrination of the CCF soldier, 

Polgrean, Maj Edward R„ 223 
Port of debarkation, Pusan, 18 
Pratt, LtCol Spencer H., 229-231 
Princeton (CV), USS, 122 
Prisoners, 56, 222, 229, 243 

Chinese Communist Forces, 100, 101, 
103, 131, 249, 260 

Interrogations, 19, 22 

NKPA, 44, 45, 57, 132 

UN, 222, 223 

of War (POWs), 151, 176 
American, 222 
Exchange, 249 

Interrogations, 53, 100, 134, 182 
Press correspondents. 6, 35, 239, 247 
Privateers, 138 

Propaganda, 156, 157, 222, 233 

Chinese, 104, 249 

Chinese Communist Forces, 134 
Psychological warfare, 215, 233 
Pukhan. 102, 109, HI. 113, UP 

River, 117, 122, 201 

Valley. 102 



Puller, Col Lewis B„ 52», 57, 60, 67, 68, 

72 76, 78, 79 
Punchbowl, 141, 154. 158, 173, 176, 180, 

182, 185, 211, 228, 260 
Pusan, 2, 8, 12, 15, 19, 22, 46, 49, 62, 
90, 95, 108, L85, 215 

Air Force Field at, 1 

Perimeter, 164 

Port of debarkation, 18 

Withdrawal to, 8 
Pyongchang, 51 
Pyonggang, 14} 
Pyongtaek, 26 
Pyongyang, 95, 248 
Pyongyang -C hi nnanpo, 103 

Quantico, Virginia, 164, 223, 234 
QUANTICO, Phase Line, 95, 99 
Quilici, LtCol Clifford E., 220 
Quinlan, John F., 237 

Radford, Adm Arthur H„ 31, 32 

Radio, 36, 68, 116, 168, 190, 195, 231 


Trouble in Jets, 28 
Rail, 89 

Traffic jams, 32 

Transportation, 60 
Railhead at Munsan-ni, 254 
Railroads, enemy, 143 
Railway system, South Korea, 33 

Tunnels, North Korea, 15 
Randano, TSgt Carmelo ],, 74 
Rations, 170, 181, 222 

USMC, 54 
Reavis, lstLt William A., 241 
Reconnaissance, 229 
Redalen, Capt Dwail L., 164 
Refrigeration ship, UN, 5 
Refugees, 13, 25, 153 
Reislcr, 2dLt Joseph 105, I05«, 113 
Replacement Drafts, USMC, 6, 31 

!4th Replacement Draft, 219 

15th Replacement Draft, 224 

18th Replacement Draft, 254 

19th Replacement Draft, 254 
Replacements, 258 

Airborne, 12 

Chinese Communist Forces, 58 
U. S., 42 

U. S. M, C, 18, 31, 32, 48, 49, 57, 89, 

Reusser, Maj Kenneth L., 27 
Reynolds, Maj Walter E-, Jr., 245 
Rhee, President Syngman, 11, 25 
Rice paddy patrols, 48, 52, 57- See also 

Ridgway, LtGen Matthew B„ 6, 7, 7w, 8, 
10, 11, lln, 19, 22, 24, 25, 25s, 
26. 29, 30, 38, 38*, 41, 42, 45, 51, 
58, 59, 59«, 60, 62h, 65, 68, 72, 
73, 79, 84. 86, 91. 93-95, 99, 108, 
115, 136, 160, 258, 261, 261M 
Declaration of Faith, 10 
Moral Leadership, 10 
.Strategy, 35 
Tactics, II 
Ringblom, Maj Allan H., 223 
Roach, Maj Maurice E., 74, 113, 117 

Andong-Yongdok, 30 

Center at Yanggu, 133 

Networks, 143 

Traffic, 143 

Transportation, 60 
Roadblocks, U. S., 24 
Roads, 48, 66, 73, 86. 95, 123, 143, Wl 

Roberts, Col Deane C„ 32, 46, 89 
Rockey, 2dLt William K-, 211 
Rooney, Col John T., 107», 109&, 151 
Rotation draft, USMC, 57 

10th Rotation Draft, 219 

11th Rotation Draft, 219 

12th Rotation Draft, 224 

27th Rotation Draft, 219 
Rubber boats, 102 
Ruble, RAdm Richard W., 27 
Russia, 160 

Soviet, 37, 261 

Saipan, 187 
Samchok, 26, 58 
Samgo-ri, 55 

Sangyong, 54 
Sapyong-ni, 99 

Sawyer, Maj Webb D., 88, 88m, 91, 106 

Schening, lstLt Richard J., 53 

Schilt, MajGen Christian F., 219 

Sthmuck, LtCol Donald M„ 70, l49 f 

Scott, lstLt John L, 56 

See, 2dLt Milo J., 229 

Selden, MajGen John T., 199ra, 231, 234n, 

236, 243. 255 
Seoul, 19. 22, 24, 28, 47, 50, 51, 59, 66, 
73, 79, 84, 107, 108, 119, 123, 137, 
170, 242, 253, 254, 259 
Evacuation of, 25 
H^tonc ^invasion ^routc, 253 

Sexton, Capt Martin J., 19 

Shepherd, Gen Lemuel C, Jr., 31, 76, 

76», 78, 78«, 96, 9&», 135, 136, 

208, 232 




LSD, 256 

LST, 254-256 

1ST 898, 34, 42 

1ST 914, 34, 42 

See alio Ship by name. 
Shoes, 114 

Lace, 6S 
Show, Gen Shiu Kwai, 81 
Sicily (CVE), USS, 2, 15 146 
Sikorsky. See Helicopters. 
Simmons, Maj Edwin H., 74, 74», lit, 

Sinhutig, 34, 42 

Smedley, Maj Kenneth C, 223, 229 
Smith, Corps man E. N., 115 
Smith, Opt Jack A., 91 
Smith, Capt Samuel S,, 130 
Smoke, 116 
Screen, 93 
Shells, 134 
Smith, Maj Gen Oliver P., in, 5, 5«, 6, 
I2>i, 18, 18», 19, I9n, 21, 22n, 29, 
30, 3Ub, 45, 45", 50, 54m, 56, 56», 
57«, 38, 58m, 6i)n, 66, 67, 68, 6Sn, 
12, 79, 91, 92, 92n, 94, 94», 99, 
106, 106", 118, HBm, 257 
Snedeker, Col Edward W., 8», 21, 109w 
Sniper, 215 

Fire, 92, 22? 
Sniping, 196, 232 

NKPA, 49 
Snows, 69, 228, 230, 234 
So-thon River, 151, 158 
Sohwari, 175 
Soissons, 118 

Sokcho-ri, 215, 254, 256 
Sum River, 66, 74 
South Africa, 24 
Soyang, 119, 128, 130, 175 
Bridgehead, 128 

River, 94, 1 17, 1 46, 150, 173, 197, 216, 
217, 230 

Valley, 175, 181, 182 
Stamm, Col John F., 199", 235. 246» 
Steiner, Col William B„ 31 
Stewart, James T., 131", 169" 
Stewart, Ltd I Joseph I.., 69, 69". 94, 95« 
StifT, LtCol Houston, 194, 195 
Stoyanow, Capt Victor, 125 
|f, iW (CA), USS, 50, 224, 244 

Effect of the truce talks, 161 

Limited war, 36, 37, 38 

Nuclear war, 36, 37, 38 
Stratemeyer, LtGen George E„ 14, 33, 136 
Strongholds, CCF, 71 
Struhle, VAdm Arthur D, 27 

Supplies, 72, 95, 144, 147, 154, 170, 171, 
[76, 181, 187, 189, 190, 220, 222, 
241, 243 

Sec Logistics. 

Dumps, 119. 219 

U, S-, 30, 62, 95 

USMC, 48, 113 
Surrender message, 55, 
Survival suits, 47 
Sutter, LtCol Allan, 75 
Suwun, 22, 41, 50, 5! 

UN Airfield at, 29 
Swanson, IstLt William, 111 

Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), 17 
Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), 17, 
26, 137 

Tactical Air Controller (Airborne) 

(TACA), 97 
Tactical Air Coordinator, Airhorne 

(TACA), 17, 116 
Tactics, 10, 258 

Advantage, 169 

Aggressive patrolling, 11 

CCF, 83, 138 
Delaying, 258 

Eighth Army, 8 

Firepower, 1 1 

Marine Corps, 138, 260 

NKPA 192 

Plan of Attack, 8 

Ridgway, [ 1 
Taeam-san, 141, 146, 147 
Taegu, 14, 29, 44, 58, 60, 64 
Taejon, 44, 90 
Taeu-san, 158, 159 
Tanks, 83, 151, 191, 245 

British Centurion, 25 

Column, USA, 62 

Fake, CCF, 103 

-Infantry patrols, 151 

Support, 138 

US, 121 

USMC, 68, 70, 75, 83, 92. 104, U4, 
117, 122, 125, 130, 133, 219 
Tanya ng, 44 
Task Force Puller, 52 
Taylor, Gen Maxwell D., 38, 38" 
Taylor, Capt Richard M., 133, 141 
Telephone, 158, 208 

Wire, 36, 71, 74 
Thailand, 24 

Thackrey, RAciiii Lyman A„ 27, 28 
Thermal hoots, 231, 234-236, 240, 250, 

Innovations, 234 
Thermopylae, 128 
Theseus, HMS, 28, 29, 46 


Thirty-eighth Parallel, 8, 15, 45, 79, 220, 

Thirty-ninth Parallel, 15 

Thomas, MajGen Gerald C„ IIS, 120, 
133, 133m, 137, 147, 150, 151, 
158, 158s, 186, 186b, 189. 197, 
W», 207, 208,211, 2V7. 228,231, 

Tierney, Elizabeth L., l64« 

Timberlake, MajGen Edward J„ 136 

Tim, Col Tai Shik, 159 

Tinsley, LtCol James H„ 119», 232, 246» 

Todun-ni, 111 

Toledo (CA), USS, 217 

Tongehon, proposed landing at, 132 

Tongchon-Kumhwa road, 132 

Tonpyong, 176 

Topyong-dong, 52, 55 

Transportation, 56, 46, 89 

Highways, 47 

Human, 181 

Motor, 42, 163, 181 

Motor lift, 42 

Railroads, 47 

Roads, 36 

Trains, 44 

Water lift, 42 

See Logistics, 
Treasure Island, 31 
Trenches, 217, 232, 246, 248 

Marine, 243 

Warfare, 232 
Trompeter, Maj Joseph D„ 117, 118 
Truce, 160 

Talks, 154-156, 161. 163, 171. 180, 
222, 233. 247-249, 261 
Truman, President Harry S„ 5, 37, 99 
Tsuika, 33 

Tucker, LtCol Roy A„ lllw 
Tundong-ni, 171 
Turkey, 24 
Typhus, 53 

Uihung, 30 
Uijongbu, 84 

Uisong, 30. 42, 44, 49, 52, 54 
Uisong-Andong road, 42 
Ulsan, 8 

United Kingdom, 24 

United Nations (UN), 29, 156 
Delegates, 156, 160, 220, 229, 233 
Forces, 24, 35, 60, 80, 126, 154, 161, 

Commander, 257 
Strength figures, 85, 218 
Truce Team, 160 


British Commonwealth 

1st Commonwealth Division, 71, 1 16. 
119, 201. 253 

27th Brigade, 22, 65, 107, 116, 121 

29th Brigade, 22, 116, 121 

Royal Australian Regiment, 116 

Canadian Battalion, 22 

Canadian Light Infantry, Princess 
Patricia, 116 

Gloucestershire Battalion, 1 16 

Independent Commandos, Royal 
Marines, 11, 12 
41 Independent Commando, 3 

New Zealand Field Artillery Bat- 
talion, 22 

Roya! commonwealth naval forces, 15 
Belgian Battalion, 201 
Colombian Battalion, 201 
EUSAK. See Army Units. 
Ethiopian Battalion, 201 
French Battalion, 176 
French Units, 15 
Greek Battalion, 201 
60th Indian Ambulance Group, 85 
Philippine 20th BCT, 201 
Swedish Evacuation Hospital Unit, 85 
Thai units, 15 
Thailand Battalion, 22, 201 
Turkish Brigade, 22, 201 

Van Fleet, LtGen James A., 99, 109, 109«, 
115, 118, 121-123, 123«, 126, 127, 
\21n, 133 142, 154, t6l, l6l!», 
199», 201, 202, 218, 219, 221, 
248, 248«, 249, 251 
Van Kueren, RAdm Alexander H., 166 
Van Ryzin, BrigGen William J., 136» 
Vatcher, William H., Jr., 155n, 22ln 
Vehicles, 142, 175, 186, 244 
DUKWs, 94, 102, 175 
EUSAK, 12 
Enemy, 15 

Jeep, 70, 91, 94, 131. 256 

Trailers, 256 
Ox cart, CCF, 143 
Tank cars, 32 
Tracked, USMC, 62 
Trucks, 105, 119, 131, 175, 181, 215, 

Convoy, 54, 70 
Enemy, 131, 143 
Fake, CCF, 103 
USMC. 30, 147 
U. S, 13, 62 



Vests, armored, 165, 167, 168, 236-238, 

240, 251. See Armor, body. 
Vittori, Cpl Joseph, 193, 193b 
Volcansek. LrCol Max J., Jr., 46 

Wade, Col Sidney S., \\$n, 221, 246n, 

Walker, Maj Carl E., 211 
Walker, Richard L., 36« 
Walker, LtGen Walton H„ 7 
Ward, lstLt Alfred J M 47 
Warehouses, Korean, 15 

Land, 250, 257 

Movement, of, 198, 201, 224, 229 
Position, of, 198, 201, 218, 229, 231 
Static, 247 
Trench, 232 
Warner, lstLt Robert E., 141 
Warships, UN, 123. See Ships. 
Washington, D. C, 7, 8, 28, 156, 161 
Watson. 2dLt John E., 229 
CCF, 35 

Antiaircraft guns. 103 
Artillery, 35, 248 
Automatic weapons, 96 
Booby traps, 74 
Burp guns, 156, 160 
Enemy mines, 70 
Grenades, 35, 96, 125 
Land mines, 70 

Explosions, 44 
Machine gun, 47, 70, 106, 125, 130 

Mines, 74 

Mortars, 35, 74, 81, 83, 125, 130, 
138, 144, 248 

Fire. 92 

120mm, 96 
Rifle, 47 

Recoil less, 125 
Russian 76mm guns, J25 
Satchel charges, 125 
Small arms, 35, 81, 83, 92, 96 

Fire, 74 

Artillery, 44, 149, 151, 191 

Automatic, I 5 1 

Burp. 197 

Grenades, 14 1, 197 

Machine fiuas, 55, 141, 178, 180, 192 

Mortars, 44, 51, 55, 142, 149, 151. 

179, 180, 184, l8 7, 191, 192, 


76mm, 187. 192, 196 
81mm, 55 

Wmto, 192 

120mm, 192 
122mm, 192 
Rifle, 14 1 

Small arms, 31, l4l, 184, 217 

105 mm Howitzer, 227 
155 mm Howitzer, 227 
United States, 69 
Army Artillery, II 
Grenade, 10 
vitzer, 277 

palm, 17, 27, 51. 55, 71, 83, 132, 
142, 171, 183, 195 
Pistol, 168 

Thompson submachine gun, 168 
Air, 217, See Aircraft. 
Antitank £tins, 149 
Artillery, 148, 217 
Bayonet, 149, 150, 168 
Bombs, 142, 143 

Napalm, 27 
Booby traps, 216 
Flame throwers, 217 
Grenades, 83, 91, 92, 149, 150, 

168, 184, 195, 217 
105mm Howitzer, 49, 233 
Machine guns, 135, 179, 216, 217 
Mines, 176, 216. See also Mines. 
Mortars, 148, 206, 217 
4.2" Mortars, 191, 195 
81mm Mortars, 90, 113, 16B, 
Rifles, 115 

75mm ' Recoil less, 148, 195 

90mm, 210 

Tank, 149 
Rockets, 195 
Weather, 25, 33, 39, 69, 131, 233-235, 

Weede, Col Richard G., 149, 192, 196, 

I99n, 204, 232 
Wehmacht, 250 
Weintal, E„ 155» 
Wermuth, LtCol John J., 204, 227 
Welch, LtCol Claude H., 89 
Wertman, LtCol Howard E., 181, 255 
West Point, 72 
West, Col Radford C, 46 
West, LtCol Robley E., 105, 148, 149 
Weyland, MajGen Otto P., 169 
Whaling, BrigGen William J„ 232 
White, lstLt Francis E„ 230 
Williams, BrifiGen Grefion A., 57 
Wilson, TSgt Harold E., 114 

al Joseph L., 149, 150 

Winfrey, IstLt Frank A., 151 
Wire laying, 230 
Whconshi, (BB), USS, 244 
Whistles, NPKA, 192 
Wolfe, LtCol David C, 89 
Wonju, 18, 19, 22, 29, 44, 45, 59, 60, 63, 
66-68, 91 

Highway and rail center at, 26 
Wonju- Hoe ngsong highway, 67 
Wonsan, 143,. 156, 168 

Landing, 63 

UN airfield at, 2? 
Woncong-ni, 187, 192, 204, 213, 233 
Wornham, Col Thomas A., 186, 191, 204 
Worthington, Maj Gordon R., 179 
World War I, 65, 68, 72, 166, 231, 232, 

World War II, 6, 7, 33, 44, 72, 99, 100, 
160, 167, 194, 232, 250, 257, 2fil 

Wound statistics, 166 

Wray, Capt Robert P., 51 70, 70*, 109*, 
111, 113, I15» 

Wyczawski, LtCol Richard W., 14, 46, 
46b, 89 

Yanggu, 128, 133, 135, 141, 146, lfil, 
171, 202 

Road center at, 132 
Yanggu-Inje, 132 
Yangjimat, 91 
Yangyang, 8, 202 
Voju, 26, 66, 72, 79 

Corridor, 58 
YOKE Ridge, 173, 176, 178, 183. See 

also Objective YOKE. 
Yonchon, 201 
Yongchon, 30, 44, 49 
Yongdok, 42, 54, 55 
Yongdok-Andong road, 54 
Yongwol-Pyongchang road, 66 
Yonpo Airfield, 14, 29 
Yu, Maj Dung Nam, 53 
Yudam-ni area, 6